the 
university  of 

Connecticut 
libraries 


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BF     131.H53  1894 
Text-book  in  psychology; 


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Inttritaiioital  €tixxmt\an  Btxm 

EDITED    BY 

WILLIAM  T.  HARRIS,  A.  M.,  LL.  D. 


Volume  XVIII. 


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INTERNATIONAL  EDUCATION  SERIES 


A    TEXT-BOOK 
IN    PSYCHOLOGY 


AN  ATTEMPT  TO  FOUND  THE  SCIENCE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 
ON  EXPERIENCE,  METAPHYSICS,  AND  MATHEMATICS 


BY 

JOHAl^N  FKIEDKICH  HEEBART 


TEAXSLATED    FEOM   THE    OEIGIXAL    GEEMAN 

By  MARGAPwET  K.   SMITH 

TEACHER  IN  THE  STATE  NORMAL  SCHOOL  AT  OSWEGO,  NEW  YORK 


NEW    YORK 

D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY 

1894 


COPTRIGHT,   1891, 

By  D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY. 


EDITOE'S    PEEFACE, 


The  present  work  is  a  translation  o  Johann  Fried- 
ricli  Herbart's  Lelirbuch  zur  Psychologie,  from  the 
second  revised  edition  published  in  1834 — the  date  of 
the  first  edition  being  181G.* 

The  fact  that  Herbart's  philosophical  writings  have 
given  a  great  impulse  to  scientific  study  and  experi- 
ment in  education  is  a  sufiicient  reason  for  including 
this  volume  in  the  International  Education  Series. 

'  He  succeeded  Krug  in  1809,  and  filled  for  a  quar- 
ter of  a  century  afterward  the  chair  long  occupied  by 
the  celebrated  Kant  at  the  University  of  Konigsberg, 
supplementing  his  philosophical  labors  by  founding 
and  directing  a  pedagogical  seminary  (or  normal  school, 
as  we  call  it  in  the  United  States).  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  Herbart's  successor  at  Konigsberg  was 
Karl  Kosenkranz,  also  eminent  in  the  philosophy  of 
pedagogy. 

Although  a  German  philosopher  and  occupying  the 
chair  of  Kant,  Herbart  set  out  from  an  entirely  differ- 
ent basis,  and  produced  a  system  unlike  those  of  the 
great  geniuses  who  have  made  German  philosophy  for  • 
ever  memorable.     So  unlike  them^  indeed,  is  his  sys- 

*  G.  Ilartenstein's  edition,  Hamburg  and  Leipsic,  1886. 


yi  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

tern  tliat  one  has  great  difficulty  to  trace  their  influ- 
ence upon  his  thoughts.J  Strange  to  say,  however,  his 
system  becomes  fruitful  in  the  following  generation, 
in  two  directions :  first,  in  the  line  of  physiological 
psychology,  especially  in  the  attempt  to  reduce  the 
facts  of  the  mind  to  mathematical  statements ;  and, 
secondly,  in  the  line  of  the  philosophy  and  art  of  edu- 
cation. 

A  careful  examination  of  the  pedagogical  writings 
of  the  followers  of  Herbart  shows  that  the  important 
thought  which  has  become  so  fruitful  is  that  of  "  ap- 
perception.'^ This  is  specially  named  or  referred  to  in 
§§  26,  40,  41,  43,  59,  123,  182,  183,  and  in  many  other 
places  in  the  following  work.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  central 
thought  from  which  the  author  proceeds  and  to  which 
he  always  returns.  — *^ 

rfo  explain  this  idea  we  contrast  perception  with  ^ 
apperception.  In  perception  we  have  an  object  pre- 
sented to  our  senses,  but  in  apperception'y^G  identify 
the  object  or  those  features  of  it  which  were  familiar 
to  us  before ;  we  recognize  it ;  we  explain  it ;  we  in- 
terpret the  new  by  our  previous  knowledge,  and  thus 
are  enabled  to  proceed  from  the  known  to  the  un- 
known and  make  new  acquisitions  ;  in  recognizing  the 
object  we  classify  it  under  various  general  classes ;  in 
identifying  it  with  what  we  have  seen  before,  we  note 
also  differences  which  charactei^ze  the  new  object  and 
lead  to  the  definition  of  new  species  or  varietieSj^,'  All 
this  and  much  more  belong  to  the  process  called  ap- 
perception, and  we  see  at  once  that  it  is  the  chief  busi- 
ness of  school  instruction  to  build  up  the  process  of 
apperception.  By  it  we  re-enforce  the  perception  of 
the  present  moment  by  the  aggregate  of  our  own  past 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  .     yii 

sense-perception,  and  by  all  that  we  have  learned  of 
the  experience  of  mankind^ 

Here,  then,  is  the  great  good  that  comes  from  the 
Herbartian  pedagogics ;  it  lifts  up  the  so-called  "  New 
Education "  from  its  first  step  where  it  was  left  by 
Pestalozzi  to  a  second  step  which  retains  all  that  was 
valuable  in  the  new  education,  and  at  the  same  time 
unites  with  it  the  permanent  good  that  remained  in 
the  old  education. 

For  Pestalozzianism  laid  great  stress  on  sense- 
perception  {Anschaiiung)  without  considering  what 
it  is  that  makes  sense-perception  fruitful.  It  is  not 
what  we  see  and  hear  and  feel,  but  what  we  inwardly 
digest  or  assimilate — what  we  apj^erceive — that  really 
adds  to  our  knowledge. 

As  soon  as  instruction  mounts  to  this  second  step 
it  ceases  to  talk  about  the  cultivation  of  outer  percep- 
tion— as  if  mere  acuteness  of  sense  were  in  itself  the 
end  of  instruction — and  turns  its  attention  upon  the 
systematic  building  up  of  the  inner  faculty  of  per- 
ception— the  recognizing  faculty.  It  accordingly  in- 
vestigates carefully  the  course  of  study.  ■  What  shall 
one  study  to  give  him  most  assimilative  power  ?  What 
shall  he  study  to  make  him  at  home  in  the  world  of 
Man  and  the  world  of  Nature,  so  that  he  may  readily 
comprehend  all  that  comes  into  his  experience  ? 

What  items  shall  enter  the  course  of  study,  is  a 
question  that  concerns  vitally  the  practical  success  of 
the  school.  But  it  is  equally  important  to  fix  the 
true  order  of  studies.  The  knowledge  of  appercep- 
tion gives  the  clew  to  the  order  in  which  the  separate 
branches  and  disciplines  should  follow  one  another. 
Those  studies  should  precede  which  furnish  the  data 


yiii  EDITOR'S   PREFACE. 

for  apperceiving  the  elements  of  the  studies  that  fol- 
low. Those  studies  should  come  later  which  presup- 
pose the  results  reached  in  the  earlier  branches.  The 
interesting  experiments  in  "  concentric  instruction," 
wherein  Grimm's  Fairy  Stories  or  Robinson  Crusoe  is 
used  as  the  central  theme  of  interest  and  all  the  other 
studies  of  the  course  are  brought  into  connection  with 
it  for  purposes  of  apperception,  may  be  referred  to 
here  *  as  illustrating  the  mode  and  manner  in  which 
the  idea  is  applied  in  some  parts  of  Germany.  Each 
class  is  to  have  its  Gesiiinungsstoff^  or  subject-matter 
that  interests  all  the  pupils  and  appeals  to  their  imag- 
ination and  feelings.  This  furnishes  a  center  of  inter- 
est for  everything  else — geography,  history,  arithmetic, 
language-study,  etc. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  pedagogy  of  all  lands  will 
take  a  great  step  forward  when  it  leaves  the  crude  first 
stage  of  work  that  is  characterized  by  bald  verbal 
memorizing  or  by  equally  defective  training  of  sense- 
perception  by  object-lessons,  and  takes  its  stand  on 
the  theory  of  apperception.  It  will  then  subordinate 
verbal  memorizing  and  aimless  lessons  in  sense-per- 
ception for  really  nourishing  instruction  and  inward 
growth. 

Herbakt's  Scaffolding  to  the  Doctrine  of 
Apperception. 

'•T^^The  idea  of  apperception  underlies,  as  we  have  said, 
the  entire  treatise  presented  in  this  book.  The  other 
matter  may  be  regarded  as  scaffolding  erected  for 
the  purpose  of  explaining  the  operations  of  this  act. 

*  Sec  Dr.  L.  R.  Klemm's  European  Schools,  pp.  184,  211. 


EDITOR'S  PKEFACE. 


IX 


There  must  be,  it  is  evident,  ideas  stored  up  in  the 
mind  from  former  experience,  and  these  ideas  may  be 
in  the  mind  but  out  of  consciousness  at  any  given 
moment.  This  gives  us  the  theory  of  the  threshold 
of  consciousness  (p.  12),  and  of  the  ideas  that  rise  from 
unconsciousness  above  that  threshold  into  conscious- 
ness when  incited  by  other  ideas  which  are  kindred  to 
them.  The  doctrine  of  complexes  and  hlendings  (p. 
17)  gives  his  notion  of  the  close  association  of  ideas  in 
the  case  of  thing  and  properties,  or  of  the  union  of 
opi^osites.  These  views  he  grounds  in  a  theory  of  the 
unity  and  simplicity  of  the  soul  and  an  interrelation 
between  one  simple  essence  {Wesen)  or  monad  and 
another,  in  which  relation  one  monad  acts  upon  another, 
which  reacts  again  upon  it  (p.  119).  This  action  and 
reaction  is  a  process  of  self-preservation.  The  self- 
preservations,  or  the  results  of  this  reaction,  are  ideas 
or  concepts  ( VorsteUung  means  mental  image,  or  con- 
cept, or  representation,  or  presentation — in  short,  any 
and  all  mental  products  included  under  the  English 
word  idea  in  its  widest  application). 

Then  there  naturally  follows  a  consideration  of 
the  mathematical  relations  of  the  rising  and  sinking 
of  these  ideas  in  consciousness  (pp.  18-22).  Here  the 
doctrine  of  series  is  suggested ;  for,  since  one  idea  calls 
up  another  complicated  or  blended  with  it,  it  must  be 
clear  that  ideas  are  always  to  be  found  as  members  of 
series  or  groups ;  and,  moreover,  the  same  idea  will  like- 
ly enough  form  a  link  in  each  one  of  several  different 
series.  Hence  the  complexity  of  association  becomes 
apparent.  The  interaction  between  mind  and  body 
(p.  34)  is  an  element  to  be  considered  in  the  mathe- 
matical calculations.     The  classification  of  the  mental 


X  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

phenomena  and  the  old  theory  of  faculties  can  not  be 
passed  without  notice,  and  the  author  discusses  it 
throughout  Part  Second  of  the  work. 
I  Herbart's  scaffoldings  of  explanation  may  be  true 
or  false,  but  even  if  false  his  investigation  is  of  perma- 
nent value,  because  it  singles  out  for  its  object  this 
problem  of  apperception.  Thus  few  will  find  what  he 
says  in  regard  to  the  will  (pp.  82,  ff.)  satisfactory,  be- 
cause the  will  is  included  under  desire :  "  The  will  is 
desire,  accompanied  with  the  conviction  that  the  ob- 
ject desired  can  be  attained."  But  the  comparative 
psychology  of  theVill  may  trace  desire  and  will  to  one 
root  in  creatures  below  man.  So,  too,  intellect  and 
feeling  have  one  root  in  the  same  lower  order  of 
creaturesj 

Mathematics  ix  Psychology. 

In  this  Text-book  of  Psychology  Herbart  indicates 
the  mathematical  application  that  may  be  made  in 
psychology,  but  does  not  develop  it  so  fully  as  in  a  sub- 
sequent work  published  in  1824  entitled  "  Psychology 
as  a  Science  founded  for  the  First  Time  on  Experience, 
Metaphysics,  and  Mathematics."  There  are  three  im- 
portant mathematical  formulae  treated  :  (1)  Of  two 
concepts,  no  matter  how  unequal  their  respective 
strength,  the  one  can  never  quite  obscure  or  arrest  the 
other  (i.  e.,  drive  it  out  of  consciousness) ;  but  of  three 
or  more  concepts,  it  may  happen  that  one  is  so  weak 
as  to  be  entirely  arrested  by  the  other  two  (p.  12). 
This  is  proved  in  the  Psychology  as  Science,  by  show- 
ing of  two  concepts  a  and  J,  that  the  amount  of  arrest 

13   expressed  m  the  proportion  a-\-l\  a\\l\      ■   ^  • 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  xi 


So  that  a  has  a  remainder  =a—      ,    ,  »  while  h has  a 

remainder  after  arrest  =  1)  —      .7  =       i    7  5  ^^^  ^^  ^^ 

obvious  that  this  can  become  zero  only  when  a  is  in- 
finite. The  case  in  which  there  are  three  concepts,  a, 
J,  and  c,  give  for  the  remainder  of  c  the  expression 

c  —  7 — A [-^  •>  and  the  conclusion  that  there  may 

be  zero  for  result — where,  for  example,  a  and  h  are 
equal  and  their  sum  is  equal  to  three  times  the  value 
of  c.     (Psychol,  als.  Wiss.,  §§  44,  45.) 

The  second  mathematical  formula  (p.  13,  §  17) 
states  that,  while  the  arrested  portion  of  the  concept 
sinks,  the  sinking  portion  is  at  every  moment  propor- 
tional to  the  part  not  arrested.  Herbart  gives  the  in- 
tegrated expression  for  this,  namely,  a-  =  S  il  —  e'~'    \ 

in  which  S  =  the  aggregate  amount  arrested ;  t  =  the 
time  elapsed  during  the  collision  of  concepts ;  o-  =  the 
arrested  portion  of  all  the  concepts  in  the  time  indi- 
cated by  t\  e  =  the  basis  of  the  natural  system  of 
logarithms.  In  §  74  of  the  Psychology  as  Science  he 
gives  the  differential  equation  from  which  this  is  de- 
rived :  [S—c)  dt  =  cl(T. 

The  third  mathematical  statement  (§§  24-28,  pp. 
18-22)  concerns  the  assistance  which  one  idea  gives 
another  to  recall  it  into  consciousness.  Herbart  gives, 
in  §  25,  both  equations,  the  differential  and  integral. 

To 

The  expression  -^  indicates  how  much  help  n  (a  concept 

in  the  mind  but  unconscious)  received  from  P  (a  con- 
scious concept  or  percept)  to  lift  it  above  the  threshold  of 


xii  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

consciousness,    n  also  aids  P  to  tlie  extent  indicated  by 

p-.     In  this  expression  r  =  tlie  remainder  of  P  that  is 

not  arrested,  and  p  the  remainder  of  n  unarrested.  Now 
the  aid  given  by  P  to  n  is  greater  before  the  union  of 
r  with  p  than  after  some  part  of  the  union  has  taken 
place.  Herbart  lets  the  portion  of  p  which  is  already 
united  with   r  and   brought   into  consciousness  =  w. 

Then  the  differential  equation  =^  . ,  df  =  clw  ex- 

11        p 

presses  the  mode  in  which  the  influence  of  P  on  II  to 
bring  up  a  new  part  of  p  into  consciousness  is  condi- 
tioned by  the  amount  remaining  of  that  part  after 
subtracting  the  part  already  become  conscious  (i.  e., 

p  —  oi  whose  ratio  to  the  total  remainder  of  n  is ). 

P 

(  -rt\ 

The  integral  equation  w  =  p  1 1  —  e  -=—  )  wherein  e  is 


the  base  of  the  natural  system  of  logarithms,  as  Her- 
bart remarks  (Psychology  as  Science,  §  86),  "  shows 
us  in  a  perfectly  clear  manner  how  w  depends  on  p,  r, 
^,  and  n  " ;  or,  in  other  words,  how  the  amount  of  an 
idea  or  concept  that  is  recalled  to  consciousness,  de- 
pends on  {a)  its  total  amount  =  n,  {l)  the  size  of  the 
part  of  it  =  p,  which  can  blend  with  P,  the  assisting 
concept ;  (c)  the  portion  of  P  =  r  which  may  blend 
with  n,  and  on  {d)  the  time  elapsed  during  the  opera- 
tion. 

Vaulting  axd  Taperin-q. 

This  doctrine  of  the  help  given  by  one  concept  to 
another  involves  the  curious  phenomenon  that  Her- 
bart describes  (§  26,  p.  21)  as  vaulting  ( Wblhung) 
and  tapering  {Zuspitzimg).     The  first  effect  of  the 


EDITOR'S  PKEFACE.  xiii 

conscious  idea,  P,  on  the  unconscious  one  allied  to  it, 
n,  is  to  bring  the  latter  into  consciousness  in  general 
without  accurate  discrimination  of  the  part  p  which 
may  blend  with  the  part  r.  But  time  being  given,  the 
other  portions  of  EL  incongruent  with  r  are  arrested 
and  sent  back,  and  thus  the  assisted  idea  is  arched, 
figuratively  speaking,  in  such  a  manner  that  its  part 
p  is  the  top  of  the  arch  and  extends  into  consciousness. 
By  the  further  action  of  separating  p  from  the  re- 
mainder of  n,  the  arch  becomes  more  and  more  pointed, 
until  finally,  only  p  remains  in  consciousness  and  all 
the  rest  of  n  has  been  arrested  and  sunk  from  view. 
The  reader,  therefore,  will  find  it  necessary  to  learn  how 
to  interpret  readily  this  figurative  expression  which 
Herbart  uses,  technically,  into  the  description  of  the 
process  of  apperception — the  first  part  of  the  process 
identifying  wholes  which  do  not  perfectly  blend,  and 
the  later  steps  of  the  process  eliminating  more  and 
more  the  portions  which  can  not  blend,  and  thus 
"  arching  "  the  portion  of  n  which  can  blend,  until  at 
last  there  is  left  only  the  pure  >  which  unites  com- 
pletely with  ?',  and  the  pointing  is  accomplished. 

^Herbart's  Place  ij^  the  History  of  Philosophy. 

1  From  the  point  of  view  of  apperception  the  anom- 
alous position  of  Herbart's  system  in  the  history  of 
philosophy  may  be  explained — or  rather  the  anomaly 
majjde  removed. 

-:       All  modern  philosophy  in  general  has  for  its  prob 
lem  the  exploration  of  the  subjective  factor  in  knowl- 
edge, as  the  Greek  philosophy  sought  to  discover  the 
objective  factor.     Thus  modern  philosophy  has  a  psy- 
chological  tendency,  while   ancient   philosophy  had 


xiv  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

an  ontological  tendency.  The  former  asks  for  the 
subjective  coefficient  in  cognition,  while  the  latter  asks 
the  necessary  conditions  of  true  being.J*^' 

If  apperception  be  divided  into  two  kinds — first, 

that  dependent  on  the  nature  of  the  mind  itself,  and, 
second,  that  dependent  on  the  acquired  experience  of 
the  mind* — then  we  may  say  that  Herbart  under- 
takes to  explore  the  second  field  of  apperception, 
while  Kant  explores  the  first.  Kant  seeks  to  ex- 
plain the  apperception  which  arises  through  the 
logical  structure  of  intelligence  itself — that  is  to 
say,  through  the  forms  of  the  mind.  These  forms  of 
the  mind  are  the  a  priori  intuitions  of  time  and  space 
and  the  categories  of  quantity,  quality,  relation  (includ- 
ing inherence  and  causality),  and  modality.  Fichte, 
Schelling,  Hegel,  and  others  followed  the  lead  of  Kant, 
and  in  the  sequel  there  arose  as  complete  a  view  of  the 
world  from  the  subjective  standpoint  as  there  had  been 
from  the  objective  standpoint  of  the  Greeks.  The 
psychologic  theory  of  the  world  duplicated  the  onto- 
logic  theory,  and  the  insight  of  Hegel  into  this  identity 
of  the  two  world-solutions  is  the  greatest  triumph  in 
the  entire  history  of  human  thought^' 

fllerbart,  rising  in  the  midst  of  the  great  ferment 
of  thought  that  surrounds  the  advent  of  Kantianism, 
seems  to  be  unaffected  by  it.  This,  however,  is  seem- 
ing rather  than  truth.  For  he  deals  with  the  problem 
of  his  time,  and  takes  the  Kantian  question  back  to  the 
place  where  Leibnitz  had  left  it.  *' Nothing  in  the^^ 
intellect  that  was  not  previously  in  sense-perception  "f 
had  been  the  motto  of  the  psychologists  who  like  Locke 

*  See  Lazarus's  Das  Leben  der  Seele. 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 


XV 


explained  all  thinking  as  a  modified  sensation.  But 
Leibnitz  added  the  limitation,  "  Nothing  except  the 
intellect  itself  " — that  is  to  say,  the  structure  of  the 
mind  itself  is  not  and  can  not  be  derived  from  sense- 
perception,  but  must  be  there  before  in  order  to  render 
such  perception  possible,  j  The  knowing  faculty  must 
have  a  structure  or  constitution  of  its  own,  and  this 
structure  must  furnish  an  element  or  factor  in  the 
product  of  knowledge^'  /t/eibnitz  was  the  first  to  use 
the  word  ap2)erception  in  a  philosophic  sense.J  The 
French  verb  apercevoir  signifies  to  perceive^  and 
s^apercevoir  signifies  to  notice  with  attention.  [But 
Leibnitz  distinguishes  perception  from  apperception 
in  the  fact  that  the  latter  is  a  knowledge  that  brings 
with  it  a  reflection  upon  the  interior  nature  of  the 
soul,  and  he  explains  this  reflection  {actes  reflexifs)  as 
having  for  its  object  "  the  ego,  substance,  self-existence 
(monade)^  soul,  and  spirit,  in  a  word  immaterial  things 
and  truths."  Such  knowledge  he  calls  self-conscious- 
ness.* Self -consciousness  ("conscience")  he  explains 
as  that  reflective  act  which  gives  us  a  knowledge  of  the 
Ego  and  of  the  true  being  of  God — in  short,  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  structure  of  mind,  or  Reason.  Here  we 
see  that  Leibnitz  meant  by  apperception  almost  exactly 
what  Kant  describes  as  the  "  transcendental  unity  of 
apperception,"  making  allowance  for  the  acute  and 
protracted  analysis  of  Kant,  who  expands  the  brief 
mention  of  Leibnitz  into  three  extensive  treatises.  I 
'  Herbart  starts  with  the  fertile  suggestion  of  Leib- 

*  See  Principles  of  Xature  and  Grace,  §S  4,  5  ;  also  The 
Monadology,  §  14,  and  especially  §§  29, 30,  in  which  he  explains 
the  object  of  la  conscience. 


xvi  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

nitz  and  moves  oH  in  the  direction  of  the  sensation- 
alists, who  like  Locke  explain  all  by  means  of  sense- 
perception.  But  Herbart  takes  with  him  also  Leibnitz's 
idea  of  the  soul  as  a  monad ;  omitting,  however,  the 
important  attribute  of  self-activity,  which  endows 
Leibnitz's  monad  ("  natural  changes  that  proceed  from 
an  internal  principle,"  "  which  change  is  perception  " 
— Monadology,  §§  11,  12).  In  the  i^lace  of  this  self- 
activity  Herbart  places  a  sort  of  mechanical/ action 
and  reaction  {Druch  and  Gcgendruch)  in  direct  oppo- 
sition to  the  doctrine  of  Leibnitz  (Monadology,  §  7), 
who  denies  the  possibility  of  mechanical  interaction 
between  independent  beingsj 

In  the  history  of  philosophy  all  systems  are  profit- 
able lessons  in  the  comprehension  of  human  thought. 
If  true  systems,  they  help  us  to  see  the  positive  road ; 
if  false,  they  stand  as  guide-posts  which  warn  the 
traveler  not  to  take  the  by-j^aths  leading  ad  absurdum. 
Herbart's  system  may  undertake  to  explain  too  much 
by  the  ideas  of  mechanical  action  and  reaction ;  or 
perhaps,  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  truly  said  that 
he  never  intended  his  "  pressure,  counter-pressure,  and 
self-preservation  "  to  be  taken  in  a  mechanical  sense. 
But  whatever  he  has  done  is  worthy  of  being  faith- 
fully studied  and  mastered,  if  for  no  other  reason  than 
for  the  discipline  that  he  gives  us  in  the  habit  of  re- 
ferring all  mental  phenomena  to  the  act  of  appercep- 
tion^ for  their  explanation. 

\  In  conclusion,  I  present  the  analysis  of  Steinthal 
(one  of  the  ablest  of  the  thinkers  who  have  followed 
Herbart),  in  which  he  gives  the  essential  elements  of 
the  act  of  apperception  in  its  four  stages  : 

1.  Identification — as  in  the  case  where  we  recog- 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  xvii 

nize  the  person  before  us  to  be  tlie  same  we  have 
known. 

2.  Classification — as  in  the  case  where  we  recog- 
nize the  object  before  us  to  be  an  individual  of  a  class 
well  known  to  us. 

3.  Harmonizing  or  reconciling  apperception — 
wherever  we  unite  two  opposed  or  incongruent  coji- 
cepts  (as,  for  example,  the  concept  of  something  that 
has  existed  and  served  our  purposes  with  the  concept 
of  the  same  thing  as  changed  and  destroyed — a  friend 
Avho  has  died ;  a  house  that  has  been  burned,  etc.). 

4.  Creative  or  formative  apperception  —  which 
makes  combinations,  poetic  or  scientific — inductive  or 
deductive  discoveries,  solutions  of  enigmas,  illusions 
and  hallucinations.  In  this  sort  of  apperception  the 
mind  creates  the  apperceiving  factor. 

The  old  doctrine  of  "  association  of  ideas,"  which, 
since  the  time  of  Locke,  has  furnished  one  of  the 
most  dismal  chapters  in  "mental  philosophy,"  so- 
called,  is  to  be  supplanted  by  this  new  doctrine  of  ap- 
perception, j 

n^t  has  Heen  asked.  Why  employ  this  bizarre  techni- 
cal term  for  what  we  can  express  in  terms  already  fa- 
miliar to  us  ?  The  answer  is,  that  the  word  appercep- 
tion has  no  synonym  already  become  familiar  to  us. 
It  is  a  term  for  a  new  idea — a  synthesis  of  many  other 
ideas  variously  expressed  already  by  such  words  as  as- 
similate, associate,  identify,  recognize,  explain,  inter- 
pret, comprehend,  classify,  subsume,  conception,  elabo- 
ration, thought,  etcj 

'  The  association  of  ideas  looks  merely  to  their  con- 
nection, which  may  be  a  matter  of  accident.  But  ap- 
perception looks   to   the   modification  of   ideas    one 


xviii  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

through  the  other,  and  hence  leads  to  the  process  of 
formation  of  ideas,  which  is  the  central  point  of  in- 
terest in  psychology  and  educationj 

I  append  a  note  giving  some  information  as  to  the 
bibliography  of  this  subject. 

W.  T.  Harris. 

Washington,  D.  C,  August,  1891. 


BIBLIOGRAPnY. 

The  student  who  desires  to  pursue  this  subject  further  may 
be  referred  to  the  following  lists  of  books  selected  out  of  the 
immense  literature  that  has  grown  up  round  the  theme  : 

I.  TJie  Fhilosophers  : 

M.  W.  Drobisch  :  Empirische  Psychologic  nachnaturwissen- 
schaftlicher  Methode.  [Drobisch  has  labored  with  most  success 
on  the  mathematical  phase  of  Herbart's  system.] 

M.  Lazarus  :  Das  Leben  der  Seele,  etc. 

H.  Steinthal  :  Einleitung  in  die  Psychologic  und  Sprach- 
wissenschaft.  [Messrs.  Lazarus  and  Steinthal  have  applied  Her- 
bart's ideas  of  apperception  with  distinguished  success  in  the 
province  of  comparative  philology,  and  their  grasp  of  this  im- 
portant thought  seems  to  me  a  great  advance  in  philosophic 
clearness  over  the  exposition  made  by  Herbart  himself.] 

W.  WuNDT :  Grundziige  der  Physiologischen  Psychologic. 
[For  independent  criticism  of  Herbart's  doctrines  and  an  able 
restatement  of  doctrines  approved  by  him.] 

T.  Fechner  :  Revision  der  Hauptpunkte  der  Psychophysik. 
[This  contains  Fechner's  review  of  the  existing  status  of  scien- 
tific investigation  into  the  quantitative  measurement  of  the 
intensity  of  sensations  by  reference  to  the  force  of  different 
stimuli,  and  was  written  on  the  occasion  of  G.  E.  Miiller's 
critique  of  his  earlier  works,] 
IL   Works  on  Education  : 

Tn.  Waitz  :  Allgemeine  Piidagogik  (1852).  [Republished 
and  enlarged  by  Dr.  0.  Willman  in  1875.] 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  xix 

K.  Y.  Stoy  ;  in  Jena :  Encyclopadie  der  Padagogik  (1861), 
and  in  the  "  Allgemeine  Schulzeitung." 

TuiSKO  ZiLLER,  in  Leipzig  :  Grundlegung  der  Padagogik 
(1865).  "  Vorlesungen  Uber  allgemeine  Padagogik "  (1876), 
"  Leipziger  Seminarbuch,"  and  "  Jahrbiicher  des  Vereins  fiir 
wissenschaftliche  Padagogik." 

H.  Kerx,  in  Berlin :  Grundriss  der  Padagogik  (1873). 

W.  Rein,  in  Jena :  Padagogische  Studien  (1889-'90). 

W.  Reix,  a.  Pickel,  uxd  E.  Scheller  :  Theorie  und  Praxis 
des  Volksschulunterrichts  uach  Herbartischen  Grundsatzen.  8 
vols.  (1888). 

G.  A.  Lixdxer,  in  Prag  :  Lehrbuch  der  empirischen  Psy- 
chologic (English  translation  by  Charles  de  Garmo,  1889),  und 
Grundriss  der  Padagogik  als  Wissenschaft  (1889). 

Karl  Laxge  :  Ueber  Apperception  (1887)., 

0.  WiLLMAXN  :  Didaktik  als  Bildungslehre*  (1882  und  1888). 

Ed.  Wiessxer  :  Herbart's  Padagogik,  dargestellt  in  ihrer 
Entwicklung  und  Anwendung  (1885). 

G.  Wiget  :  Die  formalen  Stufen  des  Unterrichts ;  Einfiih- 
rung  in  das  Studium  der  Herbart-Zillerschen  Padagogik  (1886). 

Karl  Richter  :  Die  Herbart-Zillerschen  formalen  Stufen 
(1888). 

T.  G.  RooPER :  Apperception,  or  the  Essential  Mental  Op- 
eration in  the  Act  of  Learning.  [The  original  title  to  this  essay 
was  A  Pot  of  Green  Feathers].  Published  by  C.  W.  Bardeen, 
Syracuse,  N.  Y. 


mTRODUCTION   BY  THE   TRANSLATOR. 

At  the  time  of  Herbart's  death,  August  11,  1811, 
it  was  said  of  him  that  he  was  a  man  to  be  appreciated 
only  after  centuries  had  passed  away.  The  world  has 
moved  more  rapidly  than  was  anticipated,  so  that,  after 
a  lapse  of  barely  fifty  years,  a  very  general  apprecia- 
tion of  Herbart's  psychological  and  pedagogical  work 
prevails.  Since  the  time  of  Locke  no  man  has  done 
so  much  for  psychology. 

In  America,  it  is  true,  the  number  of  educators 
who  have  any  useful  knowledge  concerning  the  Her- 
bartian  system  is  somewhat  limited ;  yet  in  the  cur- 
rent philosophical  and  educational  literature  may  be 
found  occasionally  a  brief  mention,  which  is  probably 
an  indication  of  the  broader  study  that  is  yet  to  follow. 

The  design  of  the  present  translation  is  not  so 
much  to  furnish  information  as  to  awaken  an  interest 
which  may  develop  a  desire  for  a  clearer  insight  into 
principles  that  seem  to  form  the  best  foundation  that 
has  yet  been  discovered  for  a  rational  system  of  sci- 
entific pedagogy.  .^^ 

Herbart  believed  that  a  knowledge  of  psychology   ' 
is  of  the  first  importance  to  the  teacher.     To  igno- 
rance of  the  subject  he  attributed  the  many  errors  and 
gaps  existing  in  pedagogical  knowledge  and  practice. 
He  opposed  the  theory  that  the  soul  is  composed  of 


xxii     I^'THODUCTION  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR. 

faculties  which  are  born  with  the  cliild  and  which 
constitute  a  great  part  of  its  mental  organization. 
This,  as  well  as  the  theory  of  the  higher  and  lower 
inherent  capabilities  of  the  soul,  he  regarded  as  be- 
longing to  that  which  might  be  termed  psychological 
myth  rather  than  to  scientific  psychology.  He  held 
\  that  the  doctrine  of  the  faculties  is  proved  through 
metaph3'sics  to  be  untenable.  He  argued  that  the  fun- 
damental principle  upon  which  a  possibility  for  psy- 
chological investigation  rests  lies  in  the  fact  that  at 
the  bottom  of  all  psychological  phenomena  is  a  real  ex- 
istence, the  soul,  which  he  regarded  as  an  absolutely 
simple  existence,  without  any  inherent  powers  or  tal- 
ents. 

He  believed  representations  or  concepts  *  to  be  the 
elements  of  the  united  psychical  life,  and  regarded 
them  as  the  soul's  acts  of  self-preservation.  Owing  to 
the  simplicity  or  singleness  of  the  soul,  its  separate 
acts  of  self-preservation  must  be  single  as  well.  All 
the  remaining  facts  or  manifestations  of  consciousness 
he  regarded  as  the  results  of  the  combinations  of  con- 
cepts, and  of  their  alternate  action  and  reaction  upon 
one  another. 

He  believed  that  the  effective  forces  of  the  mental 

life  consist,  not  in  fictitious  faculties,  but  in  concepts 

in  the  soul. 

r  To  concepts,  in  their  action  and  interaction  upon 

I  /      one  another,  he   ascribed   all   the  capacities  usually 

(^      attributed  of  faculties.     Concepts  working  in  combi- 

*  The  term  concept  as  employed  here  does  not,  as  is  usual 
with  the  EngUsh  metaphysicians,  indicate  the  general  notion, 
but  the  individual  presentation  formed  through  the  process  of 
perception — e.  g.,  the  concept  of  a  house,  a  tree,  etc. 


INTRODUCTION  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR,     xxiii 

nation  with,  and  in  opposition  to  one  another  furnish 
explanations  of  the  jDhenomena  of  thinking,  feehng, 
desiring,  willing,  etc.  The  general  principles  under- 
lying the  above-mentioned  operations  may  be  illus- 
trated or  indicated  by  mathematical  calculations. 

Upon  the  theory  of  the  existence  of  concepts  in 
the  soul,  which  are  susceptible  of  a  variety  of  combi- 
nations, Herbart's  psychology  treats  first  of  presenta- 
'  tions  or  sensations  —  e.  g.  of  size,  form,  color,  etc. ; 
and,  secondly,  of  concepts  formed  through  the  combi- 
nations of  these  sensations — e.  g.,  concepts  of  a  house, 
a  tree,  a  man,  etc.  This  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  general  notion — house,  tree,  man,  etc. 

In  connection  with  the  above  may  be  considered 
psychical  states — e.  g.,  thought,  feeling,  desire,  inter- 
est, etc. — which  are  the  results  of  the  action  and  inter- 
action of  concepts,  and  which  are  determined  by  laws 
that  may  be  indicated  through  mathematical  formulae. 

The  unity  of  the  soul  is  the  easily  comprehensible 
metaphysical  explanation  of  the  tendency  of  concepts, 
in  meeting  together,  to  resist  or  arrest  one  another, 
and,  so  far  as  they  are  not  opposed  to  one  another,  to 
combine  into  a  whole. 

This  resistance  or  arrest  implies  neither  distinction 
from  nor  change  in  the  concept.  The  effect  is  merely 
that  the  weaker  presentation,  or  concept,  is  partially 
or  totally  removed  out  of  consciousness,  while  the 
stronger  is  raised  into  clearness.  The  word  con- 
sciousness here  indicates  the  totality  of  all  simultane- 
ous concepts.  As  soon  as  the  resistance  weakens,  or, 
through  an  opposing  force,  becomes  ineffective,  the 
removed  concept  has  a  tendency  within  itself  to  re- 
turn into  consciousness. 


xxiv    INTRODUCTION  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR. 

Concepts  are  said  to  be  in  equilibrium  wbcn  there 
occurs  among  them  a  sufficiency  of  force  to  place  them 
equally  in  a  condition  of  arrest.  This  condition  indi- 
cates a  very  gradual  change  from  clearness  to  obscurity. 
The  change  in  the  grade  of  obscurity  to  which  it  is 
subject  is  called  the  movement  of  the  concept. 

In  a  so-called  "  statics  and  mechanics  "  of  the  mind, 
Herbart  has  indicated  the  equilibrium  and  movement 
of  concepts  by  mathematical  formulae,  with  a  view  to 
illustrating  the  simplest  psychical  laws  with  scientific 
exactness. 

The  result  of  the  arrest  of  concepts  must  be  subject 
to  modifications  on  account  of  the  different  degrees  of 
strength  possessed  by  concepts,  as  well  as  of  their  dif- 
ferent grades  of  resistance,  together  with  the  conse- 
quent differences  in  their  combinations. 

By  computation,  Herbart  reached  the  conclusion 
that,  in  the  case  of  two  concepts,  one  can  never  become 
entirely  obscured  by  the  other,  but  in  the  case  of  three 
or  four,  etc.,  one  may  become  obscured  very  easily,  and 
its  constant  effort  to  recover  itself  being  unobserved,  it 
may  be  as  ineffective  as  if  it  were  not  present. 

Concepts  are  said  to  combine  in  two  ways :  those 
which  are  not  opposed  to  one  another,  so  far  as  they 
are  unrestricted,  unite  in  what  is  called  a  complex; 
while  those  which  are  opposed  become  blended  or 
fused  together,  so  far  as  they  do  not  suffer  from  recip- 
rocal an-est. 

Tlirough  this  tendency  to  blend,  concepts  entering 
consciousness  in  succession  become  connected,  and  thus 
longer  or  shorter  concept  series  are  formed.  The  law 
according  to  which  a  concept  released  from  arrest,  as 
it  returns  to  consciousness,  strives  to  bring  with  it 


INTRODUCTION  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR,      xxv 

those  with  which  it  is  connected,  is  of  special  impor- 
tance. 

The  theory  of  the  mechanism  of  memory  is  largely 
based  upon  the  construction  of  the  concept  series. 

Though  Herbart  did  so  much  for  the  development 
of  psychology,  he  was  convinced  that  all  possible  in- 
vestigations are  quite  insufficient  to  furnish  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  and  seems  to  have  believed 
that  psychology  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  science  on 
condition  that  a  large  part  of  it  be  "  relegated  to  the 
unknown."  He  also  held  that  psychology  must  re- 
main' incomplete  and  inadequate  so  long  as  it  considers 
merely  the  j3sychical  phenomena  of  the  individual  man. 
He  believed  that  society  wherever  organized  is  subject 
to  psychical  laws  peculiar  to  itself.  In  society  the  in- 
dividual in  his  relations  to  the  whole  corresponds  to 
the  concept  in  its  relation  to  the  psychical  organism  of 
which  it  is  a  member.  Upon  this  assumption  he  for- 
mulated a  statics  and  mechanics  of  the  state  in  a  way 
corresponding  to  the  statics  and  mechanics  of  the  men- 
tal life. 

To  the  mere  reader  of  psychology,  the  Herbartian 
theories  may  at  first  appear  peculiar,  and  in  the  minds 
of  some  may  verge  upon  the  absurd ;  but  the  careful 
student  will  probably  find  no  psychological  theories 
that  are  so  well  calculated  to  stand  the  test  of  actual 
experience. 

The  Heebartia:n^  Pedagogy. 

Herbart  regarded  concepts  in  their  action  and  re- 
action upon  one  another  as  the  source  of  the  psychi- 
cal life,  and  believed  that,  without  regular  systematic 
instruction,  mental  activity  must  be  irregular  and  in- 


xxvi     INTRODUCTION  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR. 

definite,  while  the  results  are  more  or  less  worthless. 
The  mental  processes,  the  laws  of  which  the  teacher 
should  thoroughly  understand,  are  :  perception,  rejDro- 
duction,  and  apperception.  A  rule  upon  these  pro- 
cesses has  been  given,  which  enjoins  clear  perception, 
exact  reproduction,  and  thorough  ajiperceiDtion. 

In  this  connection  these  processes  are  exercised  in 
the  four  steps  of  instruction,  viz.  : 

1.  Clearness. 

2.  Comparison  (association). 

3.  System. 

4.  Philosophical  method  or  application. 

According  to  Herbart,  the  aim  of  education  is  ethi- 
cal— i.  e.,  the  moral  development  of  the  individual. 
Everything  lower  than  this  is  valueless  except  as  it 
serves  to  secure  this  end. 

This  end  is  to  be  secured  through  discipline,  train- 
ing, and  instruction. 

Discipline  has  a  twofold  task :  First,  negative ;  the 
suppression  of  the  natural  imj^atience  of  restraint  and 
wildness  of  the  child.  Second,  positive ;  the  care  of 
the  soul  in  its  intellectual,  moral,  and  spiritual  devel- 
opment. 

Training  consists  in  directing  the  attention  to  de- 
sirable objects  of  study,  and  in  fixing  the  results  of 
that  which  is  learned. 

Instruction  does  not  merely  imply  putting  the 
child  in  j^ossession  of  technical  skill,  but  it  rather  im- 
plies the  training  of  the  child  in  the  observation  of 
relations,  and  must  result  in  power  to  recognize  under- 
lying principles,  and  to  appreciate  aesthetic  and  eth- 
ical relations. 

One  of  the  tasks  of  instruction  is  to  awaken  in  the 


INTRODUCTION  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR,    xxvii 

child  a  many-sided  interest  which  will  fit  the  future 
man  to  make  himself  at  home  in  any  society  or  in  any 
country,  and  will  enable  him  to  adapt  himself  to  any 
change  of  circumstances,  as  well  as  make  him  ready 
in  resources  that  will  be  equal  to  any  emergency. 
This  many-sided  interest  may  be  secured  through  the 
development  of  two  groups  of  interests  :  First,  the  in- 
terests of  knowledge,  viz.,  empirical,  speculative,  and 
gBsthetic  interests;  second,  the  interests  of  participa- 
tion, viz.,  sympathetic,  social,  and  religious  interests. 

The  development  of  the  interests  of  the  first  group, 
depends  largely  upon  the  child's  experience  in  connec- 
tion with  material  objects,  or  with  the  world  around 
him,  while  the  development  of  the  interests  of  the  sec- 
ond group  depends  upon  the  child's  experience  in 
connection  with  his  fellow-creatures. 

The  first  condition  of  instruction  in  any  subject  is 
attention,  which  is  almost  synonymous  with  interest. 
Attention  is  of  two  kinds,  involuntary  and  voluntary. 
Involuntary  attention  is  classified  into  primitive  and 
apperceiving  attention. 

The  course  of  instruction  is  either  analytic  or  syn- 
thetic. 

Here  we  shall  leave  the  description  of  Herbart 
and  his  work,  with  the  hope  that  the  teachers  of  Amer- 
ica may  have  an  early  opportunity  of  availing  them- 
selves of  a  system  at  once  clear,  simple,  and  rational, 
and  in  every  respect  calculated  to  supply  our  lack  in 
the  direction  of  philosophical  pedagogy. 

To  those  who  may  be  still  uncertain  regarding  a 
system  of  which  so  little  is  as  yet  known,  Herbart 's 
declaration  of  his  fundamental  principle  may  be  pre- 
sented :   "  I  stand,  not  upon  the  single  point  of  the 


xxviii    INTRODUCTION  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR. 

Ego,  but  upon  a  foundation  as  broad  as  universal  ex- 
perience." 

In  closing,  the  translator  takes  this  opportunity  to 
acknowledge  her  indebtedness  to  Dr.  William  T.  Har- 
ris. But  for  his  kindly  patience  the  publication  of 
the  book  must  have  been  deferred  to  a  much  later 
date. 

Also  thanks  are  due  to  Prof.  Otto  H.  L.  Schwetzky, 
who  always  readily  gave  such  aid  as  could  only  be  ren- 
dered by  one  possessing  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
German  language  and  thought. 

Makgaeet  K.  Smith. 

OsTVEGO,  New  York,  Apj-ll  3,  1891. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Editor's  Preface v 

Introduction  by  the  Translator xxi 

Introduction  by  the  Author 1 

PART   FIRST. 

CHAPTER  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES. 

I. — Condition  of  Concepts  when  they  act  as  Forces  9 
II. — Equilibrium  and  Movement  of  Concepts         .        .11 

III. — Complications  and  Blendinqs 16 

IV. — Concepts  as  the  Source  of  Mental  States    .        .  26 
V. — The  Co-operation  of  Several  Masses  of  Concepts 

OF  Unequal  Strength 30 

VI. — A  Glance  over  the  Connection  between  Body  and 

Soul 33 


PART   SECOND. 

EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

FIRST   division. — PSYCHOLOGICAL   PHENOMENA  ACCORDING   TO   THE 

HYPOTHESIS    OF    MENTAL   FACULTIES. 

I. — A  Survey  of  the  Assumed  Mental  Faculties       .  36 
II. — The   Boundary-Line    between    the    Lower    and 

Higher  Faculties 45 

III. — Faculty  of  Representation 53 

IV. — The  Faculty  of  Feeling 74 


XXX 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGK 

V. — TuE  Faculty  of  Desire 83 

VL — The  Co-operatiox  and  Cultivation  of  the  Mental 

Faculties 93 

second  division. — mental  conditions, 

I. — The  General  Variability  of  Conditions        .        .    97 

II. — Natural  Talents 99 

HI. —  External  Influences 104 

1\'. — Anomalous  Conditions 108 

PART   THIRD. 

BA  TIONAL  PSYCHOL 0 G  Y. 

section    first. — THEOREMS    FROM    METAPHYSICS   AND    NATURAL 

PHILOSOPHY. 

I. — The  Soul  and  Matter 119 

II.— The  Vital  Forces 133 

111.— The  Connection  between  Soul  and  Body       .        .  135 

section  second — explanations  of  phenomena. 

I. — Concepts  of  Space  and  Time 139 

II. — The  Development  of  Ideas 140 

III. — Our  Comprehension  of  Things  and  of  Ourselves  150 
IV.— The   Ungoverned   Play  of  the  Psychical  Mech- 
anism      163 

V. — Self-Control  and  especially  Duty  as  a  Psychical 

Phenomenon 178 

VI.— Psychological  Observations  upon  the  Destiny  of 

Man 190 


ANALYSIS  'OF  CONTENTS. 


IXTRODUCTION  BY  THE  AUTHOR  (p.  1).— §  1.  Ma- 
terial and  work  of  psychology.  §  2.  Concepts  in  regard  to  the 
senses.  Memory  and  imagination.  Manifestations  of  intelli- 
gence and  rationality.  Opinions  in  regard  to  faculties.  §  3. 
Self-observation.  {Note. — In  psychology  the  general  ideas  are 
clearest ;  the  particular  most  obscure.)  g  4.  Empirical  physics 
has  discovered  certain  laws.  Psychology  can  not  experiment 
with  men.  §  5.  Comparison  of  representation,  feeling,  and  desire 
with  the  psychological  states  of  vegetation,  sensibility,  and  irri- 
tability respectively.  §  6.  Man  an  aggregate  of  contradictions. 
All  mental  life  a  constant  change.  §  7.  Solution  of  many  of 
the  problems  of  mental  life  to  be  found  in  metaphysics  and 
higher  mathematics.  §  8.  The  old  hj^othesis  of  mental  facul- 
ties is  a  tradition  reflecting  the  total  impression  of  psychologi- 
cal observation,  hence  can  not  be  dispensed  with.  {Note  1. — 
The  present  treatise  divided  into — Part  I.  Fundamental  Princi- 
ples ;  Part  II.  Empirical  Psychology ;  Part  III.  Rational  Psy- 
chology. Note  2. — In  modern  times,  psychology  has  rather  gone 
backward  than  forward.  Psychology  can  not  deal  with  the 
beautiful.) 

PART  FIRST.— Chapter  I.— The  Condition  of  Concepts 
when  they  act  as  Forces  (p.  9).  §  10.  Resistance  between  con- 
cepts. Resistance  an  expression  of  force.  §  11.  Do  concepts 
destroy  one  another,  or  do  they  remain  unchanged  ?  §  12.  A 
concept  which  has  in  part  become  transformed  into  an  effort 
must  not  be  regarded  as  a  severed  portion  of  the  whole  concept. 

Chapter  II.  —  Equilibrium  and  Movement  of  Concepts 
3 


xxxii  ANALYSIS  OF   CONTEXTS. 

(p.  11).  ^  13.  Equilibrium  depends  upon  a  sufficiency  of  oppo- 
sition between  concepts,  g  14.  The  sum  of  the  resistances  and 
the  ratio  of  their  limitations  are  considered  in  investigations 
into  the  statics  of  the  mind.  §  15.  The  sura  and  ratio  of  the 
mutual  limitation  depend  upon  the  strength  of  the  individual 
concepts.  §  16.  Two  concepts  never  entirely  obscure  each  other. 
''  Threshold  of  Consciousness."  {Note. — A  distinction  between 
"  A  concept  is  in  consciousness  "  and  "  1  am  conscious  of  my 
concepts."  §  17.  Law  underlying  the  movement  of  concepts. 
§  18.  Effect  of  a  new  concept  coming  upon  concept  near  equi- 
librium. §  19.  "  The  mechanical  threshold."  §  20.  Extension 
of  time  during  which  concepts  linger  on  the  mechanical  thresh- 
old. §  31.  Cause  of  changes  in  the  laws  of  reciprocal  move- 
ment.    {Note. — Concepts  which  rise  simultaneously.) 

Chapter  IIL— Complications  and  Blendings  (p.  16).  §  22. 
Why  opposed  concepts  resist  one  another.  {Note. — Partially 
complete  complexes.)  g  23.  An  aggregate  of  force  furnished  by 
the  complication  or  blending  of  several  concepts.  §  24.  Prob- 
lem :  The  encounter  between  two  concepts  and  the  blending  of 
the  remainders.  §  25.  Principles  upon  which  the  blending  of 
concepts  is  based.  §  26.  Mediate  and  immediate  reproduction. 
§  27.  Mediate  reproduction.  §  28.  Application  of  the  theories 
of  mediate  and  immediate  reproduction.  §  29.  Reproduction, 
or  memory.  Blendings  existing  between  concepts  in  a  series. 
§  30.  Several  series  may  cross  one  another.  The  same  number 
may  be  held  as  a  common  point  of  intersection  for  many  hun- 
dred series.  §  31.  Dependence  of  the  foregoing  upon  the  pre- 
supposed difference  in  the  remainders.  §  32.  The  blending  of 
free-rising  concepts.  The  conflict  between  things  as  we  perceive 
them  and  as  we  think  them. 

Chapter  IV. — Concepts  as  the  Source  of  Mental  States  (p. 
26).  §  33.  Objections  against  mathematical  psychology.  The 
soul  as  mind.  The  emotional  nature.  §  34.  -liEsthetic  judg- 
ment. {Note. — The  series  of  true  relations  may  be  presented 
here.  Conditions  under  which  disharmony  and  harmony  may 
arise.)  §  35.  A  principle  of  contrast  to  be  found  in  the  com- 
plexes. §  36.  The  source  of  unpleasant  feeling  and  of  desire. 
§  37.  The  source  of  pleasant  feeling,  i^  38,  The  sources  of  feel- 
ings and  desires  always  in  particular  concepts. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CONTENTS.  xxxiii 

Chapter  V. — The  Co-operation  of  Several  Masses  of  Concepts 
of  Cnequal  Strength  (p.  30).  g  39.  The  effect  of  a  new  act  of 
perception  upon  combinations  of  concepts.  §  40.  Inner  percep- 
tion analogous  to  the  outer.  §  41.  Inner  perception  always  ac- 
tive. ^  42.  Difference  between  concepts  in  an  active  and  in  an 
inactive  state.  §  43.  Conditions  under  which  inner  perception 
is  interrupted.  The  inner  perception  seldom  rises  to  its  second 
power. 

Chapter  VI. — A  Glance  over  the  Connection  between  the 
Body  and  Soul  (p.  32).  ^5  44.  Hitherto  no  question  concerning 
the  origin  of  concepts.  §  45.  Time  required  for  each  act  of 
perception.  Limit  to  the  strength  of  a  concept.  §  46.  Every 
human  concept  consists  of  infinitely  small  elementary  apprehen- 
sion. §  47.  The  largest  supply  of  sense-concepts  generated  in 
early  childhood.  The  susceptibility  of  the  senses  never  entirely 
extinguished,  g  48.  The  foregoing  relates  to  concepts  of  the 
same  kind,  g  49.  Influence  of  the  body  upon  psychical  mani- 
festations shown  in  three  ways,  j:^  50.  Conditions  under  which 
physiological  pressure  arises.  This  pressure  often  merely  a 
retarding  force.  Oftener  an  arresting  force.  §  51.  Conditions 
of  physiological  reaction,  g  52.  Origin  of  the  co-operation  of 
soul  and  body. 

PART  SECOND.— Empirical  Psychology.— i^'/rs^  Divis- 
ion: Psychological  Phenomena  according  to  the  Hypothesis  0} 
3Iental  Faculties. 

Chapter  I. — A  Survey  of  the  xVssumed  Mental  Faculties  (p. 
36).  §  53.  Explanation  of  fundamental  facts  from  the  forego- 
ing. A  separation  of  that  which  does  not  admit  of  union  im- 
plied in  the  effort  to  bring  together  a  manifold.  An  original 
and  essential  differentiation  of  the  human  mind  considered  in 
the  first  division  of  the  second  part  of  this  manuah  §  54.  The 
teachers  of  psychology  present  the  social,  the  educated  man.  All 
higher  mental  activity  potentially  present  in  children  and  sav- 
ages. A  limited  condition  of  man  to  be  described.  §  55.  The 
division  into  higher  and  lower  faculties,  g  56.  The  extremes 
of  the  lowest  and  highest  mental  faculties ;  sensuousness  and 
reason.  §  57.  In  the  faculty  of  representation,  we  find  imagi- 
nation and  memory ;  in  reason,  imagination  and  judgment. 
-(Esthetic  and  moral  feelinirs  and  the  emotions  in  the  facultv  of 


xxxiv  ANALYSIS  OF   CONTENTS. 

feeling.  In  desire  on  the  one  side,  willing:  on  the  other,  pas- 
sion. §  58.  (a.)  These  classifications  were  empirical  groupings. 
The  emotions  not  to  be  classified  with  the  feelings.  Morals 
and  aesthetics  are  felt,  cognized,  and  desired,  (b.)  The  classifi- 
cations made  merely  preliminary.  The  emotions  not  to  be 
classified  with  the  passions,  (c.)  The  classified  mental  faculties 
exist  side  by  side  and  in  relation  to  one  another.  The  work  of 
memory,  fantasy  (or  imagination),  and  desire  upon  the  same 
material.  The  causal  relation  of  the  different  faculties  to  one 
another.  §  59.  The  first  treatment  of  sensuous  presentations. 
The  lower  sensuous  phase  of  mental  life  to  be  met  most  fre- 
quently. The  true  Ego  appears  to  us  by  a  so-called  process  of 
apperception.  Signification  of  apperception.  The  relation  of 
a  moral  volition  to  free  will.  Assumption  of  transcendental 
freedom.  Reason  quite  different  from  sensuousness.  Reason 
and  sensuousness  the  beginning  points  of  two  series.  Idea  of 
the  Ego  and  of  transcendental  freedom  contradictory.  A  fac- 
ulty of  reason  not  consistent  with  truth.  {Note. — The  four 
principal  kinds  of  mental  diseases.  The  notions  of  mental 
soundness.) 

Chapter  II. — The  Boundary-line  between  the  Higher  and 
Lower  Faculties  (p.  45).  §  60.  The  line  of  demarkation  in  the 
representative  faculties  can  not  be  drawn  with  precision.  M?,- 
thetic  faculty  is  wanting  in  uncivilized  men.  §  61.  If  a  lower 
faculty  be  attributed  to  brutes,  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  defective, 
arrested,  or  suppressed.  We  are  not  authorized  regarding  the 
human  mind  as  an  aggregate  of  higher  and  lower  faculties. 
The  educated  man  has  power  to  apportion  his  attention  to 
diiferent  acts.  §  63.  Wolff  places  voluntary  attention  between 
the  higher  and  lower  faculties  of  representation.  Attention 
makes  a  notion  distinct.  Understanding  is  the  faculty  by 
which  our  thoughts  are  united,  etc.  §  63.  All  combination  is  a 
spontaneous  act  of  the  power  of  presentation.  Kant's  service 
to  speculative  philosophy.  The  combination  of  a  manifold  is 
the  immediate  result  of  unity  in  the  soul.  When  thinking  in- 
tensely, we  feel  ourselves  active.  Activity  neither  an  attribute 
of  the  understanding  nor  a  source  of  combinations.  The  con- 
cepts of  space  and  time.  The  power  to  distinguish  character- 
istics from  the  substance  to  which  they  are  attributed  belongs 


ANALYSIS  OF  CONTENTS.  xxxv 

to  the  higher  fiacultios.  §  64.  The  abstracting  of  the  general 
notions  from  concrete  examples  belongs  to  the  work  of  the 
higher  faculties,  as  does  the  distinction  between  o)>ject  and 
space,  event  and  time.  §  65.  In  savages  assthetic  and  moral 
apprehensions  rare.  The  brute  depends  upon  instinct.  ^  66. 
No  series  of  fixed  differences  between  humanity  and  animality, 
or  between  the  higher  and  lower  faculties.  Very  little  is  known 
of  brutes.  The  brute  receives  training  according  to  the  inner 
laws  of  its  nature.  The  differences  between  men  more  easily 
explained  than  those  between  brutes.  Man  has  needed  tools. 
Human  activity  not  to  be  regarded  as  complete. 

Chapter  III. — Faculty  of  Representation  (p.  53).  §  67. 
Conspectus  showing  the  aspects  belonging  to  the  faculty  of 
representation.  §  68.  The  work  of  touch,  taste,  smell,  hearing, 
seeing.  Classes  of  sense-impressions  greater  in  number  than 
the  organs  of  sense.  §  69.  Pressure,  warmth,  cold.  Touch 
origmally  feeling.  §  70.  Taste  furnishes  distinguishable  sensa- 
tion. §  71.  Apparatus  of  smell  less  under  our  control  than  that 
of  the  other  senses.  Odors  mostly  pleasant  or  unpleasant. 
§  72.  Hearing  richest  of  all  the  senses  in  variety  of  sensations. 
Probably  every  musical  tone  has  its  own  peculiar  place  in  the 
organ.  §  73.  Sight  distinguishes  colors.  The  color-sense  is 
sometimes  wanting.  {Note. — Every  sense  has  its  acuteness  and 
delicacy,  its  extent  and  duration.)  §  74.  The  inner  sense  an 
assumption  from  analogy  with  the  outer  sense  ;  the  inner  sense 
a  somewhat  defective  invention  of  psychologists ;  the  inner 
sense  not  able  long  to  endure  the  strain  of  intentional  effort ; 
the  inner  sense  rises  to  higher  and  higher  powers.  {Note. — 
Question  whether  there  are  concepts  without  consciousness.) 
^  75.  Theory  of  space  and  time  incorrect.  The  tone-series; 
the  color-surface.  Whether  the  color-realm  requires  a  third 
dimension.  {Note. — In  the  difference  between  high  and  dark, 
as  well  as  between  high  and  low  tones,  a  concept  of  succession 
to  be  perceived.  The  series  in  every  logical  arrangement  where 
the  varieties  are  opposed  and  at  the  same  time  united  in  the 
species.  The  theory  of  intelligible  space.)  §  76.  Concept  of  a 
series  shown  in  the  notions  of  integral  positive  numbers.  Arith- 
metic an  example  of  a  series  constantly  becoming  more  ab- 
stracted.    §  77.  The  geometrical  concept  of  space  not  original 


xxxvi  ANALYSIS  OF  CONTENTS. 

in  man.  We  habitucally  carry  a  standard  of  measureracnt  with 
us.  §  78.  Philosophers  in  difficult  cases  copy  the  procedure  of 
logic  ;  Kant's  categories  warning  examples  of  this.  Understand- 
ing, judgment,  and  reason  correspond  to  notions,  judgment, 
and  syllogisms.  Whether  notions  are  logical  ideals.  §  79. 
What  dictionaries  and  grammars  reveal  concerning  notions. 
General  notions  can  not  be  shown  to  exist.  §  80.  Human 
thought  assumes  the  form  of  judgment.  §  81.  A  wonderful 
psychological  phenomenon.  The  representation  as  a  copy 
should  resemble  the  object  itself;  the  painter  in  a  sketch  gives 
a  more  exact  knowledge  of  an  object  than  one  who  tries  to  de- 
scribe it  in  words.  The  principles  of  logic  only  applied  to 
judgments.  {Note. — The  ideal  of  an  intuiting  cognition.)  §  82. 
The  passive  attitude  of  the  subject.  Judgment  is  manifested 
only  in  speech ;  inclination  to  communicate  with  others  influ- 
ences the  form  of  one's  thought ;  expression  often  a  necessity : 
preference  and  rejection  special  kinds  of  judgments ;  the  union 
of  the  new  with  that  which  is  already  known ;  the  general  often 
to  be  explained  by  the  particular.  {Note. — School  formulas. 
Arching  and  pointing.  Pleasure  in  judging  injures  construct- 
ive power.)  §  83.  Syllogisms  progressive  unfoldings  of  the 
steps  of  a  tliought;  such  progressive  unfoldings  only  met  with 
in  ordinary  speech.  Creations  of  thought  rarely  possess  the 
accuracy  of  the  syllogism.  §  84.  Power  to  infer  an  attribute  of 
reason.  §  85.  Logical  approval  different  from  sesthetic  ap- 
proval. §  86.  Difficult  to  determine  what  transcends  experi- 
ence. Notion  of  substance  not  the  same  as  notion  of  thing; 
notion  of  force  depends  upon  the  notion  of  substance.  §  87. 
Notions  of  force  and  substance  comprehending  space  and  time. 
^  88.  Pure  geometric  notions  of  bodies.  §  89.  Psychologists 
careless  in  regard  to  the  question  of  reproduction.  §  90.  Viv- 
idiiess  and  accuracy  of  reproduction.  §  91.  Accuracy  and  viv- 
idness of  reproduction  seldom  found  at  the  same  time  in  equal 
proportions.  {Note. — With  some  psychologists  memory  implies 
reproduction  and  recollection.)  f?  92.  Upon  the  association  of 
concepts  and  the  way  in  which  they  reproduce  one  another. 
(Note. — In  inventions,  creation  the  essential  element.)  g  93. 
Agreement  between  memory  and  imagination.  §  94.  Difference 
between  memory  and  imagination. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CONTEXTS.  xxxvii 

Chapter  IV.— The  Faculty  of  Feeling  (p.  74).  §  Oo.  Neces- 
sity for  assuming  faculties  in  addition  to  the  representing  fac- 
ulty, i^  96.  Boundary-line  between  feeling  and  desire  drawn 
near  representation.  {JVote. — Explanation  of  feeling.)  g  97. 
Didicult  to  separate  feelings  from  desires  and  aversions.  Three 
kinds  of  feelings ;  indifferent  feelings.  §  98.  Feelings  which 
depend  upon  the  nature  of  that  which  is  felt.  §  99.  Difference 
between  unpleasant  feelings  of  this  kind.  §  100.  Analogy  of  the 
above  feelings  to  aesthetic  feeling.  (Note. — Sense  of  the  sub- 
lime ;  sense  of  the  ridiculous ;  comic  sensations ;  laughter.) 
^  101.  Feeling  the  source  of  desire  and  aversion.  Desires  which 
are  independent  of  the  pleasure  or  pain  of  their  object.  §  102. 
Intermediate  feelings.  §  103.  Mixed  feelings.  (Note  1. — False 
speculations  in  regard  to  feelings.  JS'ote  2. — Poets  mingle  feel- 
ings in  their  works  of  art.)  g  104.  Emotions  not  merely  stronger 
feelings.  §  105.  Kant's  classification  of  the  emotions.  §  106. 
Emotions  to  be  regarded  physiologically  as  well  as  psychologic- 
ally. {JVofe  1. — Action  and  reaction  between  soul  and  body. 
JVote  2.— Effect  of  emotion  upon  physical  organs.) 

Chapter  V.— The  Faculty  of  Desire  (p.  82).  ^^  107.  The 
faculties  of  representation,  feeling,  and  desire  should  furnish  an 
exhaustive  classification  of  mental  activities.  Difference  be- 
tween a  strong  will  and  a  strong  desire.  ^  108.  Desires  to  be 
distinguished  according  to  the  above  classification  of  feelings. 
^  109.  The  most  important  distinction  is  between  the  lower 
and  higher  faculties  of  desire.  ^  110.  Impulses  and  instincts 
implied  in  the  lower  faculties  of  desire.  §111.  Psychologists 
have  placed  the  impulses  of  self-love,  imitation,  etc.,  side  by  side 
with  the  organic  impulses.  The  assumption  of  special  faculties 
frequent  in  the  theory  of  desire.  §  112.  Inclinations  different 
in  different  people.  §  113.  The  passions  the  most  striking  spec- 
tacle in  psychology.  §  114.  Deliberation  precedes  judgment 
and  action.  §  115.  Reason  is  not  a  source  of  willing  nor  of 
knowledge.  §  116.  The  connection  between  means  and  ends 
complicates  moral  deliberation.  §  117.  Circumspection  the 
mental  condition  of  a  man  who  reflects.  The  work  of  delibera- 
tion is  to  make  prominent  the  aesthetic  judgment  upon  the  will. 
The  ideas  of  inner  freedom,  of  perfection,  of  benevolence,  of 
right,  and  of  equity.    §  118.  Freedom  of  the  will.     A  man's 


?^.\\V111 


ANALYSIS  OF  CONTENTS. 


choice  a  co-operation  of  reason  and  desire.  (Xofe  1. — The 
ground  for  illusion  is  in  regard  to  freedom.  An  act  is  respon- 
sible in  proportion  as  it  discloses  a  weak  or  a  strong  will.) 
(JS'ofe  2. — Transcendental  freedom  a  stranger  in  psychology.) 
g  119.  Reason  regarded  as  the  seat  of  freedom.  The  passionate 
man  a  slave. 

Chapter  VI. — The  Co-operation  and  Cultivation  of  the  Men- 
tal Faculties  (p.  92).  §  120.  The  assumption  of  faculties  defective, 
g  121.  Reproduction  the  chief  seat  of  mental  life  next  to  the 
senses.  i$  122.  Value  of  reproduction  in  regard  to  habits  and 
accomplishments.  §  123.  The  two  directions  of  cultivation  de- 
termined by  the  inner  sense  and  the  outer  action.  Self-con- 
sciousness necessary  to  self-control.  External  action  includes 
desires,  observation,  and  judgment.  Effect  of  external  deeds 
npon  a  man's  character.  Employment  pursued  determines 
character.  ^  124.  Permanent  feelings  rise  from  inner  think- 
ing and  external  action,  g  125.  Disastrous  effect  of  passions 
upon  development,  upon  imagination,  and  understanding. 

Second  Division  :  Mental  Conditions. 

Chapter  I. — The  General  Variability  of  Conditions  (p.  97). 
§  126.  No  one  condition  of  human  life  resembles  another.  §  127. 
Reproduction  proves  that  no  concept  once  found  is  ever  lost, 
g  128.  A  change  of  concepts  in  consciousness  a  necessity  to 
man.  The  need  of  change  increases  through  gratification. 
§  129.  Hunger  and  satiety,  waking  and  sleep,  have  a  well-known 
cycle.  §  130.  The  physical  life  has  its  period  of  growth,  full 
strength,  and  decline.  Variations  to  be  observed  throughout 
the  life  of  the  child,  the  boy,  the  man. 

Chapter  II. — Natural  Talents  (p.  99).  §  131.  The  course  of 
life  modified  through  difference  of  sex.  Girls  develop  earlier 
than  boys.  §  132.  The  temperaments  in  connection  with  the  feel- 
ings and  the  emotions.  The  mingling  of  temperaments.  {Note. 
— A  physiological  view  of  temperament.)  ^  133.  The  emotions 
strengthened  or  weakened  by  the  responsiveness  or  the  imper- 
turljability  of  the  body.  {Note. — Physiognomy  and  craniology 
too  indefinite  at  present  to  have  any  value  in  psychology.) 
§  134.  The  natural  talents  of  humanity.  §  135.  The  question 
concerning  the  races  comes  between  those  concerning  the  tal- 
ents of  the  individual  and  of  humanitv. 


ANALYSIS   OF  CONTENTS.  xxxix 

Chapter  III.— External  influences  (p.  104).  §  136.  From 
the  empirical  standpoint  no  decision  concerning  the  original 
talents  of  human  nature.  §  137.  Influences  of  climate,  soil, 
etc.,  upon  man.  §  138.  The  nation  has  a  predominating  tem- 
perament and  a  history,  g  139.  Diilerence  of  ranks  or  castes  in 
every  civilized  nation,  i^  140.  The  youth  is  influenced  by  his 
family,  his  education,  his  surroundings,  etc.  §  141.  The  free- 
dom that  remains  to  a  man  in  the  midst  of  external  influences- 
Kant  endeavored  to  secure  responsibility.  The  force  with  which 
a  man  works  on  himself  or  against  himself. 

Chapter  IV. — Anomalous  Conditions  (p.  108).  §  142.  Man 
subjected  to  anomalous  conditions.  Difliculty  in  contrasting  the 
well  man  with  the  mentally  diseased.  §  143.  Anomalous  condi- 
tions to  be  compared  with  the  mental  disorders,  illusion,  madness, 
dementia,  idiocy.  §  144.  Illusion  depends  upon  a  fixed  idea.  In- 
tervals of  sound  health  in  a  diseased  imagination.  In  delusions 
the  disorder  not  purely  mental.  §  145.  Madness  an  impulse  to 
bodily  action  without  aim.  In  healthy  men,  action  occasionally 
appears  at  the  same  time  voluntary  and  involuntary.  {Note. — 
Madness  without  delusion.)  §  146.  In  dementia,  a  mingling  of 
concepts  without  regular  connection.  The  fool  resembles  the 
stupid  child.  The  proper  cure  of  dementia  is  bodily.  §  147. 
Idiocy  or  imbecility  is  general  weakness  of  the  mind.  §  148. 
The  classes  of  mental  disorders  are  extremes  under  which  modi- 
fied disorders  may  be  subsumed.  §  149.  Anomalous  mental 
states  analogous  to  mental  disorders.  The  peculiarities  of  the 
dream.  Concluding  Remarks. — The  opposite  of  mental  disor- 
der is  a  healthy  mental  condition.  The  same  degree  of  mental 
health  not  to  be  found  in  all  mental  faculties.  Comparison  be- 
tween insanity  and  the  passions.  No  passion  is  a  pure  force. 
The  kinds  of  passions  belonging  to  the  different  kinds  of  insan- 
ity. Concepts  manifest  themselves  at  one  time  as  passions,  at 
another  as  reason. 

PART  THIRD.— Rational  Psychology.— ;S'eci'/on  First: 
Theorems  from  Jletaphysics  and  Natural  Philosophy/. 

Chapter  I.— The  Soul  and  Matter  (p.  119).  §  150.  Notion  of 
the  soul  to  be  restored.  The  soul  a  simple  essence  with  no  space 
relations.  §  151.  The  soul  has  no  time  relations.  §  152.  The 
soul  has  no  immediate  natural  talents.     §  153.  The  nature  of 


xl  ANALYSIS  OF  CONTENTS. 

the  soul  unknown.  §  154.  Resistance  among  essences.  §  155. 
The  self-preservations  of  the  soul.  §  156.  The  difference  be- 
tween soul  and  matter.  Space  conditions  belong  to  essences. 
Matter  does  not  fill  space  as  a  geometric.  Matter  always  pene- 
trable by  its  solvent. 

Chapter  11.— Vital  Forces  (p.  122).  §  157.  Vital  forces. 
§  158.  Each  element  has  its  own  vital  force.  {Note. — No  matter 
entirely  inorganic.)  §  159.  The  source  of  vital  force  referred  to 
Providence.  §  IGO.  The  soul  an  example  of  the  internal  devel- 
opment of  a  simple  essence.  The  relation  between  psychology 
and  physiology.  {Note. — A  characteristic  of  vitality  is  assimila- 
tion.) §  161.  Vital  forces  differ  in  kind  as  well  as  in  degree. 
The  difference  between  parts  of  the  body  nourished  by  the  same 
kind  of  food.  Causality  depends  upon  the  dissimilarity  of  the 
elements. 

Chapter  111. — The  Connection  between  Soul  and  Body 
(p.  125).  §  162.  Connection  between  mind  and  matter  in  brutes 
and  in  man.  §  163.  The  location  of  the  soul.  (Note  1. — The 
spheres  of  the  physiologist  and  metaphysician  differ.  Note  2. — 
No  reason  for  assuming  the  soul  of  brutes  and  man  to  be  in  the 
same  place.  §  164.  The  nervous  system  in  the  human  body 
serves  a  single  soul.  §  165.  The  dependence  of  the  mind  upon 
the  body  not  to  be  regarded  as  strange.  §  166.  The  theory  con- 
cerning a  general  organic  connection  of  the  v/hole  universe. 

Section  Sexojid :  Ucplnncttion,  of  Phenomena. 

Chapter  I. — Concepts  of  Space  and  Time  (p.  129).  p  167. 
A  psychological  disclosure  needed  as  to  how  the  world  and  we 
ourselves  appear  to  ourselves.  §  168.  Investigations  into  the 
nature  of  series  of  concepts  necessary  to  explain  things  in  the 
relation  of  time  and  space.  §  169,  The  limitation  of  the  repro- 
duction depends  upon  accompanying  conditions.  The  relation 
of  intermediate  concept  between  two  others  will  never  be 
changed.  §  170.  The  general  form  of  the  concept  depends 
upon  a  definite  starting-point.  §  171.  If  the  beginning  point 
be  dispensed  with,  the  perception  and  the  reproduction  seen 
constantly  in  one  direction.  §  172.  In  the  soul  the  concept  of 
space  is  intensive.  The  fundamental  idea  of  number  is  that  of 
more  or  less.  True  and  complete  symbols  for  the  notion  of 
number.     §  178.  The  original  apprehension  of  the  eye  not  spa- 


ANALYSIS  OF  CONTENTS.  xli 

tial.  The  movement  of  the  eye  furnishes  the  spatial  concepts. 
§  174.  The  concept  of  space  relations  depends  upon  reproduc- 
tions just  occurring.  (1.)  Succession  in  representation  not  a  rep- 
resented succession.  (2.)  Only  an  imperceptibly  short  interval 
of  time  required  to  furnish  a  concept  of  space  relations.  §  175. 
Distinction  between  time  and  space  perceptions.  Propositions 
1  and  2  in  §  174  apply  to  the  representation  of  the  temporal. 
§  170.  Only  educated  people  can  comprehend  long  extensions  in 
time.  i:$  177.  In  a  psychological  sense  everything  temporal  and 
spiritual  is  infinitely  divisible.  {Note  1. — Geometry  needed  in 
commensurable  quantities  on  account  of  the  infinite  divisibility 
of  space  and  time.  Note  2. — Spatial  and  temporal  relations  not 
dependent  on  space  and  time.  Note  3. — The  beautiful  in  space.) 
§  178.  Concepts  of  intensive  magnitudes.  Origin  of  the  stand- 
ard by  which  we  characterize  our  sensations  of  strong  and  weak. 

Supplement. — The  Difference  between  Series  (p.  138).  The 
differences  in  the  series  in  general.  1.  The  series  are  longer  or 
shorter.  2.  Degree  of  union  among  the  terms  stronger  or  weaker. 
3.  The  series  similar  or  not  in  regard  to  strength  of  terms  as 
well  as  in  degree  of  combination.  4.  Several  series  often  serve 
for  one.  5.  Many  series  return  into  themselves.  6.  Strong 
among  dissimilar  often  form  a  series  among  themselves.  7.  A 
term  often  has  a  side  series.  8.  Side  series  may  progress  simul- 
taneously. 9.  Each  element  of  a  complex  may  be  the  beginning 
point  of  a  series.  10.  Series  may  start  simply,  and  later  may 
form  a  complex.  Reproduction  fluctuates  between  two  kinds 
of  opposed  possible  influences. 

Chapter  II. — The  Development  of  Notions  (p.  140).  §  179. 
All  concepts  subject  to  the  laws  of  blending,  etc.  Notions,  as 
such,  exist  only  in  our  abstraction.  The  union  of  the  practical 
Avith  the  theoretical  understanding.  §  180.  That  notions  are  a 
peculiar  class  of  concepts,  a  delusion.  General  notions  and  logi- 
cal ideals.  How  are  they  constructed?  §  181.  Why  do  con- 
cepts so  often  occur  in  the  form  of  judgments  %  Judgments  not 
mere  complexes  or  blendings.  §  182.  Collective  impressions 
from  similar  perceptions.  §  183.  Reproduction  of  concepts 
through  similarity.  §  184.  Collective  concepts  in  which  series 
lie  infolded  to  be  regarded  as  subjects,  etc.  §  185.  The  place  of 
the  subject,     t^  186.  Each  word  in  the  language  fitted  to  be  the 


xlii  ANALYSIS  OF  CONTENTS. 

subject  of  a  judgment.  §  187.  In  an  expressed  judgment,  for 
the  hearer,  two  cases  possible.  §  188.  Intelligible  speech  must 
be  connected.  {Note. — In  music,  distinctions  between  the  intel- 
ligible and  the  senseless  to  be  made.  The  intelligible  not  also 
the  beautiful.)  §  189.  The  development  of  ideas  the  result  of 
continuous  judgment.  §  190.  The  relation  between  a  genus  and 
its  species.  §  191.  The  determination  of  the  content  of  com- 
plexes, or  the  definition  of  ideas.  §  192.  The  definition  and 
separation  of  general  notions  are  problems  to  be  solved,  etc. 

Chapter  III. — Our  Comprehension  of  Things  and  Ourselves 
(p.  150).  §  194.  Concepts  become  combined  so  far  as  they  are 
not  arrested.  For  a  child  there  are  no  individual  objects.  The 
first  chaos  of  concepts  subjected  to  a  separation.  Movement  of 
objects  aids  in  making  distinctions.  §  195.  Objects  separated  into 
individual  things;  things  separated  into  their  properties.  The 
question  concerning  substance.  §  196.  Contradictions  in  the 
notion  of  the  thing  with  several  properties.  ^  197.  Differences 
in  the  human  apprehension  of  things  to  be  considered  prepara- 
tory to  the  theory  of  self-consciousness.  The  object  in  motion 
occupies  more  attention  than  the  object  at  rest.  §  198.  The 
brute  as  well  as  man  occupies  himself  less  with  the  inanimate 
than  with  the  living  object.  {Note. — That  the  Ego  opposes  to 
itself  a  non-Ego,  an  error  of  idealism.)  i^  199.  The  origin  of  the 
concept  of  a  concept.  §  200.  The  concept  of  self-knowledge. 
The  possibility  of  apprehending  two  opposite  concepts,  the  rep- 
resenting and  the  represented,  as  one  and  the  same.  The  iden- 
tity of  self.  §  201.  The  concept  of  the  Ego.  Man  the  movable 
central  point  of  things.  {Note. — The  concept  of  the  we.)  %  202. 
The  unity  of  personality  depends  upon  the  blendings  of  all  the 
concepts  which  in  the  course  of  life  are  added  to  the  complex 
which  makes  up  the  self  of  each  person.  The  Ego  develops 
differently  in  different  concept  masses.  ^  203.  A  correct  notion 
of  ourselves  to  be  obtained  through  the  notion  of  the  soul. 
{Note. — The  Ego  as  a  metaphysical  principle.  §  204.  The 
meaning  of  intuition.  Intuition  a  complicated  process.  Pas- 
sivity in  intuition. 

Chapter  IV. — The  Ungoverned  Play  of  the  Psychical  Mech- 
anism (p.  163).  §  205.  The  mental  activity  may  originate  in 
concepts  themselves  in  the  psychical  organism  or  in  external 


ANALYSIS   OF   CONTENTS.  xliii 

impressions.  §  206.  A  small  number  of  concepts  would  soon 
approach  a  statical  point.  This  movement  toward  the  statical 
point  is  influenced  by  the  number  of  concepts.  §  207.  Changes 
in  the  arrest  of  concepts  occur  in  consequence  of  new  complica- 
tions. Hence  changes  in  mental  conditions.  §  208.  The  stat- 
ical threshold  is  developed  from  the  mechanical.  §  209.  Older 
(earlier)  concepts  are  stronger  than  later  ones.  §  210.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  reproduction  determines  the  purpose  of  the  elabora- 
tion. {JSIote. — Distinction  between  analytic  and  synthetic  in- 
struction.) ^  211.  Concepts  become  more  firmly  and  more  vari- 
ously interwoven  in  following  the  tendency  toward  equilibrium. 
The  intelligence  has  its  seat  in  the  general  connection  among 
concepts.  §  212.  Conversation  is  the  ordinary  stimulant  to  the 
imagination.  §  213.  A  man's  sense-perception  and  attention 
depend  upon  his  imagination  and  thought.  Attention  partly 
involuntary,  partly  voluntary.  Four  circumstances  to  be  ob- 
served during  the  act  of  attention.  Reproduced  concepts  may 
be  unfavorable  to  involuntary  observation.  {Note. — Attention 
belongs  to  the  fundamental  notions  of  general  pedagogy.) 
§  214.  Every  physical  feeling  is  in  a  condition  to  bring  the 
series  of  concepts  complicated  with  it  into  consciousness.  §  215. 
Changes  in  the  physical  condition  must  correspond  to  changes 
in  the  mental  state.  {Note. — An  increased  velocity  m  the 
changes  of  bodily  conditions  renders  the  play  of  the  psychical 
mechanism  difficult  of  control.)  §  216.  The  effect  of  emotion 
should  not  be  apparent  upon  the  healthy  body.  A  system  of 
possible  emotions  exists  in  every  human  organism.  The  effects 
of  physiological  pressure  are  to  be  ascertained  from  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  psychical  mechanism.  (1.)  Under  physiological 
pressure  obscurity  arises.  (2.)  This  pressure  retards  the  vault- 
ing and  tapering  of  a  series  of  concepts.  (3.)  With  many  this 
pressure  is  not  constantly  effective.  (4.)  A  constant  pressure 
acting  upon  free-rising  concepts  disarranges  their  movement. 
§  217.  Different  concept  masses  depend  upon  outside  impres- 
sions. §  218.  The  external  world  regarded  as  the  sphere  of 
action.  The  functions  of  body  and  soul  combined  in  move- 
ments in  different  parts  of  the  body  and  the  feelings  arising 
therefrom.  §  219.  Illustration  of  §  218  by  a  series  of  concepts, 
a,  b,  c,  d,  etc.     §  220.  The  position  of  a  hindrance  often  repre- 


xliv  ANALYSIS   OF   CONTENTS. 

seiits  merely  something  lacking  in  an  ordinary  environment. 
g  221.  Etlect  of  a  tissue  of  series.  §  222.  The  first  essential  of 
a  man's  character  furnished  in  the  object  and  manner  of  his 
love.  §  223.  The  nature  of  will.  §  224.  The  will  has  its  imagi- 
nation and  its  memory.  §  225.  How  the  will  is  strengthened. 
^  226.  Desires  may  meet  and  oppose  one  another.  {Note. — The 
greater  the  number  of  concept  masses  so  much  the  more  har- 
moniously do  they  work  together.)  §  227.  The  external  life 
often  hinders  a  man  from  turning  his  whole  will  inward. 

Chapter  V. — Self-control,  especially  Duty,  as  a  Psychical 
Phenomenon  (p.  178).  §  228.  Self-control  to  be  distinguished 
from  that  which  a  man  exacts  of  himself.  §  229.  The  child 
controls  himself  when  he  delays  an  action  which  serves  as  a 
means  to  an  end.  §  230.  Experiences  showing  the  inconsistency 
of  the  will  more  striking  in  great  than  in  small  things.  The 
sign  of  a  good  law.  §  231.  Conscience  follows  from  self -con- 
sciousness. A  fixed  law  preceding  cases  to  be  decided,  necessity 
as  security  against  partiality.  §  232.  In  the  beginning  practical 
principles  are  individual.  §  233.  The  basis  of  duty  in  practical 
(moral)  philosophy.  §  234.  Actual  self-control  depends  upon 
the  co-operation  of  several  concept  masses.  The  demands  of 
labor  upon  the  will.  {Note. — Necessity  for  guarding  against 
theories  representing  one's  freedom  greater  than  it  really  is.) 
§  235.  Self-control  conformed  to  an  end  or  purpose.  {Note  1. — 
The  assumption  of  a  transcendental  freedom  of  the  will.  Note 
2. — Discussion  concerning  the  mental  condition  of  criminals.) 
§  236.  "Where  the  conditions  of  self-control  are  to  be  found. 
The  cultured  man  and  savages  have  hardly  any  faculty  of  the 
understanding  except  the  passions.  We  can  not  speak  of  sev- 
eral understandmgs,  several  imaginations.  §  237.  The  consid- 
eration of  moral  self-control.  Moral  feeling  arises  from  moral 
judgments.  §  238.  A  purely  moral  self-control  an  ideal.  §  239. 
No  particular  time  of  life  can  be  held  as  decisive  m  regard  to 
the  power  of  self-control. 

Chapter  VI. — Psychological  Observations  upon  the  Destiny 
of  Man  (p.  190).  i^  240.  Man  not  to  be  considered  as  standing 
alone.  The  individuals  of  a  social  whole  related  to  one  another 
in  almost  the  same  way  as  the  concepts  in  the  soul  of  an  indi- 
vidual.   §  241.  A  science  of  politics  similar  to   the  empirical 


ANALYSIS   OF   CONTENTS.  xlv 

psychology  of  this  work.  §  242.  Philosophy  of  history  depends 
upon  psychology.  No  history  of  known  countries  can  furnish 
a  history  of  the  world.  The  statesman  demands  of  the  philos- 
ophy of  history  that  which  the  educator  demands  of  psychology. 
§  243.  Comparison  of  mental  diseases  with  social  desires  and 
delusions.  Man  assigns  to  himself  the  place  he  would  like  to 
occupy  in  an  ideal  society.  The  importance  of  the  will  in  ma- 
turing character.  §  245.  To  fill  his  place  in  the  social  whole  is 
the  highest  aim  of  the  individual.  §  246.  The  career  of  the  in- 
dividual man  not  to  be  confined  to  the  earthly  life.  Death  is 
rejuvenescence.  §  247.  Revolutions  among  concepts  may  be 
necessary  after  death.  §  248.  The  product  created  by  concepts 
striving  after  equilibrium  not  the  same  in  any  two  souls.  §  249. 
Eternal  life  a  gentle  fluctuation  of  concepts.  §  250.  The  soul's 
knowledge  of  its  former  career  upon  earth.  §  251.  The  differ- 
ences between  individuals  may  be  lessened  after  death.  §  252. 
The  future  as  seen  from  the  standpoint  of  science. 


HERBAET'S  PSYCHOLOGY. 


IXTRODUCTIOK 

1.  The  material  of  psychology  may  be  gained  from 
inner  perception,  intercourse  with  men  of  different 
degrees  of  development,  the  observations  of  educators 
and  statesmen,  the  writings  of  travelers,  historians, 
poets,  and  moralists,  and  finally  from  observations  on 
insane  people,  sick  people,  and  the  lower  animals. 
The  work  of  psychology  is  not  merely  to  collect  this 
material,  but  to  make  the  total  of  inner  experience 
comprehensible,  while  it  is  the  work  of  the  philosophy 
of  nature  to  accomplish  the  same  in  regard  to  outer  ex- 
perience limited  as  it  is  by  space-conditions.  As  the 
two  circles  of  experience  are  different  and  yet  united, 
so  also  are  the  two  sciences.  In  respect  to  their  funda- 
mental ideas,  they  depend  in  common  upon  general 
metaphysics,  yet  psychology  has  this  peculiar  relation 
to  the  latter,  that  many  questions,  which  upon  occasion 
arise  in  metaphysics  and  then  must  be  postponed,  are 
answered  in  psychology.  For  this  reason  the  trea- 
tise on  psychology  may  very  well  be  allowed  to  pre- 
cede that  on  metaphysics,  and  in  this  way  the  meta- 
physical idea  of  the  soul  (the  substance  of  the  mind) 
may  be  dispensed  with  at  first.  By  this  the  beginner 
lightens  his  task,  partlv  because  he  can  tarry  longer  in 
4 


2  INTRODUCTION. 

tlie  circle  of  experience,  and  partly  because  the  mani- 
fold relations  of  psychology  to  morals,  pedagogy,  poli- 
tics, philosophy  of  history,  and  to  art,  heighten  the 
interest  of  the  study, 

2.  That  concepts  (Vo}'steUungen  =  ideas  or  repre- 
sentations) are  received  through  the  senses,  preserved 
by  the  memory,  reproduced  by  the  imagination,  and 
anew  combined  ;  that  the  understanding  ( Verstand) 
shows  itself  in  the  understanding  of  a  language  or  an 
art;  the  Reason  (  Vcniiuiff)  in  perceiving  reasons  and 
counter-reasons  ;  this  generally  received  opinion  has 
been  adopted  and  carried  out  by  psychologists,  and  the 
distinction  between  the  beautiful  and  the  ugly  has 
been  assigned  to  the  a}sthetic  judgment,  the  passions 
to  the  faculty  of  desire,  the  emotions  to  the  faculty  of 
feeling.  The  opinion  is,  that  these  faculties  are  al- 
ways to  be  found  together  in  every  man ;  but  the  great 
contest  over  the  explanation  and  classification  of  facul- 
ties must  long  ago  have  brought  to  notice  the  fact  that 
psychology  needs  another  branch  of  investigation  in 
which  at  the  beginning  the  attention  must  be  directed 
toward  changing  conditions.  These  changes  (but  not 
those  faculties)  we  experience  directly  in  ourselves. 

3.  A  preliminary  comparison  of  psychology  with 
the  three  principal  branches  of  natural  science  is  use- 
ful. Natural  history  may  first  present  individual  ex- 
amples of  the  objects  which  it  afterward  classifies ;  it 
may  enumerate  definitely  the  characteristics  perceived. 
Xow,  inasmuch  as  a  regular  process  of  abstraction  is 
possible,  beginning  with  the  individuals  and  ascending 
toward  the  species  and  genera  [by  omitting  one  after 
another  the  characteristics  that  differentiate  the  indi- 
viduals from  tlie  species,  and  the  lower  classes  from 


UNCERTAINTY  OF  MENTAL  FACTS.  3 

the  higher],  it  follows  that  we  have  before  us  these 
characteristics  [omitted  in  the  process  of  rising  to  the 
abstract  classes],  and  can  add  tliem  as  we  descend  to 
the  concrete.  When  these  logical  operations  are  prop- 
erly performed,  and  ascent  is  made  from  the  concrete 
to  the  abstract,  and  descent  from  the  abstract  to  the 
concrete,  no  one  is  misled  into  supposing  the  abstract 
to  be  anything  real.  Everybody  knows  the  abstract 
terms  to  be  mere  devices  of  thought,  invented  by  it  for 
the  purpose  of  conveniently  surveying  at  a  glance  the 
manifold  objects  of  nature. 

On  the  contrary,  no  material  of  facts  lies  at  the 
foundation  of  psychology,  spread  out  before  the  eyes 
so  that  it  can  be  definitely  shown  and  classified  into 
subordinate  and  higher  classes  without  any  gaps  in  the 
series.  Self-observation  mutilates  the  facts  of  con- 
sciousness even  in  the  act  of  seizing  them ;  it  wrests 
them  from  their  natural  combinations  and  delivers 
them  over  to  a  restless  process  of  abstraction  which 
finds  a  point  of  repose  only  when  it  has  reached  the 
ultimate  species — namely,  conception,  feeling,  and  de- 
sire. Under  these  three  general  classes,  by  definitions  (a 
method  precisely  opposite  to  that  of  empirical  science), 
it  subsumes  the  mental  facts  observed  so  far  as  it  can 
be  done.  Xow,  if  to  these  vague  and  unscientific 
classifications  there  be  added  a  theory  of  mental  facul- 
ties which  we  are  supposed  to  possess,  then  psychology 
is  changed  into  a  mythology  in  which  no  one  will  con- 
fess a  serious  belief,  but  upon  which  the  most  impor- 
tant investigations  are  made  dependent,  so  that,  if  this 
foundation  were  removed,  nothing  clear  would  remain. 

Note. — It  is  noteworthy  that  in  psychology  the  highest  ideas 
are  the  clearest ;  the  lower,  however,  are  always  obscure.     Thus 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

for  some  time  we  have  been  tolerably  (though  not  entirely) 
united  in  regarding  the  three  classes,  conception,  feeling,  desire, 
as  the  ultimate  species  of  mental  faculties,  but  the  discrimination 
of  the  emotions  from  the  passions  is  of  later  origin,  and  even  yet 
has  not  thoroughly  penetrated  the  usages  of  speech :  if  we  ask 
exhaustively  about  the  kinds  of  memory,  as  memory  of  place, 
memory  of  names,  memory  of  things,  etc.,  no  one  undertakes  to 
name  for  us  in  reply  all  the  classes,  nor  are  the  poetic,  the 
mathematical,  and  the  military  imaginations  discriminated  from 
one  another,  although  manifest  differences  are  to  be  found  among 
men  in  this  respect.  By  this  indefiniteness  in  the  subordinate 
classes,  it  may  be  perceived  at  once  that  the  original  apprehen- 
sion of  psychological  facts  is  so  inexact  that  it  admits  of  no  pure 
natural  history  of  the  mind.  Nevertheless,  on  account  of  the 
customs  of  speech  already  established,  in  our  logical  review  of 
empirical  psychology  we  shall  sometimes  make  use  of  the  cus- 
tomary names. 

4.  Empirical  physics,  thoiigli  it  has  not  as  yet  dis- 
covered the  real  forces  of  nature,  has  learned  certain 
laws  according  to  Avhich  phenomena  take  place.  By 
recalling  the  latter,  a  connection  in  the  variety  of  phe- 
nomena is  perceived.  Experiments  with  artificial  ap- 
paratus and  the  application  of  mathematics  aid  greatly 
in  the  discovery  of  these  laws. 

Psychology  can  not  experiment  with  men,  and  tliere 
is  no  apparatus  for  this  purpose.  So  much  the  more 
carefully  must  we  make  use  of  mathematics ;  by  it  sci- 
entific accuracy  is  gained  for  the  fundamental  ideas ; 
then  the  work  of  referring  individual  cases  to  the  law 
begins.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  one  has  the  idea 
of  the  tension  of  opposed  concepts ;  then  we  go  back 
to  the  different  conditions  possible  in  this,  among 
others  to  the  difference  in  mental  states.  In  this 
way  the  rules  of  reproduction  are  first  learned,  ac- 
cording to  which,  in  the  concejDt  series,  every  concept 


PHYSIOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY.  5 

presents  itself  between  others ;  then  we  go  back  to  the 
space-and-time  constitution  of  sensuous  objects  and  to 
the  logical  aspect  of  ideas. 

5.  In  the  observation  of  animal  life,  physiology 
makes  use  of  three  principal  ideas,  viz.,  vegetation 
[i.  e.,  nutrition  or  assimilation],  irritability  [i.  e.,  reac- 
tion against  foreign  influences],  and  sensibility.  We 
may  attempt  to  compare  the  faculty  of  feeling  with  sen- 
sibility, the  faculty  of  desire  with  irritability,  the  faculty 
of  concepts  with  vegetation ;  then  we  see  that  this  analo- 
gy gives  a  little  light  inasmuch  as  vegetation  continues 
during  sleep  while  sensibility  disapjoears,  and  through 
the  refreshment  (of  sleep)  the  irritability  of  the  mus- 
cles gains  new  force.  Duration  also  belongs  to  con- 
cepts. When  they  are  once  perfected  to  the  extent  of 
definite  knowledge  they  remain  to  old  age,  while  feel- 
ings and  desires  change  and  weaken.  Moreover,  vege- 
tation is  the  foundation  of  bodily  life,  as  concepts  are 
the  foundation  of  the  mental  life.  But  the  analogy 
must  not  be  carried  too  far.  In  plants  only  vegetation 
exists,  there  being  no  perceptible  sensibility  and  irri- 
tability (or  reaction  against  environment)  save  with  the 
rarest  and  most  imperfect  exceptions.  On  the  con- 
trary, representation,  feeling,  and  willing,  are  constant- 
ly to  be  found  in  combination.  And,  besides  this,  the 
whole  mental  existence  of  man  is  immeasurably  more 
changeable  than  any  object  of  physiology  whatever. 

6.  If  we  regard  man  with  a  speculative  glance  sharp- 
ened by  the  fundamental  ideas  of  metaphysics,  we  find 
him  to  be  an  aggregate  of  contradictions.  Inner  expe- 
rience has  not  the  least  claim  to  more  value  than  the 
outer,  notwithstanding  all  that  enthusiasm  for  inner 
observation  has  imagined  and  may  still  imagine  to  be  of 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

special  truth  and  value,  and  wliicli  it  is  impossible  to 
wrest  from  those  who  wish  to  believe  therein.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  field  of  investigation  is  disclosed  by 
whicli  empirical  material  is  elaborated  into  true  knowl- 
edge, a  result  which  in  empirical  psychology,  on  ac- 
count of  its  indefiniteness  and  instability,  is  more  dif- 
ficult to  accomplish  than  in  many  other  parts  of  hu- 
man experience. 

All  mental  life,  as  we  observe  it  in  ourselves  and 
others,  is  shown  to  be  an  occurrence  in  time,  a  con- 
stant change,  a  manifold  of  unlike  conditions  com- 
bined in  one,  finally  a  consciousness  of  the  Ego  and 
the  non-Ego,  all  of  which  belong  to  the  form  of  expe- 
rience and  are  unthinkable  [as  its  content].  Even  the 
difficulties  in  regard  to  material  existence  are  not  far 
away,  for  we  know  the  mind  of  man  only  in  combi- 
nation with  the  body,  and  mere  experience  can  not 
determine  whether  the  sei^aration  of  the  one  from  the 
other  actually  occurs. 

7.  The  readiest  solution  of  these  problems  is  found 
in  general  metaphysics,  but  further  elaboration  from  a 
psychological  standpoint  demands,  besides  this,  higher 
mathematics,  inasmuch  as  the  concepts  must  be  re- 
garded as  forces  whose  effectiveness  depends  upon  their 
strength,  their  oppositions,  and  their  combinations,  all 
of  which  are  different  in  degree. 

8.  In  such  a  simple,  almost  popular,  presentation 
as  is  proposed  here,  the  old  hypothesis  of  mental  facul- 
ties can  not  be  entirely  dispensed  with,  for  that  hy- 
pothesis is  a  work  of  ages,  and  indicates  the  nearest 
approach  attainable  by  natural  effort  to  bring  together 
the  mental  life  of  man  into  one  picture.  It  is  a  tradi- 
tion which  reflects  the  total  impression  of  all  psycho- 


CLASSIFICATIONS  OF  FACULTIES.  7 

logical  observations ;  guided  by  it,  we  shall  sketch  the 
outlines  of  empirical  psychology,  and,  in  order  to  make 
the  necessity  for  an  explanation  of 'the  facts  percepti- 
ble, shall  note  its  most  striking  effects. 

XoTE.— The  whole  treatise  will  be  divided  into  the  following 
principal  parts : 

Part  I.  Fundamental  Theories. 
Part  II.  Empirical  Psychology. 
Part  III.  Rational  Psychology. 

9.  A  work  of  Cams  is  extant  upon  the  history  of 
psychology,  the  third  volume  of  which  is  composed  of 
his  posthumous  writings. 

XoTE.— It  may  be  briefly  stated  here,  but  not  shown  in  detail, 
that  in  modern  times  psychology  has  rather  gone  backward  than 
forward.  In  regard  to  this  science,  Locke  and  Leibnitz  were 
both  upon  a  better  path  tlian  that  along  which  we  have  been 
led  by  Wolff  and  Kant.  The  two  latter  advocate  in  a  peculiar 
manner  the  discrimination  of  mental  faculties,  and  for  this  reason 
must  be  classed  together,  however  much  they  differ  from  each 
other  in  other  respects.  Wolff  had  in  mind  the  logical  task  of 
classifying  mental  phenomena,  Avithout  troubling  himself  more 
closely  with  their  inner  origination,  and  for  this  reason  he  is  un- 
equaled  in  the  thoughtlessness  with  which  he  covers  up  the 
greatest  difficulties  with  mere  verbal  definitions.  Kant  makes 
use  of  the  hypothetical  mental  faculties  to  present  his  investiga- 
tions clearly  according  to  form,  that  he  might  accompany  human 
knowledge  in  its  progress  from  the  senses  to  the  understanding 
and  the  reason,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  rid  his  writings  of  this 
hypothesis. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  mention  here  later  errors,  since  in 
empirical  psychology  one  will  be  inclined  to  relate  a  second  time, 
facts  which  every  person  knows  already,  or,  with  a  pretended 
gift  for  observation  into  his  own  inner  life,  will  have  made  dis- 
coveries which  others  can  not  find  in  themselves,  or  will  have 
effaced  from  psychology  here  a  metaphysical,  there  an  ethical, 
here  a  religious,  there  a  physiological  color  by  which  either  tho 


8  INTRODUCTIOX. 

mutual  liniitations  or  the  combinations  of  science  are  disre- 
garded, while  the  source  of  the  psychical  mechanism  remains 
entirely  hidden.  But  this  one  thing  may  be  said,  that  psycholo- 
gy can  not  portray  the  beautiful.  Its  work  is  not  to  admire,  but 
to  explain ;  not  to  exhibit  curiosities,  but  to  make  man  as  he  is 
generally  comprehensible  ;  neither  to  raise  him  to  heaven,  nor  to 
fix  him  immovably  in  the  dust ;  not  to  close  the  lines  of  inves- 
tigation, but  to  open  them. 


PAET    FIKST. 

FUNDA3IENTAL  PRINCIPLES. 
CHAPTER   I. 

THE     C0XDITI02T    OF    COXCEPTS,    "WIIEX    THEY    ACT   AS 
FORCES. 

10.  CoxcEPTS  become  forces  wlieu  they  resist  one 
another.  This  resistance  occurs  wlien  two  or  more 
opposed  concepts  encounter  one  another. 

At  first  let  us  take  this  proposition  as  simply  as 
possible.  In  this  connection,  therefore,  we  shall  not 
think  of  complex  nor  of  compound  concepts  of  any 
kind  whatever ;  nor  of  such  as  indicate  an  object  with 
several  characteristics,  neither  of  anything  in  time  nor 
space,  but  of  entirely  simple  concepts  or  sensations — 
e.  g.,  red,  blue,  sour,  sweet,  etc.  It  is  not  our  purpose 
to  consider  the  general  notions  of  the  above-mentioned 
sensations,  but  to  consider  such  rej^resentations  as  may 
result  from  an  instantaneous  act  of  sense-perception. 

Again,  the  question  concerning  the  origin  of  the 
sensations  mentioned  does  not  belong  here,  much  less 
has  the  discussion  to  do  with  the  consideration  of  any- 
thing else  that  might  have  previously  existed  or  oc- 
curred in  the  soul. 

The  proposition  as  it  stands  is  that  opposed  con- 
cepts resist  one  another.     Concepts  that  arc  not  op- 


10  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLES. 

posed — e.  g.,  a  tone  and  a  color — may  exist,  in  which 
case  it  will  be  assumed  that  such  concepts  olfer 
no  resistance  to  one  another.  (Exceptions  to  this 
latter  proposition  may  occur,  of  which  more  here- 
after.) 

Resistance  is  an  expression  of  force.  To  the  re- 
sisting concept,  however,  its  action  is  quite  accidental ; 
it  adjusts  itself  to  the  attack  which  is  mutual  among 
concepts,  and  which  is  determined  by  the  degree  of 
opposition  existing  between  them.  This  opposition 
may  be  regarded  as  that  by  which  they  are  alfected 
collectively.  In  themselves,  however,  concepts  are 
not  forces. 

11.  Now,  what  is  the  result  of  the  resistance  men- 
tioned ? 

Do  concepts  partially  or  Avholly  destroy  one  another, 
or,  notwithstanding  the  resistance,  do  they  remain  un- 
changed ? 

Destroyed  concepts  are  the  same  as  none  at  all. 
However,  if,  notwithstanding  the  mutual  attack,  con- 
cepts remain  unchanged,  then  one  could  not  be  re- 
moved or  suppressed  by  another  (as  we  see  every 
moment  that  they  are).  Finally,  if  all  that  is  con- 
ceived of  each  concept  were  changed  by  the  contest, 
then  this  would  signify  nothing  more  than,  at  the  be- 
ginning, quite  another  concept  had  been  present  in 
consciousness. 

The  presentation  (concept),  then,  must  yield  with- 
out being  destroyed — i.  e.,  the  real  concept  is  changed 
into  an  effort  to  present  itself. 

Here  it  is  in  effect  stated  tlTat,  as  soon  as  the  hin- 
drance yields,  the  concept  by  its  own  effort  will  again 
make  its  appearance  in  consciousness.     In  this  lies  the 


EQUILIBRIUM  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  CONCEPTS.   U 

possibility  (although  not  for  all  cases  the  only  ground) 
of  reproduction. 

12.  When  a  concept  becomes  not  entirely,  but  only 
in  part,  transformed  into  an  effort,  we  must  guard 
against  considering  this  part  as  a  severed  portion  of 
the  whole  concept.  It  has  certainly  a  definite  magni- 
tude (upon  the  knowledge  of  which  much  depends) 
but  this  magnitude  indicates  only  a  degree  of  the  ob- 
scuration of  the  whole  concept.  If  the  question  be 
in  regard  to  several  parts  of  one  and  the  same  concej^t, 
these  parts  must  not  be  regarded  as  different,  severed 
portions,  but  the  smaller  divisions  may  be  regarded 
as  being  contained  in  the  larger.  The  same  is  true  of 
the  remainders  after  the  collisions — i.  e.,  of  those  parts 
of  a  concept  which  remain  unobscured,  for  those  parts 
are  also  degrees  of  the  real  concept. 


CHAPTER   II. 

EQUILIBRIUM!    AXD    MOVEMEXT   OF    COXCEPTS. 

13.  Whex  a  sufficiency  of  opposition  exists  be- 
tween concepts,  the  latter  are  in  equilibrium.  They 
come  only  gradually  to  this  point.  The  continuous 
change  of  their  degree  of  obscuration  may  be  called 
their  movement. 

The  statics  and  mechanics  of  the  mind  have  to  do 
with  the  calculation  of  the  equilibrium  and  movement 
of  the  concepts. 

14.  All  investiofaticns  into  the  statics  of  the  mind 


12  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES. 

begin  "vvith  two  diftereut  quantitative  factors,  viz., 
the  sum  (or  the  aggregate  amount)  of  the  resistances 
and  the  ratio  of  their  limitation.  The  former  is  the 
quantity  wliich  rises  from  their  encounter,  to  be  divided 
between  the  opposing  concepts.  If  one  knows  how  to' 
state  it,  and  knows  also  the  ratio  in  Avhich  the  different 
concepts  yield  in  the  encounter,  then,  by  a  simple  cal- 
culation in  proportion,  the  statical  point  of  each  con- 
cept— i.  e.,  the  degree  of  its  obscuration  in  equilibrium 
— may  be  found. 

15.  The  sum  as  well  as  the  ratio  of  the  mutual 
limitation  depends  upon  the  strength  of  each  indi- 
vidual concept  which  is  affected  in  inverse  ratio  to  its 
strength,  and  upon  the  degree  of  opposition  between 
the  two  concepts.  For  their  influence  upon  each  other 
stands  in  direct  ratio  to  the  strength  of  each. 

The  principle  determining  the  sum  of  the  mutual 
limitation  is,  that  it  shall  be  considered  as  small  as 
possible,  because  all  concepts  strive  against  suppres- 
sion, and  certainly  submit  to  no  more  of  it  than  is 
absolutely  necessary. 

16.  By  actual  calculation,  the  remarkable  result  is 
obtained  that,  in  the  case  of  the  two  concepts,  the  one 
never  entirely  obscures  the  other,  but,  in  the  case  of 
three  or  more,  one  is  very  easily  obscured,  and  can  be 
made  as  ineffective — notwithstanding  its  continuous 
struggle — as  if  it  were  not  present  at  all.  Indeed,  this 
obscuration  may  happen  to  a  large  number  of  con- 
cepts as  well  as  to  one,  and  may  be  effected  through 
the  agency  of  two,  and  even  through  the  combined  in- 
fluence of  concepts  less  strong  than  those  which  are 
suppressed. 

Here  the  expression  "  threshold  of  consciousness" 


EQUILIBRIUM  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  CONCEPTS.   13 

must  be  explained,  as  we  shall  have  occasion  to  use  it. 
A  concept  is  in  consciousness  in  so  far  as  it  is  not 
suppressed,  but  is  an  actual  representation.  When  it 
rises  out  of  a  condition  of  complete  suppression,  it 
enters  into  consciousness.  Here,  then,  it  is  on  the 
threshold  of  consciousness.  It  is  very  important  to 
determine  by  calculation  the  degree  of  strength  which 
a  concept  must  attain  in  order  to  be  able  to  stand  beside 
two  or  more  stronger  ones  exactly  on  the  threshold  of 
consciousness,  so  that,  at  the  slightest  yielding  of  the 
hindrance,  it  would  begin  to  rise  into  consciousness. 

Note. — The  expression  "  A  concept  is  in  consciousness  "  must 
be  distinguished  from  that,  "  I  am  conscious  of  my  concept." 
To  the  latter  belongs  inner  perception  ;  to  the  former  not.  In 
psychology,  we  need  a  word  that  will  indicate  the  totality  of  all 
simultaneous  actual  presentations.  No  word  except  conscious- 
ness can  be  found  for  this  purpose. 

Here  we  are  obliged  to  be  content  with  a  circumlocution — and 
this  all  the  more,  because  the  inner  perception  which  is  usually 
attributed  to  consciousness  has  no  fixed  limit  where  it  begins  or 
ceases,  and,  moreover,  the  act  of  perceiving  is  not  itself  per- 
ceived ;  so  that,  since  we  are  not  conscious  of  it  in  ourselves,  we 
must  exclude  it  from  consciousness,  although  it  is  an  active 
knowing,  and  in  no  way  a  restricted  or  suppressed  concept. 

17.  Among  the  many,  and,  for  the  most  part,  very 
complicated  laws  underlying  the  movement  of  con- 
cepts, the  following  is  the  simplest : 

While  the  arrested  portion  [Hemmiingssnmme)  of 
the  concept  sinks,  the  sinking  part  is  at  every  mo- 
ment proportional  to  the  part  unsuppressed. 

By  this  it  is  possible  to  calculate  the  whole  course 
of  the  sinking  even  to  the  statical  point. 

Note. — Mathematically,  the  above  law  may  be  expressed: 
(r  =  S(-[^_g        jin   which  S  =  the   aggregate   amount    sup- 


14:  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES. 

pressed,  t  =  the  time  elapsed  during  the  encounter,  a  =  the 
suppressed  portion  of  all  the  concepts  in  the  time  indicated 
by  t. 

As  the  latter  quantity  is  apportioned  among  the  individual 
concepts,  it  is  found  that  those  which  fall  directly  beneath  the 
statical  threshold  (16)  are  very  quickly  driven  there,  while  the 
rest  do  not  reach  exactly  their  statical  point  in  any  given  finite 
time.  On  account  of  this  latter  circumstance,  the  concepts  in 
the  mind  of  a  man  of  most  equable  temperament  are,  while  he 
is  awake,  always  in  a  state  of  gentle  motion.  This  is  also  the 
primary  reason  why  the  inner  perception  never  meets  an  object 
which  holds  it  quite  motionless. 

18.  When  to  several  concepts  already  near  equi- 
librium a  new  one  comes,  a  movement  arises  which 
causes  them  to  sink  for  a  short  time  beneath  their 
statical  point,  after  which  they  quickly  and  entirely  of 
themselves  rise  again — something  as  a  liquid,  when 
an  object  is  thrown  into  it,  first  sinks  and  then  rises. 
In  this  connection  several  remarkable  circumstances 
occur : 

19.  First,  upon  an  occasion  of  this  kind,  one  of  the 
older  concepts  may  be  removed  entirely  out  of  con- 
sciousness even  by  a  new  concept  that  is  much  weaker 
than  itself.  In  this  case,  however,  the  striving  of  the 
suppressed  concept  is  not  to  be  considered  wholly  in- 
effective, as  shown  above  (see  16) ;  it  works  with  all 
its  force  against  the  concepts  in  consciousness.  Al- 
though its  object  is  not  conceived,  it  produces  a  certain 
condition  of  consciousness.  The  way  in  which  these 
concepts  are  removed  out  of  consciousness  and  yet  are 
effective  therein  may  be  indicated  by  the  expression, 
"  They  are  on  the  mechanical  tlireshold."  The  thresh- 
old mentioned  above  (10)  is  called  for  the  sake  of  dis- 
tinction the  statical  threshold. 


EQUILIBRIUM  AND  MOVEMENT  OF  CONCEPTS.   ]5 

Note, — If  the  concepts  on  the  statical  threshold  acted  in  the 
same  way  as  on  the  mechanical  threshold  we  should  find  our- 
selves in  a  state  of  the  most  intolerable  uneasiness,  or  rather 
the  body  would  be  subjected  to  a  condition  of  tension  that  must 
in  a  few  moments  prove  fatal,  even  as  under  present  conditions 
sudden  fright  will  sometimes  cause  death ;  for  all  the  concepts 
which,  as  we  are  accustomed  to  say,  the  memory  preserves,  and 
which  we  well  know  can  upon  the  slightest  occasion  be  repro- 
duced, are  in  a  state  of  incessant  striving  to  rise,  although  the 
condition  of  consciousness  is  not  at  all  affected  by  them. 

20.  Second,  the  time  during  which  one  or  more 
concepts  linger  upon  the  mechanical  threshold  can  be 
extended  if  a  series  of  new,  although  weaker,  concepts 
come  in  succession  to  them. 

Every  employment  to  which  we  are  unaccustomed 
puts  us  in  this  condition.  The  earlier  concepts  are 
pressed  back  of  the  later  ones.  The  former,  however, 
because  they  are  the  stronger,  remain  tense,  affect  the 
physical  organism  more  and  more,  and  finally  make 
it  necessary  that  the  employment  cease,  when  the  old 
concepts  immediately  rise,  and  we  experience  what  is 
called  a  feeling  of  relief  which  depends  in  part  upon 
the  physical  organism,  although  the  first  cause  is  pure- 
ly psychological. 

21.  Third,  when  several  concepts  are  driven  in 
succession  to  the  mechanical  threshold,  several  sudden 
successive  changes  in  the  laws  of  reciprocal  move- 
ments arise. 

In  this  way  is  to  be  explained  the  fact  that  the 
course  of  our  thoughts  is  so  often  inconsequent, 
abrupt,  and  apparently  irregular.  This  appearance 
deceives  in  the  same  way  as  the  wandering  of  the 
planets.  The  conformity  to  law  in  the  human  mind 
resembles  exactlv  that  in  the  firmament. 


10  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLES. 

Note. — As  a  counterpart  to  the  concepts  which  sink  simul- 
taneously are  to  be  observed  those  which  rise  simultaneously, 
especially  wlien  they  rise  free — i.  e.,  when  a  restricting  environ- 
ment or  a  general  pressure  suddenly  disappears.  With  the  ris- 
ing the  amount  of  suppression  increases.  Hence,  in  the  case  of 
three,  one  may  be,  as  it  were,  bent  back,  and  under  certain  con- 
ditions may  sink  quite  to  the  threshold.  Their  elevation  is 
greater  than  the  depression  to  which,  sinking  together,  they 
would  have  pressed  one  another,  because  in  sinking  the  sum  of 
their  mutual  limitation  depends  upon  the  total  strength,  which 
in  the  gradual  rising  is  not  the  case. 


CHAPTER  III. 

COMPLICATIOXS    A^^D    BLENDI>s"GS. 

22.  The  easily  conceivable  metaphysical  reason 
wliy  opposed  concepts  resist  one  another  is  the  unity 
of  the  soul,  of  which  they  are  the  self-preservations. 
This  reason  explains  without  difficulty  the  combina- 
tion of  our  concepts  (which  combination  is  known  to 
exist).  If,  on  account  of  their  opposition,  they  did 
not  suppress  one  another,  all  concepts  would  compose 
but  one  act  of  one  soul ;  and,  indeed,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  not  divided  into  a  manifold  by  any  kind  of  arrests 
whatever,  they  really  constitute  but  one  act.  Con- 
cepts that  are  on  the  threshold  of  consciousness  can 
not  enter  into  combination  with  others,  as  they  are 
completely  transformed  into  effort  directed  against 
other  definite  concepts,  and  are  thereby,  as  it  were, 
isolated.  In  consciousness,  however,  concepts  combine 
in  two  ways  :  First,  concepts  which  are  not  opposed  or 


COMPLICATIONS  AND  BLENDINGS.  17 

contrasted  with  one  another  (as  a  tone  and  a  color)  so 
far  as  they  meet  unhindered,  form  a  complex ;  second, 
contrasted  concepts  [e.  g.,  red  and  yellow],  in  so  far 
as  they  are  affected  neither  by  accidental  foreign  con- 
cepts nor  by  unavoidable  opposition,  become  blended 
(fused). 

Complexes  may  be  complete ;  blendings  (fusions) 
from  their  nature  must  always  be  (more  or  less)  in- 
complete. 

Note. — Of  such  complexes  as  are  partially  or  almost  com- 
plete, we  have  remarkable  instances  in  the  concepts  of  things 
with  several  characteristics  and  of  words  used  as  signs  of 
thoughts.  In  the  mother-tongue  the  latter,  words  and  thoughts, 
are  so  closely  connected  that  it  would  appear  that  we  think  by 
means  of  words.  (Concerning  both  examples  more  hereafter.) 
Among  the  blendings  are  especially  remarkable,  partly  those 
which  include  in  themselves  an  aesthetic  relation  (which,  taken 
psychologically,  is  created  at  the  same  time  with  the  blending), 
partly  those  which  involve  succession,  in  which  serial  forms 
have  their  origin. 

23.  That  which  is  complicated  or  blended  out  of 
several  concepts  furnishes  an  aggregate  of  force,  and 
for  this  reason  works  according  to  quite  other  statical 
and  mechanical  laws  than  those  according  to  which 
the  individual  concepts  would  have  acted.  Also  the 
thresholds  of  consciousness  change  according  to  the 
complex  or  blending  (fusion),  so  that  on  account  of  a 
combination  a  concept  of  the  very  weakest  kind  may 
be  able  to  remain  and  exert  an  influence  in  conscious- 
ness. 

Note  1. — The  computation  for  complexes  and  blendings  de- 
pends upon  the  same  principles  as  that  for  simple  concepts  ;  it 
is,  however,  much  more  intricate,  especially  for  the  reason  that 
5 


18  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLES. 

in  the  case  of  incomplete  combinations  the  forces  as  well  as  tlieir 
arrests  are  only  partially  interwoven  with  one  another  (and  do 
not  fully  enter  as  factors  into  the  product). 

Note  2. — Combinations  of  concepts  consist  not  only  of  two 
or  three  members,  but  they  often  contain  many  members  in  very 
unequal  degrees  of  complication,  or  blending,  in  which  case  no 
calculation  can  estimate  the  multiplicity.  Nevertheless,  from 
the  latter,  the  simplest  cases  may  be  chosen  and  the  more  intri- 
cate ones  estimated  according  to  them.  For  every  science  the 
simplest  laws  are  the  most  important. 

24  FroUem :  After  an  encounter  between  two 
concepts,  P  and  11,  the  remainders,  r  and  p,  are  blended 
(or  incompletely  united).  The  problem  is  to  indicate 
what  help  one  of  the  two  concepts,  in  case  it  should 
be  still  more  suppressed,  Avotild  receive  from  the  other. 

Note. — Solution:  Let  P  be  the  helping  concept;  it  helps 
with  a  force  equal  to  r,  but  n  can  only  appropriate  this  force  in 

the  ratio  of  p :  n.      Hence  through  P,  IT  receives  the  help    ^. 

To 

and  in  the  same  way  P  receives  from  n  the  help  -^ 

The  proof  lies  immediately  in  the  analysis  of  the 
ideas.  It  is  plain  that  the  tw^o  remainders,  r  and  p, 
taken  together,  determine  the  degree  of  union  between 
the  two  concepts.  One  of  them  is  the  helping  force  ; 
the  other,  compared  with  the  concept  to  which  it  be- 
longs, is  to  be  considered  as  a  fraction  of  the  whole ; 
and,  of  the  totality  of  help  which  could  be  rendered 
by  the  first  remainder,  it  yields  that  portion  winch 
here  attains  efficient  activity. 

25.  The  following  principles  may  be  observed 
here  : 

a.  Beyond  the  point  of  union  no  help  extends  its 
influence. 


I 


COxMPLICATlO.NS   AND   BLEXDINGS.  19 

If  the  concept  n  has  more  clearness  in  conscious- 
ness than  the  remainder  p  indicates,  then  by  the  striv- 
ing of  the  concept  P,  which  might  come  to  the  help 
of  the  former,  already  more  than  enough  has  been 
done ;  hence  for  the  present  it  exerts  no  more  iuilu- 
ence. 

h.  The  farther  the  one  of  the  concepts  is  below  the 
point  of  union,  so  much  the  more  effectively  does  the 
other  help. 

Note. — This  gives  the  following  diiferential  equation : 

n     P  _  ^^ 

whence  by  integration  (^  =  p  *  -,  _       fr. ) 

This  equation  contains  the  germ  of  manifold  inrestigations 
which  penetrate  the  whole  of  psychology.  It  is  indeed  so  sim- 
ple that  it  can  never  really  occur  in  the  human  soul,  but  all  in- 
vestigations into  applied  mathematics  begin  with  such  simple 
presuppositions  as  only  exist  in  abstraction — e.  g.,  the  mathe- 
matical lever,  or  the  laws  of  bodies  falling  in  a  vacuum.  Here 
merely  the  influence  of  the  help  is  considered,  which,  if  every- 
thing depended  upon  it  alone,  would  bring  into  consciousness 
during  the  time  t  a  quantity  a>  from  n.  Besides,  if  we  take  into 
consideration  the  single  circumstance  that  n  meets  with  an  un- 
avoidable arrest  from  other  concepts,  then  the  calculation  be- 
comes so  complicated  that  it  can  be  only  approximately  solved 
by  an  integration  of  the  following  form  : 

d^u  =  ad^udt  +  hdudf^  +  cu)dt^. 

It  is  self-evident  that  it  much  more  nearly  expresses  the 
facts  which  are  to  be  observed  experimentally. 

26.  The  foregoing  contains  the  foundation  of  the 
theory  of  mediate  reproduction,  which,  according  to 
ordinary  language,  is  derived  from  the  association  of 
ideas  or  concepts.  Before  pursuing  this  further  we 
must  mention  immediate  reproduction — i.  e.,  that  re- 


20  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLES. 

production  which  by  its  own  force  follows  upon  the 
yielding  of  the  hindrances.  The  ordinary  case  is  that 
a  concept  gained  by  a  new  act  of  jjerception  causes  the 
old  concept  of  the  same  or  of  a  similar  object  to  rise 
into  consciousness.  This  occurs  Avhen  the  concept 
furnished  by  the  new  act  of  perception  presses  back 
everything  present  in  consciousness  o^jposed  to  the 
old  concept,  which  is  similar  to  the  new  one.  Then, 
w^ithout  further  difficulty,  the  old  concept  rises  of  it- 
self. From  this  are  to  be  observed  the  following  con- 
ditions, which  are  to  be  found  by  calculation,  of  which, 
however,  no  idea  can  be  given  here : 

a.  In  the  beginning  the  rising  is  in  proportion  to 
the  square  of  the  time,  if  the  new  act  of  perception 
occurs  suddenly ;  but  to  the  cube  of  the  time,  if  the 
latter  (as  is  usual)  is  formed  by  a  gradual  and  linger- 
ing act  of  apprehension. 

h.  The  course  of  the  rising  is  adjusted  principally 
to  the  strength  of  the  concept  furnished  by  the  new 
act  of  perception  in  proportion  to  the  opposing  one 
which  it  has  pressed  back  ;  but  the  individual  strength 
of  the  rising  concept  only  has  influence  under  special 
conditions.  It  can,  as  it  were,  only  use  this  strength 
in  the  free  space  which  is  given  to  it. 

c.  The  rising  concept  blends  as  such  with  the  con- 
cept, similar  to  it,  furnished  by  the  new  act  of  percep- 
tion. Since  it  does  not  rise  entirely,  however,  the 
blending  is  incomplete. 

d.  The  fact  that  immediate  reproduction  is  not 
limited  entirely  to  the  old  concept  of  exactly  the  same 
kind,  but  extends  to  the  more  or  less  similar  so  far 
as  to  receive  partial  freedom  from  the  new  act  of  per- 
ception, is  of  special  imi:)ortance.     The  whole  repro- 


COMPLICATIONS  AND   BLENDINGS.  21 

diiction  may  be  indicated  by  the  name  of  vaulting 
(or  arching).  In  the  case  of  a  long  duration,  or  of 
a  frequent  repetition  of  a  new  act  of  perception,  a 
second  important  process,  which  we  call  tapering  (or 
pointing),  follows.  The  peculiarity  of  this  latter  con- 
sists in  the  fact  that  the  concepts  which  are  less 
similar  are  again  arrested  by  the  concepts  received 
through  the  new  act  of  perception,  as  the  old  con- 
cepts bring  with  them  into  consciousness  others  which 
are  opposed  to  the  new,  so  that  finally  the  concept 
that  is  entirely  homogeneous  finds  itself  alone  favored, 
and  forms,  as  it  were,  a  tapering  summit  where  the 
highest  point  of  the  vault  (or  arch)  was  heretofore. 

27.  Where  the  circumstances  allow,  with  this  im- 
mediate rej^roduction  is  united  that  mediate  repro- 
duction mentioned  in  25.  The  concept  P,  mentioned 
above,  is  reproduced  immediately  (i.  e.,  without  the 
mediation  of  others),  then  the  free  space  allowed  it  may 
be  regarded  as  that  r  (spoken  of  in  25)  or  as  a  force 
which  strives  to  raise  the  n  blended  with  it  to  its  point 
of  blending  p. 

Note,— As  the  free  space  gradually  increasing  (and  again 
decreasing)  is  given,  we  must  for  the  present  observation  regard 

r  in  the  formula  a  =  p  (^  _q    — jasa  variable  quantity,  and 

indeed  as  a  function  of  that  quantity  upon  which  the  proposi- 
tions in  26  depend. 

28.  The  most  important  applications  of  the  previ- 
ous theories  are,  if  with  different  remainders  r,  r\  r'\ 
etc.,  of  one  and  the  same  concept  P  several  n,  n',  n", 
etc.,  are  united,  by  which,  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  we 
may  assume  the  remainders  of  the  latter,  viz.,  p,  p\  p", 
to  be  equal ;  also,  11,  XT',  etc.,  may  be  equal. 


22  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES. 

A  concept  acts  vpoji  several  nnitcd  with  it  in  tJie 
same  series  accordiug  to  the  time  in  which  its  remain- 
ders {hy  which  it  is  united  with  those  others  according 
to  quantity)  stand. 

Note. — In  order  to  avoid  diffuseness,  this  most  important 
law  is  here  only  very  incompletely  expressed  in  words.  We 
recognize  it  better  and   more  clearly  in  the  formula  given : 

0}  —  p  i ^  —J,  if  instead  of  one  r  we  substitute  different 

^  \1  —  e     n/' 

smaller  and  greater,  r,  r',  r",  etc.  But  the  more  exact  calcula- 
tion mentioned  in  25  shows  that  the  n,  IT',  n",  etc.,  blended 
with  them,  not  only  rise,  but  sink  again,  as  it  were,  to  make 
place  for  each  other,  and  in  the  order  of  r,  r,'  r",  etc. 

29.  Here  is  discovered  the  ground  of  the  genuine 
reproduction  or  of  memory  so  far  as  it  brings  to  us  a 
series  of  concepts  in  the  same  order  in  which  they 
were  first  received.  In  order  to  comprehend  this,  we 
must  consider  what  union  arises  among  several  con- 
cepts that  are  successively  given. 

Let  a  series,  a,  b,  c,  d,  be  given  by  perception  ;  then, 
from  the  first  movement  of  the  perception  and  during 
its  continuance,  a  is  exposed  to  an  arrest  from  other 
concepts  already  in  consciousness.  In  the  mean  time, 
rt,  already  partially  sunken  in  consciousness,  became 
more  and  more  obscured  when  b  came  to  it.  This  b 
at  first,  unobscured,  blended  with  the  sinking  a  ;  then 
followed  c,  which  itself  unobscured,  united  with  J, 
which  was  becoming  obscured,  and  also  with  «,  which 
was  still  more  obscured.  Similarly  followed  d,  to  be- 
come united  in  different  degrees  with  a,  b,  c.  From 
this  arises  a  law  for  each  of  these  concepts  that  states 
how,  after  the  whole  series  has  been,  for  a  time,  removed 
out  of  consciousness,  upon  the  re-cmergence  of  one  of 


OF  COMPLEXES  AND   BLENDINGS.  23 

the  concepts  of  such  a  series  into  consciousness,  every 
other  concept  of  the  same  series  is  called  up.  Let  it  be 
assumed  that  a  rises  first,  then  it  is  united  more  with 
^,  less  with  c,  and  still  less  with  d ;  backward,  however, 
1)^  c,  and  d  are  blended  collectively  in  an  unobscured 
condition  with  the  remainders  of  a ;  hence  a  seeks  to 
bring  them  all  again  into  an  unobscured  condition 
[i.  e.,  into  full  consciousness].  But  a  acts  the  most 
quickly  and  strongly  upon  ^,  more  slowly  upon  c,  still 
more  slowly  upon  ^,  etc.,  by  which  close  investiga- 
tion shows  that  l  sinks  again,  while  c  rises,  even  as 
c  sinks  when  d  rises ;  in  short,  the  series  follows  in 
the  same  order  as  first  given.  On  the  contrary,  let  us 
assume  that  c  is  originally  reproduced,  then  c  acts 
upon  d  and  the  following  members  of  the  series  ex- 
actly in  the  same  way  as  was  indicated  in  the  case 
of  a — i.  e.,  the  series  c^  rZ,  etc.,  unfolds  gradually  in  the 
order  of  its  succession.  On  the  contrary,  h  and  a 
experience  quite  another  influence.  The  unobscured 
c  was  blended  with  their  different  remainders.  Then 
c  acts  upon  them  with  its  whole  strength,  and  without 
delay,  but  only  to  call  back  the  remainders  of  a  and  h 
united  with  it,  to  bring  a  part  of  t  and  a  smaller  part 
of  a  into  consciousness.  Thus  it  happens  that  when 
we  remember  something  in  the  middle  of  a  known 
series,  the  preceding  part  of  the  series  presents  itself  all 
at  once  in  a  lessened  degree  of  clearness,  while  the  por- 
tion following  comes  before  the  mind  in  the  same  order 
as  the  series  it  brings  with  tt.  But  the  series  never 
runs  backward ;  an  anagram  from  a  well-comprehended 
word  never  originates  without  intentional  effort. 

30.  Several  series  may  cross  one  another,  e.  g.,  ^,  J, 
c,  d^  e,  and  a,  ^,  c,  8,  c,  in  wliich  c  is  common  to  the  two 


24  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLES. 

series.  If  c  were  reproduced  alone,  it  would  strive  to 
call  up  d  and  e  as  well  as  8  and  €.  If,  however,  b 
comes  into  consciousness  first,  then  the  first  series 
comes  decidedly  forward  on  account  of  the  united  help 
of  b  and  c,  yet  the  oppositions  among  the  members  of 
both  series,  in  this  case,  have  each  their  own  influence. 

We  may  remark  that,  to  the  simple  tj'pe  or  model 
here  given,  a  variety  of  complicated  psychological  oc- 
currences may  be  adjusted.  The  same  c  can  be  held 
as  the  common  point  of  intersection  for  many  hun- 
dred series.  On  account  of  the  manifold  oppositions 
in  these  series,  the  common  c  may  cause  none  of  the 
members  to  rise  perceptibly,  but  so  soon  as  b  and  a 
come  forward,  determining  c  more  closely,  the  inde- 
cision will  disappear,  and  the  uppermost  series  will 
really  come  before  the  mind. 

31.  The  foregoing  depends  upon  the  difference 
presupposed  in  the  remainders  r,  r',  r",  etc.  (28).  But 
in  order  that  this  difference  may  have  its  influence, 
the  concept  to  which  these  remainders  belong  must 
come  forward  sufficiently  into  consciousness.  Let  it 
be  granted  that  it  is  arrested  to  such  a  degree  that 
its  active  representation  amounts  to  no  more  than  that 
of  the  smallest  among -the  remainders  r,  r',  r",  etc., 
then  it  works  equally  on  the  whole  series  of  concepts 
blended  with  it  so  that  a  vague  total  impression  of  all 
comes  into  consciousness.  The  reason  for  this  is  ex- 
plained in  sections  27  and  12.  The  remainders  are  not 
different  parts  severed  from  one  and  the  same  concept ; 
hence  if  a  little  of  the  latter  is  in  consciousness,  we 
must  not  first  question  whether  this  little  may  be  one 
and  perhaps  quite  the  smallest  among  those  remainders, 
but  we  must  assume  that  it  really  is  so,  although  at 


OF  COMPLEXES   AND  BLENDINGS.  25 

the  same  time  it  may  be  a  part  of  every  other  greater 
remainder.  If  the  active  concept  gradually  rises  into 
consciousness,  then  the  remainders,  from  the  smaller 
to  the  greater,  one  after  the  other,  gain  a  special  law 
of  action.  By  this  the  above  vague  impression  of  the 
whole  rises,  in  which  lies  a  whole  series  of  concepts, 
and  these  are  gradually  developed  out  of  one  another. 

Note. — Here,  among  others,  must  be  compared  the  phenom- 
ena resulting  from  exercise  and  skill ;  that,  moreover,  not  every 
course  of  thought  repeats  faithfully  the  series  constructed  ;  and 
upon  that  is  based,  in  part,  the  ground  of  the  inequalities  in  the 
quantities  n  and  p  (25),  with  whose  possible  difference  we  can 
not  deal  further  here.  Additional  facts  may  be  deduced  from 
the  following  • 

32.  If  free-rising  concepts  (of  which  mention  was 
made  in  the  closing  remarks  of  the  last  chapter)  should 
blend  in  regular  gradation,  they  would  be  subject  to 
other  laws  of  reproduction  which  originate  out  of  the 
blending,  and  are  distinguished  and  determined  ac- 
cording to  their  differences.  Upon  occasion,  likewise 
arises  a  process  of  construction  and  formation  of  series 
which  differ  from  the  form  of  analogous  concepts  in 
case  the  latter  are  given  and  then  sink  out  of  con- 
sciousness. From  this  may  be  explained  the  conflict 
between  things  as  we  perceive  them  and  as  we  think 
them,  as  well  as  the  tendency  to  regard  them  otherwise 
than  as  they  first  present  themselves ;  consequently 
the  modifying  action  of  the  self -activity  upon  that 
which  lies  before  the  perception.  This  may  be  ob- 
served especially  in  the  case  of  children  who  can  have 
no  set  purpose  in  the  matter. 


20  FUNDAME^'TxVL  JUilNClPLES. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

CONCEPTS    AS   Till-:    SOURCE    OF    MEXTAL   STATES. 

33.  OxE  of  tlie  objections  against  mathematical 
psychology  is  that  mathematics  defines  only  quantity, 
while  psychology  must  especially  consider  quality.  It 
is  now  time  to  meet  this  objection,  and  to  collect  the 
explanations  of  those  mental  states  which  the  forego- 
ing presents. 

Here  we  must  first  remark  that  the  peculiar  striv- 
ing of  concepts  for  representation  (11)  never  appears 
immediately  in  consciousness,  for,  just  so  far  as  con- 
cepts change  into  striving,  they  are  removed  out  of 
consciousness.  Also,  the  gradual  sinking  of  concepts 
can  not  be  perceived.  A  special  instance  of  this  is, 
that  no  one  is  able  to  observe  his  own  falling  asleep. 

So  far  as  it  represents  or  conceives,  the  soul  is 
called  mind ;  so  far  as  it  feels  and  desires,  it  is  called 
the  heart  or  disposition  (Gemiltli).  The  disposition 
of  the  hearty  however,  has  its  sonrce  in  the  ynind — in 
other  words,  feeling  and  desiring  are  conditions,  and, 
for  the  most  part,  changeable  conditions  of  concepts. 
The  emotions  indicate  this,  while  experience,  upon  the 
w^hole,  confirms  it :  the  man  feels  little  of  the  joys  and 
sorrows  of  his  youth  ;  but  what  the  boy  learns  correct- 
ly, the  graybeard  still  knows.  The  extent,  however,  to 
which  a  steadfast  disposition  and,  above  all,  character 
can  be  given,  will  be  shown  later  in  the  exj)lanations 
of  the  principles  above  presented. 

34.  First,  there  is  a  blending  of  concepts  not 
only  after  the  arrest  (22),  but  quite  a  different  one 
before  it,  provided  the  degree  of  opposition  (15)  be 


CONCEPTS,  SOURCE  OF  ALL  MENTAL  STATES.    27 

sufficiently  smalL  A  principle  of  aesthetic  judgment 
lies  in  this.  Pleasant  feelings  in  their  narrowest  sense, 
together  with  their  oj^posites,  must  be  regarded  as 
analogous  to  these  esthetic  judgments — i.  e.,  as  spring- 
ing from  the  relation  of  many  concepts  which  do  not 
assert  themselves  individually,  but  rather  which  per- 
haps, for  psychological  reasons,  can  not  be  perceived 
when  separated. 

Note. — In  carrying  out  this  investigation,  the  series  of  tone 
relations  upon  which  music  depends  may  be  presented  as  a  sub- 
ject of  experiment.  Among  simple  tones,  the  degree  of  arrest 
(the  interval  of  tones),  entirely  alone  and  without  means,  deter- 
mines the  aesthetic  character  of  its  relation.  It  is  also  certain 
that  the  psychological  explanation  (widely  different  from  the 
acoustical)  of  all  harmony  is  to  be  sought  in  the  difference  be- 
tween the  degrees  of  arrest,  and  that  it  must  be  found  there. 
The  necessary  calculations  for  this  are,  for  the  most  part,  to  be 
found  in  the  second  volume  of  the  Konigsberg  Archives  for 
Philosophy.  Of  the  somewhat  extensive  investigations,  only 
the  principal  ones  which  experience  decidedly  confirms  can  be 
given  here  : 

Wlien  the  forces,  into  which  concejjts,  through  their 
similarity  and  their  contrasts,  separate  one  another, 
are  equally  strong,  there  arises  disharmony.  If,  how- 
ever, one  of  these  forces  he  opposed  to  the  others  in  such 
a  relation  that  it  is  driven  to  the  statical  threshold  (16) 
hy  them,  then  a  harmonious  relation  will  prevail. 

35.  Second,  a  principle  of  contrast  is  to  be  found 
in  the  com23lexes  (22),  which  we  here  consider  com- 
plete. The  complexes  a-{-  a  and  h -\-  ft  are  similar, 
provided  a  :  a  =  l?  :  /3;  it  not,  they  are  dissimilar.  Let 
the  degree  of  arrest  between  a  and  h  equal  p,  and  that 
between  a  and  (3  equal  tt.  Now,  if  in  similar  com- 
plexes, p  =  TT,  then,  and  then  only,  will  the  individual 


28  FUNDAMENTAL   PKIXClPLES. 

concepts  be  arrested,  exactly  as  if  they  had  not  been 
in  any  combination  ;  also  no  feeling  of  contrast  arises, 
inasmnch  as  the  arrest  is  successful  only  when  the  op- 
posing forces  bring  the  feeling  of  contrast  with  them ; 
but,  in  every  yariation  from  the  case  presented,  the  less 
opposed  concepts  are  affected  by  their  combination 
with  the  other  two,  but  in  this  very  way  a  part  of  the 
arrest  will  be  withheld  from  the  latter ;  consequently, 
notwithstanding  the  opposition,  something  remains  in 
consciousness  that  resists,  and  in  this  lies  the  feeling 
of  contrast.  If  tt  <  j;,  then  the  contrast  between  a 
and  1)  will  be  felt,  not  that  between  a  and  y8.  If  tt  >  7?, 
the  case  is  reversed.  When  tt  =  (9,  the  contrast  be- 
tween a  and  h  is  the  greatest. 

36.  Third,  a  complex  « -(-  a  is  reproduced  by  a 
concept  furnished  by  a  new  act  of  perception  sim.ilar 
to  a  (26).  Now,  when  a,  on  account  of  its  combina- 
tion with  «,  comes  forward,  it  meets  in  consciousness 
a  concept  opposed  to  it,  ^.  Tlien  a  will  be,  at  the 
same  time,  driven  forward  and  held  lack.  In  this 
situation,  it  is  the  source  of  an  unpleasant  feeling 
which  may  give  rise  to  desire,  viz.,  for  the  object  rep- 
resented by  a  provided  the  opposition  offered  by  p  is 
weaker  than  the  force  which  a  brings  with  it. 

This  is  ordinarily  the  case ;  desires  are  excited  by  a 
remembrance  of  their  object.  When  the  remembrance 
is  strengthened  by  several  incidental  concepts,  the  im- 
pulses of  desire  are  renewed.  As  often  as  the  oppos- 
ing concepts  (i.  e.,  concepts  of  the  hindrances  which 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  longing)  attain  prej^onderance, 
they  produce  a  painful  feeling  of  privation. 

37.  Fourth,  a  concept  comes  forward  into  con- 
sciousness by  its  own  strength   (perhaps  reproduced 


CONCEPTS,  SOURCE  OF  ALL  MENTAL  STATES.    29 

according  to  the  method  described  in  2G),  at  the  same 
time  being  called  forward  by  several  helping  concepts 
(24).  Since  each  of  these  helps  has  its  own  measure 
of  time  in  which  it  acts  (according  to  the  formnla  in 
25),  then  the  helps  may  strengthen  one  another  against 
a  possible  resistance,  but  they  can  not  increase  their 
own  velocity.  The  movement  in  advancing  takes  place 
only  with  that  velocity  which  is  the  greatest  among 
several  concepts  meeting  together,  hut  it  is  favored  hy 
all  tlie  rest.  This  favoring  is  part  of  the  process  which 
takes  place  in  consciousness,  but  in  no  way  is  it  any- 
thing represented  or  conceived.  Hence  it  can  only  be 
called  a  feeling — without  doubt  a  feeling  of  pleasure. 

Here  is  the  source  of  the  cheerful  disposition,  es- 
pecially of  joy  in  successful  activity.  Here  belong 
various  movements,  instigated  from  without,  wdiich 
do  not  accelerate  but  favor  one  another  as  in  the  case 
of  dancing  and  music.  Of  the  same  character  is  the 
action  according  to  several  centering  motives,  and 
such  too  is  the  insight  based  on  understanding  several 
reasons  which  confirm  one  another. 

38.  In  general,  it  may  be  observed  that  feelings 
and  desires  have  not  their  source  in  the  process  or  act 
of  conception  in  general,  but  always  in  certain  par- 
ticular concepts.  Hence  there  may  be  at  the  same 
time  many  different  feelings  and  desires,  and  these 
may  either  agree  or  entirely  disagree  one  with  the 
other. 


30  FUNDAMENTxVL   PRINCIPLES. 

CHAPTER   V. 

THE    CO-OPERATIOX  OF  SEVERAL  MASSES  OF  COXCEPTS 
OF    UNEQUAL    STRENGTH. 

39.  From  the  foregoing,  it  may,  in  a  way,  be  per- 
ceived that  after  a  considerable  number  of  concepts  in 
all  kinds  of  combinations  is  j^resent,  every  new  act  of 
perception  must  work  as  an  excitant  by  which  some 
will  be  arrested,  others  called  forward  and  strength- 
ened, progressing  series  interrupted  or  set  again  in  mo- 
tion, and  this  or  that  mental  state  occasioned.  These 
manifestations  must  become  more  complex  if,  as  is 
usual,  the  concept  received  by  the  new  act  of  percep- 
tion contains  in  itself  a  multiplicity  or  variety,  that  at 
the  same  time  enables  it  to  hold  its  place  in  several 
combinations  and  series,  and  gives  them  a  fresh  im- 
pulse which  brings  them  into  new  relations  of  opposi- 
tion or  blending  with  one  another.  By  this,  the  con- 
cepts brought  by  the  new  act  of  perception  are  assimi- 
lated to  the  older  concepts  in  such  a  way  as  to  suffer 
somewhat  after  the  first  excitation  has  worked  to  the 
extent  of  its  power,  because  the  old  concepts  —  on 
account  of  their  combinations  with  one  another — are 
much  stronger  than  the  new  individuals  which  are 
added. 

40.  If,  however,  already  very  strong  complexes  and 
blendings  with  many  members  have  been  formed, 
then  the  same  relation  which  existed  between  the  old 
and  the  new  concepts  may  be  repeated  within  between 
the  old  concepts.  Weaker  concepts,  which,  according 
to  any  kind  of  law,  enter  into  consciousness,  act  as  ex- 
citants upon  tliose  masses  before  mentioned,  and  are 


CO-OPERATIOX   OF   UNEQUAL   CONCEPTS.        31 

received  and  ap^^ropriated  by  them  (apperceived)  just 
as  in  the  case  of  a  new  sense-impression  ;  hence  ilte 
inner  perception  is  analogous  to  the  outer.  Self-con- 
sciousness is  not  the  subject  of  discussion  here,  al- 
though it  is  very  often  combined  with  the  above. 

41.  In  what  has  been  said,  lies  that  which  experi- 
ence confirms,  viz.,  that  the  inner  perception  is  never 
a  passive  apprehension,  but  always  (even  against  the 
will)  active.  The  apperceived  concepts  do  not  con- 
tinue rising  or  sinking  according  to  their  own  laws, 
but  they  are  interrupted  in  their  movements  by  the 
more  powerful  masses  which  drive  back  whatever  is 
opposed  to  them  although  it  is  inclined  to  rise  ;  and 
in  the  case  of  that  which  is  similar  to  them  although 
it  is  on  the  point  of  sinking,  they  take  hold  of  it  and 
blend  it  with  themselves. 

42.  It  is  worth  the  trouble  to  indicate  how  far  this 
difference  among  concepts — which  we  might  be  in- 
clined to  divide  into  dead  and  living — may  be  carried. 

Let  us  recall  the  concepts  on  the  statical  thresh- 
old (IG).  These  are,  indeed,  in  effect  nothing  less  than 
dead;  for,  in  the  condition  of  arrest  in  which  they 
stand,  they  are  not  able  by  their  own  effort  to  effect 
anything  whatever  [toward  rising  into  consciousness]. 
Xevertheless,  through  the  combination  in  which  they 
stand,  they  may  be  reproduced,  and,  besides,  they  will 
often  be  driven  back  in  whole  heaps  and  series  by 
those  more  powerful  masses,  as  when  the  leaves  of  a 
book  are  turned  hurriedly. 

43.  If  the  apperceived  concepts — or  at  least  some  of 
them — are  not  on  the  statical  threshold,  then  the  ap- 
perceiving  concepts  suffer  some  violence  from  them ; 
also  the  latter  may  be  subject  to  arrest  from  another 


32  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES. 

side,  ill  wliicli  case  the  inner  perception  is  interrupteil ; 
through  this,  uncertainty  and  irresoUition  may  be  ex- 
phiined. 

The  apperceiving  mass  may  be,  in  its  turn  apper- 
ceived  by  another  mass  ;  but  for  this  to  occur,  there 
must  be  present  several  concept  masses  of  distinctly 
different  degrees  of  strength.  Hence  it  is  somewhat 
seldom  that  the  inner  perception  rises  to  this  second 
power  [the  apperception  of  apperception],  and  only  in 
the  case  of  philosophical  ideas  is  this  series  considered 
as  one  which  might  be  prolonged  into  infinity. 


CHAPTER  yi. 

A    GLANCE    OYER   THE    CONNECTION    BETWEEN    BODY 
AND   SOUL. 

44.  Up  to  the  present  chapter,  concepts  have  been 
considered  as  present  in  the  soul  without  any  question 
concerning  their  origin  or  concerning  foreign  influ- 
ences. This  has  been  done  for  simplicity.  Now,  sense- 
perception  in  part  and  physiological  influences  in  part, 
together  with  concepts  already  present,  must  be  con- 
sidered. 

45.  Even  from  experience  it  may  be  assumed  that 
each  act  of  perception  of  any  considerable  strength  re- 
quires a  short  space  of  time  for  its  creation ;  but  expe- 
rience and  metaphysics  at  the  same  time  teach  that 
by  delaying  longer,  the  strength  of  the  perception  in 
no  way  increases  in  proportion  to  the  time,  but,  the 


THE  CONXECTIOX  BETWEEN  liODY  AND  SOUL.    33 

sti'onger  the  i^erception  already  is,  so  much  the  less  does 
it  increase,  and  from  this  it  follows,  by  an  easy  calcula- 
tion, that  there  is  a  final  limit  to  its  strength  which 
the  attained  concept  very  soon  reaches,  and  above 
which  even  by  an  infinite  delay  the  same  percejjtion 
will  not  be  able  to  rise.  This  is  the  law  of  diminish- 
ing snscejjtibiliti/,  and  the  strength  of  the  sense-im- 
pression is  quite  indifferent  in  regard  to  this  limit. 
The  weakest  sense-perception  may  give  the  concept 
quite  as  much  strength  as  the  strongest,  only  it  re- 
quires for  this  a  somewhat  longer  time. 

4G.  Every  human  concept  really  consists  of  infi- 
nitely small  elementary  apprehensions  very  unlike  one 
another,  which  in  the  different  moments  of  time  dur- 
ing the  continuance  of  the  act  of  perception  were 
created  little  by  little.  However,  if  during  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  perception  an  arrest  caused  by  old 
opposed  concepts  did  not  occur,  these  apprehensions 
would  be  all  necessarily  blended  into  a  single,  undi- 
vided total  force.  For  this  reason  the  total  force  will 
be  perceptibly  less  than  the  sum  of  all  the  elementary 
apprehensions. 

47.  In  early  childhood  a  much  larger  supply  of 
simple  sense-concepts  is  generated  than  in  all  the  fol- 
lowing years.  Indeed,  the  work  of  the  after-years  con- 
sists in  making  the  greatest  possible  number  of  com- 
binations from  this  supply.  Although  this  suscepti- 
bility is  never  entirely  extinguished,  yet,  if  there  were 
not  a  kind  of  renewal  of  it,  the  age  of  manhood  would 
be  more  indifferent  and  more  unfruitful  in  sense-im- 
pressions than  it  really  is. 

Though  concepts  on  the  statical  threshold  are 
quite  without  influence  for  that  which  goes  on  in  con- 
6 


3 J:  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCirLES. 

sciousness  (10),  tlioy  can  not  weaken  the  susceptibility 
to  new  perceptions  similar  to  themselves.  Hence  this 
receptivity  would  be  completely  re-established  if  the 
earlier  ratio  of  arrest  were  not  quite  changed  by  the 
new  acts  of  j^erception,  and  a  certain  freedom  to  re-_ 
produce  themselves  directly  given  to  the  older  con- 
cepts (26).  When  this  happens,  the  receptivity  de- 
creases. The  greater  the  number  of  old  concepts  of 
the  same  kind  present  in  consciousness — this  means 
usually  the  longer  one  has  lived — so  much  greater  is 
the  number  of  concepts  which  upon  a  given  occasion 
enter  at  the  same  time  into  consciousness ;  and  thus 
with  years  the  renewal  of  receptivity  diminishes. 

48.  The  above  statements  refer  not  only  to  con- 
cepts of  exactly  the  same  kind,  but  to  all-  whose  de- 
gree of  opposition  is  a  fi-action.  This  can  not  be 
developed  here,  since  in  the  foregoing  nothing  exact 
could  be  said  of  the  difference  between  the  degrees  of 
opposition. 

40.  It  is  to  be  especially  observed  that  the  influ- 
ence of  the  body  upon  psychical  manifestations  is 
shown  in  three  ways — its  repression  {Druclc)^  its  ex- 
citation {Resonanz)^  and  its  co-operation  in  action. 
Upon  this  are  the  following  preliminary  remarks  : 

50.  Physiological  repression  arises  when  the  accom- 
panying conditions,  which  should  correspond  to  the 
changes  in  the  soul,  can  not  follow  without  hin- 
drance ;  hence  the  hindrance  will  also  be  felt  as  such 
in  the  soul  because  -the  conditions  of  each  affect 
both.  This  repression  is  often  merely  a  retarding 
force,  to  suit  which  the  mental  movements  must  pro- 
ceed more  slowly,  as  is  the  case  with  slow  minds  that 
consume  time   and  are  stupefied  by  quick   changes. 


THE  CONNECTION  BETWEEN  BODY  AND  SOUL.    35 

Often,  hoAvever,  repression  is  similar  to  an  arresting 
force,  and  as  such  it  can  be  mathematically  calculated, 
as  when  it  increases  the  number  of  opposed  concepts 
by  one  or  more.  By  it  all  active  concepts  may  be 
driven  to  the  statical  threshold ;  and  here  we  have  the 
explanation  of  sleep.  In  this  case  it  would  be  a  deep 
and  complete  sleep. 

51.  Physiological  excitation  {Resonanz)  arises  when 
the  accompanying  bodily  conditions  change  more 
quickly  or  become  stronger  than  would  be  necessary  to 
merely  cause  no  hindrance  to  the  mental  movements. 
Then  the  soul,  again  in  response  to  the  body,  will  act 
more  quickly  and  more  vigorously.  The  soul  must 
also  share  the  resulting  relaxations  of  the  body,  as  in 
intoxication  and  passion. 

52.  The  co-operation  of  the  soul  and  body  in  ex- 
ternal action  can  not  originally  proceed  from  the  soul, 
for  the  will  does  not  know  in  the  least  what  influence 
it  really  exerts  upon  the  nerves  and  muscles.  But  in 
the  child  exists  an  organic  necessity  for  movement* 
At  first  the  soul  accompanies  this  and  the  active  move- 
ments arising  from  it,  with  its  feelings.  The  feelings, 
however,  become  connected  with  perceptions  of  the 
members  moved.  If,  in  the  result,  the  concept  arising 
from  such  a  perception  acts  as  a  means  of  arousing 
desire  (16),  then  the  feeling  connected  with  it  arises, 
and  to  this  latter  as  accompanying  bodily  condition 
belong  all  those  phenomena  in  the  nerves  and  muscles 
by  which  organic  movement  is  actually  determined  or 
defined.  Thus  it  happens  that  concepts  come  to  ap- 
pear as  a  source  of  mechanical  forces  in  the  outer 
world. 


PAET   SECOND. 

EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 


FIRST  DIVISION :  (I)  PSYCHOLOGICAL   PHENOMENA 

ACCORDING  TO   THE   HYPOTHESIS  OF 

MENTAL  FACULTIES. 


CHAPTER   I. 

A   SURVEY   OF   THE   ASSUMED   MEIs"TAL    FACULTIES. 

53.  Eeom  the  foregoing  fundamental  principles 
many  known  facts  are  to  be  explained,  while  many 
others  still  remain  obscure.  It  is  not  necessary  at 
present  to  define  this  difference  more  closely.  The 
question  how  far  the  proposed  explanations  reach  may 
silently  accompany  the  following  exposition  until  the 
facts  are  examined,  for  then  the  thread  of  investiga- 
tion may  be  more  conveniently  taken  up  ;  but  the 
commonly  accepted  mental  faculties  need  now  a  criti- 
cal elucidation  which  must  advance  gradually  with  the 
observation  of  the  facts  themselves. 

Combined  with  the  effort  to  bring  together  a  mani- 
fold is  naturally  implied  a  separation  of  that  which 
manifestly  does  not  admit  of  union,  since  it  is  either 
excluded  or  else  makes  its  appearance  only  under  un- 
usual circumstances.  Inasmuch  as  the  teachers  of 
psychology  have  undertaken  to  show  the  human  mind 


THE  ASSUxMED  MENTAL  FACULTIES.  37 

in  the  form  of  a  picture,  they  have  at  first  omitted 
those  features  which  constitute  the  distinguishing 
characteristics  of  the  individual,  as  well  as  the  chang- 
ino-  conditions  of  human  nature.  We  reserve  these 
for  the  second  division,  and  keep  for  the  first  only  that 
which  is  considered  an  original  and  essential  differ- 
entiation of  the  human  mind  into  various  functions. 

54.  Right  here,  however,  on  account  of  the  peculiar 
indefiniteness  of  psychological  facts,  it  is  impossible 
to  draw  a  dividing  line.  The  man  presented  by  the 
teachers  of  psychology  is  the  social,  the  educated  man, 
who  stands  on  the  summit  of  the  whole  past  history 
of  his  race.  In  this  man  the  various  functions  are 
found  apparently  in  combination,  and  under  the  name 
of  mental  faculties  are  regarded  as  a  universal  inher- 
itance of  mankind.  Facts  are  silent  as  to  whether 
this  variety  be  originally  found  together  or  whether 
it  be  a  manifold.  The  savage  and  the  infant  give 
us  much  less  opportunity  to  admire  the  compass  of 
their  minds  than  the  nobler  among  the  brutes.  Here 
psychologists  help  themselves  by  the  evasive  assump- 
tion that  all  higher  mental  activity  is  potentially  pres- 
ent, not  in  brutes,  but  in  children  and  savages,  and 
may  be  regarded  as  undeveloped  talents  or  as  psychic 
faculties ;  and  the  most  insignificant  resemblances  be- 
tween the  demeanor  of  the  savage  or  the  child,  and 
that  of  the  educated  man,  are  valued  by  them  as  per- 
ceptible traces  of  awakening  intelligence,  awakening 
reasoning,  or  awakening  moral  sense.  But  the  ob- 
servation must  not  escape  us  that  in  the  following 
discussion  a  special  and  accurately  limited  condition 
of  man  will  be  described,  according  to  the  total  im- 
pression which  those  men  whom  we  call  by  the  vague 


38  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

expression  "  educated ''  liave  made  upon  us.  Great 
uncertainty  in  regard  to  this  total  impression  can  not 
be  avoided.  There  are  no  universal  facts.  Purely 
psychological  facts  lie  in  the  region  of  transitory  con- 
ditions of  individuals,  and  are  immeasurably  far  re- 
moved from  the  height  of  the  general  notion  of  man 
in  general. 

55.  The  comparison  just  mentioned  between  man 
and  the  lower  animals  occasions  the  first  division  into 
what  is  considered  the  original  manifold  of  mental 
faculties.  In  so  far  as  man  rises  perceptibly  above  the 
brute,  higher  faculties,  and,  in  so  far  as  he  is  similar 
to  the  brute,  lower  faculties  are  attributed  to  him. 
This  classification  crosses  the  one  already  mentioned, 
viz.,  presentation,  feeling,  and  desire,  each  one  of  these 
being  divided  into  an  upper  and  a  lower  faculty. 

As  an  aid  in  the  survey  of  empirical  psychology 
the  two  classifications  are  equally  useful,  and  we  shall 
use  both. 

56.  Since  in  psychology  one  activity  passes  gradu- 
ally into  another,  we  shall  not  begin  at  the  very  equiv- 
ocal line  of  demarkation  between  the  two,  but  shall  at 
first  place  the  extremes  opposite  each  other.  For  the 
lowest  mental  state,  sensuousness ;  for  the  highest,  rea- 
son will  be  assumed.  The  two  are  similar  in  that  they 
both  appear  in  the  several  members  of  the  second 
division.  We  speak  of  a  sensuous  representation  (  Vo?'- 
stellen),  a  sensuous  feeling,  and  a  sensuous  desire ;  we 
speak  also  of  a  theoretic  and  a  practical  reason — i.  e., 
of  a  conceptive  reason  and  of  a  willing  or  regulative 
reason ;  but  we  are  careful  not  to  speak  of  a  feeling 
reason,  because  we  think  of  reason  never  as  passive, 
but   always   as   active,  since   it   is  to  be  regarded  as 


THE  ASSUMED  MENTAL   FACULTIES.  39 

the  highest  faculty  of  man.  The  signification  of  the 
expression  used  here  is,  according  to  the  common  usages 
of  speech,  after  a  sort  intelligible  to  every  one.  This 
is  not  the  right  place  for  nicer  distinctions,  as  they 
themselves  become  the  points  in  dispute. 

57.  If  we  go  from  the  two  extremes  toward  the 
middle,  first  of  all,  in  the  faculty  of  representation,  in 
the  region  near  sensuousness,  we  find  imagination  and 
memory ;  in  the  region  of  reason,  we  find  understand- 
ing and  power  of  judgment.  Secondly,  in  the  faculty 
of  feeling,  over  against  the  sensuous  feelings  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  we  find  the  aesthetic  and  moral  feelings,  and 
the  emotions.  Thirdly,  in  the  faculty  of  desire  oppo- 
site the  sensuous  appetites  and  instincts,  we  find,  on 
the  one  hand,  intelligent  and  rational  willing ;  on  the 
other,  the  passions. 

58.  Before  we  lay  out  this  rough  sketch  of  the 
psychological  field  more  in  detail,  we  must  observe  the 
following:  (a.)  These  classifications  are  mere  empirical 
groupings  without  any  indication  of  completeness, 
without  any  fixed,  definite,  and  authorized  division ; 
hence,  it  will  be  no  matter  for  wonder  if,  upon  a  closer 
investigation  of  the  facts,  subjects  are  discovered  which 
either  belong  in  more  than  one  of  the  departments 
already  made,  or  which  can  not  be  classified  in  any 
one  of  them  whatever.     Here  are  a  few  examples  : 

In  Wolff's  exposition,  the  faculty  of  feeling  is  not 
distinguished  from  the  faculty  of  desire,  nor,  conse- 
quently, the  emotions  from  the  passions.  We  shall 
show  hereafter  that  the  emotions  do  not  belong  in  the 
class  of  feelings,  much  less  in  tlie  other  classes  ;  hence 
they  do  not  belong  in  any  one  of  the  classes  made, 
although  feelings  accompany  the  emotions,  as  well  as 


40  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

emotions  the  passions.  Morals  and  aesthetics  are, 
according  to  experience,  felt,  cognized,  and  desired, 
notwithstanding  which  we  are  not  inclined,  as  perhaps 
in  the  case  of  sensuousness,  to  allow  them  to  extend 
through  all  three  principal  faculties,  as  if  moral  feel- 
ings, cognitions,  and  volitions  existed  co-ordinate, 
equally  independent  of  one  another  ;  but  it  is  a  dis- 
puted question  whether  morality  has  its  origin  in  a 
command,  in  a  cognition,  or  in  a  feeling.  If  we  ask 
experience,  the  answer  is  undeniably  this  :  morality  is 
most  often  felt,  more  seldom  rightly  perceived,  and 
most  seldom  willed  In  this,  however,  there  is  nothing 
evident  excepting  insecurity  and  fluctuation  on  the 
part  of  empirical  psychology,  and  on  the  part  of 
every  investigation  which  has  no  better  foundation. 

(b.)  The  classifications  made  can  be  used  only  in  the 
preliminary  examination,  but  in  no  way  can  they  be 
used  as  an  exact  description  of  that  which  takes  place 
in  man,  for  they  separate  that  wdiich  in  reality  is  con- 
stantly united.  Whether  there  can  be  a  presentation 
in  consciousness  without  feeling  and  desire,  experience 
does  not  indicate ;  these  movements  of  the  emotional 
nature  pass  over  incessantly  one  into  another.  It  is 
evident  that  to  every  feeling,  something  felt,  and  to 
every  desire  something  desired,  belong,  but  whether 
in  every  case  each  must  be  a  representation  in  con- 
sciousness, experience  neither  denies  nor  affirms,  for  a 
representation  may  be  so  vague  as  to  be  impossible  of 
recognition.  The  affirmative  answer  has,  however,  the 
advantage,  because  in  most  cases  it  is  manifestly  the 
right  one.  The  emotions  {Afl'ecten)  do  not  belong  in 
a  class  with  the  passions,  yet  we  can  by  no  means  think 
of  an  entirely  emotionless  passion.    Whoever  describes 


THE  ASSUxMED   MENTAL  FACULTIES.  41 

the  history  of  only  a  single  passionate  outbreak  must 
regard  it,  with  all  the  emotions  aroused  by  it,  as  a 
single  transaction  or  occurrence.  The  continuous  flow 
of  this  occurrence  does  not  admit  of  its  being  pre- 
sented as  a  mosaic  painting,  the  individual  bits  of 
which  might  be  collected  from  the  several  divisions  of 
empirical  23sychology. 

(c.)  That  the  classified  mental  faculties  exist  not 
only  side  by  side  with  one  another,  but  in  relation  to 
one  another,  empirical  psychology  acknowledges,  in 
the  fact  that  it  employs  them  throughout  in  the 
elaboration  of  one  and  the  same  material.  This 
material  is  suj^posed  to  be  received  by  the  sensory 
\_SinnlicliJceit  =■  sensuous  phase  of  the  mind],  and 
this  gives  rise  to  the  question  relating  to  the  causal 
action  of  the  outer  world  upon  man.  If  this  should 
be  denied,  then  sensuousness  must  be  regarded  rather 
as  a  creative  faculty.  Memor}^  according  to  it, 
preserves  this  same  material,  but,  unmodified  by  this 
preservation,  fantasy  makes  it  into  new  forms ;  and 
again  unmodified  by  these  new  forms,  understanding 
constructs  notions  from  it ;  also  the  faculty  of  desire 
transforms  it  into  an  object  of  desire  or  aversion ; 
and  again  fantasies,  ideas,  desires,  etc.,  are  to  be  pre- 
served by  the  memory  and  upon  occasion  replaced 
with  fresh  material,  and  again  subjected  to  the  elabo- 
rating faculties,  or,  in  case  this  appears  inconceivable, 
is  it  perhaps  only  a  part  of  the  material  which  mem- 
ory holds  fast  in  its  storehouse,  and  to  fantasy  will  be 
surrendered  another  part,  still  another  to  the  under- 
standing, still  another  to  the  faculty  of  desire,  etc.  ? 
Concerning  this  question  we  ask  in  vain  of  experience. 
So  much  the  more   necessary  is  it  that  we  perceive 


42  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

and  acknowledge  the  indispensable,  metaph3^sical  pre- 
supposition of  some  kind  of  a  manifold  and  compli- 
cated cansal  relation  of  the  ditferent  faculties  to  one 
another,  as  well  as  to  the  alleged  material  which  they 
are  to  elaborate  in  common. 

59.  By  the  admission  of  the  causal  relation  just 
mentioned,  psychology  has  hitherto  fixed  the  order 
of  presenting  its  doctrines.  Sensuous  presentations 
are  first  treated  according  to  tJie  statement,  "Nihil  est 
in  intellectu,  quod  non  prius  fuerit  in  sensu,"  and  for 
the  others  an  order  is  given  which  makes  them  proceed 
gradually  from  the  former.  The  gradual  development 
of  individual  man  and  of  peoi:»les,  likewise  the  differ- 
ence between  the  brute  and  man,  furnish  a  guide  here. 

Experience  shows  that  we  meet  with  the  lower 
sensuous  j^hase  much  more  frequently  than  with  any 
other  phases  of  the  mental  life,  in  reality,  however,  the 
latter  never  without  the  former ;  indeed,  this  is  so 
much  the  case  that  we  have  great  trouble  in  giving 
even  a  tolerably  definite  meaning  to  the  expression 
"  pure  reason."  Nevertheless,  there  are  two  important 
psychological  facts  which  we  can  not  understand  oth- 
erwise than  as  incompatible  with  the  causal  relation 
between  sense  and  reason,  viz.,  pure  self -consciousness 
and  moral  volition.  What  we,  in  the  current  of  time, 
observe  always  as  shifting  accidents,  that  must  we  dis- 
tinguish from  our  true  Ego ;  we  know  the  latter  appears 
to  us,  independent  even  of  the  inner  sense,  by  a  so-called 
pure  apperception.  In  its  general  acceptation,  apper- 
ception signifies  the  knowing  of  that  which  takes  place 
in  our  own  minds ;  and  a  volition  shows  itself  more 
clearly  as  genuinely  moral  when  it  scorns  consideration 
of  advantages  and  disadvantages  as  they  lie  before  one 


THE  ASSUMED  MENTAL  FACULTIES.  43 

in  experience,  in  which  case  the  mind  rises  above  sen- 
suous feelings  and  directly  opi30ses  them.  How  is  this 
elevation  possible  ?  The  answer,  through  free-will,  is 
one  quite  commensurable  to  the  inner  perception 
which  is  generally  conceded  in  such  cases.  Hence  a 
so-called  transcendental  freedom,  independent  of  all 
causality,  will  be  assumed,  an  assumption  parallel  with 
that  of  pure  apperception.  Now,  if  we  attribute  both 
to  reason,  as  to  that  which  in  man  stands  the  farthest 
removed  from  sensuousness,  then  in  this  signification 
reason  is  not  so  much  something  higher  than  sen- 
suousness, but  rather  something  quite  different  from 
it ;  and  sensuousness  can  no  longer  be  considered  a 
basis,  nor  even  as  a  condition  of  all  the  rest. 

Upon  this  supposition,  psychology  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  its  material  ouglit  not  to  present  a  progress 
from  sensuousness  to  reason,  but  ought  to  present  two 
series  of  observations  originally  parallel,  of  which 
reason  and  sensuousness  constitute  the  beginning 
points ;  the  meeting-place  of  the  two,  however,  in  its 
manifold  modifications,  would  be  the  highest  region, 
and,  as  it  were,  the  goal.  Empirical  psychology  can 
oppose  nothing  to  this  demand.  In  my  Introduction 
to  Philosophy  (103  and  107),  however,  it  is  already 
shown  that  the  idea  of  the  Ego  and  of  transcendental 
freedom  are  contradictory.  Hence,  also,  the  idea  just 
advanced,  of  a  faculty  of  reason,  is  not  consistent  with 
truth.  The  common  idea  of  sensuousness,  however, 
especially  when  considered  as  the  source  of  evil,  is  not 
more  correct.  The  greatest  evil  is  quite  as  little 
purely  sensuous  as  sensuousness  is  pure  evil. 

Note. — When  in  common  life  we  hear  it  said  that  one  man 
has  more  nnderstandinr^.  another  more  memory,  a  third  more 


44  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

imagination,  a  fourth  a  sounder  judgment,  and  yet,  upon  the 
whole,  no  greater  nor  less  degree  of  mental  health  can  be 
attributed  to  the  one  than  to  the  other,  then  the  conjecture 
arises  that  all  this  distinction  of  the  so-called  mental  faculties 
has  more  to  do  with  the  products  of  mental  activity  than  with 
the  internal  nature  of  the  latter,  whether  this  nature  be  sound 
or  diseased. 

Of  the  mental  diseases,  the  four  principal  kinds  or  species 
empirically  known — idiocy,  dementia,  madness,  hallucination — 
will  be  more  closely  defined  hereafter.  It  may  be  useful,  how- 
ever, to  construct  here  the  notion  of  mental  soundness  from 
the  opposites  of  these  terms,  namely,  susceptibility  to  reaction, 
concentration,  repose,  and  mutual  adjustment  of  all  concepts 
through  one  another,  since  a  lack  in  any  one  of  these  four 
requisites  indicates  an  approach  to  mental  disease  much  more 
directly  than  a  defect  in  imagination,  memory,  or  understand- 
ing, etc.  The  requisites  mentioned,  however,  refer  plainly 
enough  to  the  previously  mentioned  theory  of  concepts  as 
forces  whose  readiness  to  move  upon  the  least  change  in  their 
strength  or  combination  is  quite  as  perceptible  as  their  ten- 
dency to  remain  at  rest  in  equilibrium.  By  this  theory,  the 
collection  of  concepts  of  the  same  kind  and  of  those  already 
in  combination,  quite  as  much  as  every  kind  of  possible  recip- 
rocal influence,  are  completely  secured  by  the  laws  of  reproduc- 
tion, provided  that  no  foreign  influence  on  the  part  of  the  body 
disturbs  the  mental  state.  Nevertheless,  the  relation  of  the 
body  to  the  mind  can  not  be  more  closely  estimated  without 
mentioning  some  principles  of  the  philosophy  of  nature,  which, 
at  this  point,  would  be  premature.  To  begin  with,  the  first  of  the 
above-mentioned  classifications  (55)  must  be,  if  not  freed  from 
its  iudefiniteness,  at  least  recognized  in  its  many  significations. 


LOWER  AXD   HIGHER  FACULTIES.  45 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE     BOU^n'DARY-LIXE     BETWEEN    THE    LOWER     AXD 
HIGHER    FACULTIES. 

60.  Ix  the  representative  faculties,  the  line  of  de- 
markation  between  the  lower  and  higher  runs  between 
the  imagination  and  the  understanding ;  in  the  faculty 
of  feeling,  between  sensuous  jileasure  and  aesthetic 
feeling ;  in  the  faculty  of  desire,  between  the  passions 
and  deliberate  choice.  On  account  of  the  uncertainty 
in  the  definition  of  these  faculties  the  line  can  not  be 
drawn  with  precision  ;  psychologists,  too,  admit  that 
it  can  not  be  sharply  defined ;  at  least,  so  says  Wolff, 
in  his  Empirical  Psychology  (233).  This  is  so  much 
the  more  evident  because  an  analogon  rationis  is  at- 
tributed even  to  the  brutes,  while  no  one  concedes  to 
them  imagination  similar  to  that  possessed  by  human 
beings.  The  brutes  would  have,  according  to  this,  a 
share  in  the  higher  faculty  of  representation,  and,  on 
the  contrary,  would  lack  in  something  that  is  to  be 
attributed  to  the  lower  faculty.  The  view  held  in 
regard  to  the  faculty  of  feeling  seems  to  be  some- 
what more  satisfactory,  as  no  one  expects  aesthetic 
judgment  from  brutes.  Also  in  uncivilized  men  the 
aesthetic  faculty  seems  to  be  wanting,  and  appears  to 
be  a  higher  degree  of  culture  rather  than  a  faculty 
peculiar  to  human  nature.  Finally,  in  regard  to  the 
passions  we  shall  find  some,  and  very  wicked  ones  they 
are,  which  with  the  noblest  have  their  origin  in  the 
highest  regions  of  human  thought,  so  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  reckon  them  among  the  lower  faculties,  or 


40  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

among  those  attributed  to  brutes.     The  subject  must 
then  be  treated  in  some  other  way. 

01.  To  attribute  a  lower  faculty  to  the  brutes  in 
comparison  with  man,  means  to  regard  the  mental 
power  of  the  former  either  as  defective,  arrested,  or 
suppressed. 

Granted,  first,  that  it  is  defective  in  itself  in  com- 
parison with  the  more  complete,  wider-reaching,  power 
of  man ;  for  this  there  are  very  significant  reasons  in 
the  lack  of  hands  and  speech.  Because  of  this,  the 
opportunity  of  the  brute  to  get  concepts  from  objects 
is  very  much  more  limited  than  that  of  man,  and  while 
the  understanding  and  intelligence  of  man  are  most 
closely  related  to  speech,  the  brute  at  the  most  can  at- 
tain to  the  understanding  of  only  a  few  signs.  The 
child,  however,  in  the  lowest  grades  of  its  education  is 
in  the  same  state  at  first ;  its  knowledge  of  the  use  of 
its  hands  is  quite  as  limited  as  of  the  use  of  speech. 

Granted,  secondly,  that  this  mental  power  is  ar- 
rested— as  it  originally  might  have  been  greater — then 
it  is  also  arrested  in  the  brutes,  and,  indeed,  in  a  two- 
fold manner  ;  for  first,  with  them,  some  disturbing  ele- 
ment enters  into  their  circle  of  concepts  which  does 
not  oppress  man  so  much.  In  the  case  of  brutes  with 
mechanical  instincts,  it  is  quite  clear  that  this  disturb- 
ing element  is  an  organic  excitation  which  they  obey ; 
in  the  case  of  others,  premature  puberty  comes  into 
consideration.  Besides  this,  however,  on  account  of 
the  comparative  smallness  of  the  brain  of  the  brute, 
the  physical  organism  probably  may  not  yield  to  men- 
tal excitations  as  in  the  case  of  man. 

Granted,  thirdly,  that  this  mental  power  or  faculty 
be  considered  suppressed,  this  may  be  a  faculty  sub- 


LOWER  AND   HIGHER  FACULTIES.  47 

jected  to  service,  or  one  entirely  subdued ;  in  that  case 
this  designation  is  not  generally  appropriate  to  brutes, 
but  rather  to  the  lower  faculty  of  man  so  far  as  he 
controls  himself.  But,  again,  the  control  is  so  very 
dependent  upon  the  degtee  of  education  already  ob- 
tained, that  it  fluctuates,  according  to  the  kind,  be- 
tween cunning  and  morality,  according  to  the  degree 
to  which  the  uncultured  or  sick  man  is  proportion- 
ately incapable  of  exercising  judgment.  Finally,  if 
exceptions  are  of  any  value,  among  trained  animals 
there  are  so  many  cases  of  self-control  acquired  by 
practice  that  a  distinction  in  the  mental  faculty  which 
naturally  would  hold  good  in  all  cases  can  not  be 
shown;  we  must  rather  fall  back  upon  distinctions 
which  are  based  upon  favoring  or  hindering  the 
growth  of  faculties  or  upon  the  training  acquired. 
Consequently,  we  are  neither  necessitated  nor  author- 
ized to  regard  the  human  mind  as  an  aggregate  of  two 
specifically  different  faculties,  fitted  as  it  were  into 
each  other.  But  it  appears  that  the  mental  excita- 
bility, according  to  the  difference  in  the  combinations 
and  obstructions  of  concepts,  is  expressed  in  an  in- 
finite variety  of  forms.  All  these  observations  are 
independent  of  metaphysics.  The  question,  however, 
whether  if  once  metaphysics  be  called  in,  these  ob- 
servations would  be  refuted  or  established,  is  not  to  be 
discussed  here. 

To  the  man  who  rises  to  a  higher  degree  of  educa- 
tion we  shall  attribute  empirically,  not  merely  a  sim- 
ple, but  a  versatile  capacity  to  apportion  his  attention, 
as  it  were,  to  many  different  acts — now  intentionally 
to  direct  his  thoughts,  now  to  change  the  tone  of  his 
feelings,  and  again  to  prescribe  for  himself  at  one  time 


48  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

intermission  or,  at  another,  regular  effort.  It  is  known 
that  among  brutes  little  or  no  trace  of  this  appears.  In 
regard  to  the  human  faculty,  attention  has  already  been 
drawn  to  this  point  in  the  first  part  of  this  work  (40- 
43).  In  this  sense  we  shall  recognize  a  higher  and  a 
lower  faculty. 

62.  Between  the  lower  and  higher  faculties  of  rep- 
resentation, Wolff  places  attention  (however,  only  the 
voluntary,  while  the  involuntary  is  perhaps  even  more 
important).  According  to  him,  the  higher  faculty 
begins  with  the  distinguishing  of  notions  whose  char- 
acteristics the  attention  analyzes.  This  definition  is, 
indeed,  more  limited  in  its  compass  than  is  indicated 
by  ordinary  language  in  the  words,  understanding  and 
intelligent^  yet  it  coincides  in  part  with  this  distinction 
in  a  remarkable  manner.  Inasmuch  as  attention  makes 
a  notion  distinct  it  brings  forward  in  succession  with 
equal  emphasis  the  partial  concepts  existing  in  it.  It 
levels  or  evens,  as  it  were,  the  notion  whose  character- 
istics were  heretofore  projected  unevenly  and  acci- 
dentally. Thus  it  is  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
thing  thought,  all  of  whose  properties  are  independent 
of  the  differences  which  individual  thinking  brings 
into  it,  that  more  attention  is  exercised  upon  this  than 
upon  that  characteristic.  Also,  it  accords  with  the  ex- 
planation (given  elsewhere)  of  the  understanding, 
which  accounts  for  the  meaning  that  the  ordinary 
custom  of  speech  associates  with  that  word,  viz.,  un- 
derstanding is  the  faculty  by  which  our  thoughts  are 
united  according  to  the  nature  of  the  object  thought. 
Sufficient  examples  of  disproportionate  individual 
thinking  are  to  be  found  in  common  life.  Such  is 
the  fragmentary  knowledge  of  the  routinist  compared 


LOWER   AND   HIGHER   FACULTIES.  49 

with  the  symmetrically  elaborated  knowledge  of  the 
true  scholar.  The  latter  is  without  doubt  a  work  of 
progressiye  attention. 

G3.  In  regard  to  the  boundaries  between  the  loAyer 
and  the  higher  faculties,  Kant  was  guided  by  the  fun- 
damental thought :  "  The  nnion  of  a  manifold  can 
never  occur  through  the  senses.  .  .  .  All  combination 
is  a  spontaneous  [or  self-actiye]  act  of  the  power  of 
representation,  which,  in  order  to  be  distinguished  from 
sensuousness,  must  be  called  understanding "  ( Ver- 
stand)  (see  Krit.  d.  R.  F.,  §  15).  This  very  plausible 
assertion  is,  from  its  nature,  speculative.  (It  occasions 
the  higher  Skepsis,  which  is  described  in  my  Intro- 
duction to  Philosophy,  22-29  ;  also,  98-103.) 

In  strongly  emphasizing  this  thought  Kant  has 
rendered  a  great  service  to  speculative  philosophy,  but 
he  has  only  begun  the  most  important  investigations 
growing  out  of  the  above;  in  no  wise  has  he  com- 
pleted them,  and,  while  they  necessarily  must  always 
hold  their  place  as  the  foundation  of  general  meta- 
physics, everything  like  this  Kantian  assertion  must 
disappear  completely  from  the  dogmas  of  psychology, 
for  the  end  of  investigation  is  exactly  the  opposite  of 
that  which  its  beginning  seems  to  indicate.  The  com- 
bination of  a  manifold  (of  concepts)  does  not  take  place 
by  any  process  that  could  be  called  an  act — at  least,  a 
spontaneous  act ;  it  is  the  immediate  result  of  unity 
in  the  soul.  Further,  the  combination  of  the  mani- 
fold depends  npon  the  manner  in  which  the  sense- 
impressions  meet,  and  this  is  determined  by  external 
conditions,  as  already  intimated  in  my  Introduction 
to  Philosophy.  Finally,  Kant's  assertion  can  not 
in  any  w\ay  be  supported  by  empirical  psychology. 
7 


50  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

When  thinking  intensely  we  feel  ourselves  active,  and 
then  are  sometimes  conscious  of  intentionally  group- 
ing notions  according  to  their  characteristics,  but, 
where  we  originally  unite  the  manifold  of  a  given  in- 
tuition (An. sella uuii(/)  into  the  notion  of  an  object,  we 
find  ourselves  obliged  to  take  the  object  as  it  presents 
itself;  we  are  limited  to  this,  and  know  nothing  of 
acts  of  spontaneity. 

While  activity  is  neither  an  attribute  of  the  under- 
standing nor  the  source  of  combinations,  the  under- 
standing has,  on  the  contrary,  its  seat  in  a  certain  kind 
of  combination ;  indeed,  the  whole  higher  faculty  en- 
croaches upon  sensuousness,  memory,  and  imagination 
(which  are  usually  reckoned  among  the  lower  facul- 
ties), so  that  in  educated  men  it  is  manifested  in  such 
elaborate  combinations  as  are  not  to  be  expected  in 
savages  and  brutes.  Here,  first  of  all,  belongs  the  ex- 
tension of  the  concepts  of  space  and  time,  wdiich  ex- 
tend far  beyond  the  sphere  of  sensuous  impressions, 
even  into  infinity.  By  this  we  especially  recognize  the 
fact  that  power  to  look  resolutely  into  the  past  and  to 
anticipate  a  somewhat  remote  future  is  wanting  in  the 
brute  and  the  savage. 

Furthermore,  there  is  a  great  difference  between 
the  mere  meeting  together  of  the  characteristics  of  an 
object  and  the  distinguishing  of  these  characteristics 
from  the  substance  to  which  they  are  attributed ;  like- 
wise between  the  mere  apprehension  of  a  limited  series 
of  occurrences  and  the  deduction  of  the  same  from 
causes  and  forces.  The  second  power,  but  not  the 
first,  belongs  to  the  higher  faculties- 

This  remark,  although  occasioned  by  Kant's  theory, 
belongs  to  the  following  : 


LOWER  AXD   HIGHER  FACULTIES.  5I 

64.  Little  as  the  logical  polish  of  ideas  can  serve 
for  the  measure  of  the  intelligence  (we  have  but  to 
think  of  the  understanding  of  women,  artists,  states- 
men, merchants)  it  constitutes,  nevertheless,  a  part  of 
the  difference  which  we  seek.  The  savage  and  the 
brute  also  have,  without  doubt,  total  impressions  of 
objects  that  resemble  one  another,  complex  concepts 
of  trees,  houses,  men,  etc.,  but  in  this  case  the  contrast 
between  the  abstract  and  the  concrete  is  wanting.  The 
general  notion  has  not  been  separated  from  its  exam- 
ples. This  separation  belongs  to  the  higher  faculty, 
as  does  also  the  difference  between  object  and  space, 
event  and  time,  as  likewise  the  difference  between  our 
Ego  and  our  changing  conditions ;  while  one  brute  cer- 
tainly distinguishes  itself  from  the  other  with  which  it 
contends  for  food. 

65.  Esthetic  and  moral  apprehensions  in  savages 
are  rare  and  limited ;  in  brutes  they  seem  to  be  en- 
tirely wanting.  Choice  is  much  less  deliberate,  and 
upon  the  whole  appears  not  to  be  so  persistent  as  in 
the  case  of  cultured  men.  The  brute  has  here,  side 
by  side  with  the  lack  of  higher  powers,  a  positive 
peculiarity,  viz.,  a  visibly  greater  dependence  upon 
instinct,  which  is  in  part  periodical,  and  stands  in  the 
closest  connection  with  the  physical  organism. 

66.  All  that  has  been  cited  gives  no  conclusive 
series  of  fixed  differences  either  between  humanity 
and  animality,  or  between  the  higher  and  lower  facul- 
ties. But  we  have  no  reason  to  demand  causes  and 
fixed  differences  where  we  meet  transient  ones  suffi- 
cient to  explain  satisfactorily  how  one  could  have 
come  to  ask  about  the  difference  which  is  everywhere 
assumed   to   be  one  and   the  same.     However,  if  it 


52  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

should  be  thought  that  the  brute  is  brought  too  near 
to  man,  the  following  remarks  are  of  weight  on  the 
opposite  side : 

We  know  very  little  of  brutes.  We  distinguish 
their  different  classes  much  too  little.  In  the  training 
of  brutes,  from  which  we  learn  to  recognize  a  percep- 
tible versatility  of  talent,  we  find  in  most  cases,  at  the 
foundation,  that  quite  as  false  a  notion  exists  as  in  the 
case  of  the  defective  education  of  the  child.  The  brute 
can  receive  no  training  save  that  which  is  according 
to  the  inner  laws  of  its  nature;  and,  even  when  we 
intend  to  use  the  brute  only  as  a  brute,  the  greatest 
part  of  the  applied  force,  even  if  it  was  necessary  for 
the  attainment  of  the  aim,  is  without  doubt  coarse 
abuse.  Whoever  has  observed  young  brutes,  must  have 
remarked  how  often  they  strive  to  use  their  fore-feet  as 
hands — a  vain  effort  to  overcome  the  limitations  of 
their  organization.  To  man,  however,  instead  of  in- 
solence, a  little  more  gratitude  for  the  advantage  of 
education,  in  the  possession  of  wdiich  he  especially  re- 
joices, is  to  be  recommended.  Besides,  while  manifold 
differences  in  the  mental  activity  of  different  brutes  re- 
main a  secret  to  us,  the  differences  between  men  are 
much  more  plainly  to  be  perceived.  To  the  question 
whether  concepts  can  completely  manifest  themselves 
as  forces  in  man,  or  whether  here,  perhaps,  something 
of  the  limitation  observed  in  the  brutes  remains,  the 
following  may  furnish  a  general  answer  :  The  hands 
of  man  have  been  obliged  to  furnish  themselves  with 
innumerable  tools.  Language  has  needed  the  print- 
ing-press. Geniuses  reveal  the  great  extent  to  which 
free  mental  activity  is  lacking  in  an  ordinary  man,  and 
idiots  sho^v  how  closely  in  the  human  form  the  bands 


FACULTY  OF   REPRESENTATION.  53 

"which  the  physical  places  upon  the  mental  life  may 
be  tied.  Finally,  self-control,  a  work  of  higlier  edu- 
cation, suffers  in  every  failure  in  training  and  educa- 
tion. Hence  it  is  sufficiently  clear  that  the  human  ac- 
tivity, as  hitherto  known,  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a 
complete,  conclusive  exposition  of  what  concepts  act- 
ing as  forces,  may  be  able  to  accomplish,  and  the  con- 
jecture quickly  rises  that  in  the  other  heavenly  bodies, 
under  other  conditions  of  gravitation,  atmosphere, 
illumination,  etc.,  may  be  found  physical  organizations 
furnishing  much  better  opportunity  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  mental  activity. 


CHAPTER  III. 

FACULTY   OF   FvEPEESENTATION. 

67.  The  following  conspectus  shows  those  aspects 
which  are  considered  to  belong  to  the  faculty  of  repre- 
sentation : 

(  (  (aa)  According  to  matter. 

A.  Production  ]  ^^^  °^  experience :  -j  ^^^^  According  to  form. 

(  (2)  of  ideas  which  transcend  experience. 

B.  Reproduction : 

According  to  this  outline,  we  shall  examine  the 
faculty  of  representation,  and  in  doing  so  shall  con- 
sider the  usual  classification  of  the  assumed  mental 
faculties. 


64:  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

A.   The  Outer  Sense. 

G8.  The  prodnction  of  the  material  of  experience 
is  principally  the  work  of  the  outer  senses,  of  touch, 
taste,  smell,  hearing,  and  seeing. 

What  is  called  the  material  and  form  of  experience  is  dis- 
cussed in  my  Introduction  to  Philosophy  (25-29). 

The  five  senses  mentioned  are  enumerated  accord*- 
ing  to  the  organs  of  sense.  There  is  a  larger  number 
of  tlie  different  classes  of  sensuous  impressions.  More- 
over, the  organs  themselves  contain  sensitive  surfaces, 
hence  innumerable  sensitive  places ;  with  the  remark- 
able difference  that  in  the  case  of  some  senses  only  a 
total  sensation  arises,  while  in  the  case  of  others  every 
single  spot  of  the  sensitive  surface  furnishes  a  separate 
presentation. 

09.  The  feeling  of  pressure,  and  that  of  warmth 
and  cold,  has  its  organ  extended  over  the  whole  sur- 
face of  the  body.  Pressure  is  perceived  in  very  many 
different  ways,  according  as  it  is  uniform  or  not  uni- 
form in  the  different  parts  of  the  sensitive  surface  and 
in  the  successive  moments  of  time  during  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  sensation.  Thus  we  distinguish  sharp, 
smooth,  rough,  elastic,  etc.  Warmth  and  cold  are 
perhaps  perceived  more  in  the  inner  parts  of  the 
nerves,  pressure  more  in  the  outer. 

The  sense  of  touch  is  originally  feeling,  but  this 
feeling  has  a  special  application  by  which  it  helps  to 
determine  the  form  of  the  experience.  At  the  begin- 
ning we  may  remark  that  in  touching,  several  fingers, 
several  parts  of  the  tongue — in  a  word,  several  por- 
tions of  the  sensitive  surface — are  brought  into  play. 

70.  Taste  furnishes  very  many  distinguishable  sen- 


TEE  OUTER  SENSE.  55 

sations,  which,  however,  coming  simultaneously,  inter- 
fere with  one  another.  The  tongue  is,  at  the  same 
time,  an  excellent  organ  of  feeling  of  every  kind. 
It  receives  different  kinds  of  nerves. 

71.  Odors,  like  tones,  are  obtrusive;  but  they  do 
not,  like  the  latter,  admit  of  being  distinguished  into 
separate  elements.  The  apparatus  of  smell  is  less  un- 
der our  control  than  the  organs  of  the  other  senses ; 
even  when  in  our  power,  it  suffers  much  in  its  func- 
tions. Odors  may  cause  death,  and  may  propagate 
infectious  diseases.  They  are  mostly  pleasant  or  un- 
pleasant, seldom  indiiferent,  but  none  can  be  long  per- 
ceived; each  quickly  blunts  or  overtaxes  the  organ. 
In  comparison  with  the  savage,  and  with  many  brutes, 
the  susceptibility  of  the  civilized  man  in  regard  to  this 
sense  seems  to  be  blunted. 

72.  Of  all  the  senses,  hearing  is  the  richest  in  the 
variety  of  sensations  which  it  furnishes.  Musical  tones 
are  distinguishable,  even  coming  simultaneously.  The 
distinguishing  of  vowels  is  independent  of  them,  and 
in  addition  to  these  two  classes  comes  the  perception 
of  consonants  which  apj^ear  to  belong  to  the  class  of 
complex  noises.  The  unrhythmical  and  yet  intelligible 
speech  of  man  is  a  noteworthy  phenomenon ;  those 
who  from  birth  are  quite  unmusical  yet  hear  very  well 
what  is  said  to  them. 

Probably  every  musical  tone  has  its  own  peculiar  place  in 
the  organ.  Unless  this  is  so,  it  is  not  easy  to  comprehend  how 
simultaneous  tones  remain  separate,  and  why  they  do  not  pro- 
dace  a  third  mixed  tone  which  would  destroy  the  aesthetic  ap- 
prehension of  the  interval. 

73.  Sight  distinguishes  colors,  and,  independently 
of  these,  the  degrees  of  light  and  shade.     Every  spot 


56  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

of  the  retina  of  tlie  eye  sees  individually,  and  furnishes 
a  separate  sensation.  In  many  eyes  which  otherwise 
possess  keen  sight,  tlie  color-sense  is  in  part  wanting, 
while  in  others  it  fails  entirely.  The  greatest  mo- 
bility, the  capacity  to  adapt  itself  to  near  and  remote 
objects,  to  strong  and  faint  light,  finally  to  cover  itself 
voluntarily  with  the  eyelid,  are  peculiarities  of  this 
organ. 

It  will  be  shown  hereafter  that  mobility  aids  most  especially 
the  apprehension  of  the  space  forms.  This  apprehension  is  by 
no  means  so  original  as  it  appears;  it  is  learned  and  passes 
through  very  different  steps  of  development. 

Note. — Every  sense  has  its  degree  of  acnteness  and  delicacy, 
its  extent  and  duration.  Up  to  this  time,  everything  that  has 
been  said  refers  only  to  sensations,  not  to  perceptions,  which 
latter  presuppose  the  concept  of  an  object  opposed  to  other  ob- 
jects and  to  the  subject,  and  hence  bring  into  play  at  the  same 
time  most  of  the  so-called  mental  faculties  (by  no  means  merely 
those  of  sense).  He  who  forgets  himself  and  becomes  absorbed 
in  sensuous  contemplation  (Anschauung),  as  it  is  called,  is  only 
in  a  condition  for  the  reception  of  mere  sensations. 

B.  The  Inyier  Sense. 

74.  Ko  perceptible  organ  of  the  body  indicates  an 
inner  sense ;  but,  from  analogy  with  the  outer  senses, 
it  has  been  assumed,  in  order  that  we  may  attribute  to 
it  the  apprehension  of  our  own  conditions  in  their 
actual  succession.  The  inner  sense,  so  far  as  it  is  held 
to  be  a  special  component  of  our  mental  constitution 
(the  explanation  is  to  be  found  in  The  Principles 
above  discussed,  see  sections  40-43),  is  consequently 
entirely  an  invention  of  psychologists,  and  indeed  a 
somewhat  defective  invention  ;  for  they  know  neither 
how  to  reckon  definitely  the  classes  of  concepts  which 


THE  INNER  SENSE.  57 

it  furnishes,  nor  how  to  point  out  any  semblance  of 
a  law,  according  to  which  the  extreme  irregularity  of 
its  working  might  be  explained.  The  outer  senses 
perform  their  functions,  if  they  can,  and,  in  case 
they  fail  to  do  so,  we  know  the  reason  for  the  failure ; 
but  the  inner  sense,  at  times  watching  sharply  every- 
thing that  occurs  in  the  innermost  recesses  of  the 
heart  (also,  indeed,  inventing  much  there)  is  at  other 
times  so  dull  and  so  idle  that,  although  we  may  be 
conscious  of  having  had  a  thought,  we  feel  ourselves 
incapable  of  finding  it  again.  The  inner  sense  is  not 
able  long  to  endure  the  strain  of  intentional  effort; 
that  which  we  wish  to  see  accurately  in  ourselves 
becomes  obscured  during  the  observation.  Besides, 
wonderful  as  is  that  material  of  experience  which  the 
inner  sense  furnishes  us,  just  as  wonderful  does  the 
mental  activity  ascribed  to  it  sometimes  appear.  Not 
seldom  the  self-apprehension  seizes  upon  the  most 
violent  emotions  and  tames  them.  Sometimes  in  the 
midst  of  the  most  intense  labor  in  the  outer  world,  a 
man  restrains  himself  notwithstanding  the  pressure,  in 
order  to  complete  his  work  rightly.  The  actor,  who 
represents  a  cunning  deceiver,  is  conscious,  first,  of  his 
own  person;  second,  of  the  character  of  his  role; 
third,  of  the  art  of  simulation  and  of  the  appearance 
assumed,  which  are  attributed  to  this  character  as  the 
means  of  the  deception.  Indeed,  the  inner  sense  rises 
in  a  scale  of  higher  and  higher  powers  ad  infinitum; 
e.  g.,  we  may  observe  our  self -observation  and  again  an 
observation  of  that,  and  so  on  forever. 

Note. — In  the  controversy  between  the  Cartesians,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Locke  and  Leibnitz  on  the  other,  the  disputed 
question  is,  whether  there  are  concepts  without   consciousness. 


58  EMPIIUCAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  simplest  and  sliortest  answer  is,  that  if  all  representation 
had  to  be  again  represented,  then  the  inner  sense  would  be 
obliged  to  rise  in  an  unbroken  series  to  an  infinitely  higher 
power.  In  the  Leibnitz  theory,  however,  the  assertion  of  uncon- 
scious concepts  is  made  to  depend  on  the  metaphysical  idea  of 
substance. 

C.  Forms  of  Series 

75.  Space  and  time  have  been  explained  by  a  very 
incorrect  tlieory,  inasmuch  as  they  are  regarded  as 
existing  forms  of  sensuonsness  which  are  individual, 
single,  and  independent  of  one  another.  Space  is  the 
only  completely  elaborated  series-form.  It  is  produced 
especially  in  connection  with  sensations  of  sight  and 
feeling;  it  is,  however,  not  by  any  means  limited  to 
these  sensations,  but  quite  a  similar  kind  of  produc- 
tion, either  complete  or  within  certain  limits,  occurs 
from  many  other  causes,  either  clearly  or  vaguely 
thought ;  sometimes  with  characteristic  accompanying 
conditions  which  cause  other  series  connected  with  it 
to  be  distinguished  from  space.  Such  a  series  is  time. 
Another  is  number.  Another  is  degree  or  intensive 
magnitude. 

Less  distinct,  but  nevertheless  indispensable,  is  the 
series  produced  by  the  putting  together  of  sensations 
of  the  same  kind  according  to  the  possibility  of  tran- 
sition one  to  another.  From  this  Ave  have  the  tone 
series  (to  be  distinguished  from  the  scale,  Avhich  de- 
pends upon  aesthetic  conditions).  Similar  to  it  Avould 
be  the  color  surface  between  the  three  primary  colors, 
yellow,  red,  and  blue,  if  we  knew  certainly  whether  all 
the  colors  were  connected  with  the  grades  of  difference 
between  light  and  dark  (perhaps  we  should  say  black 
and  white),  and  could  be  traced  back  to  those  three ; 


FORMS  OF  SERIES.  59 

or  whether  the  color  realm  does  not  rather  require  a 
third  dimension. 

Note. — In  the  difference  between  light  and  dark,  as  well  as 
in  the  tone-series  in  the  contrast  between  high  and  low  tones,  a 
concept  of  succession  in  the  ascent  is  to  be  perceived,  which  dis- 
closes the  fact  that  the  process  of  arching  and  pointing  (see  §  26) 
moves  more  slowly  in  the  lower  and  darker,  and,  on  the  con- 
trary, more  quickly  in  the  higher  (tones)  and  lighter  (shades).  In 
music,  the  bass  voice  generally  moves  more  slowly  than  the  treble. 

Still  less  distinct,  but  quite  as  indispensable,  is  the  series  in 
every  logical  arrangement  where  the  varieties  are  opposed  to 
one  another,  and  are,  at  the  same  time,  united  in  the  species. 
Not  merely  the  expressions  here  are  space  symbols.  In  the 
thing  itself  there  is  something  through  which  such  expressions 
as  the  circumference  or  sphere  of  a  notion  is  called  up,  although 
these  words,  so  far  as  they  are  borrowed  from  space  which  is 
the  elaborated  series,  are  only  metaphysical. 

Quite  as  necessary  in  metaphysics  is  the  theory  of  intelligible 
space,  which,  with  perfect  clearness,  is  construed  according  to  all 
three  dimensions,  merely  for  the  convenience  of  metaphysical 
thought  without  mingling  anything  sensuous, 

76.  The  concept  of  a  series  is  shown  most  compre- 
hensively in  the  notions  of  integral  positive  numbers. 
But  these  notions,  gradually  created  and  extended 
(savages  and  children  have  not  a  little  trouble  with 
them),  do  not  suffice  in  themselves  to  express  all  vari- 
eties of  progression  increasing  or  decreasing,  the  pro- 
duction of  the  series  in  numbers  becomes  constantly 
more  artificial  and  complicated  :  e.  g.,  between  whole 
numbers  continuous  transitions  are  made  by  means  of 
fractions ;  also  a  backward  prolongation  of  the  series 
may  be  made  by  means  of  minus  numbers.  Again, 
the  ideas  of  surd  roots,  logarithms,  and  exponential 
quantities,  are  developed ;  finally,  we  have  the  count- 
less functions  resulting  from  integration,  at  the  foun- 


60  EMPllllCAL  PSrCIiOLOGY. 

dation  of  which  lies  a  differential — i.  e.,  the  idea  of  a 
certain  ratio  of  increase  or  decrease. 

]3riefly,  for  psychologists,  arithmetic  furnishes  the 
remarkable  example  of  a  concept  of  a  series  constantly 
becoming  more  abstracted,  which  may  be  traversed  in 
both  directions  and  by  infinitely  minute  steps. 

77.  By  analogy  with  this  undeniable  fact,  we  may 
find  it  at  least  probable  that  the  geometrical  concept 
of  space,  in  its  infinite  magnitude  and  diYisibility,  is 
by  no  means  innate  in  man,  but  is  a  product  of  a  series 
formed  similarly  to  that  mentioned  above.  This  is 
so  much  the  more  true,  inasmuch  as  the  infinite  plas- 
ticity of  sjiace  notions  is  shown  continually  in  that 
which  geometry,  in  its  continued  onward  progress, 
makes  out  of  it.  The  princij^les  for  the  explanation 
of  this  production  of  space  will  be  found  in  the  third 
division  of  this  book.  Here  we  may  especially  call 
attention  to  the  notion  of  a  middle  between  two  op- 
posed sides.  This  is  characteristic  of  every  series.  A 
number  lies  between  numbers,  a  place  in  space  be- 
tween other  places,  a  point  of  time  between  two  points 
of  time,  a  degree  between  a  higher  and  lower  degree, 
a  tone  between  other  tones,  etc. 

Further,  we  may  remark  the  psychological  fact 
that  we  habitually  carry  with  us  a  certain  standard  of 
measurement,  a  unit  of  distance,  be  it  full  or  empty, 
in  space,  in  time,  and  in  the  tone-series,  and  also 
something  of  the  same  kind  in  dealing  with  intensive 
magnitudes,  as  is  noticeable  in  the  case  of  measuring 
by  the  eve,  and  of  beating  time. 


LOGICAL  FORMS.  61 

D.  Logical  Forms, 

78.  Philosophers  have  a  bad  habit  of  leaning  heav- 
ily on  logic  in  difficult  cases — not  for  the  purpose  of 
following  its  prescriptions  with  special  care — which 
would  be  very  laudable — but  to  imitate  or  copy  its 
procedure,  which  they  have  observed  in  its  scientific 
development.  Warning  examples  of  this  are  Kant's 
categories,  put  together  according  to  a  very  defective 
table  of  logical  judgments,  and  also  his  categorical 
imperative  which  contains  nothing  but  a  reminiscence 
of  the  logical  relation  of  the  general  to  the  particu- 
lar. Therefore,  in  psychology,  one  has  found  it  un- 
necessary to  say  anything  upon  notions,  judgments, 
and  syllogisms,  except  that  to  each  logical  operation 
there  is  doubtless  a  corresponding  faculty  in  the  soul ; 
and  because  logic  in  order  to  proceed  from  the  simple 
to  the  complex,  treats  first  of  notions,  then  of  judg- 
ments, and  finally  of  syllogisms,  the  psychologist  has 
unhesitatingly  treated  the  so-called  faculties  of  these 
things,  viz.,  understanding,  judgment,  and  reason,  in 
the  same  order.  But  several  circumstances  make  the 
fact  doubtful  whether  notions,  in  the  strict  logical 
sense,  really  occur  in  human  thinking,  and  it  is  a 
question  whether  they  are  not  rather  logical  ideals 
which  our  actual  thinking  strives  more  and  more  to 
approach.  In  the  third  division  of  this  book  this 
question  will  be  answered  affirmatively ;  besides  this, 
it  will  be  shown  that  it  is  through  judgments  that  no- 
tions more  and  more  nearly  approach  the  ideal ;  hence, 
in  a  certain  sense,  judgments  precede  notions.  It  will 
finally  be  made  clear  that  from  this  influence  of 
judgments  very  important  results,  especially  for  meta- 
physical notions,  will  be  found. 


02  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

79.  For  information  regarding  those  ideas  which 
we  call  notions  we  may  inquire  of  dictionaries  and 
grammars.  For  each  word,  the  dictionaries  show  us  a 
thought  which  fluctuates  between  a  mass  of  different 
characteristics  that  are  sometimes  hardly  reconcilable. 
The  grammars  reveal  the  fact  that,  wherever  strictly 
logical  demands  do  not  require  it,  instead  of  general 
notions  (as  man,  tree),  we  generally  think  but  one  in- 
dividual, and  indicate  it  by  the  indefinite  article  (a 
man,  a  tree).  Hence,  it  is  no  wonder  that  most  men, 
when  they  are  asked  what  they  mean  by  this  or  that 
word,  have  not  a  good  verbal  definition  ready.  Hence, 
too,  men  do  not  present  each  general  notion  according 
to  its  content  (as  ought  to  be  the  case  in  logic)  and 
then  proceed  to  regard  the  application  to  the  extent 
as  something  accidental  to  the  notion  itself.  On  the 
contrary,  they  indicate  certain  total  impressions  of 
many  similar  objects  by  means  of  words,  and  the  sig- 
nification of  these  words,  which  is  in  no  case  firmly 
fixed,  must,  in  the  use,  suggest  the  connection  every 
time  to  such  a  degree  that  one  may  recall  prominent- 
ly certain  characteristics  of  an  otherwise  indefinite 
thought. 

From  this  we  can  see  how  we  should  burden  psy- 
chology with  a  problem  based  upon  misconception  if 
we  should  propose  to  explain  the  source  of  truly  gen- 
eral notions  in  the  human  soul. 

General  notions  can  not  be  shown  to  actually  exist, 
except  in  the  sciences,  where  one  can  plainly  see  how 
they  are  formed — viz.,  by  positive  and  negative  judg- 
ments which  affirm  all  the  kinds  of  characteristics  that 
belong  to  the  definition  we  seek,  and  deny  all  others. 

80.  I^ow,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  fact   not  to  be 


LOGICAL   FORMS.  03 

doubted  that  human  thought  very  often  (although  not 
always)  assumes  the  form  of  judgments.  The  combi- 
nation of  a  subject  and  predicate  lies  at  the  founda- 
tion of  nearly  all  forms  of  speech  in  the  languages  of 
civilized  peoples.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however, 
that  the  logical  demand  that  the  subject  and  predicate 
shall  be  clearly  defined  notions,  is  not  comj^lied  with 
in  actual  usage. 

81.  The  fact  just  mentioned  may  appear  a  won- 
derful psychological  phenomenon.  Upon  the  suppo- 
sition that  a  being  that  forms  ideas  should  recognize 
a  real  or  only  an  apparent  world,  or  even  only  think 
a  world  as  possible,  it  does  not  by  any  means  follow 
that  this  thinking  and  recognition  must  assume  ex- 
actly the  form  of  judgments,  but  one  may  be  tempted 
to  consider  such  a  remarkable  condition  as  a  peculiar 
trait  in  the  constitution  of  human  nature. 

The  representation,  considered  as  a  copy  of  the 
objects  presented,  should  resemble  the  objects  them- 
selves, and  should  correspond  to  them  in  the  most 
exact  manner ;  but  no  one  will  consider  the  connection 
of  subjects  and  (for  the  most  part  negative)  predicates 
to  be  a  combination  that  takes  place  in  the  objects. 
The  painter  who  sketches  for  us  the  person  about 
whom  we  inquire,  gives  us  a  much  more  exact  knowl- 
edge than  he  who,  with  words,  should  enumerate  all 
the  predicates  which  are  perceived  by  a  siugle  glance 
at  the  sketch.  Moreover  the  whole  scaffolding  of  va- 
rieties and  species  which,  according  to  the  principles 
laid  down  in  the  introduction  to  logic,  we  may  be  able 
to  build  into  notions,  is  entirely  foreign  to  reality,  and 
is  never  used  except  in  our  cognitions  expressed  in  the 
form  of  judgments. 


Qi  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

Note. — To  the  mind  of  many  a  philosopher  (e.  g.,  Spinoza) 
has  occurred  the  ideal  of  an  intuiting  cognition,  for  which,  in- 
deed, if  it  were  a  reality,  a  so-called  intellectual  intuition,  non- 
sensuous  in  its  origin,  and  beholding  the  truth  directly,  would 
be  demanded.  If  contradictory  notions  were  taken  for  the  ob- 
jects actually  intuited,  and  as  such  recommended  to  us,  the 
result  would  be  such  as  has  already  been  in  part  experienced 
by  the  present  age.  If  we  do  not  desist  from  following  artifi- 
cially the  cum  ratione  insanire,  psychology  may,  however,  still 
be  enriched  with  quite  as  sad  as  remarkable  facts.  On  the  con- 
trary, if  we  understood  how  to  place  false  systems  at  a  distance 
and  to  observe  them  from  the  right  standpoint,  we  should  learn 
something  from  them. 

82.  The  main  question  which  we  have  to  put  to 
speculative  psychology  is,  Whence  comes  the  passive 
attitude  of  the  subject — viz.,  that  thought  to  which  a 
determination  must  be  given  by  the  predicate  ?  Inas- 
much as,  in  thinking,  the  subject  and  predicate  come 
together  in  the  relation  of  substantive  and  adjective, 
why  are  they  not  so  placed  at  once  ?  Why  does  it 
appear  that  a  real  psychic  faculty  called  judgment 
must  first  connect  them  ? 

In  view  of  facts,  the  following  observations  are  to 
be  made  : 

{a.)  It  is  a  begging  of  the  question  to  assert  that 
all  human  thought  is  an  unconscious  judgment.  In 
reality,  judgment  is  manifested  only  in  speech,  but  a 
man  has  many  thoughts  which  he  can  not  express  in 
language. 

{h.)  A.  man's  inclination  to  communicate  with  oth- 
ers has  a  great  influence  upon  the  development  of  his 
thought  in  expressed  judgments.  Perhaps  the  con- 
verse of  this  is  also  true  ;  the  reserved  man  may  be 
one  whose  concepts  do  not  readily  assume  the  form  of 


LOGICAL  FORMS.  65 

judgments.  Among  children  may  be  observed  very 
striking  differences  in  regard  to  talkativeness  and  re- 
serve, even  when  the  latter  does  not  arise  from  shy- 
ness or  indolence. 

{c.)  Expression  is  often  a  necessity,  and  gives  re- 
lief. The  judging  in  this  case  is  connected  with  in- 
stinct and  feeling. 

(d.)  The  decisions  which  express  preference  and 
rejection  are  special  kinds  of  judgment  in  which  sub- 
ject and  predicate  are  very  sharply  separated.  The 
tendency  to  these  is  so  great  that  one  believes  readily 
in  omens — i.  e.,  he  is  inclined  to  consider  every  event 
as  threatening  or  favorable.  From  the  repeated  at- 
tempts of  philosophers  to  refer  good  and  bad  to  affir- 
mation and  negation,  it  may  be  su2)posed  that  between 
the  judgment  on  one  side,  and  desire  and  repulsion  on 
the  other,  no  fundamental,  natural,  but  rather  a  psy- 
chological, relation  must  exist. 

(e.)  Another  principal  kind  of  judgment  in  which 
the  separation  and  the  fusion  of  the  two  component 
elements  are  very  observable,  presents  itself  in  the 
union  of  the  new  Avith  that  which  is  already  known. 
Either  that  which  is  known  is  the  subject  here,  and 
the  new  constitutes  the  predicate,  with  changes  which 
we  observe  in  the  things — e.  g.,  the  tree  blooms ;  or 
the  new  is  the  subject,  and  is  subsumed  under  a  known 
predicate — e.  g.,  in  all  answers  to  the  question,  \That 
is  that  ? 

The  latter  remarks  are,  it  is  true,  only  an  enumera- 
tion of  instances,  but,  taken  psychologically,  the  gen- 
eral is  often  only  to  be  explained  by  the  particular, 
because  very  frequently  particular  concepts  are  made 
general  by  transferring  them  to  others.  As  the  notions 
8 


QQ  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

of  irratioiiiil  quantities  arise  while  tlie  concept  of  a 
division  into  equal  factors  is  transferred  to  those  num- 
bers which  do  not  consist  of  several-  equal  factors,  so 
also  universal  custom,  in  order  to  bring  all  speech  into 
the  form  of  judgments,  may  have  had  a  very  special 
beginning,  and  we  are  in  no  way  justified  in  supposing 
that  all  thoughts  which  now  appear  in  the  form  of  a 
combination  of  subject  and  predicate  contain  in  them- 
selves the  reason  for  such  an  arrangement. 

Note. — Judgments,  such  as  A  =  A,  or,  The  stone  is  not 
sweet,  are  school  formulas  and  school  examples.  But  if  the 
judgment  made  be  original,  then  the  standpoint  of  the  one 
making  the  judgment  is  disclosed.  Children  judge  and  question 
where  the  adult  no  longer  sepai-ates  his  already  united  substan- 
tive and  adjective,  and  where  he  is  restrained  partly  by  knowing 
the  limits  of  human  knowledge,  partly  by  custom,  and  partly  by 
his  inclination  to  regard  things  only  from  a  business  point  of 
view. 

The  process  of  arching  and  pointing  (see  sec.  26)  is  easily  to 
be  recognized  where  an  answer  is  given  to  the  question,  "  What 
is  that  ? "  "  It  is  nothing  but  snow,"  said  a  child  to  whom  a 
snow-cake  was  offered.  Here  the  cake  was  the  subject,  the  ap- 
prehension of  which  occasioned  the  arching,  What  kind  of  a 
cake?  until  the  pointing  left  only  the  snow  remaining.  The 
final  propositions,  This  cake  is  not  edible ;  it  will  melt,  are  of 
a  similar  kind.  The  predicates  here  come  from  within — i.  e., 
they  are  contained  in  the  nature  of  the  subject.  The  case  would 
be  reversed  when  a  person,  who  hitherto  lias  been  accustomed  to 
see  dogs  run  free,  for  the  first  time  sees  and  expresses  the  judg- 
ment that  the  dog  carries  goods  to  the  market.  He  would  have 
passed  by  a  wagon  drawn  by  horses  without  expressing  any 
judgment.  The  arching  causes  tension,  the  pointing  satisfies: 
hence  there  is  a  pleasure  in  judgment;  hence  we  have  hasty 
judgments  and  chatter,  which  injure  oliservation  and  thinking. 
The  observer  would  have  remarked  more  if  he  had  not  gone 
away  satisfied  with  one  kind  of  pointing.  In  the  case  of  the 
thinker,  the  arching  would   l-ave  been   more  complete  and  its 


LOGICAL  FORMS.  67 

elevation  greater.     Besides  this,  the  pleasure  in  judging  injures 
the  constructive  power.     Critical  minds  are  seldom  creative. 

The  observer  goes  successively  from  one  arching  to  another; 
he  forms  series  of  judgments.  Mere  sense-perception  does  not 
separate  the  predicates  ;  it  is  less  acute :  the  arching  is  defective, 
and  therefore  the  pointing  is  also  defective.  Often  inaccurate 
repetition  follows  upon  this.  Language,  with  its  many  signifi- 
cations attached  to  words,  exerts  an  influence  here,  provided  no 
effort  be  made  to  secure  a  constant  correction. 

83.  Logic  considers  syllogisms  to  be  progressive 
unfoldings  of  the  steps  of  a  thought.  U23on  this  point 
only  two  observations  are  suggested  : 

(a.)  Very  rarely  in  ordinary  speech  is  such  a  pro- 
gressive development  presented  in  the  form  of  a  com- 
plete syllogism.  The  syllogism  has  nearly  always 
something  tedious  in  it,  unless  it  be  abridged,  as  in 
the  enthymeme.  This  is  in  no  way  a  fault  in  the 
syllogism  (as  it  is  often  considered),  but  merely  a  re- 
minder that  logic  and  psychology  are  different  things. 
The  concept  series,  for  the  most  part,  deal  with  the 
minor  premises,  while  they  only  touch  the  major  pre- 
mises in  passing — so  to  speak. 

{b.)  Very  rarely  have  the  creations  of  thought 
originally  (in  the  act  of  invention)  the  accuracy  of  the 
syllogism.  In  most  cases  they  are  attempts  to  unite 
into  one  a  pair  of  notions  which  relate  to  the  same 
middle  term,  even  before  the  necessary  quantities  of 
the  propositions  and  the  precise  form  of  their  identity 
with  the  middle  term  are  proved.  Correct  conclusion 
and  correct  measuring  are  closely  related.  The  middle 
term  as  the  standard  of  measurement  must  be  firmly 
held. 

84.  Hence,  if  the  power  to  infer  be  attributed  to 
the   faculty  of   reason,  then,  again,  an   inadmissible 


eS  EMPIRICAL .  PSYCHOLOGY. 

limitation  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul  hecomes  visible. 
To  form  syllogisms  and  to  test  and  confirm  them  are 
two  quite  ditferent  things,  which,  in  reality,  are  for  the 
most  part  widely  separated.  The  first  may  be  ascribed 
to  imagination,  the  second  to  reason. 

85.  Finally,  mention  must  be  made  here  of  logical 
approval,  which  is  very  different  from  aesthetic  ap- 
proval. The  former,  unlike  the  latter,  does  not  con- 
sist in  a  preference,  the  opposite  of  which  is  rejec- 
tion, but  in  a  recognition  by  which,  upon  the  whole, 
one  is  pleased  with  the  object  as  it  is ;  but  wdth  the 
recognition  is  combined  a  peculiar  kind  of  feeling 
in  which  the  pressure  of  evidence  and  the  gratifica- 
tion of  a  claim  are  mingled,  and  the  question  as  to 
whether  it  is  more  pleasant  or  unpleasant  can  only  be 
determined  by  the  circumstances.  The  principal 
thing  here  is  to  observe  how  the  alleged  faculties  of 
recognition  and  feelings  are  related,  or,  as  the  psy- 
chologists prefer  to  say,  flow  into  one  another,  with 
W'hich  they  are  contented  and  do  not  trouble  them- 
selves to  inquire  further  concerning  the  causal  rela- 
tion existing  in  this  influx. 

K   Transcendental  Kotions. 

86.  It  is  not  easy  to  determine  what  belongs  to  ex- 
perience and  what  transcends  it.  Kant  reckons  the 
notions  of  substance  and  force  as  belonging  to  that 
which  enters  into  experience  as  a  condition  of  the 
latter,  and,  according  to  him,  there  is  a  substantia 
phcBnomeno7i.  In  this  we  must  differ  from  him  on 
the  grounds  which  have  in  part  been  presented  in  my 
Introduction  to  Philosophy,  and  which  will  be  further 
developed  in  the  General  Metaphysics — that  is  to  say, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  NOTIONS.  ^9 

the  notion  of  substance  is  not  the  same  as  the  notion 
of  thing,  but  has  arisen  from  it.  Tiling  is  conceived 
as  a  complex  of  characteristics  without  calling  up  the 
question  of  the  real  unity  of  those  characteristics  which 
are  therein  blindly  presupposed.  Substance  is  the 
bearer  of  all  the  characteristics,  and  something  differ- 
ent from  them,  a  notion  which  first  arises  when  w^e 
perceive  that  we  must  distinguish  the  characteristics 
from  their  unity.  This  notion  is  contradictory;  it 
must  be  transformed  into  the  notion  of  an  essence 
which,  by  virtue  of  disturbances  and  self-adjustments, 
presents  to  us  the  phenomenon  of  a  complex  of  charac- 
teristics which  in  truth  do  not  by  any  means  belong 
to  it.  The  notion  of  force  depends  upon  that  of  sub- 
stance, and  is  developed  in  almost  the  same  way  with 
it,  viz.,  out  of  the  notion  of  a  changing  thing ;  also, 
it  is  to  be  subjected  to  a  similar  metaphysical  correc- 
tion. Both  notions  arise  at  the  outermost  limit  of 
experience  as  contradictions  wdiich  extend  into  the 
department  of  metaphysics — i.  e.,  which  oblige  us  to 
go  beyond  experience,  and  to  establish  beliefs  or  con- 
victions in  us  whose  objects  can  not  be  furnished  by 
any  experience. 

87.  Furnished  with  the  notions  of  substance  and 
force  (however  obscure  and  incorrect  the  thought  of 
them  may  otherwise  be),  the  human  mind  penetrates 
into  all  parts  of  space  and  time,  both  into  the  infin- 
itesimally  small  terms  of  the  same  series,  and  also 
into  the  maxima  in  order  to  find  the  highest  and 
most  sublime.  Thus  arise  questions  concerning  the 
infinity  of  the  world,  concerning  the  constituent  ele- 
ments of  matter  (either  masses  or  atoms),  concerning 
the  world  of  spirits  and  of  God. 


70  EMPIRICAL   PSYCIIOLOGV. 

Note. — It  is  highly  inopportune  at  this  point  to  raise  psy- 
chological questions  upon  subjects  of  this  kind,  as  has  been  the 
tendency  of  late,  under  tlie  mistaken  notion  that  in  this  way 
we  may  gain  a  certain,  scientific  basis.  Invariably  the  notions 
of  the  mental  faculties  by  which  these  subjects  are  to  be  recog- 
nized are  formed  according  to  the  opinions  upon  the  subjects 
themselves ;  and,  first,  one  must  have  sufficient  metaphysics  to 
enable  one  to  correct  these  opinions  before  one  can  even  ask 
what  capacity  for  the  knowledge  which  lies  beyond  the  senses 
may  dwell  in  man.  If  one  could  invent  a  false  logic  for  the 
pleasure  of  false  speculation,  then  one  might  also  venture  the 
same  thing  with  psychology ;  but  experience  will  not  yield. 

88.  Here  belong  the  purified  geometric  notions  of 
bodies  as  uniform  productions  of  pure  surfaces,  lines, 
and  points.  Moreover,  they  transcend  experience,  or 
rather  experience  transcends  them,  because  each  sen- 
suous object  adds  something  to  these  notions  by  which 
it  specializes  them.  The  question  concerning  the  men- 
tal faculties  which  furnish  the  fundamental  notions  of 
geometry  is  so  much  the  less  necessary  because  at  the 
first  glance  one  can  see  that  these  notions  (by  the  pre- 
supposed production  of  the  space  series)  are  obtained 
from  experience,  provided  it  be  possible  to  analyze  that 
which  the  senses  present  in  a  confused  condition  ;  an 
operation  which  is  not  dissimilar  to  the  formation  of 
scientific  general  notions. 

F.   Reproduction. 

89.  In  the  case  of  reproduction  which  refers  en- 
tirely to  the  temporal  life  of  man,  viz.,  to  the  continu- 
ance of  concepts  once  created,  we  again  find  on  the 
part  of  psychologists  a  carelessness  in  regard  to  the 
real  question.  Our  concepts  recede  from  consciousness 
and  return  again.    For  which  shall  we  first  seek  reason 


REPRODUCTION  OP  COXCEPTS.  71 

— the  receding  or  the  returning  ?  The  question  must 
first  be  directed  toward  tlie  former,  although,  in  fact, 
it  is  usual  to  discuss  only  the  latter. 

90.  Re^oroduction  offers  two  special  points  for  dis- 
cussion— its  vividness  and  its  accuracy.  The  former 
is  ascribed  to  imagination,  the  latter  to  memory.  Thus 
two  mental  faculties  are  invented  for  one  and  the  same 
thing  which  is  regarded  from  two  different  sides ;  for 
this  there  is,  however,^  an  excuse  which  is  easily  recog- 
nizable in  that  which  directly  follows. 

91.  A  high  degree  of  accuracy  and  vividness  of  re- 
production, at  the  same  time  and  in  equal  proportions, 
is  very  seldom  found.  Accuracy  depends  mainly  upon 
the  fact  that  a  concept  reappears  in  the  same  connec- 
tion with  others  as  that  in  which  it  first  appeared  — 
i.  e.,  with  the  same  characteristics  of  a  thing,  the  same 
circumstances  of  a  transaction,  the  same  combination 
of  time  and  place  relations,  etc.  This  requirement 
will  very  seldom  be  fulfilled  in  cases  where  the  vividness 
of  the  reproduction  allows  the  return  almost  simul- 
taneously into  consciousness  of  many  concepts  which 
are  connected  with  one  another,  and  which  cross  one 
another  in  various  ways.  Thus  it  is  found  that  men 
of  much  imagination  possess  but  little  accuracy  of 
memory,  although  in  this  respect  there  are  exceptions. 

Note. — Several  psycholos^ists  include,  under  memory,  repro- 
duction with  recollection.  The  latter  is  to  express  the  judgment 
that  one  has  had  the  same  concept  before.  From  this  some- 
times a  special  faculty  of  memory  is  A^ery  unnecessarily  assumed. 
But  the  judgment  mentioned,  by  which  subject  and  predicate 
are  really  separated,  can  be  very  seldom  proved  to  take  place, 
and  the  whole  theory  is  in  nowise  accordant  with  the  usages  of 
language.  We  say  of  a  man  who  easily  learns  a  speech  by  rote, 
and  without  taking  it  out  of  its  connection  repeats  it  accurately, 


72  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

he  has  a  good  memory,  even  if  he  does  not  remember  during  the 
repetition  that  it  is  the  same  discourse  which  is  written  on  this 
or  that  paper,  and  wliich  he  memorized  at  this  or  that  hour. 

92.  Psychological  writings  are  full  of  remarks, 
which  it  is  not  necessary  to  record  here,  upon  the 
association  of  concepts  or  ideas ;  in  other  words,  upon 
the  manner  in  which  tlie  latter  call  one  another  up, 
not  only  according  to  perceived  combinations  of  time 
and  space,  but  also  according  to  resemblances,  and  even 
apparently  according  to  contrast.  Eather  we  may  men- 
tion here  the  varied  complicated  course  which  repro- 
duction often  takes — e.  g.,  he  who  finds  coals  and  ashes 
in  a  forest  thinks  immediately  of  burning  wood  which 
(farther  backward)  may  have  lain  dry  in  the  forest, 
then  (forward)  of  men  who  may  have  encamped  there 
and  who  may  have  set  fire  to  it.  But  how  came  the 
men  there?  (This  question  goes  backward.)  What 
has  become  of  them  ?  (Forward.)  What  fire  might 
have  originated  had  a  storm  arisen  ?  (Side wise  into 
the  region  of  possibility,  at  the  same  time  looking 
back  upon  the  storm  and  forward  to  the  injury.)  Or 
a  man  finds  old  coins  in  the  ground.  How  do  they 
come  there  ?  To  what  time  do  they  belong  ?  Where- 
fore were  they  buried  ?  To  whom  does  the  treasure 
belong  ?  Every  seed  recalls  the  plant  from  which  it 
started,  and  points  forward  to  that  which  may  arise 
from  it,  while  at  the  same  time  it  suggests  the  use 
which  may  perhaps  be  made  of  it  without  planting  it. 
It  is  a  useful  exercise  to  observe  in  many  such  exam- 
ples as  the  above  the  changing  directions  and  ramifi- 
cations of  a  course  of  thought.  Besides,  it  is  well 
known  that  in  the  case  of  association,  according  to 
resemblances,  one  thing  is  put  in  the  place  of  the 


REPRODUCTION  OF  CONCEPTS.       73 

other  many  times,  out  of  which  arise  many  new  com- 
plications, or  inventions,  for  wliich  an  inventive  fac- 
ulty has  been  found. 

Note. — In  all  inventions  creation  in  its  broadest  sense  is  the 
most  essential  element.  Quite  as  much  imagination  belongs  to 
original  scientific  thinking  as  to  poetic  creation,  and  it  is  very 
doubtful  whether  Newton  or  Shakespeare  possessed  the  more 
imagination. 

93.  Memory  and  imagination  agree  in  this,  that  in 
every  man  their  special  strength  is  limited  to  certain 
classes  of  subjects.  For  him  who  wishes  geometrical 
imagination,  exercise  in  the  so-called  art  of  poetry 
would  be  quite  useless ;  and  he  who  retains,  without 
any  trouble,  the  technical  terms  of  a  science  which 
interests  him,  has  often  a  bad  memory  for  village  gos- 
sip. Here  we  find  that  reproduction,  as  well  in  regard 
to  its  vividness  as  to  its  faithfulness,  is  most  closely 
related  to  other  mental  activity,  and  that  the  assump- 
tion of  peculiar  psychical  faculties  wdiich  take  care  of 
reproduction  as  a  means  only  of  grouping  manifesta- 
tions satisfactorily  is  in  the  highest  degree  awkward. 

94.  Memory  and  imagination  differ  from  one  an- 
other in  that  the  former  appears  to  bring  up  only  rep- 
resented and,  as  it  were,,  dead  pictures,  while  the  lat- 
ter appears  to  be  employed  in  the  process  of  active 
representing.  The  transition  of  concepts  from  one 
condition  into  another  is  very  perceptible  in  the  re- 
reading of  something  which  one  has  one's  self  written  ; 
also,  in  verifying  what  one  has  one's  self  thought  out. 


74  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

THE   FACULTY   OF   FEELING    (OEFUHLVERMOGEIi).* 

95.  If  we  begin  to  assume  psychic  faculties,  there 
arises  the  necessity  for  assuming  one  or  more  additional 
besides  the  representing  faculty,  for  the  reason  that, 
by  an  account  of  that  which  we  represent,  or  of  how 
the  representation  arises  in  us,  we  are  by  no  means  able 
to  indicate  all  that  goes  on  in  our  minds.  Especially  is 
it  to  be  seen  that  in  us  are  manifested  manifold  phases 
of  preference  and  rejection,  on  account  of  which  the 
faculties  of  desire  and  aversion  have  been  set  up  side 
by  side  with  the  faculty  of  representation. 

96.  Now,  in  the  broad  and  dim  space  near  repre- 
sentation, the  boundary  between  feeling  and  desire  has 
recently  been  drawn.  But  if  i:)sychologists  are  asked 
concerning  the  origin  of  tliis  boundary,  they  say  that 
desire  relates  to  objects,  and  feeling  to  conditions  or 
states ;  yet  their  explanations  move  in  a  circle,  or  at 
least  do  not  touch  the  question  as  to  whether  perhaps 
feeling  and  desire  are  one  kind  of  occurrence,  which 
we  in  our  representation  observe  from  different  sides, 
and  hence  call  by  two  different  names. 

Note. — Maass,  in  his  work  upon  feelings,  explains  feeling 
through  desire  ("  A  feeling  is  pleasant,  in  so  far  as  it  is  desired 
for  its  own  sake  ") ;  but,  in  his  work  upon  the  passions,  he  says 
that  it  is  a  well-known  law  of  Nature  to  desire  that  which  is  con- 
ceived as  good,  and  to  detest  that  which  is  represented  as  bad. 
From  this  the  question  arises,  What  is  good  and  what  is  bad  ?    To 

*  The  reader  will  observe  that  the  word  feeling  is  restricted 
here  to  the  meaning  implied  by  the  German  word  Gefuhl.  and  is 
not  used  indiscriminately  to  indicate  feeling,  emotion,  and  desire. 


TDE  FACULTY  OF  FEELING.  75 

this  we  receive  the  answer,  Sensuousness  represents  as  good  that 
by  which  it  is  pleasantly  affected,  etc.,  and  here  we  find  our- 
selves in  a  circle.  Hoffbauer,  in  his  Outlines  of  Empirical  Psy- 
chology, begins  the  chapter  upon  faculties  of  feeling  and  desire 
thus :  "  We  are  conscious  of  many  conditions  in  our  minds 
which  we  try  to  reproduce ;  these  we  call  pleasant.  Certain 
concepts  create  in  us  the  effort  to  make  their  object  real ;  this 
we  call  desire."  Here  is  one  and  the  same  basis,  viz.,  effort,  un- 
derlying feelings  and  desires,  and,  if  the  distinction  be  in  the 
objects  and  conditions,  then  the  question  is,  whether  perhaps  the 
feelings,  consequently  the  conditions,  which  were  expected  from 
the  objects,  may  not  be  what  is  really  desired.  This  important 
point  appears  to  be  treated  no  better  by  other  authors.  They 
ought  to  have  noticed  the  excellent  remark  by  Locke,  in  his 
work  on  the  Human  Understanding.  It  does  not  exhaust  the 
subject,  but  proceeds  in  the  right  way,  and  shows  that  many 
desires  (if  not  all)  are  independent  of  feelings,  although  they 
may  have  the  latter  as  results.  That  which  Locke  calls  dissatis- 
faction is  no  feeling,  but  the  first  movement  of  desire. 

97.  K'ow,  as  the  facts  which  we  call  feelings  can 
only  with  the  greatest  difficulty  be  separated  from 
those  called  desires  and  aversions,  to  enumerate  the 
kinds  of  feelings  is  a  very  uncertain  undertaking. 
Three  kinds  are  prominent :  sensuous  comfort  and 
pain  ;  feeling  of  the  beautiful  and  the  ugly  (with 
which  the  sublime  and  trivial  may  be  included)  ;  and 
the  emotions  which  as  yet^we  are  accustomed  to  discuss 
under  the  subject  of  the  feelings.  But  with  this  the 
subject  is  not  exhausted.  In  the  first  i^lace,  we  must 
observe  that  the  feelings  are  doubled  through  sym- 
pathy with  that  which  others  feel.  In  the  next  place, 
we  may  remark  that  each  kind  of  outer  and  inner  ac- 
tivity, according  as  it  succeeds  or  fails  (i.  e.,  according 
as  the  desire  underlying  the  activity  is  satisfied  or  not), 
carries  with  it  comfort  or  discomfort.     Furthermore, 


76  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

that  feelings  mingle  in  various  ways  (a  disputed  point 
like  the  following).  Finally,  there  are  conditions  of 
feeling  which,  if  not  indifferent,  are,  nevertheless,  so 
constituted  that  pleasure  and  discomfort  are  not  char- 
acteristic of  them,  and  theii  strength  can  not  be  meas- 
ured by  those  sensations 

98.  In  order  to  have  at  least  a  fixed  standpoint,  we 
shall  divide  feelings  into  those  which  depend  upon  the 
nature  of  what  is  felt,  and  into  others  which  depend 
upon  accidental  mental  conditions ;  here  a  third  class 
may  be  mentioned  as  existing  between  them,  viz.,  a 
class  which  depends  upon  a  certain  mental  condition, 
so  that  this,  in  connection  with  the  nature  of  the  ob- 
ject felt,  gives  rise  to  a  corresponding  feeling.  Next 
we  must  speak  of  the  intermediate  condition  between 
the  pleasant  and  the  unpleasant ;  and,  lastly,  the  emo- 
tions will  come  in  their  turn. 

A.    Feelings  which  arise  from  the  Nature  of  that 
which  IS  felt. 

99.  That  there  are  such  feelings  is  an  evident  fact. 
Every  bodily  pain,  as  such,  is  unpleasant,  without  re- 
gard to  the  question  how  much  ado  we  make  about  it, 
or  how  patiently  we  bear  it.  Moreover,  unpleasant  feel- 
ings of  this  kind  are  specifically  different.  Burning, 
cutting,  electric  shock,  aching  teeth,  each  of  these  ex- 
cites its  own  peculiar  pain,  which  may  be  distinguished 
from  every  other,  although  a  mere  imaginary  pain  that 
in  itself  would  be  neither  pleasant  nor  unpleasant, 
does  not  admit  of  being  separated  ;  rather  the  sensation 
and  its  opposite  are  one  and  the  same.  Sweet  viands, 
soft  tones,  a  mild  temperature,  furnish  examples  of 
pleasant  sensations  of  this  kind,  the  pleasure  of  which 


THE  FACULTY  OF  FEELING.        77 

is  understood,  without  regard  to  the  question  as  to  its 
value,  or  whether  by  it  one  is  inclined  to  seek  their 
continuance  or  to  give  one's  self  up  to  these  sensations. 

100.  These  feelings  are  analogous  to  all  aesthetic 
feeling,  from  which  they  differ  only  in  this,  that  in  the 
latter  case  the  object  presented  is  made  the  subject  of 
a  predicate,  which  expresses  approbation  or  blame  ; 
hence  the  aesthetic  feeling  is  brought  into  the  form  of 
a  judgment  and  is  scientifically  treated,  which  from  a 
practical  standpoint  is  infinitely  superior. 

XoTE. — When,  in  the  beautiful,  size  predominates,  a  sense  of 
the  sublime  arises.  This  is  a  genuine  species  of  beauty,  because 
relations  of  magnitude  themselves  belong  to  the  elements  of 
beauty.  But  we  seek  in  vain  for  the  definition  of  the  ridiculous, 
which  has  its  origin  in  the  possibility  of  laughing,  and  which 
can  not  be  considered  without  reference  to  a  human  body  and 
its  organic  vital  sensations.  The  most  purely  comic  sensations 
would  to  the  pure  intellect  amount  to  mere  contrast.  Laugh- 
ing belongs  to  the  emotions ;  like  the  latter,  it  shakes  the  body, 
and  again,  in  reversed  order  through  the  latter,  it  shakes  the 
mind.  Like  the  emotions,  it  is  a  mental  condition  of  short 
duration,  for  which,  according  to  the  whim  of  the  moment,  we 
find  ourselves  in  readiness  or  not.  Besides,  the  ridiculous  is  an 
example  of  that  which  is  strongly  felt,  without  either  pleasure 
or  the  reverse  being  a  characteristic  of  it.  As  we  know,  there  is 
a  joyous  and  a  bitter  laugh,  and  between  the  two  a  certain  in- 
difference toward  the  ridiculous,  as  in  the  case  of  the  comedian, 
whose  serious  business  it  is  to  arouse  laughter  in  others. 

B.  Feelings  that  depend  upon  the  Mental  Conditions. 

101.  In  connection  with  the  above  first  class  of 
feelings,  it  may  be  correctly  stated  that  feeling  is  the 
source  and  (at  least  in  part)  the  ground  of  explanation 
of  the  corresponding  desire  and  aversion.  In  the  sec- 
ond class,  just  to  be  considered,  desire,  on  the  contrary. 


78  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

must  be  regarded  as  something  original,  and  the  feel- 
ing is  not  to  be  considered  an  effect,  but  the  associate 
and  follower  of  the  desire. 

We  may  mention  here  the  numerous  desires  which 
are  either  independent  of  the  pleasure  or  pain  of  their 
object,  or  which  have  no  relation  to  the  latter.  All 
the  things  which  are  wished  for  to-day  and  despised 
to-morrow,  everything  whose  value  decreases  and  aug- 
ments according  to  individual  caprice  and  partiality, 
furnish  us  striking  examples  here.  The  desire  for 
these  things  is,  as  is  known,  accompanied  by  much 
unpleasant  feeling,  and,  in  the  case  of  gratification,  by 
a  brief  pleasure.  Such  pleasant  and  unpleasant  feel- 
ings can  be  called  neither  sensuous  nor  rational.  It  is 
connected  with  the  arousing  of  our  activity,  just  as  the 
object  of  our  deed  may  be  so  constituted  as  to  affect 
our  activity.  Whether  a  child  wishes  to  untie  a  knot 
in  a  string,  or  a  mathematician  wishes  to  solve  a  prob- 
lem in  numbers  and  geometrical  figures,  the  feeling 
of  exertion  and  of  ineffective  effort  remains  always  of 
the  same  kind.  The  restless  activity  of  man  (con- 
trasted with  the  natural  effort  of  the  brute)  is  generally 
of  this  kind.  Here  belong  also  the  feelings  which 
appear  to  entirely  lack  an  object,  as  in  the  case  of 
anxiety,  or  in  that  of  comfortable  repose. 

C.  Intermediate  and  Mixed  Feelings. 

102.  All  feelings  of  contrast,  and  of  amazement, 
which  latter  are  in  a  way  related  to  the  former,  may 
be  regarded  as  intermediate  feelings — i.  e.,  such  as 
can  neither  be  described  nor  estimated  by  the  pleas- 
ure or  the  pain  which  they  bring  with  them.  Amaze- 
ment may  be  pleasant  quite  as  well  as  unpleasant.     In 


THE  FACULTY  OF  FEELING.        79 

all  beautiful  art,  contrasts  are  indispensable,  and  yet 
they  are  very  seldom  connected  with  essentially  aesthetic 
relations;  rather  they  serve,  first  of  all,  to  hold  the 
manifold  asunder,  and  thereby  to  promote  the  intelli- 
gibility of  the  aesthetic  relations. 

103.  That  there  may  be  mixed  feelings  follows  in 
any  case  from  the  difference  between  the  two  classes 
before  mentioned.  An  example  of  this  is  curiosity, 
which  desires  to  see  something  foreign  to  itself,  and 
which  is  satisfied  by  a  sensation  which  has  become  in 
part  really  unpleasant  to  itself.  Besides,  no  one  who 
studies  experimentally  can  be  willing  to  deny  mixed 
feelings,  inasmuch  as  cases  daily  occur  where  one  and 
the  same  event  affects  our  feelings  in  different  respects, 
and  very  often  in  opj^osite  ways. 

Note  1. — False  speculations  have  succeeded  in  obscuring 
these  simple  facts.  People  fancy  that  they  have  discovered  a 
twofold  delusion:  first,  an  exchange  of  the  feeling  itself  for  its 
manifold  causes ;  second,  a  misapprehension  of  the  transition 
from  one  feeling  into  another.  These  remarks  may  not  make  the 
facts  doubtful,  but  will  still  less  establish  the  opposite  assertion. 
It  has  already  been  shown  (see  sections  34-38)  that  the  feeling 
and  the  willing  of  man  are  founded  in  the  concept  masses,  and 
not  by  any  means  directly  in  the  soul.  Hence  the  variety  and 
conflict  of  feeling,  as  well  as  of  willing,  are  given  in  experience 
quite  as  intelligibly  as  certainly. 

Note  2. — Only  too  often  poets  are  moved  to  mingle  feelings 
in  their  works  of  art.  Thus  they  may  reach  the  piquant,  but 
not  the  beautiful.  Great  masterpieces  may  frequently  be  misun- 
derstood. Shakespeare  introduces  the  comic  into  his  tragedies, 
but,  if  by  this  he  for  the  moment  relaxes  a  tense  condition  in 
order  so  much  the  more  certainly  to  increase  it  again,  he  is 
careful  never  to  allow  the  ridiculous  to  become  attached  to  his 
principal  characters.  In  his  narration  of  the  journey  of  Odys- 
seus, Homer  is  romantic ;  but  that  is  a  narration  of  extraordi- 


80  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

nary  sufferings,  and  portrays  the  character  of  Odysseus  himself, 
from  whom  no  one  would  expect  a  purely  serious  and  faithful 
account. 

D.  The  Emotions  {Affect en). 

■  104.  After  the  emotions  (transitory  variations  from 
the  condition  of  equanimity)  have  been  separated  from 
the  passions  (rooted  desires),  a  prevailing  opinion  has 
arisen  that  the  emotions  are  nothing  but  stronger  feel- 
ings. But  there  are  very  strong  enduring  feelings 
which  have  grown  into  the  deepest  recesses  in  the 
foundation  of  human  character  (e.  g.,  adherence  to 
one's  own  people  and  to  the  fatherland),  with  which 
the  most  complete  equanimity  exists  so  long  as  nothing 
of  an  opposite  nature  which  may  disturb  them  appears. 
The  moment  of  danger  to  one's  own,  or  to  the  father- 
land, may  arouse  emotion,  but  this  emotion  is  widely 
different  from  feeling  itself.  In  the  same  way,  a  man 
may  possess  a  strong  and  lasting  feeling  of  honor  with- 
out being  in  a  condition  of  emotion  from  it.  So  far 
from  emotions  being  feelings,  they  rather  make  feeling 
tame  or  dull.  The  moralist  and  the  artist  have  great 
cause  to  guard  against  insipidity,  which  arises  when 
one  from  pure  emotion  finally  no  longer  knows  at  what 
he  weeps  or  laughs. 

105.  Kant's  classification  of  the  emotions  into  melt- 
ing (i.  e.,  paralyzing  to  activity)  and  stirring  (rilstic/e 
=  arousing  to  activity)  throws  light  upon  the  subject. 
Variation  from  equanimity  may  occur  from  two  causes : 
either  there  is  too  much  or  too  little  present  in  con- 
sciousness. To  the  first  class  belong  mental  shock, 
sadness,  fear ;  to  the  second,  joy  and  anger. 

106.  The  emotions  are  not  merely  a  psychological 
but  also  a  physiological  subject,  for  they  act  upon  the 


THE  EMOTIONS.  81 

body  with  remarkable,  often  dangerous  power,  and  by 
this  means,  in  reverse  order,  make  the  mind  dependent 
upon  the  body,  partly  from  the  continuance  of  the 
bodily  condition  (which  does  not  cease  so  quickly  as 
would  the  mental  state  by  itself),  partly  from  the  tend- 
ency of  the  body  to  yield  to  emotion.  Thus  courage 
and  timidity  are  very  often  dependent  upon  health  and 
sickness. 

It  is  a  remarkable  circumstance  that  different  bodily 
conditions  belong  to  different  emotions.  For  example, 
shame  drives  the  blood  to  the  cheeks,  fear  makes  one 
pale,  anger  and  despair  increase  the  strength  of  the 
muscles,  etc. 

From  this  we  see  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  enu- 
merate and  distinguish  the  possible  emotions  accord- 
ing to  a  merely  psychological  principle. 

Note. — Without  presenting  here  the  theory  of  the  union 
between  soul  and  body,  according  to  the  laws  of  natural 
philosophy,  we  may  make  further  use  of  the  two  preceding 
observations : 

1.  Every  gradual  excitation  of  one  system  by  another  works 
by  reflex  action  in  such  a  manner  that  from  the  part  of  the 
system  excited  the  disturbance  is  extended  into  the  exciting 
part.  Under  the  excitement  of  emotion,  not  only  the  body  is  dis- 
turbed, but  the  mind  suffers  a  prolonged  uneasiness,  and  indeed 
the  different  systems  of  the  bodily  organism  must  be  disturbed 
in  the  same  way.  The  excitation  goes  from  the  soul  to  the 
brain,  from  the  brain  to  the  spinal  marrow,  from  the  spinal 
marrow  to  the  ganglia,  from  there  to  the  circulatory  system, 
from  there  to  the  individual  organs,  and  thence  to  the  nutritive 
system — and  then  the  influence  returns  in  reversed  order  [from 
the  nutritive  system  io  the  soul],  and  not  suddenly  but  succes- 
sively, just  as  the  excitation  proceeded,  which  latter  may  be 
regarded  as  an  accelerating  force  (according  to  the  technique 
of  mechanics). 


82  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

2.  The  partial  effect  upon  definite  organs,  of  which  the 
emotions  give  proof,  nuist  also  occur  where  we  do  not  observe 
it.  In  tlie  reproduction  of  visual  concepts  arises  an  excitation 
of  the  optic  nerve,  in  tliat  of  auditory  concepts  an  excitation  of 
the  auditory  nerve,  etc. ;  but,  in  the  concept  of  a  movement,  the 
nerves  of  motion  are  excited,  so  that  the  special  act  of  holding 
back  is  necessary,  if  the  movement  is  not  to  follow. 

If  we  combine  these  two  explanations  just  given,  then  the 
most  varied  tendencies  are  explicable  without  any  occasion  for 
the  current  theory  which  confounds  life  and  soul,  thus  giving 
rise  to  the  error  of  materialism,  so  called,  which  in  regard  to 
matter  is  still  more  preposterous  than  in  regard  to  soul. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   FACULTY   OF    DESIRE. 

107.  liN"  regard  to  the  word  desire,  we  must,  at  the 
very  first,  correct  a  wrong  use  of  speech  which  ob- 
tains generally  in  treatises  on  psychology.  The  fac- 
ulty of  desire,  together  with  those  of  representation 
and  feeling,  should  furnish  an  exhaustive  classification 
of  the  mental  activities.  It  must,  therefore,  include 
wishes,  instincts,  and  every  species  of  longing,  inas- 
much as  they  belong  neither  to  feelings  nor  to  repre- 
sentations. In  works  upon  psychology  is  to  be  found 
the  assertion  that  that  wliich  is  desired  must  be  rep- 
resented as  attainable ;  the  belief  in  the  impossibility 
of  attainment  kills  the  desire.  This  statement  is  true 
in  regard  to  willing,  which  is  a  desire  combined  with 
the  supposition  that  it  can  be  fulfilled.  Hence  there 
is  a  great  difference  between  a  strong  vv-ill  and  a  strong 


THE  FACULTY  OP  DESIRE.  83 

desire.  !N"apoleon  willed  when  emperor,  and  desired 
when  at  St.  Helena.  The  expression  desire  must  not 
be  so  limited  as  to  exclude  those  wishes  which  remain, 
though  they  may  be  vain  or  so-called  pious  wishes,  and 
which,  for  the  very  reason  that  they  do  remain,  con- 
stantly incite  men  to  new  efforts,  because  through  them 
the  thought  of  a  possibility  is  ever  anew  suggested  in 
spite  of  all  reasons  which  appear  to  prove  the  impossi- 
bility of  attainment.  It  is  very  important  to  give  to 
the  concept  of  the  unattainability  of  the  wished-for 
object  strength  enough  so  that  a  peaceful  renunciation 
may  take  the  place  of  the  desire.  A  man  dreams  of  a 
desirable  future  for  himself,  even  when  he  knows  it 
will  never  come. 

108.  According  to  the  classification  of  feelings 
made  above,  we  must  now  distinguish  among  desires 
(the  word  taken  in  its  widest  sense)  those  which  have 
for  object  something  pleasant  as  such  (aversions  having 
something  unpleasant  as  such)  from  others  whose  di- 
rection is  determined  by  no  feeling,  but  merely  by  the 
present  mental  condition. 

Note. — Usually  the  latter  kind  of  desires  is  misunderstood. 
We  think  that  the  object  desired  must  necessarily  be  represented 
as  a  good  thing.  This  is  either  a  tautology — if  good  means  the 
same  as  the  thing  desired — or  it  is  an  error  which,  from  an 
empii-ical  point  of  view,  belongs  to  the  numberless  gratuitous 
assumptions  of  psychologists.  In  Alexander  Baumgarten's 
Metaphysics  (665)  is  to  be  found  the  statement :  "  Quae  placentia 
praevidens  exstitura  nisu  meo  prassagio,  nitor  producere.  Quae 
displicentia  praevidens  impedienda  nisu  meo  prassagio,  eorum 
opposita  appeto."  This  is  given  as  the  law  of  the  faculty  of 
desire  (lex  facultatis  appetitivae).  But  regarded  as  a  general  law 
this  theory  of  that  otherwise  valuable  work  is  defective  in  every 
point.    Placer e,  so  far  as  it  means  anticipation  of  something 


S4  EMPIRICAL  rSYClJOLOGY. 

pleasant  or  beautiful,  is  not  necessary.  Prmvidere  has  likewise 
crept  in.  It  is  true  that  whoever  represents  to  himself  a  desire, 
will  find  his  concept  develop  time  conditions.  But  the  lowest 
animals  also  desire,  and  yet  we  can  not  assume  that  they  sepa- 
rate the  present  from  the  future.  Exstitura  nisu  meo  presup-' 
poses  the  concept  of  the  Ego,  or  at  least  a  feeling  of  self,  which 
has  a  much  later  origin  than  the  simple  desires  of  brutes  and  of 
young  children. 

109.  The  most  important  distinction,  however,  is 
that  between  the  lower  and  higher  faculties  of  desire. 
For  the  two  separate  into  hostile  classes,  while  feelings 
exist  side  by  side,  or  mingle  together ;  and,  in  regard 
to  concepts,  most  people,  ev^n  cultured  men  and 
scholars,  remain  at  the  sensuous  standpoint  without 
being  seriously  troubled  by  the  metaphysical  protest 
against  sense- knowledge. 

A.    The  Loicer  Faculties  of  Desire. 

110.  Here  we  are  first  met  by  impulses  and  in- 
stincts. Of  the  latter,  man  has  only  a  fragment ;  we 
find  them  existing  in  the  brutes  in  more  perfect  form 
and  in  greater  variety,  where  it  is  clearly  shown  that 
by  means  of  them  the  organic  structure  constitutes 
the  essential  and  governing  principle.  The  construct- 
ive art-impulses  of  brutes  are  special  examples  of  in- 
stincts. 

But  the  most  important  and  the  most  general  of  the 
impulses  is  that  for  movement  and  change,  the  rest- 
less activity  which  is  especially  displayed  in  children 
and  young  animals,  in  which  we  find  much  vitality 
with  little  mind.  Such  examples  afford  practice  in 
distinguishing  between  life  and  soul.  Since  this  ac- 
tivity varies  according  to  age,  and,  besides,  is  different 
in  individuals  from  birth,  we  may  believe  that  it  is  a 


THE  LOWER  FACULTIES  OF  DESIRE.  85 

result  of  the  organism,  lience  ratlier  a  physiological 
than  a  psychological  subject. 

111.  Now,  as  psychologists  have  made  their  discov- 
eries by  the  analogy  which  the  outer  sense  bears  to  the 
inner,  side  by  side  with  the  organic  impulses  they  place 
several  others,  such  as  self-love,  the  impulse  of  imita- 
tion and  of  exaggeration,  the  social  instincts,  etc.  Yes, 
they  even  assume  a  general  instinct  to  seek  happiness, 
although  no  one  can  specify  definitely  the  object  of 
this  latter  instinct,  as  it  differs  in  different  individ- 
uals. 

It  is  clear  that  nothing  but  psychological  abstrac- 
tion, under  the  name  of  instinct,  has  given  the  very 
indefinite  idea  of  happiness  a  foundation.  But  in 
regard  to  self-love  and  the  social  instincts,  the  case  is 
no  better.  Desire  here  precedes  all  thought  of  I,  thou, 
he.  Experience  shows  plainly  enough  that  egoistic 
prudence  as  well  as  resolution  to  sacrifice  something 
for  others  is  only  formed  gradually,  according  as  the 
knowledge  of  the  collisions  that  take  place  between 
selfish  and  altruistic  interests  is  more  deeply  impressed. 

The  insidious  introduction  of  real  forces,  or  at  least 
of  special  talents  and  native  germs,  is  particularly  fre- 
quent in  the  theory  of  faculties  of  desire,  because  man 
shows  himself  active  in  his  desire,  and  is,  above  all, 
inclined  to  assume  as  many  forces  as  classes  of  real  or 
apparent  activities. 

112.  The  inclinations,  or  those  lasting  mental  con- 
ditions which  are  favorable  to  the  rise  of  certain  kinds 
of  desires,  show  themselves  more  than  the  so-called 
instincts  to  be  different  in  different  people.  They  are 
for  the  most  part  results  of  the  habit  which  appears 
to  extend  from  the  faculty  of  representation  into  the 


86  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

faculty  of  desire.  For  there  are,  first,  tlie  thoughts 
which  follow  the  accustomed  direction,  and  which,  if 
no  hindrance  intervenes  before  there  is  opportunity 
for  perceptible  feeling  and  desire,  pass  directly  into 
action ;  but  if  something  is  placed  in  the  way,  then 
the  desire,  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  effort  and 
fatiguing  activity,  increases. 

113.  The  most  striking,  and,  next  to  madness,  the 
saddest  spectacle  in  psychology  is  furnished  by  the 
passions.  In  his  Anthropology,  Kant  has  delineated 
them  excellently  well.  They  are  not  inclinations  or 
mental  conditions,  but  are  desires,  and  every  desire, 
without  exception,  the  noblest  as  well  as  the  worst, 
may  become  a  passion.  It  becomes  such  in  so  far  as 
it  attains  dominion  to  such  an  extent  that  moral  de- 
liberation is  out  of  the  question.  A  tendency  to  at- 
tach undue  importance  to  trifles  is  the  peculiar  sign  of 
the  passions.  Hence,  they  can  only  be  defined  and 
described  in  contrast  with  practical  reason.  A  perfect 
classification  of  the  passions  is  quite  impossible,  for 
the  reason  that  every  desire,  strengthened  by  circum- 
stances and  habit,  may  give  a  perverted  direction  to 
internal  deliberation.  Every  classification  of  passions 
is  at  the  same  time  a  classification  of  desires  in  general. 
In  history,  the  passions  play  a  conspicuous  part.  One 
should  beware  of  attributing  this  part  to  Providence ; 
by  doing  so  one  would  resemble  Mephistopheles  too 
much,  and  finally,  like  him,  would  fall  out  of  his 
part. 

B.   The  Higher  Faculties  of  Desire. 

114.  Deliberation  precedes  judgment  and  action, 
when  a  man,  before  he  joins  a  predicate  to  a  subject, 


THE  HIGEER  FACULTIES  OF  DESIRE.         87 

and  before  he  changes  the  present  places  of  things, 
compares  other  possible  ways  of  thought  and  action. 
In  deliberation  lie  deferring  and  delay,  as  well  as  con- 
centration and  pondering.  Deliberation  is  supposed 
to  obviate  revocation  and  repentance.  It  accomplishes 
this  in  so  far  as  every  one  among  the  possible  kinds 
of  representation,  each  desire  that  might  come  into  col- 
lision with  another,  is  allowed  to  enter  fully  into  con- 
sciousness, and  as  strongly  as  possible  to  work  against 
the  others,  or  to  co-operate  with  them.  If  in  this  pro- 
cess something  is  forgotten— if  during  a  period  of  de- 
liberation something  is  hindered  in  manifesting  its  full 
value,  then  there  is  danger  that  another  mental  state 
will  follow,  and  the  decision  of  the  former  mental 
state  be  found  objectionable.  Hence  deliberation  is 
an  inner  exj^eriment,  the  result  of  which  must  be  ac- 
cepted with  entire  submission;  from  this,  reason  in 
thought  and  action  has  its  names  [i.  e.,  the  "  theoreti- 
cal reason  "  and  the  "  practical  reason  "]. 

115.  Hence,  reason  is  originally  neither  command- 
ing nor  law-giving ;  above  all,  it  is  not  the  source  of 
willing.  It  is  quite  as  little  a  source  of  knowledge. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  regarded  as  such ;  indeed,  it  is 
thought  to  be  the  highest  judge  and  authority,  which 
is  a  very  natural  result,  inasmuch  as  (with  the  custom- 
ary habit  of  making  gratuitous  assumptions)  the  dan- 
ger of  having  to  repent — if  one  does  not  act  according 
to  the  results  of  reflection — leads  one,  in  connection 
with  the  threat,  to  think  of  a  command,  and,  in  con- 
nection with  the  command,  of  one  who  gives  the  com- 
mand. 

116.  Moral  (PrakfiscJie)  deliberation  becomes  more 
complicated  by  reason  of  the  connection  between  means 


SS  EMPIRICAL   rSYCHOLOGY. 

and  ends.  It  has  not  indeed  to  weigh  a  manifold 
immediate  desire  against  another  (in  order  to  clioose 
among  several  ends),  but  also  to  go  through  the  series 
of  possible  results  which  are  connected  with  the  ends, 
and  which  make  their  attainability  probable.  In  the 
latter  respect,  deliberation  is  ascribed  to  practical  un- 
derstanding, which  is  the  faculty  of  adjusting  itself  to 
the  nature  of  the  thing  thought,  independent  of  imagi- 
nation and  passion.  When  this  kind  of  deliberation 
is  completely  perfected  it  creates  plans.  The  choice 
among  ends,  however,  is  restricted  by  practical  reason. 

117.  Circumspection  is  the  mental  condition  of  a 
man  who  reflects.  If  it  becomes  a  habit,  deliberation 
is  extended  continuously  in  every  direction  ;  finally,  an 
effort  is  made  to  include  every  possible  desire  in  one 
act  of  deliberation,  while  more  and  more  one's  wishes 
are  constantly  limited  and  subordinated.  The  ques- 
tion is  concerning  the  ultimate  aim  of  all  human  action 
and  impulse — viz.,  the  highest  good.  In  this,  delibera- 
tion makes  use  of  general  notions.  Maxims  (very  dif- 
ferent from  plans)  and  principles  are  originated,  and, 
these  being  collected,  a  science  of  morals  is  developed. 

In  practical  philosophy  it  is  shown  that  after  set- 
ting aside  all  changeable  desires  depending  upon  the 
momentary  inclination,  only  the  non-arbitrary  prefer- 
ence and  rejection  can  hold  the  highest  rank, -and  such 
is  in  fact  assigned  in  tlie  aesthetic  judgments  upon  the 
will. 

For  this  reason  the  work  of  deliberation  (or  if  one 
prefers,  of  practical  [moral]  reason)  is  to  bring  forward 
those  judgments,  and  the  ideas  arising  from  them — 
viz.,  of  inner  freedom,  of  perfection,  of  benevolence,  of 
right,  and  of  equity.    These  ideas  must  be  disentangled 


.    FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL.  89 

from  their  complication  with  all  other  thinking  and 
willing  wherein  they  lie,  at  first  hidden,  and  they  must 
be  23laced  at  the  summit  of  all  wisdom,  while  desires 
and  wishes  are  collectively  made  subordinate  to  them. 

C.  Freedom  of  the  Will 

118.  When  a  decision,  the  result  of  a  completed 
act  of  deliberation,  is  on  the  point  of  presenting  itself, 
it  often  happens  that  a  desire  arises  and  opposes  this 
decision.  In  that  case  a  man  does  not  know  what  he 
wishes — he  regards  himself  as  standing  between  two 
forces  which  draw  him  toward  opposite  sides.  In  this 
act  of  self-consideration  he  places  reason  and  desire 
opposite  each  other,  as  if  they  were  foreign  counselors, 
and  regards  himself  as  a  third,  who  listens  to  the  two 
and  then  decides.  He  believes  himself  to  be  free  to 
decide  as  he  will. 

He  finds  himself  sufficiently  rational  to  compre- 
hend w^hat  reason  may  say  to  him,  and  sufficiently  sus- 
ceptible to  allow  the  enticemxcnts  of  desire  to  influence 
him.  If  this  were  not  so,  his  freedom  would  have  no 
value ;  he  would  only  be  able  to  incline  blindly  in  this 
or  that  direction,  but  he  could  not  choose.  Kow,  how- 
ever, the  reason  to  which  he  gives  heed,  and  the  desire 
which  excites  and  entices  him,  are  not  really  outside  of 
him,  but  within  him,  and  he  himself  is  not  a  third, 
on  a  level  with  those  two,  but  his  own  mental  life  lies 
in  each  and  works  in  each.  Hence,  when  he  finally 
chooses,  this  choice  is  nothing  but  a  co-operation  of 
those  two  factors,  reason  and  desire,  between  which  he 
thought  he  stood  free. 

When  a  man  finds  that  reason  and  desire  in  their 
co-operation  have  decided  over  him,  he  seems  to  him- 


90  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

self  not  to  be  free,  but  nitlier  subjected  to  foreign 
arts  and  influences. 

Manifestly,  this  is  again  an  illusion,  and  from  ex- 
actly the  same  source  as  the  first.  Just  because  reason 
and  desire  are  nothing  outside  of  him,  and  he  nothing 
outside  of  them,  the  decision  which  arises  from  them 
is  not  foreign,  but  his  own.  He  has  chosen  only  with 
self-activity,  yet  not  with  a  force  different  from  his 
reason  and  from  his  desire,  and  which  could  give  a 
result  different  from  those  two. 

Note  1. — Here  is  the  principle  ground  for  psychological 
ilhisions  in  regard  to  freedom.  We  can  not  here  consider  the 
deeper  lying  metaphysical  and  moral  misapprehensions  mingled 
with  the  illusions  mentioned.  It  may  be  very  briefly  stated  that 
the  difficulties  that  are  found  in  responsibility  are  the  easiest  of 
all  to  remove.  An  act  is  held  to  be  responsible  so  far  as  it  can 
be  regarded  as  a  product  of  a  will;  it  is  more  or  less  responsible 
the  more  or  less  it  discloses  weak  or  strong  will.  So  far  every- 
thing is  clearly  and  generally  well  understood.  Now,  however, 
all  this  is  thrown  away  if  the  will  itself  may  in  turn  be  deter- 
mined by  something  else,  for  this  is  no  better  than  if  the  stand- 
ard l)y  which  everything  else  is  to  be  measured  should  itself  be 
subjected  to  a  measurement.  Thus  the  fear  arises  that  if  the 
will  has  had  other  causes  from  which  it-  unavoidably  proceeded, 
these  causes  should  bear  the  blame,  since  not  only  the  will  but 
the  actions  arising  from  it  should  be  imputed  to  them.  Hence 
we  prefer  to  ascril:v3  to  the  will  a  self-determination.  From  this 
arises  an  infinite  series  (compare  Introduction  to  Philosophy, 
i^  107).  But  that  fear  is  quite  groundless :  responsibility  stops 
with  the  actor,  just  as  soon  as  the  action  is  referred  to  the  will ; 
for  this  is  at  once  subjected  to  a  "  practical  [or  moral]  judg- 
ment "  (Kant's  "  categorical  imperative  "),  which  remains  in  per- 
fect self-identity  and  independence  whatever  may  be  mentioned 
as  the  causes  and  occasion  of  the  will.  However,  if  it  be  found 
that  the  will  had  an  earlier  will  as  its  source,  the  responsibility 
begins  again  anew.     The  depraved  man  after  he  has  become  en- 


FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL.  91 

tirely  bad,  will  be  held  to  be  completely  responsible  for  his  crimes, 
but  these  again  may  be  laid  as  a  burden  upon  his  corruptor,  and 
so  on  backward  as  long  as  somewhere  a  will  may  be  pointed  out 
as  the  originator  of  those  crimes. 

Note  2. — Transcendental  freedom,  which  Kant  wished  to  be 
assumed  as  a  necessary  article  of  faith  for  the  sake  of  the  cate- 
gorical imperative  (because  he  had  failed  in  finding  the  right 
foundation  for  practical  philosophy)  is  an  entire  stranger  in  psy- 
chology. Let  him  who  does  not  perceive  this,  study  Kant's  two 
Critiques  of  Pure  and  Practical  Reason,  and  learn  from  them  to 
treat  this  subject  with  caution.  Kant  has  ^aken  great  pains  to 
create  in  himself  a  clear  conviction  upon  this  point ;  he  has,  how- 
ever, produced  the  confusion  that  adheres  to  his  categorical  im- 
perative, but  which  with  his  followers  took  on  quite  other  forms. 

119.  Now,  while  the  consciousness  of  freedom,  so 
far  as  it  is  to  stand  between  reason  and  desire,  rests 
upon  no  better  facts  than  have  been  given  above,  quite 
another  result  is  reached  if  reason  itself  be  considered 
the  seat  of  freedom.  Xothing  is  more  evident  than 
that  the  passionate  man  is  a  slave.  His  incapacity  to 
consider  motives  of  advantage  or  duty,  his  ruin  through 
his  own  fault,  are  clearly  evident.  In  contrast  with 
him,  the  reasoning  man  who  represses  his  desires  as 
soon  as  they  are  opposed  by  considerations  of  good, 
may  rightly  be  called  free,  and,  the  stronger  he  is  in 
this  power  of  repression,  the  freer  he  is.  But,  whether 
such  a  strength  may  be  increased  ad  infinitum^  can  not 
be  determined  by  existing  cases,  for  these  indicate  only 
a  limited  power. 


EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE    CO-OPERATIOJ^   AKD    DEVELOPMENT   OF   THE 
MENTAL    FACULTIES. 

l'-?0.  The  hypothetical  assumption  of  faculties,  in 
the  foregoing  discussion,  has  been  shown  to  be  so  de- 
fective that  the  attempt  to  give  an  exhaustive  survey 
of  their  mutual  influence  in  all  their  combinations 
would  necessarily  appear  useless.  However,  before  we 
observe  the  human  mind  in  its  changing  conditions 
more  closely,  a  few  remarks  will  be  useful  in  facilitat- 
ing the  summing  up  of  the  preceding  discussion. 

121.  Next  to  the  outer  senses,  whose  indispensa- 
bility  is  at  first  glance  evident  (what  would  a  man  be, 
born  blind,  deaf,  and  without  hands  ?),  reproduction 
in  its  forms  of  memory  and  imagination  is  without 
doubt  the  chief  seat  of  the  mental  life.  The  exercise 
of  the  senses,  confined  as  it  is  to  the  present  moment, 
gives  very  little,  and  we  should  be  limited  to  mere 
animal  existence  if  the  past  did  not  remain  to  us,  as 
a  treasure  into  which  we  are  constantly  dipping.  At 
the  time  when  the  flow  of  unsought  thoughts  is  weak, 
or  quite  stopped,  we  best  realize  the  poverty  of  feelings, 
the  crudity  of  desires,  the  inactivity  or  ineffective  eflort 
of  the  understanding  and  reason  without  the  imagina- 
tion. 

The  work  of  imagination  ripens  into  permanent 
products  in  myths  and  traditions,  which  are  elevated 
into  objects  of  faith  by  the  art-power  of  representation. 

122.  This  is  the  place  to  mention  habits  and  ac- 
complishments. For  these  reproduction  is  especially 
necessary ;  we  can  secure  them  in  permanent  form  by 


DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE  FACULTIES.     93 

no  other  means,  and  the  same  may  also  be  said  of  the 
necessity  of  the  exercise  of  the  understanding,  of  rea- 
son, and  of  moral  culture.  For  the  facts  that  may  be 
cited  for  this  indicate  that  earlier  formed  ideas,  judg- 
ments, feelings,  volitions,  quite  as  well  as  sensuous 
representations,  are  reproduced,  and  that  they  obtain 
a  new  influence  by  means  of  this  reproduction ;  they 
show  also  that  reproduction  occurs  the  more  quickl}^ 
surely,  and  accurately  the  of tener  and  more  carefully 
the  attention  has  been  occupied  with  those  notions. 
Moreover,  facts  show  that  habit  has  much  less  to  do 
with  memory  and  imagination  than  with  the  concepts 
that  are  reproduced.  To  the  person  who  learns  much 
by  rote,  memorizing  will  become  gradually  easier, 
though  this  facility  is  restricted  to  the  circle  of  con- 
cepts to  which  he  is  accustomed.  Let  the  person  who 
has  a  great  memory  for  music  attempt  to  commit  to 
memory  a  series  of  names  or  numbers,  and  he  will  soon 
see  of  how  little  benefit  to  him  the  previous  exercise 
of  the  memory  is  to  him  in  this  field. 

123.  Cultivation  takes  place  in  two  principal  direc- 
tions, which  are  determined  first  by  the  inner  sense  and 
secondly  the  outer  action.  Reflection  is  connected  with 
both,  which  fact  occasions  the  first  remark  that  this 
reflection  (the  bending  back  of  the  course  of  thought  to 
a  definite  point)  sometimes  intentionally  revives  and 
forms  concepts  (in  work),  and  at  others  it  is  employed 
in  the  apperception  of  the  object  given  in  experience ; 
therefore,  that  in  the  first  case  the  activity  proceeds 
from  it,  and  is  controlled  by  it ;  in  the  second  case,  on 
the  contrary,  the  excitation  lies  in  the  object  presented. 
But  the  two  cases  are  never  entirely  separated.  More- 
over, the  work  of  reflection  creates  a  new  object  every 


91  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

moment,  inasmiicli  as  the  work  advances  and  comes 
under  observation,  and  Just  here  reflection  connects 
itself  with  it.  Conversel}^,  exj)erience  leads  us  to  com- 
parison and  judgment,  but  with  these  comes  further 
reflection  which  deals  with  the  notions,  or  opinions,  or 
caprices  present,  as  the  objects  fixed  uj)on  by  reflection, 
according  to  the  peculiarity  of  each.  Eeflection  upon 
an  object  which  exists  merely  in  thought  is  of  a  differ- 
ent character.  Here  the  movement  lies  in  the  reflect- 
ing mass  of  concepts  themselves.  The  continuous  fix- 
ing of  this  object  of  pure  thought,  however,  to  which 
the  observation  is  to  confine  its  attention,  still  costs 
not  a  little  effort. 

The  inner  sense,  which  is  usually  ^^laced  on  a  par 
with  the  outer  sense,  on  account  of  this  similarity,  is 
in  this  case  quite  out  of  its  natural  relation.  It  is 
rather  the  great  principle  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of 
all  regular  activity,  especially  of  artistic  fancy  and 
of  practical  reason.  Without  self-consciousness  man 
could  control  neither  himself  in  general  nor  his  ac- 
tivity in  particular. 

External  action  Avhich  objectifies  a  man's  thought 
and  embodies  it  for  him,  but  at  the  same  time  gives 
an  opportunity  for  various  distortions,  always  includes 
within  its  compass  desires,  observation,  and  judgment. 
In  so  far  as  it  succeeds  or  fails,  it  changes  desire  either 
into  express  volition  or  into  a  mere  wish,  accompanied 
by  pleasure  or  pain,  by  which  the  foundation  is  laid 
for  the  habitual  disposition  of  the  man.  New  condi- 
tions of  life  often  furnish  new  incentives  to  action; 
thus,  a  man  often  appears  to  change  all  at  once.  This 
is  most  striking  in  a  case  where  a  common  need  occa- 
sions a  new  common  action,  and  from  the  isolated 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  FACULTIES.     95 

"  I's  "  a  new  "  we  "  is  created.  Yet  it  is  perhaps  more 
remarkable  to  observe  how  after  a  time  a  person  appa- 
rently changed  becomes  again  the  same  as  formerly. 

The  deepest  impressions  are  given  to  a  man's  char- 
acter through  his  external  deeds  when  they  belong  to 
his  vocation  or  his  daily  occupation.  Here  we  see  in 
the  clearest  manner  both  the  conflict  and  the  co-opera- 
tion that  exist  in  the  dominant  masses  of  concepts 
that  belong  to  the  series  which  is  actually  passing 
through  the  mind.  During  labor  these  masses  of  con- 
cepts are  in  equipoise  in  consciousness,  and  every  indi- 
vidual act  depends  on  the  flowing  series  for  its  place 
and  time,  and  it  must  be  undertaken  at  the  point  fixed 
by  the  stage  of  advancement  of  the  work. 

Very  important  determinations  of  character  flow 
from  the  peculiarity  of  tlie  employment  pursued.  The 
series  of  concepts  that  determine  the  life  of  the  gar- 
dener, or  of  the  farmer,  move  slow^ly  wdth  disturbances 
through  natural  causes  which  often  necessitate  his 
watching  and  waiting.  The  series  of  the  musician, 
actor,  etc.,  have,  on  the  contrary,  their  distinct  rhythm. 
Again,  the  concept  series  of  the  fencer,  juggler,  etc., 
move  quite  differently  and  require  that  without  definite 
rhythm  the  right  moment  must  be  most  accurately 
perceived.  One  of  the  most  important  directions  for 
the  practical  educator  and  teacher  is  that  he  observe 
as  accurately  as  possible  how  the  concept  series  ought 
to  proceed  among  his  pupils,  and  how  they  can  and 
actually  do  proceed.  Important  differences  which  de- 
mand attention  are  to  be  found  here. 

124.  Whatever  a  man  by  inner  thinking  or  exter- 
nal action  may  attempt,  certain  permanent  feelings 
rise  more  and  more  out  of  the  fluctuating  mental  con- 


96  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

ditions,  and  these  feelings  become  decisive  criteria  for 
him  in  his  actual  deliberation,  and  consequently  in  his 
understanding  and  in  his  reason.  They  become  these 
special  criteria,  provided  he  possesses  a  deliberation  of 
sufficient  strength  to  resist  changing  desires. 

This  is  especially  true  in  the  aesthetic  apprehension 
of  the  world  peculiar  to  every  person  (which  in  many 
respects  may  be  one-sided,  and  consequently  even  be- 
come morally  perverted),  according  to  which  every  per- 
son habitually  determines  his  relations  with  the  world. 
The  impression  which  family  and  fatherland,  human- 
ity and  human  history  make  upon  the  individual  is 
explained  by  this.  This  impression  is  compounded 
of  all  that  involuntarily  pleases  or  displeases  him. 
Hence  everything  that  hinders  a  man  in  seeing  clearly 
and  in  judging  fairly  works  injuriously  uj3on  his  in- 
nermost character. 

1^5.  The  passions  act  most  disastrously  upon  all 
development.  They  are  the  extreme  opposite  of  the 
aesthetic  judgment ;  moreover,  through  them  all  versa- 
tility of  effort  is  destroyed.  Through  their  influence 
imagination  and  understanding  receive  a  one-sided 
direction.  They  themselves,  in  case  they  find  gratifi- 
cation, result  in  weariness  and  vacuity  to  mind  and 
heart,  and  in  case  they  remain  ungratified  they  end  in 
sorrow  and  illness.  Those  who  boast  as  to  what  they 
have  willed  to  become  through  passionate  excitement 
deceive  themselves ;  they  ought  to  rejoice  that,  in  their 
shipwreck,  they  have  not  lost  everything,  and  many 
are  to  be  commended,  inasmuch  as  they  make  a  better 
use  of  the  goods  saved  than  they  did  formerly  of  their 
whole  fortune. 


SECOND  DIVISIOX— MENTAL  CONDITIONS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    GE^^ERAL   VARIABILITY    OF    CO?fDITIOXS. 

^  126.  Accurately  considered,  no  one  condition  of 
human  life  exactly  resembles  another.  Everything 
which  is  presented  to  the  inner  perception  is  wavering 
and  fluctuating.  This  remark  which  discloses  the 
impossibility  of  a  fixed  and  definite  psychological  ex- 
perience, was  made  at  the  beginning  of  the  present 
treatise,  and  must  now  be  further  elaborated.  With  it 
is  connected  the  observation  of  the  different  conditions 
of  life  as  every  person  passes  through  them ;  further, 
it  suggests  the  sketch  of  the  most  striking  differences 
in  human  habits  and  human  development  under  the 
influence  of  external  conditions  ;  and,  finally,  it  calls 
for  a  brief  description  of  anomalous  mental  conditions. 
127.  Reproduction  through  memory  and  imagina- 
tion proves  (see  section  90)  that  no  concept  once 
created  is  ever  lost,  and  that  a /meeting  of  concepts 
which  has  once  occurred  can  hardly  be  without  results. 
But  when,  with  the  multitude  of  concepts  that  the 
mind  of  a  mature  man  has  accumulated,  we  compare 
that  which  he  is  conscious  of  doing  each  individual 
moment — we  must  be  astonished  at  the  disproportion 
between  the  riches  of  the  former  and  the  poverty  of  the 
latter.j  By  way  of  comparison,  we  might  ascribe  to 
the  human  mind  an  eye  which  possessed  an  extremely 
10 


98  EMPIRICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

sniiiU  pupil  but  tlie  liigliest  degree  of  movability.  The 
explanation  of  this  lies  directly  in  what  has  heretofore 
been  tauglit  concerning  the  threshold  of  consciousness 
(16-19).  Besides,  the  small  number  of  concepts  which 
we  are  able  to  take  in  at  any  one  time  is  often  grasped 
in  a  moment  of  quick  transition,  and  by  this  it  is  pos- 
sible for  the  intellectual  man  to  bring  his  concepts  into 
the  most  varied  relations,  and  to  modify  them  through 
one  anotherj 

128.  Certain  incitements  resulting  in  a  change  of 
concepts,  by  means  of  external  impressions,  are  a  ne- 
cessity to  man.  The  lonely  man  seeks  social  inter- 
course, and  if  no  means  have  been  taken  to  keep  the 
mind  in  activity,  a  long  stay  in  one  place  is  painful 
on  account  of  the  monotony  of  the  surroundings.  If 
this  necessity  remains  long  unsatisfied,  human  life 
gradually  narrows  down  in  a  degree  to  correspond  with 
the  slow  periodical  changes  to  be  observed.  Converse- 
ly, the  need  increases  through  gratification.  Those 
who  make  history  (like  Napoleon)  for  this  reason  al- 
ways find  enough  men  ready  to  devote  themselves  to 
their  service  just  because  they  are  restless.  Even  be- 
hind the  stove  one  complains  of  empty  newspapers. 

129.  By  virtue  of  the  arrangement  of  the  human 
body,  hunger  and  satiety,  waking  and  sleep,  have  every 
day  their  well-known  cycle,  and,  in  addition,  seasons 
bring  with  them  their  variety  of  gratifications  and  of 
augmentations  of  bodily  needs.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
discuss  here  the  tension  and  relaxation,  the  reflection, 
resolution,  action,  and  rest  which  follow  therefrom. 

Note. — The  noteworthy  modification  of  sleep  through  dreams 
may  be  deferred  more  conveniently  to  the  discussion  of  anoma- 
lous conditions. 


NATURAL  TALENTS.  99 

130.  The  earthly  life,  tcaken  as  a  whole,  has  its 
period  of  growth,  of  full  strength,  and  of  decline. 
The  child,  from  psychological  reasons,  if  it  be  well, 
moves  restlessly,  pursues  simple,  artless  fancies  and 
plays ;  it  is  indisposed  to  think  connectedly,  but  is  in 
the  highest  degree  susceptible  to  everything  new. 
Hence  it  is  not  capable  of  freeing  itself  from  mo- 
mentary feelings.  The  boy,  though  still  very  weak  in 
this  respect,  can,  nevertheless,  be  elevated  through 
education  without  undue  haste  to  a  significant  de- 
gree of  true  insight  and  self-control.  The  youth 
receives  an  increase  of  strength,  but  also  of  unrest. 
If  he  can  not  act,  he  dreams.  The  man  to  whom 
these  powers  are  no  longer  new,  but  to  whom  the  dif- 
ficulties of  human  action  are  known,  makes  a  judicious 
use  of  what  he  has,  if  his  childhood  and  youth  have 
not  been  spoiled.  He  acts  more,  and  therefore  he 
dreams  less.  The  later  years  retain  as  much  manli- 
ness as  the  body  permits,  with  great  individual  varia- 
tions. In  the  most  favorable  examples  thinking  takes 
the  place  of  dreaming  and  of  action,  even  though  it  is 
too  late  to  accomplish  much.  Every  age  atones  for 
the  sins,  and  suffers  for  the  misfortunes,  of  the  pre- 
ceding one. 


CHAPTER  IL 

NATURAL    TALEXTS. 


131.  The  course  of  life  is,  in  the  first  place,  modi- 
fied through  difference  of  sex.  This  is  often  observa- 
ble in  early  youth.    Girls  develop  worldly  wisdom  at  an 


100  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

earlier  age  than  boys,  and  are  earlier  inclined  to  hold 
themselves  within  the  bounds  of  propriety.  On  the 
contrary,  their  period  of  education  is  shorter  than  that 
of  boys.  Hence  they  collect  less  mental  material,  but 
they  elaborate  it  more  quickly  and  with  less  variety 
and  sjoecialization.  The  result  is  to  be  seen  in  the 
whole  life.  The  female  sex  depends  upon  its  feelings. 
The  man  acts  more  from  knowledge,  principles,  and 
relations.  Tliis  explains  the  great  variety  of  callings 
which  men  follow. 

132.  In  connection  with  the  so-called  tempera- 
ment, every  man  has  another  original  peculiarity,  that 
is  to  be  explained  by  physiological  predisposition  in  re- 
gard to  feelings  and  emotions.  Of  the  four  known 
temperaments,  the  joyous  and  the  sad  (sanguine  and 
melancholy)  relate  to  the  feelings ;  the  excitable  and 
the  slow  (choleric  and  phlegmatic)  to  the  excitability 
of  the  emotions.  The  rationale  of  these  temperaments 
is  generally  easy  to  perceive ;  for  the  common  state  of 
feeling  which  the  body  brings  with  it,  and  which  accom- 
panies a  man  through  his  whole  life,  can  not  easily  oc- 
cupy exactly  the  middle  place  between  the  pleasant  and 
the  unpleasant ;  according  as  it  inclines  toward  this 
or  that  side,  a  man  becomes  sanguine  or  melancholy. 
He  can  not  be  both  at  the  same  time,  but  he  has  his 
place  somewhere  on  the  line  which  runs  in  the  two 
directions.  However,  a  fluctuating  temperament  is 
not  only  conceivable,  but  is  sometimes  to  be  met  with 
in  experience,  by  virtue  of  which  a  man  is  disposed  to 
change  from  joyousness  to  sadness  without  special 
cause.  Furthermore,  as  the  emotions  call  the  physical 
organism  into  play,  and  find  in  it,  as  it  were,  the 
sounding-board  through  which  they  are  strengthened 


NATURAL  TALENTS.  101 

and  made  more  lasting,  there  must  be  a  degree  of 
adaptability  in  this  organism  by  virtue  of  which  a  man 
is  either  more  choleric  or  more  phlegmatic,  so  that  he 
may  not  be  both  at  the  same  time,  but  may  fluctuate 
between  the  two. 

From  this  arises  the  possible  mingling  of  temper- 
aments according  to  the  combinations  of  these  two 
series.  The  sanguine  temperament  is  either  choleric 
or  phlegmatic,  and  so,  too,  the  melancholy  may  be 
choleric  or  phlegmatic.  It  is  conceivable  that  one  may 
be  neither  sanguine  nor  melancholy,  for  the  zero-point 
lies  just  between  the  two.  But  it  is  inconceivable  that 
one  should  be  indifferent  in  regard  to  the  choleric  and 
phlegmatic  temperament,  for  to  have  no  excitability 
whatever  of  the  emotions  would  indicate  an  extreme 
phlegmatic  temperament.  Here  the  zero-point  lies  at 
one  of  the  extremes.  The  middle  is  the  accustomed 
excitability — an  arithmetical  mean,  which  is  to  be 
found  by  experience,  almost  like  the  average  stature  of 
the  human  body. 

Note. — The  names  of  the  temperaments  may  also  be  other- 
wise derived ;  and  if  the  expression,  choleric  temperament,  be 
applied  to  a  persistent  tendency  to  anger,  then  the  foregoing 
does  not  hold  good.  As  the  subject  is  not  purely  psychological, 
a  physiological  view  may  be  in  place  here.  Of  the  three  systems 
or  factors  in  animal  life,  a  concealed  defect  in  any  one  of  them 
may  influence  the  mind.  If  irritability  (i.  e.,  reaction  against 
the  environment)  and  sensibility  are  uninjured,  and  if  the  nutri- 
tive system  suffers  only  in  so  far  as  to  cause  a  constant  discom- 
fort in  the  general  feeling,  a  choleric  bitterness  of  temperament 
may  arise.  This  is  to  be  perceived  in  a  few  sad  cases  in  chil- 
dren. If  the  irritability  suffers,  good-nature,  and,  perhaps, 
talent  may  exist,  but  a  sufficiently  strong  external  life  will  be 
wanting.  If  the  sensibility  suffers  generally,  the  difficulty  ap- 
pears to  proceed  from  a  so-called  Boeotian  or  peasant  tempera- 


102  EMPIRICAL  rSYCnOLOGY. 

ment.  If  only  the  sensibility  of  the  brain  suffers  relatively,  or, 
to  use  a  clearer  expression,  the  ganglionic  system  predominates, 
this  may  be  the  cause  of  the  sanguine  temperament.  If  the 
nutritive  system  and  irritability  are  both  at  the  same  time  weak, 
we  find  the  phlegmatic  temperament.  Thus  it  appears  that  all 
temperaments  perceptibly  prominent  imply  some  defect. 

133.  As  tlie  body  strengthens  the  emotions  by 
means  of  its  responsiveness,  or  by  its  imperturbability 
weakens  their  outbreaks,  even  so  it  mingles  in  all  the 
changes  of  feeling  and  of  thought — sometimes  like  the 
fly-wheel,  which  prolongs  the  motion  received ;  and  at 
other  times  like  an  inert  weight,  which  delays  the 
motion  or  renders  it  quite  impossible.  At  least,  it  is 
known  that  the  waking  of  a  man  is  not  always  or 
merely  an  indication  that  he  has  done  sleeping.  That 
narrow  pupil  which  in  a  foregoing  section  (127)  we 
attributed  to  the  human  mind  in  general,  is  in  the 
case  of  individuals  more  or  less  narrow,  and  the 
mobility  of  the  concepts  which  come  and  go  in  con- 
sciousness is  in  such  cases  less  or  greater.  If  to  this 
we  add  the  special  tendency  of  many  persons  for  this 
or  that  kind  of  thinking  and  feeling,  then  we  have  a 
scale  of  differences,  the  extremes  of  which  are  called 
genius  and  imbecility.  The  latter  is  classed  with 
anomalous  conditions,  because  it  is  often  found  with 
them,  and  like  them  renders  a  man  useless  in  society. 

Note.— That  which  is  connected  with  physiognomy  and  cra- 
niology  is  too  uncertain  and  too  indefinite  to  have  at  present 
any  value  in  psychology  beyond  that  of  being  a  curiosity.  Many 
singular  facts  (no  matter  from  what  department  of  knowledge) 
may  be  true,  but  to  be  of  scientific  importance  they  must  be  re- 
lated in  a  demonstrable  manner  to  what  is  already  known  and 
tried;  if  they  remain  alone,  they  are  of  no  value.  To  wish  to 
subordinate  psychology  entirely  to  physiology  means  to  exactly 


NATURAL  TALENTS.  103 

reverse  the  true  relation  of  the  two  sciences,  a  mistake  that  has 
often  been  made  in  both  modern  and  ancient  times.  In  the 
third  part  of  this  book  the  true  relation  will  in  a  measure  be 
indicated. 

13-i.  The  question  may  be  asked,  What  talents  hu- 
manity is  endowed  with  by  nature.  It  is  known  that 
long  experience  and  careful  study  of  the  human  dispo- 
sition serves  to  detract  much  from  the  good  opinion 
which  a  youth  may  have  formed  from  an  outside  view 
of  cultivated  society ;  he  does  not  yet  know  how  much 
that  is  bad  is  hidden  in  men  and  secretly  nourished 
by  them.  But  this  fact  shows  less  against  the  natural 
talents  of  humanity  than  against  the  coarse  treatment 
which  up  to  the  present  time  has  been  generally  ap- 
plied where  an  effort  has  been  made  to  educate  men. 
Inasmuch  as  this  treatment,  especially  on  account  of 
the  imperfections  of  church  and  state,  has  from  early 
times  influenced  the  external  demeanor  of  men,  for 
centuries  a  disproportion  has  arisen  between  seeming 
and  being,  which  in  ancient  and  mediseval  times  could 
hardly  have  been  known  to  such  a  degree  as  at  present, 
as  in  those  former  times  there  was  much  less  of  trans- 
planted and  imitated  culture  than  at  present.  Besides, 
the  talent  of  humanity  is  quite  different  from  the 
talent  of  the  individual  man.  The  former  has  to  do 
with  social  development  in  general ;  hence  it  has  to  do 
quite  especially  with  the  relation  between  the  rare  great 
minds  that  make  epochs  in  history,  and  the  multitude 
of  common  men  who  can  only  receive  and  carry  for- 
ward culture.  Our  history  of  humanity,  which  in- 
cludes only  a  few  thousand  years,  is  much  too  short  to 
enable  us  to  judge  with  any  degree  of  certainty  con- 
cerning facts  upon  this  question.     Regardless  of  the 


104:  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

old  sa3'iiig,  "  Nothing  new  under  the  sun,"  much,  too 
much  that  is  new  occurs,  to  render  possible  a  general 
survey  of  the  earthly  path  of  humanity. 

135.  Between  the  questions  concerning  the  talents 
of  the  individual  and  concerning  those  of  humanity 
we  should  have  to  place  that  concerning  the  races 
of  mankind,  if  observation  furnished  anything  certain 
in  a  psychological  connection.  But  that  which  might 
perhaps  be  said  upon  this  has  a  closer  connection  with 
the  following  subject. 


CHAPTER   III. 

EXTERNAL    INFLUEN^CES. 

136.  From  the-  empirical  standpoint,  no  decision 
has  been  reached  in  regard  to  what  may  have  origi- 
nated in  human  nature,  and  what  may  be  produced  by 
influence  from  without.  Our  introduction  to  meta- 
physics has  warned  us  not  to  trust  much  to  either  kind 
of  concepts,  inasmuch  as  the  idea  of  a  manifold  of  tal- 
ents in  the  individual,  as  well  as  that  of  causes  and 
influences  of  every  kind,  belong  to  those  concepts  that 
can  not  be  retained  as  they  are  first  presented  to  us  by 
experience.  Here,  therefore,  we  can  only  consider  the 
most  striking  phenomena  as  we  find  them  vary  in  the 
external  conditions  of  man. 

137.  First,  we  have  to  consider  the  place  where  the 
man  lives,  w^ith  all  the  numerous  and  wide-reaching 
influences  of  climate,  the  nature  of  the  ground  and 


EXTERNAL  INFLUENCES.  1U5 

soil,  the  situation  and  neighborhood.      This  will  be 
more  fully  developed  in  our  historical  lectures. 

138.  The  nation  to  which  the  individual  belongs 
has  not  merely  a  predominating  temperament,  but  it 
has  also  its  history,  and  the  individual  enters  this  his- 
tory at  a  certain  point  of  time.  With  it  is  united  a 
degree  of  culture,  a  national  feeling  and  conscience  to 
which  the  individual  at  all  points  in  the  course  of  his 
life  is  linked,  and  through  it  elevated  and  repressed. 

139.  In  every  nation  that  has  freed  itself  from  bar- 
barism there  is  a  difference  of  ranks  or  castes  (merely 
transplanted  in  the  case  of  the  women,  in  the  case  of 
the  men  original).  This  difference  of  rank  is  partly 
a  work  of  violence  and  necessity,  partly  a  result  of 
natural  talents,  and  partly  a  consequence  of  the  divis- 
ion of  labor.  A  rank  is  assigned  to  the  individual, 
provided  one  is  conceded  him,  only  in  so  far  as  he 
himself  can  produce  a  conformity  of  his  action  to 
the  special  function  marked  out  for  his  province  (not 
in  so  far  as  he  is  active  for  his  own  aims,  for  in  the 
idea  of  division  of  labor  it  is  plain  that  he  works  for 
all,  or  at  least  for  many).  Now,  inasmuch  as  the 
man  seeks  to  concentrate  his  whole  action  into  con- 
formity to  the  specific  function  proposed,  an  outside 
form  that  is  impressed  on  each  arises,  together  with 
a  standard  of  honor  for  each  order,  by  which  not  only 
(as  may  happen)  the  means  used  causes  even  the  aim 
to  be  displaced,  and  in  part  forgotten,  but  also  the 
thoughts  and  intentions  of  the  man  are  adjusted  to  his 
action ;  they  vanish  together  in  the  circle  of  their 
utility,  and  the  efforts  which  remain  are  divided  into 
two  parts,  one  of  which  belongs  to  the  demands  of 
one's  rank  or  station,  while  the  other  in  spite  of  the 


106  EMPIUICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

rank  seeks  its  iiulividiuil  gmtification.  In  case  tliis 
contest  increases,  the  man  and  his  station  are  of  no 
value  to  each  other,  and  injure  each  other  mutually. 

The  less  one  has  to  produce  conformity  of  his  action 
to  the  end  in  view — i.  e.,  the  more  he  is  the  employee 
of  another — so  much  the  less  does  he  trouble  himself 
with  his  actions  and  so  much  the  less  honor  is  there 
for  him;  so  much  the  more  weight,  however,  falls 
upon  that  second  part  of  the  effort  which,  notwith- 
standing the  limited  position,  seeks  gratification.  For 
the  sake  of  this  individual  gratification,  if  a  mild 
and,  at  the  same  time,  firm  treatment  on  the  part 
of  the  employer  does  not  obviate  the  evil,  all  oppor- 
tunities are  made  use  of,  and  the  arts  of  falsity  are 
exerted. 

As  a  rule,  we  find  the  better  class  in  each  nation 
among  those  who  have  undertaken  a  share  of  the  gen- 
eral labor,  and  who  manage  it  according  to  their  own 
judgment. 

140.  As  his  rank  influences  the  mature  man,  so 
the  family  to  which  the  youth  belongs,  as  well  as  the 
education  which  he  receives,  together  with  the  exam- 
ples, and  all  his  surroundings,  influence  him.  One 
seldom  trains  himself  in  opposition  to  his  environ- 
ment, never  indej)endently  of  it. 

141.  The  principal  question  is  how  much  and  what 
freedom  remains  to  man  in  the  midst  of  all  the  ex- 
ternal influences.  It  is  easy  to  carry  out  these  reflec- 
tions to  such  a  point  that,  when  one  yields  to  the  im- 
pression made  on  him  by  the  contemplation  of  the 
facts,  the  conviction  arises  that  man  either  becomes 
what  he  is  through  external  influences  combined  with 
natural  talent  which  precedes  his  will,  or  at  least  that 


EXTERNAL  INFLUENCES.  107 

the  circle  of  freedom  is  so  small  that  its  value  must  be 
iusiguificant. 

Kant  admitted  that  the  whole  temporal  existence 
of  man  comes  under  the  law  of  natural  necessity.  In 
order  to  save  Freedom  he  placed  it  in  the  intelligible 
world  as  an  article  of  faith  for  the  moral  man. 

If  one  may  presume  to  understand  a  man  better 
than  he  understood  himself,  then  it  is  very  easy  to 
show  what  Kant  intended.  Eesponsibility  was  to  be 
secured.  But  that  is  secured  without  any  theory  of 
freedom  (see  note  to  section  118).  Then,  practically 
to  reach  the  essential  idea  of  the  Kantian  view,  we 
need  neither  metaphysics  nor  speculative  psychology, 
nor  even  a  critique  of  reason,  but  only  on  the  one  side 
an  untrammeled  search  for  facts ;  on  the  other,  a  cor- 
rect concept  of  practical  philosophy. 

But  it  is  very  important  to  go  beyond  this,  in  order 
to  recognize  more  completely  the  force  with  which 
a  man  often  with  great  results  works  on  himself,  or 
even  against  himself.  This  is  especially  important  at 
an  age  when  one  stands  between  the  education  just 
ended  and  the  vestibule  opening  into  the  future  rank 
or  station.  At  this  period  the  self-determination  may 
be  greater,  or  at  least  richer  in  results,  than  before  and 
after.  Explanations  upon  this  point  will  be  found 
in  the  third  part  of  this  book. 


lOS  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

ANOMALOUS   COKDITIOis^S. 

142.  For  the  most  part,  we  see  man  subjected  to 
anomalous  conditions,  among  which  the  dream  even 
in  the  healthy  man  may  be  reckoned.  But  the  born 
imbecile  is  lost  beyond  ordinary  measure  in  simplicity 
and  mediocrity  of  talent.  Also  in  the  other  kinds  of 
mental  disorder  are  to  be  found  many  a  resemblance 
(quite  as  striking  as  sad)  to  errors,  emotions,  and  pas- 
sions, so  that  it  is  difficult  to  contrast  closely  the  well 
man  with  the  mentally  diseased. 

143.  In  all  cases  where  an  empirical  manifold  does 
not  easily  admit  of  accurate  analysis,  we  are  safest 
in  beginning  with  the  most  manifest  differences,  with 
the  extremes,  and  afterward  comparing  the  interven- 
ing members  with  them.  Upon  this  ground  we  begin 
with  peculiar  mental  disorders,  and  later  shall  mention 
conditions  of  illness  similar  to  them,  together  with 
phenomena  which  are  associated  with  sleep. 

Mental  disorders  which  make  their  appearance  in 
waking  hours,  and  in,  at  least  apparent,  bodily  health, 
come  under  four  classes  (according  to  Reil  and  Pinel, 
the  latter  of  whom  has  found  some  valid  grounds  for 
assuming  a  fifth) — illusion,  madness,  dementia,  idiocy. 

144.  Mental  illusion  ( Wahnsinn)  depends  upon  a 
so-called  fixed  idea,  upon  a  wrong  concept  which  af- 
fects a  part  of  the  circle  of  thought,  while  in  other 
respects  the  thinking  remains  in  its  due  course  and 
proceeds  consistently  from  that  concept.  It  is  there- 
fore self-evident  that  the  wrong  concept  must  really 
deceive  and  will  not  be  recognized  as  a  delusion;  like- 


INSANITY.  109 

wise  that  it  contains  a  groundless  error  from  which 
one  can  not  successfully  disengage  the  sound  part  of 
the  knowledge  which  he  possesses.  If  an  assumption 
of  mental  faculties  is  to  be  based  on  this,  then  the 
source  of  insane  delusion  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  dis- 
eased imagination  which  in  most  cases  has  suffered 
through  an  injurious  influence  of  the  faculty  of  de- 
sire, or  sometimes  of  the  understanding  or  reason, 
and  sometimes  also  it  has  suffered  merely  from  bodily 
causes.  With  the  disease  of  imagination  is  combined 
a  weakness  of  judgment  and  of  power  to  reason,  so  that 
the  clearest  refutations  of  the  delusion  are  not  under- 
stood by  the  person  who  is  ill.  Furthermore,  the  dis- 
ease acts  upon  emotions,  desires,  opinions,  etc 

The  same  diseased  imagination^  however,  shows 
itself  to  have  intervals  of  sound  health  and  often  a 
genial,  exalted  activity  in  everything  that  is  not  con- 
nected with  a  fixed  idea.  Likewise  the  other  mental 
faculties  show  clearly  that  they  are  not  weak,  but  are 
disposed  to  regular  activity. 

If  the  hypothesis  of  the  mental  faculties  be  set 
aside,  the  occasion  for  surprise  at  this  disappears. 

Moreover,  the  following  kinds  of  delusions  may  be 
marked  :  Imagined  change  of  body,  or  of  person  ;  im- 
agined influence  of  the  devil,  etc. ;  imagined  inspira- 
tion, especially  religious  fanaticism,  a  morbid  desire 
to  make  one's  self  known  by  self-sacrifices ;  fixed  re- 
proaches with  which  a  man  torments  himself ;  amorous 
illusions ;  weariness  of  life ;  fear  of  death  ;  fear  of  pov- 
erty and  hunger  ;  and  finally  stupid,  as  well  as  restless 
insanity.  The  explanation  of  all  these  phenomena  is 
not  far  to  seek.  First,  the  disorder  of  the  mind  is  not 
always  purely  mental,  for  in  the  psychical  mechanism 


110  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

there  is  to  be  found  no  reason  for  the  unyielding  op- 
position against  plain  experience.  Further,  in  all 
mental  disorder  an  emotion  is  unmistakable.  The 
latter  is  a  paralysis  in  the  nervous  system.  Hence  the 
concej^t  mass  in  which  the  emotion  has  its  seat  can 
not  undergo  such  a  change  as  is  necessary  to  affect  the 
body  in  an  opposite  way.  From  the  innumerable  cases 
which  are  narrated  as  very  remarkable,  the  psycholo- 
gist, as  soon  as  he  has  recognized  the  psychical  mech- 
anism and  its  possible  arrests,  learns  little  or  nothing 
new  whatever. 

145.  Madness  {Wuth)  or  frenzy  (T^oZ'S^^cZ^/f),  prop- 
erly delirium,  consists  in  an  impulse  to  bodily  actions 
without  aim  ;  indeed,  even  against  the  will.  Very 
generally  it  is  an  impulse  to  destructive  acts  with  ex- 
treme and  dangerous  violence.  That  bodily  disease 
lies  at  the  foundation  of  this  is  clear  enough,  for  in 
the  intellect  is  to  be  found  no  principle  of  unity  for 
these  conditions. 

Yet,  as  a  pure  psychological  phenomenon  in  healthy 
meuy  action  [Handehi)  occasionally  appears  to  be  at 
the  same  time  voluntary  and  involuntary.  Hence,  we 
can  not  by  any  means  regard  the  actions  of  a  delirious 
(raving)  man  as  merely  automatic  if  he  tries  to  resist 
them.  The  difficulty  lies  in  the  error  of  regarding  the 
will  as  a  mental  faculty  which  appears  to  oppose  itself, 
inasmuch  as  the  same  person  will  and  at  the  same  time 
will  not. 

Note. — The  strange  question,  whether  there  can  be  madness 
without  delusion,  might  be  answered  by  the  phenomenon  of 
hydrophobia.  Certainly  the  stormy  agitation  of  the  vascular 
system  proceeding  from  the  abdomen  may  give  rise  to  raving 
actions  without  proportionate  injury  to  Jjhe  brain, 'just  as  in 


INSANITY.  Ill 

cholera  the  blood  stops  and  becomes  almost  stiffened  through 
nervous  influence,  while  the  sensibility  of  the  dying  man  is  but 
little  troubled.  In  discussing  the  emotions  we  have  already 
called  attention  to  the  partial  action  of  certain  mental  states 
upon  certain  organs ;  the  converse  action  also  takes  place.  The 
question  here  is  not  concerning  the  possible  resistance  of  the 
will,  but  concerning  the  attack  upon  the  mind  which  proceeds 
from  the  body. 

146.  In  dementia  {Narrlieit)  the  connection  be- 
tween the  concepts  ceases,  while  the  latter,  without 
regard  to  any  rule  whatever,  mingle  together  gro- 
tesquely. Moreover,  here  in  the  realm  of  mind  every 
principle  of  unity  is  Avanting.  The  reason  for  the 
change  of  concepts  is  no  longer  psychological,  it  must 
be  physiological. 

According  to  the  hypothesis  of  the  mental  facul- 
ties, the  principal  seat  of  the  evil  would  be  in  the 
understanding,  and  really  the  fool  bears  some  resem- 
blance to  the  stupid,  unintelligent  child.  But  the 
lawlessness  of  the  other  mental  faculties  in  dementia 
would  long  ago  have  been  noticed  if  one  had  ever 
ventured  to  think  of  an  exact  conformity  to  law  in 
that  faculty.  The  essential  point  is,  here,  that  every 
long  series  of  concepts  is  hindered  in  its  passage  be- 
cause the  nervous  system  opposes  itself  to  the  kind  of 
tension  involved  in  such  a  train  of  thought.  It  is 
clearly  evident  that  such  a  disease  is  much  more 
general  and  much  more  certainly  incurable  than  the 
torpidity  of  an  individual  emotion  in  insanity.  The 
psychical  cure  of  delusion  or  insanity  proper  is  es- 
sentially protection  and  prevention  lest  the  emotion 
reach  a  state  of  fury,  and  the  delusion  attain  an  in- 
creased power.  The  proper  cure  is  bodily,  though 
often  merely  Nature's  cure.     Discipline  (punishment) 


112  EMPIRICAL   PSYCnOLOGY. 

can  efYoct  something  pedagogically,  and  in  many  cases 
responsibility  is  not  entirely  wanting,  especially  in 
actions  which  do  not  follow  directly  from  the  delu- 
sion ;  the  responsibility  is,  however,  lessened  by  un- 
fortunate ill-humor,  which  has  in  it  no  essentially 
fixed  delusion.  Of  infinitely  greater  importance  than' 
all  the  insane  asylums  and  psychical  cures  would  be 
prevention  of  that  fanaticism  which  may  lead  to  in- 
sanity. 

147.  Idiocy  or  imbecility  {Blodsinn)  which  alone 
of  all  the  mental  disorders  appears  to  be  inborn,  and 
which  in  the  foregoing  we  have  indicated  as  the 
opposite  extreme  of  genius,  is  general  weakness  of 
mind,  without  admitting  the  mention  of  one  mental 
faculty  as  superior  to  the  other.  It  does  not  differ  so 
much  in  quality  as  in  degree,  and  may  go  so  far  that 
the  man  almost  resembles  a  plant,  but  as  such  grows 
and  is  healthy. 

148.  The  classes  of  mental  disorders  above  given 
serve  not  so  much  for  immediate  classification  of  ac- 
tual cases  (which  for  the  most  part  present  themselves 
as  hybrid  or  complex)  as  for  the  definition  of  simple 
characteristics  under  which  the  admitted  mental  dis- 
eases are  to  be  subsumed.  Mental  delusion  and  demen- 
tia, madness  and  idiocy,  are  extremes  between  which 
the  middle  conditions  lie.  Delusion  may  be  united 
with  madness,  and  with  lesser  degrees  of  idiocy ;  also 
with  dementia.  The  collection  of  notions  here  is  simi- 
lar to  that  in  the  temperaments. 

149.  Nearly  all  anomalous  states  of  mind  are  analo- 
gous to  mental  disorders.  The  dream  resembles  insani- 
ty, especially  in  the  imagining  of  persistent  embarrass- 
ment in  which  one  does  not  escape  from  the  situation. 


INSANITY.  113 

The  frenzy  of  fever  appears  as  delirium.  Dizziness, 
fainting,  and  such  conditions  are  similar  to  idiocy. 
Intoxication  causes  a  man  to  waver  between  dementia 
and  madness.  It  is,  however,  manifest  that  we  must 
not  extend  these  comparisons  too  far.  The  delusion 
of  the  dream  is  much  more  varied  and  changeable 
than  in  the  corresponding  mental  disorder.  Dreams 
possess  a  certain  kind  of  unity,  viz.,  unity  of  feeling. 
A  dream  of  thieves  in  the  night,  where  the  scene 
suddenly  changes  to  a  room  lighted  by  the  sun,  and  is 
filled  with  many  strangers  who  offer  congratulations 
upon  the  attainment  of  a  high  honor — such  a  dream 
one  perceives  was  not  really  dreamed,  but  invented 
as  a  psychological  example  (Maass  upon  the  Passions, 
Part  I,  p.  171).  Similar  changes  from  a  painful  to  a 
much-desired  condition  will  often  occur  during  the 
dream  when  the  bodily  position  suddenly  changes. 

The  duplication  of  self-consciousness  into  different 
parties  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  peculiarities  of 
the  dream  and  its  affiliated  states.  The  dreamer  often 
ascribes  to  others  his  own  thoughts,  sometimes  feeling 
ashamed  that  he  himself  has  not  perceived  or  has  not 
known  them.  In  changing  states  of  dreaming  and 
waking,  of  paroxysms  and  of  intervals  of  quiet,  there 
is  often  a  double  personality  without  that  memory  of 
a  former  state  that  is  retained  on  passing  out  of  one 
into  the  other  when  waking  from  a  dream.  There  are 
examples  of  violent  fright,  after  which  persons  ask, 
"  Who  am  I  ?  "  and  must  be  reminded  again  of  their 
own  name,  position,  calling,  etc.,  by  some  circumstance. 

In  this  comparative  study  of  the  fundamental  forms 
of  mental  disorders  there  seem  to  be  excluded  from 
the  anomalous  conditions  only  the  facts  of  so-called 
11 


114  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

animal  magnetism,  which  are  too  little  understood. 
These  facts  indicate  a  change  in  the  bond  of  union, 
between  the  body  and  soul — a  change  which,  however, 
may  be  quickly  reversed,  and  the  former  state  re-estab- 
lished.    (Compare  1G3.) 

Concluding  Remarks. 

If  from  mental  disorders  we  turn  back  again  to 
ordinary  psychological  phenomena,  and  compare  the 
different  orders,  mental  delusion  recalls  the  passions ; 
madness,  the  emotions ;  dementia,  mental  distraction ; 
and  idiocy,  indolence  and  idleness  (the  latter  recalls 
also  stupidity;  but  this  itself  is  a  degree  of  idiocy). 
Passions,  emotions,  mental  distraction,  and  indolence 
are  also  diseased  conditions  of  the  mind,  only  less  stub- 
born than  insanity  itself. 

The  opposite  of  them  all  is  the  healthy  condition  of 
the  mind  : 

(a.)  Hence,  as  the  opposite  of  mental  delusion  and 
of  passions,  the  sound  mind  involves  mutual  determi- 
nation of  all  concepts  and  desires  through  one  another, 
or  freedom  from  fixed  ideas  and  fixed  desires. 

{!).)  As  the  opposite  of  madness  and  emotion,  it 
involves  repose  and  equanimity. 

(c.)  As  the  opposite  of  dementia  and  distraction,  it 
involves  coherence  and  concentration  of  thought. 

{d.)  As  an  opposite  of  idiocy  and  indolence,  it  in- 
volves excitability  and  sprightliness. 

We  do  not  seek  for  the  same  degree  of  mental 
health  in  all  mental  faculties,  but  we  find  current 
in  language  such  expressions  as  sound  understanding, 
sound  judgment,  and  sound  reason.  The  nature  of 
reason,  understanding,  and  judgment  will   be   more 


SANITY  AND  INSANITY.  115 

clearly  understood  through  a  comparative  study  of  the 
alleged  characteristics  of  mental  health.  Of  this,  more 
in  the  third  part  of  this  book. 

The  comparison  between  insanity  and  the  passions 
may  be  carried  somewhat  further.  The  most  similar 
to  the  fixed  ideas  of  the  former  are  the  objective  pas- 
sions, or  those  which  aim  at  definite  objects  of  desire. 
As  we  can  classify  (with  Maass)  the  latter  into  those 
which  refer  to  one's  own  individuality,  those  which 
refer  to  other  men,  and  those  which  have  to  do  with 
things,  so  also  we  may  find  that  insanity  differs  in  re- 
spect to  its  object.  The  imagined  transformations  into 
princes  and  kings,  or  even  into  persons  of  the  Deity, 
correspond  to  pride.  The  fear  of  death  and  of  imagi- 
nary adversaries  and  persecutors  is  joined  to  egoism  or 
selfishness.  Desire  for  liberty  recalls  the  intractability 
of  most  insane  people,  and  the  necessity  of  governing 
them  by  force  and  authority.  Love,  hate,  jealousy, 
often  pass  into  insanity.  Ambition,  become  insanity, 
seeks  to  make  itself  known  by  self-sacrifices  of  an  un- 
usual kind,  while  the  desire  to  govern  often  erects  for 
itself  a  throne  in  an  insane  asylum  ;  the  desire  for  en- 
joyment sometimes  partakes  of  a  crazy  state  of  blessed- 
ness, w^hich  believes  that  it  has  direct  communication 
with  heaven.  Avarice,  on  the  contrary,  labors  under 
a  foolish  anxiety  about  poverty  and  hunger. 

As  to  what  concerns  the  subjective  passions — desire 
for  pleasure,  dread  of  disgust  and  emptiness  (accord- 
ing to  Maass) — it  may  be  remarked  that  the  common 
usages  of  speech  furnish  no  w^ords  for  this  mental  phase, 
which  can  not  be  exactly  indicated  by  the  expression, 
passion  {Leidenschaft).  Where  there  is  no  definite 
object,  there  is  also  no  definite  act  of  attention,  but  a 


IIG  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

fluctuating  mental  condition  which  is  not  in  harmony 
with  itself,  and  is  for  this  reason  weak  ;  so  that  if  rea- 
son can  not  govern  it  the  cause  does  not  proceed  so 
much  from  the  opposition  which  it  meets  as  from  in- 
capacity to  come  to  a  fixed  resolution  at  the  command 
of  reason.  Hence,  it  appears  that  we  can  not  consider 
the  states  of  mind  here  mentioned  among  the  passions. 
But  the  ideas  of  empirical  psychology  are  too  fluctu- 
ating to  admit  of  firm  reliance  on  such  conclusions. 
No  passion  is  a  pure  force  or  strength.  Each  carries 
with  it  its  weakness,  its  misery,  its  pitiably  helpless 
condition.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  to  be 
denied  that  the  desire  for  pleasure,  even  the  most  com- 
mon, which  frequently  changes  with  objects — and  so, 
too,  the  dread  of  disgust  and  of  the  feeling  of  emptiness 
— often  by  its  continuous  strength  can  fill  only  too  well 
the  place  of  an  objective  passion.  Various  excitations 
of  desire  for  this  or  that  pleasure,  or  of  aversion  for 
this  or  that  discomfort,  are  capable  of  a  combination, 
and,  as  it  were,  of  an  accumulated  intensity,  by  which 
they  [neutralize  one  another  and]  are  changed  into  a 
complex  force  which  drives  men  in  a  middle  direction. 
If  we  ask  here  for  analogous  kinds  of  insanity,  it 
may  be  remarked,  first,  that  after  shame  has  disap- 
peared, together  with  intelligence,  all  pleasures  have 
a  tendency  to  express  themselves  freely  and  boldly. 
Moreover,  it  is  remarkable  that  stupid  insanity,  which, 
in  case  it  is  not  quite  idiocy,  expresses  itself  in  every 
movement  only  as  an  abhorrence  of  uncomfortable 
feeling ;  and  therefore  it  shows  itself  in  a  very  general 
dread  of  pain.  Eestless  insanity  implies  more  dis- 
tinctly dread  of  emptiness ;  it  likewise  implies  weari- 
ness of  life,  which  leads  to  suicide. 


SANITY  AND  INSANITY.  117 

Kow,  as  we  have  searched  for  kinds  of  illusion 
similar  to  the  passions  (inasmuch  as  we  followed  the 
classification  of  passions  made  by  Maass),  so,  converse- 
1}%  we  must  be  allowed  to  investigate  the  kinds  of 
passions  corresponding  to  the  dilferent  kinds  of  illu- 
sion. Whichever  of  these  is  exhaustively  presented,  in 
a  complete  tabular  view,  wdll  furnish,  without  doubt,  a 
complete  classification  of  the  other.  A  supernumerary 
member  of  the  one  list,  however,  will  indicate  a  miss- 
ing term  in  the  other. 

Among  the  kinds  of  illusion  we  find,  imagined  re- 
proaches against  one's  self,  pretended  suggestions  of 
the  devil,  doubt  in  the  mercy  of  God,  etc.  In  the  se- 
ries of  passions,  what  corresponds  to  these  mental 
aberrations?  Very  manifestly  a  moral  and  religious 
enthusiasm,  which  passes  over  into  self-torture.  And 
furthermore,  this  recalls  political  and  learned  passions, 
as  well  as  all  kinds  of  fanaticism.  The  true  nature  of 
these  passions  must  necessarily  have  escaped  previous 
psychologists  (and  not  Maass  alone),  because  they  were 
resolved  to  carry  out  consistently  the  theory  that  the 
passions  belonged  to  sensuousness,  and  hence  were  to 
be  entirely  separated  from  reason.  The  source  of 
moral  and  religious  concepts  is  ascribed  to  reason. 
These  concepts,  together  with  the  scientific  thoughts 
and  theories  collectively  related  to  them,  may  become 
objects  of  passionate  search.  Xothing  is  so  sacred 
that  it  can  not  inflame  the  human  mind  in  an  unholy 
way.  Just  as  hunger  and  thirst,  those  lowest  wantb 
may  change  the  unfortunate  man  into  a  thief,  a 
robber,  and  a  murderer,  so  may  the  thirst  of  knowl- 
edge, so  may  higher  efforts  of  every  kind,  lead  to  crim- 
inal acts.     Indeed,  reason  (if  such  a  mental  faculty 


118  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

really  exists)  not  iufrequently  enters  into  peaceful 
coalition  with  passionate  sensuousness.  This  is  seen 
most  clearly  in  the  idea  of  right,  to  which  men  very 
generally  allow  only  a  restricted  sphere,  inasmuch  as 
outside  of  and  in  spite  of  it  they  permit  themselves 
every  gratification  of  their  desires.  The  robber-cap- 
tain administers  justice  to  his  band. 

The  fundamental  principle,  licereticis  non  est  ser- 
vanda fides,  had  force  at  one  time  in  the  one  holy 
Church  ;  a  multitude  of  similar  examples  is  to  be 
found  in  common  life,  where  men  find  it  necessary  to 
act  uprightly  only  toward  those  whom  they  consider 
their  equals,  while  they  regard  all  others  as  strangers 
and  enemies.  Would,  one  seriously  admit  that  reason, 
negating  itself,  had  in  this  concluded  a  disgraceful 
treaty  with  sensuousness,  to  which  it  gave  up  the 
whole  foreign  territory  ? 

All  these  and  many  other  dif!iculties  disappear  at 
once  as  soon  as  it  is  perceived  how  concepts  manifest 
themselves,  now  as  passion,  now  as  reason ;  while  they 
are  in  themselves  neither  the  one  nor  the  other,  and, 
moreover,  contain  nothing  as  a  previously  -  formed 
germ  similar  to  either.  Hence,  also,  they  contain  no 
idea  of  justice,  nor  any  other  idea  or  category. 


PAKT    TIIir.D. 

RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

SECTION    FIRST.— THEOREMS    FROM    METAPHYSICS 
AND  NATURAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER   I. 

THE    SOUL   AXD    MATTER. 

150.  The  notion  of  the  soul  which  some  modern 
systems  have  unreasonably  subjected  to  suspicion  must 
be  restored,  although  under  characteristics  hitherto 
unknown. 

The  soul  is  a  simple  essence  ( Wesen)^  not  merely 
without  parts,  but  also  without  any  kind  of  diversity 
or  multiplicity  in  its  quality ;  hence  it  has  no  space 
relations.  In  thinking  it,  however,  with  other  es- 
sences, it  is  included  necessarily  in  space,  and  for  every 
moment  of  time  it  is  located  in  a  definite  place.  This 
place  is  the  simple  in  space,  or,  what  is  the  same,  the 
nothing  in  space,  a  mathematical  point. 

Note. — For  certain  theories  of  natural  philosophy  and 
physiology,  but  not  for  psychology,  necessary  fictions  are  le- 
gitimate, in  which  the  simple  is  regarded  as  if  it  admitted  of 
separation  into  parts.  Such  fictions  must  be  employed  with 
reference  to  the  soul's  union  with  the  body,  but  without,  for 
that  reason,  ascribing  to  the  soul  itself  any  real  space  conditions 
whatever.     The  fictions  of  geometricians  are  in  some  respects 


120  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

similar  when  they  regard  the  curve  as  consisting  of  indefinitely 
short  straight  lines. 

151.  Furthermore  the  soul  lias  no  time  relations. 
In  thinking,  however,  wherein  it  is  included  with  other 
essences,  it  must  be  conceived  as  in  time  and  indeed 
as  in  eternity,  although  this  eternity,  and  still  more 
the  temporal  duration,  must  not  be  predicated  of  the 
soul.     (Introd.  to  Phil.,  115  ) 

152.  Tlie  soul  has  no  innate  natural  talents  nor 
faculties  whatever,  either  for  the  purpose  of  receiving 
or  for  the  purpose  of  producing.  It  is,  therefore,  no 
tabula  rasa  in  the  sense  that  impressions  foreign  to 
itself  may  be  made  upon  it ;  moreover,  in  the  sense 
indicated  by  Leibnitz,  it  is  not  a  substance  which  in- 
cludes in  itself  original  activity.  It  has  originally 
neither  concepts,  nor  feelings,  nor  desires.  It  knows 
nothing  of  itself,  and  nothing  of  other  things ;  also  in 
it  lie  no  forms  of  perception  and  thought,  no  laws  of 
willing  and  action,  and  not  even  a  remote  predisposi- 
tion to  any  of  these. 

153.  The  simple  nature  {Das  einfache  Was)  of  the 
soul  is  totally  unknown  and  will  forever  remain  so. 
It  is  as  little  an  object  of  speculative  as  of  empirical 
psychology. 

154.  Between  several  dissimilar  simple  essences 
exists  a  relation  w^hich,  with  the  help  of  a  comparison 
from  the  physical  world,  may  be  described  as  pressure 
and  resistance.  For  the  reason  that  pressure  is  the 
retardation  of  movement,  the  relation  mentioned  con- 
sists in  the  capacity  of  the  simple  quality  of  each  exist- 
ence to  be  changed  through  the  other,  if  each  did  not 
resist  and  maintain  itself  in  its  quality  against  the 
disturbance.     Self-preservations  of  this  kind  are  the 


THE  SOUL  AND  MATTER.  12 1 

only  events  which  really  occur  in  nature,  and  this  is 
the  comhination  of  event  with  beinof. 

155.  The  self-preservations  of  the  soul  are  (at  least 
in  part  and  so  far  as  we  know  them)  concepts  and  in- 
deed simple  concepts,  for  the  act  of  self-preserva- 
tion is  as  simple  as  is  the  essence  which  is  preserved. 
Hence  there  exists  an  infinite  manifold  of  other  such 
acts  of  self-preservation,  which  differ  as  the  disturb- 
ances differ.  With  this  explanation  the  manifold  of 
concepts  and  their  infinitely  varied  complexes  present 
no  difficulty  whatever. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  feelings  and  de- 
sires. They  appear  to  be  composed  of  something 
objective,  added  to  a  preference  and  rejection,  which 
will  be  explained  later.  Nor  can  we  at  this  point  dis- 
cuss self-consciousness,  or  anything  whatever  that  may 
be  considered  as  belonging  to  the  inner  sense. 

156.  The  difference  between  soul  and  matter  is  not 
a  difference  in  the  nature  of  the  simple  essences,  but 
it  is  a  difference  in  the  manner  of  our  apprehending 
them.  Matter,  represented  as  a  spatial  reality  with 
spatial  forces,  as  we  are  accustomed  to  think  it,  be- 
longs neither  in  the  realm  of  essence  (Sein)  nor  in  that 
of  actual  events,  but  is  merely  an  appearance.  This 
matter  is  real,  however,  as  an  aggregate  of  simple 
essences,  and  in  these  essences  something  really  occurs 
which  results  in  the  johenomenon  of  a  space  exist- 
ence. 

The  explanation  of  matter  depends  entirely  upon 
showing  how  to  the  inner  states  of  the  essences  (self- 
preservations)  certain  space-conditions  belong,  as  means 
necessary  for  the  act  of  comprehension  by  the  specta- 
tor, which  space-conditions,  just  because  they  are  noth- 


122  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

ing  real,  must  be  adjusted  to  those  inner  conditions ; 
and  by  this  an  appearance  of  attraction  and  repulsion 
arises.  The  equilibrium  of  the  two  latter  (attraction 
and  repulsion)  determines  for  matter  its  degree  of 
density,  likewise  its  elasticity,  its  form  of  crystalization 
in  free  condensation,  in  a  word  its  essential  properties, 
which  in  this  form  are  originally  based  upon  the  quali- 
ties of  simple  essences. 

Matter  never  fills  space  as  a  geometric  continuum 
(it  can  not  be  composed  of  simple  parts),  but  with  im- 
perfect mutual  penetration  of  its  adjacent  simple  parts. 
(Concerning  this  contradiction  compare  the  remark  in 
section  150.) 

Matter  is  impenetrable  only  for  those  substances 
which  are  not  capable  of  changing  the  equilibrium  of 
attraction  and  repulsion  that  exists  in  it.  It  is  always 
penetrable  for  that  agent  which  is  capable  of  dissolv- 
ing it. 

Note. — Concerning  the  foregoing  and  what  follows,  refer- 
ence must  be  made  to  the  author's  Metaphysics,  in  which  is 
found  his  Philosophy  of  Nature. 


CHAPTER   IL 

VITAL    FORCES. 

157.  Vital  forces  are  nothing  original  (I  have 
named  them  in  the  plural  because  they  can  neither 
originate  nor  act  alone),  and  there  is  nothing  similar 
to  them  in  the  nature  of  essences. 


VITAL  FORCES.  123 

Only  a  system  of  self-preservations  in  one  and  the 
same  essence  is  capable  of  creating  them,  and  they 
are  to  be  regarded  as  the  inner  development  of  simple 
essences.  Generally,  they  originate  in  the  elements  of 
organic  bodies  whose  arrangement  is  fitted  for  pro- 
ducing systems  of  self-preservation  in  the  individ- 
ual elements.  This  is  shown  in  the  assimilation  of 
food. 

158.  Once  acquired,  there  remains  with  each  ele- 
ment its  own  vital  force,  even  though  the  element  be 
separated  from  the  organic  body  to  which  it  belonged. 
This  is  shown  in  the  sustenance  of  the  higher  organ- 
ism by  the  lower,  and  of  the  vegetable  organism  by 
decayed  parts  of  other  organic  bodies. 

Note. — To  this  belongs  the  explanation  of  all  generation, 
without  exception,  including  that  of  some  lower  organisms 
from  apparently  crude  material — i.  e.,  from  such  material  as  pos- 
sesses no  organic  structure  (structure  is  a  space-predicate) — but 
from  this  deficiency  of  structure  the  lack  of  vital  force  can  by 
no  means  be  inferred.  To  assume,  however,  an  original  vital 
force  in  this  is  an  unwarraVited  procedure.  In  our  circle  of  ex- 
perience there  is  no  matter  whatever  of  which  it  could  with  cer- 
tainty be  asserted  that  it  is  entirely  inorganic.  The  whole  at- 
mosphere is  full  of  elements  which  have  already  gained  vital 
force  in  some  organic  body  or  other,  and  the  number  of  such 
elements  is  constantly  increasing  in  nature.  Indeed,  we  do  not 
know  whether  the  same  mutual  exchange  of  vital  force  does  not 
occur  among  the  stars. 

159.  All  human  investigation  must  recognize  the 
fundamental  source  of  vital  forces  by  referring  them 
to  that  Providence  according  to  whose  designs  they 
were  originated.  ^NTo  metaphysics  and  no  experience 
reaches  further.  Every  theory  as  to  the  probable  crea- 
tion of  lower  organisms  by  a  natural  })rocess  from  in- 


124,  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

organic  matter,  and  the  development  of  higher  organ- 
isms from  those  of  a  lower  order,  can  be  refuted. 

100.  In  the  example  of  the  soul,  psychology  shows 
us  an  excellent  internal  development  of  a  simple  es- 
sence. According  to  this  type,  one  must  explain  the 
development  of  all  other  essences,  even  those  that  are 
not  able  to  represent  or  conceive.  To  this  may  be 
added  a  former  remark  that,  where  several  essences 
make  up  a  material  whole,  the  inner  state  determines 
an  adequate  external  condition  for  it — i.  e.,  a  position 
in  space.  For  this  reason  vital  forces  generally  ap- 
pear moving  forces ;  just  for  this  reason,  however,  their 
movements  can  not  be  comprehended  through  chemi- 
cal or  mechanical  laws.  With  the  latter,  no  inner 
development  comes  into  consideration. 

In  the  above  the  relation  between  psychology  and 
physiology  is  indicated.  Psychology  is  the  first,  the 
preceding ;  physiology,  in  case  it  is  to  be  something 
more  than  a  mere  empirical  science,  the  second ;  for  it 
must  learn  from  the  former  to  understand  the  notion 
of  inner  development.  We  can  not  have  a  correct 
definition  of  life  without  the  help  of  psychology. 

ISToTE.— On  this  difficulty  of  defining  life  consult  among  oth- 
ers Treviraniis  (Biology,  vol.  i,  p.  16).  The  most  comprehensive 
empirical  characteristic  of  vitality  is  assimilation,  which,  for 
this  reason,  is  first  mentioned  in  the  foregoing,  if  an  organism 
should  be  found  without  this  peculiarity,  we  might  doubt 
whether  it  could  be  considered  to  be  living,  even  if  it  were 
granted  that  it  might  possess  a  soul  (a  case  which  may  very 
well  be  admitted  in  the  general  notion). 

161.  From  the  above  it  is  self-evident  that  the 
vital  forces  may  be  very  different  in  kind  as  well  as  in 
degree.     For  a  system  of  self-preservations  might  be 


CONNECTION  BETWEEN  SOUL  AND  BODY.  125 

different  in  different  essences ;  in  similar  essences  the 
self-preservations  vary  according  to  the  difference  in 
the  disturbances;  finally,  there  may  be  a  greater  or 
smaller  number  of  self-preservations  belonging  to 
them. 

From  this  may  be  explained  the  difference  in  those 
parts  which  are  nourished  by  the  same  kind  of  food. 
The  elements  of  which  the  heart  and  the  nerves  con- 
sist certainly  do  not  differ  in  their  chemical  constitu- 
ents so  much  as  in  their  internal  structure. 

The  causal  relation  between  the  different  parts  of 
the  same  living  body,  likewise  that  between  this  body 
and  the  outer  world,  offers  upon  the  whole  no  difficulty 
whatever.  All  causality,  and  especially  all  cohesion  of 
matter,  depends  upon  the  dissimilarity  of  the  elements. 
Hence,  for  example,  the  action  of  the  nerves  upon  the 
muscles  can  excite  no  special  wonder,  much  less  can  it 
justify  hypotheses  of  electric  currents,  polarizations, 
etc.,  which  are  empty  vagaries  that  owe  their  existence 
to  the  latest  hobbies  of  the  physicist.  There  might 
be  something  true  in  them,  and  yet,  even  then,  the  most 
important  questions  remain  unanswered,  and  in  the 
end  one  riddle  take  the  place  of  the  other. 


CHAPTER   ni 

THE   COXifECTIO:N"   BETWEEN    SOUL   AND   BODY. 

162.  The  connection  between  mind  and  matter  in 
the  brutes,  and  especially  in  man,  has  in  it  much  that 
is  surprising,  which  must  be  referred  to  the  wisdom  of 


12G  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Providence ;  but  this  is  not  where  we  are  accustomed 
first  of  all  to  seek  it,  because  we  consider  matter  real 
so  far  as  it  occupies  space,  and  because  we  regard  the 
human  mind  as  an  original  thinking,  feeling,  and  will- 
ing existence,  so  that  between  the  tAvo  (matter  and 
mind)  there  is  no  middle  term.  AVe  may  seek  beyond 
matter,  as  a  spatial  manifestation,  for  the  simple  es- 
sences possessing  capacity  for  internal  development 
from  w^hich  this  manifestation  arises.  We  may  regard 
the  mind  as  the  soul  endowed  with  power  of  repre- 
sentation. We  may  remember  that  to  the  concepts,  as 
self-preservations  of  the  soul,  other  self-23reservations  in 
other  essences  (in  the  nervous  system)  must  corre- 
spond. Thus  we  perceive  that  the  chain  of  self-pres- 
ervations belonging  together  may  indeed  extend  still 
further ;  that  it  may  run  through  a  whole  system  of 
essences  which  present  themselves  as  one  body ;  and  we 
shall  no  longer  consider  it  enigmatic  if  from  the  foot 
to  the  brain,  and  even  into  the  soul,  a  succession  of  in- 
ternal states  having  nothing  to  do  with  the  lapse  of 
time  nor  with  any  movement  in  space  is  extended  for- 
ward and  backward.  Time  and  space  may  appear, 
however,  as  accompanying  phenomena. 

163.  First  of  all,  the  question  concerning  the  loca- 
tion of  the  soul,  which  has  been  wrongly  refused  a 
hearing,  presents  itself  here.  It  is  acknowledged  upon 
physiological  grounds  that  we  can  not  with  any  degree 
of  probability  indicate  a  place  but  only  a  region  for  it 
(in  the  point  of  junction  between  the  brain  and  the 
spinal  cord).  Nor  is  a  fixed  position  necessary,  but 
the  soul  may  move  in  a  certain  region  without  the 
least  indication  of  it  being  given  in  its  concepts ;  nor 
can  the  slightest  trace  of  its  movements  be  found  by 


CONNECTION  BETWEEN  SOUL  AND  BODY.  127 

making  an  anatomical  investigation.  The  change  of 
its  seat,  however,  may  be  regarded  as  a  very  friiitfal 
h3"pothesis  for  the  explanation  of  its  anomdous  condi- 
tions. 

Note  1. — This  statement  has  aroused  much  astonishment, 
yet  physiologists  may  remember  that  their  sphere  of  observation 
lies  in  the  regions  of  space,  and  they  might  leave  it  to  the  meta- 
physician to  see  that  nothing  more  be  allowed  to  space  than  be- 
longs to  it.  If  they  wish,  however,  to  share  his  cares  with  him 
they  must  earnestly  study  metaphysics,  and  then  one  will  be  able 
to  talk  further  with  them. 

Note  2. — We  should  have  no  reason  for  assuming  that  in  all 
brutes  and  in  man  the  seat  of  the  soul  is  in  the  same  place 
Probably  in  the  brutes,  especially  in  the  lower  orders,  it  is  in 
the  spinal  cord.  Furthermore,  we  can  not  assume  that  each 
brute  has  only  one  soul.  In  worms  whose  severed  parts  con- 
tinue to  live  the  opposite  assumption  is  probable.  In  the  hu- 
man nervous  system  may  be  found  many  elements  whose  inner 
development  widely  surpasses  the  soul  of  an  animal  of  the  low- 
er order.  (Besides,  we  must  not  forget  that  indications  of  life 
are  not  indications  of  soul.  In  organic  parts  that  have  been 
separated  from  their  organism,  life  may  continue  for  some  time 
without  soul.) 

If  we  wished,  however,  to  attribute  to  man  several  souls  in 
one  body,  we  should  beware  of  thinking  of  mental  activities  as 
divided  among  them,  rather  the  latter  must  be  regarded  as 
being  entire  in  each  soul.  Secondly,  the  most  exact  harmony 
among  these  souls  would  have  to  be  assumed  so  that  they  might 
serve  for  identical  examples  of  the  same  kind.  This  is,  however, 
in  the  highest  degree  improbable,  and  hence  the  whole  thought 
is  to  be  rejected.  If,  in  the  contest  between  reason  and  passion, 
it  sometimes  seems  to  a  man  that  he  has  several  souls,  this  is  a 
psychical  phenomenon  which  can  not  be  considered  in  connec- 
tion with  the  paradoxical  thoughts  just  mentioned,  but  which 
will  be  explained  later. 

164.  The  whole  nervous  system  in  the  human  body 
serves  a  single  soul,  and  by  means  of  this  system  the 


128  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

soul  is  implanted  in  this  body,  more  a  burden  than  a 
help  to  it,  for  the  body  lives  as  a  plant  for  itself,  pro- 
vided nourishment  and  a  suitable  place  be  given  it,  as 
sometimes  has  to  be  done  for  idiots.  Stories  of  some 
who  were  idiots  from  birth  give  rise  to  the  thought 
that  they  may  be  merely  vegetating  bodies  without 
souls. 

105.  AVith  the  close  causal  connection  of  all  parts 
in  the  whole  system  which  we  call  man,  the  varied  de- 
pendence of  the  mind  upon  the  body  can  appear  in  no 
way  strange.  So  much  more  wonderful  is  it  that,  upon 
the  whole,  the  nervous  system  appears  to  be  made  al- 
most entirely  to  obey  the  mind.  We  shall  perceive  this 
more  and  more  when  we  see  how  little  the  physiologi- 
cal conditions  are  necessary  to  explain  the  states  and 
activities  of  the  mind.  Yet  only  in  the  healthy  man 
is  the  nervous  system  a  good  servant.  In  illness  it 
shows  itself  disobedient  and  obstinate,  and  in  many 
mental  disorders,  especially  in  dementia,  the  relation 
between  the  nerves  and  the  soul  is  entirely  reversed. 
This  is  an  indication  that  we  are  not  to  regard  the 
healthy  condition  merely-  as  a  natural  phenomenon 
which  could  not  be  otherwise,  but  in  it  we  have  to  re- 
vere a  beneficent  arrangement  of  Providence. 

166.  It  would  be  hardly  necessary  to  mention  the 
intercourse  with  the  outer  world  which  is  afforded  to 
the  human  soul  and  at  the  same  time  limited  through 
its  body,  were  we  not  obliged  to  remark  in  regard  to  the 
theory,  now  very  wide-spread,  concerning  a  general  or- 
ganic connection  of  the  whole  universe,  that  we  can 
not  bring  the  latter  into  relation  with  the  theories 
advanced  here  if  we  do  not  wish  to  mix  up  entirely 
heterogeneous  concepts. 


SPACE  AND  TIME.  129 

Note. — There  are  no  tenable  grounds  a  priori  for  a  universal 
causal  relation,  and  experience  ends  with  the  feeble  glimmer  of 
liffht  which  remote  suns  throw  on  one  another. 


SECTION  SECOND.— EXPLANATIONS  OF  PHENOMENA. 
CHAPTER   I. 

CONCEPTS    OF    SPACE    AND    TIME. 

167.  It  is  as  yet  too  early  to  explain  everything  in 
psychology.  Meanwhile  much  has  explained  itself  in 
the  foregoing,  and  the  comparison  of  facts  with  the 
principles  established  will  gradually  lead  us  to  further 
explanations. 

How  the  world,  and  we  ourselves,  as  phenomena, 
come  to  appear  to  ourselves,  is  the  first  point  u]3on 
which  we  need  a  psychological  revelation,  in  order 
especially  to  learn  to  comprehend  the  origin  of  meta- 
physical problems.  After  that  the  question  must  be 
concerning  our  position  in  the  world  from  a  practical 
[moral]  standpoint,  especially  that  we  may  compare 
that  which  we  can  be  with  that  which  we  ought  to  be. 

168.  Why  we  apprehend  things  in  the  world  in 
the  relations  of  space  and  time,  must  be  answered  by 
an  investigation  into  the  nature  of  series  of  concepts 
("29).     The  following  serves  as  an  introduction  : 

In  section  28,  instead  of  the  definite  particular 
remainders  r,  r',  r\  of  a  single  concept  P,  the  infinite 
multitude  of  all  its  possible  remainders  is  given,  and 
th^se  are  considered  to  be  blended  with  innumerable 
concepts  n  11'  n",  etc.  Thus  for  the  concept  P  will 
12 


130  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

arise  a  continuous  succession  of  reproductions,  each 
of  which  has,  however,  its  own  law  which  depends 
upon  its  remainder  r,  according  to  the  formuki  in  sec- 
tion 25. 

Moreover,  in  section  29,  instead  of  the  series  «,  5,  c,  d^ 
etc.,  there  is  posited  a  continuous  succession,  of  which 
each  member  like  P,  with  all  its  possible  remainders, 
is  blended  with  other  members,  but  each  in  a  peculiar 
manner. 

Besides,  let  this  succession  of  blended  concepts  be 
considered  to  be  extended  indefinitely  on  both  sides, 
and  finally  let  it  be  remarked  that,  if  it  be  not  made 
impossible  by  accompanying  conditions,  each  member 
of  the  succession  may  be  such  that  in  it  several  such 
successions  may  cross  one  another  (as  in  c,  section  30). 

Moreover,  when  any  one  member  in  this  whole 
system  of  concepts  moves  even  in  the  slightest  degree, 
the  movement  is  transferred  to  the  next  member,  and 
so  on,  'with  the  inviolable  law  that  if  of  three  remain- 
ders r,  7'',  r"^  of  one  and  the  same  concept,  r'  lies  be- 
tween r  and  r\  then  also  the  concept  11'  (between  n 
and  n")  blended  with  r'  will  be  reproduced  as  well  as 
those  concepts  which  are  blended  with  r  and  r".  This 
relation  of  intermediary  between  two  others  must 
always  be  present,  even  though  the  degree  of  repro- 
duction be  very  slight.  This  is  the  general  law  in  all 
series. 

109.  AVhether,  and  in  what  way,  the  kind  of  re- 
production is  limited,  depends  upon  accompanying 
conditions,  as  follows  : 

A.  If  in  the  sense-perception  the  series  a^  J,  c^  d^ 
etc., — or  rather  if,  instead  of  the  latter,  the  conceivable 
continuum  can  change  its  order  by  all  possible  trans- 


SPACE   AXD  TIME.  131 

positions  (e.  g.,  as  in  a  cb  d,  a  db  c^  etc.) — then  each 
time,  from  the  perceived  succession,  a  new  succession 
arises  in  the  reproduction.  But  in  this  case  the  laws 
for  reproduction  become  so  involved  that  no  percepti- 
ble order  remains  (as  if  a  number  of  small  arches  of 
different  curvatures  were  attached  to  one  another). 

B.  Let  it  be  assumed,  however,  that  the  sense-per- 
ception is  reversed — i.  e.,  the  series  b  c  is  changed  into  c  b 
and  abed  into  dcba^  etc., — the  relation  of  the  interme- 
diate concept  between  two  others  will  never  be  changed 
for  any  other ;  moreover,  the  series  of  concepts  might 
begin  here  or  there,  and  there  be  no  definite  starting- 
point.  The  law  of  reproduction  arising  from  this  fur- 
nishes a  spatial  concept  with  a  progress  from  each  point 
in  the  series  toward  at  least  the  two  opposite  sides. 

170.  Let  there  be  a  definite  starting-point,  and  for 
the  rest  let  everything  be  as  heretofore ;  then  arises  the 
most  general  form  of  the  concept,  namely,  that  real- 
ized in  the  series  of  numbers. 

171.  Let  the  beginning  point  be  dispensed  with ; 
then  the  perception  series  runs  without  reversal,  con- 
stantly in  one  direction;  then  also  the  reproduction 
can  take  only  this  one  direction.  Now  if,  while  the 
perception  is  at  d^  a  is  at  the  same  time  reproduced, 
then  from  d  the  series  ab  c  d  is  recalled  back  to  a ;  the 
same  series,  however,  will  be  held  in  consciousness  by 
d,  according  to  another  law  (as  in  section  29  c  re- 
calls b  and  a).  From  this  arises  the  representation  of 
the  concept  of  time. 

172.  First,  for  illustration,  we  may  remark  that  in 
the  soul  the  concept  of  space  is  not  itself  extended,  but 
is  necessarily  completely  intensive,  and  that  time  does 
not  elapse  during  the  representation  of  the  temporal 


132  RATIOXAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

to  such  an  amount  as  to  equal  the  time  represented. 
As  for  number,  its  fundamental  idea  is  only  that  of  the 
more  or  less ;  the  one,  two,  three,  etc.,  together  with 
the  inserted  fractions,  are  only  transferred  to  this  fun- 
damental idea.  The  abscissas  of  analytical  geometry 
are  the  true  and  complete  symbols  for  the  notion  of 
number  in  its  universality. 

173.  The  original  apprehension  of  the  eye  can  not 
be  spatial ;  for  the  perceptions  of  all  colored  places 
converge  in  the  unity  of  the  soul  and  in  this  every 
trace  is  lost  of  right  and  left,  above  and  below,  etc., 
which  found  a  place  upon  the  retina  of  the  eye.  The 
same  is  true  of  touching  with  the  tongue  and  the 
hands. 

But  in  seeing  the  eye  moves ;  it  changes  the  center 
of  its  surface  of  sight.  By  this  movement  there  is  a 
constant  blending  of  the  concepts  gained,  an  incitation 
of  those  wdiich  are  strengthened  by  perceptions  of  what 
lies  outside  the  middle  of  the  field  of  vision,  and  an  in- 
numerable multitude  of  reproductions  interlacing  one 
another — all  these  are  combined,  and  for  them  no 
words  could  be  found  if  we,  educated  as  we  are,  were 
to  meet  them  as  new  objects.  Those  born  blind  who 
subsequently  attain  sight,  already  know  space  inas- 
much as  touch  prepares  for  them  successions  of  re- 
productions similar  to  those  which  sight  furnishes 
more  conveniently  and  more  rapidly.  By  this  we  see 
how  two  widely  differing  senses  produce  the  same  result. 

174.  The  concept  of  space  relations  demands  a  suc- 
cession that  takes  place  in  the  act  of  representation, 
for  it  depends  upon  reproductions  which  are  just  oc- 
curring. In  this  connection  two  points  are  to  be  ob- 
served : 


SPACE   AND  TIME.  I33 

(1.)  The  succession  in  representation  is  not  a  repre- 
sented succession. 

(2.)  It  does  not  require  a  measurable  duration  of 
time,  but  only  an  impercei^tibly  short  interval,  espe- 
cially as  by  the  movement  of  the  eye  in  its  field  of  vision 
numberless  apprehensions  of  colored  surfaces  at  every 
movement  arise  simultaneously  and  act  upon  the  con- 
cepts previously  gained,  both  strengthening  and  excit- 
ing them.  The  spatial  seeing  includes  in  it  an  infinite 
variety  of  extremely  weak  simultaneous  reproductions 
which  are  united  with  the  apprehensions  actually  taking 
place,  which  latter  in  themselves  alone  would  not  be 
considered  to  be  spatial.  Since  in  this  spatial  seeing 
it  is  not  necessary  that  any  single  reproduction  series 
should  require  a  perceptible  length  of  time  to  pass  be- 
fore the  mind,  no  measurable  duration  is  necessary  for 
it,  and  therefore  it  appears  to  us  as  though  space  intui- 
tions are  quite  simultaneous  and  entirely  free  from  all 
succession  in  time. 

175.  In  order  to  distinguish  between  time  and 
space  perceptions  in  their  origin  more  accurately,  w^e 
may  suppose  the  following  case : 

From  rt,  two  series,  abed  and  a  B  C  D^  may  begin 
both  of  which  are  presented  to  the  attention  simulta- 
neously. Up  to  this  point  in  the  representation  there 
is  nothing  temporal  nor  spatial,  nor  is  there  anything 
of  the  kind  if,  after  the  whole  series  of  perceptions  is 
removed  out  of  consciousness,  at  some  later  time  a  is 
again  brought  into  consciousness  and  then  both  series 
are  simultaneously  reproduced.  Such  a  reproduction  is 
rather  an  example  of  the  kind  that  we  are  accustomed 
to  attribute  to  memory,  in  which  time  is  consumed,  but 
no  time  and  no  space  represented.     The  matter  is  dif- 


13 JL  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

fereut  if,  while  D  and  d  are  still  perceived  (or  thought) 
a  again  rises  (perhaps  on  account  of  a  concept  similar 
to  it  that  has  just  now  arisen),  and  recalls  to  mind  the 
remaining  terms  of  its  series.  For  then  this  successive 
recollection  of  the  several  terms  occurs  during  a  simul- 
taneous collective  presentation  of  the  whole  series  as 
remarked  m  section  171.  Thus  the  collective  survey  of 
the  earlier  and  later  moments  of  time  and  the  view  of 
the  time  extension  would  be  accomplished,  whereas 
those  persons  wiio  could  not  hold  together  the  begin- 
ning and  the  end  of  the  series,  and  could  not  observe 
a  transition  from  the  former  to  the  latter,  would  never 
know  anything  of  time.  We  should  get  still  another 
result  if  a  should  not  immediately  rise  again,  but  if  a 
series  €  >;  8,  should  enter  between  D  and  d  which  in 
the  perception  goes  from  D  to  d  and  also  backward, 
and  if,  moreover,  the  perception  should  return  also 
from  D  through  C  and  B  to  ff,  and  from  d  through  c 
and  h  to  a.  By  this  D  and  d  would  diverge,  and  the 
differences  between  that  which  Avas  the  first  and  that 
which  was  the  last  would  be  obliterated ;  the  different 
series  would  in  the  reproduction  converge  from  all 
points  toward  one  another  at  any  new  excitation,  and 
the  apprehension  would  be  spatial. 

Both  propositions  in  section  174  apply  to  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  temporal.  We  consume  only  a  short 
time  in  representing  to  ourselves  a  whole  year  or 
even  a  century,  provided  the  partial  concepts  in  the 
series  here  necessary  are  blended  with  one  another; 
the  time,  however,  which  we  consume  is  not  repre- 
sented in  the  object.  The  concept  of  a  period  of  time 
arises  when  one  runs  through  the  time  series  backward 
and  forward  with  equal  facility. 


SPACE  AND  TIME.  135 

176.  It  is  possible  only  for  educated  people  to  com- 
prehend long  extensions  in  time.  In  its  earliest  years, 
the  child  can  realize  only  very  short  periods  of  time. 
The  reason  lies  simply  in  the  necessity  for  reaction  of 
the  later  concepts  upon  the  earlier  ones  in  the  series 
(section  171).  The  child  has  great  susceptibility  (sec- 
tion 47) :  for  this  reason,  and,  because  the  complexes 
and  blendings  possess  little  strength,  the  impression 
of  the  present  moment  throws  the  one  previously  ap- 
prehended too  quickly  below  the  threshold  of  con- 
sciousness, and  thus  long  series  can  not  be  formed. 

177.  Psychologically  considered,  everything  tem- 
poral and  spatial  is  infinitely  divisible  ;  for  it  depends 
upon  such  remainders  of  one  and  the  same  concept,  as 
r,  r',  ?•,",  etc.  {28).  If  there  could  be  only  a  definite 
number  of  such  remainders,  then  also  a  corresponding 
number  of  diUerent  laws  of  reproduction  for  the  same 
concept  would  be  possible.  But  the  whole  concept  is 
in  no  way  a  complex  of  such  parts  as  those  remain- 
ders ;  rather,  all  obscuration  by  which  the  remainders 
arise  is  accidental  to  the  concept,  and  even  opposed  to 
it.  Since  here  the  whole  precedes  the  parts,  so  the 
division  has  no  limits,  and  the  possibility  of  different 
laws  of  reproduction  is  likewise  unlimited.  Thus  it 
happens  that  for  the  senses  and  the  imagination,  in 
space  and  in  time,  the  whole  appears  to  precede  the 
parts,  and  from  this  arises  the  contradiction  in  the 
notion  of  matter.  (See  Introduction  to  Philosophy, 
section  119.) 

KoTE  1. — Geometry  is  to  be  considered  in  this  connection. 
On  account  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  space  and  time  it 
needed  its  incommensurable  quantities.  From  this,  however, 
much  evil  has  arisen  for  metaphysics,  ^^hich  was  so  incautious 


136  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

as  to  consider  this  view  of  space  to  be  the  primary  and  only 
correct  one. 

Note  2. — We  have  proceeded  from  spatial  and  temporal  re- 
lations, but  not  from  space  and  time.  To  make  the  former 
dependent  upon  the  latter  is  an  error  which  can  not  be  explained 
here.  Empty  spaces  are  seen  just  as  empty  intervals  (pauses) 
are  heard,  viz.,  by  expecting  that  which  is  omitted.  Concepts 
already  present  are  in  these  examples  carried  further  forward ;  in 
the  empty  spaces  or  time  intervals  they  sink  constantly,  how- 
ever, until  something  new  is  given,  which  now  becomes  blended 
with  the  remainders  still  in  the  mind.  If  the  transfer  be  con- 
tinued further,  and  exceed  the  last  conceived  limits,  then,  there 
being  no  other  limits,  infinity  is  disclosed.  Not  only  the  given 
forms,  but  also  the  forms  gained  through  free  rising  concepts 
(to  which  belongs  the  creation  or  construction  of  geometrical 
figures),  offer  very  rich  material  for  investigation  if  we  consider 
the  difference  of  their  apprehension  from  different  points  of  view. 

Note  3. — For  the  explanation  of  the  beautiful  in  space,  we 
must  take  into  consideration  not  only  the  favoring  in  the  repro- 
duction of  the  series  which  variously  unite,  but  especially  we 
must  consider  also  the  effort  to  blend  all  things  beheld  into  a 
one.  The  latter  act  has  some  analogy  with  the  blending  before 
the  arrest  (section  34).  All  forms  approaching  roundness  re- 
spond to  this  effort,  while  on  the  contrary  the  angular,  the  ex- 
tended, the  crooked,  resist  it.  Variegated  flourishes  please  for  a 
time,  but  we  turn  again  to  the  more  simple.  Works  of  art  are  for 
the  most  part  interesting  for  what  they  say  or  signify ;  the  pure 
space  relations  with  their  peculiar  beauty  are  often  forgotten. 

178.  By  way  of  supplement  we  may  add  a  word 
upon  the  origin  of  concepts  of  intensive  magnitudes. 
The  question  here  is,  W^hat  is  the  origin  of  the  stand- 
ard which  we  use  when  we  characterize  our  simple 
sensations  as  strong  or  weak?  The  reawakening  of 
similar  old  concepts  alone  does  not  suflfice  for  an  ex- 
planation ;  for,  in  the  first  place,  the  concept  does  not 
adjust  itself  to  the  strength  of  that  which  is  reawak- 
ened, although  the  awakening  occurs  through  its  own 


SPACE  AND  TlxME.  137 

forces  ;  ia  the  second  place,  the  result  is  only  a  blend- 
insr  of  the  old  and  new,  but  it  is  not  a  measure  of  one 
by  the  other.  We  have  here  one  of  the  numerous  ex- 
amples of  that  class  of  psychological  problems  which 
are  scarcely  ever  observed  on  account  of  their  simplici- 
ty, but  which  are  very  ditiicult  to  solve.  The  reason 
seems  to  lie  in  the  law  of  helps  {2b).  These  helps  have 
their  measure,  not  merely  of  time,  but  also  of  strength, 
up  to  the  point  to  which  they  endeavor  to  raise  the 
old  similar  concepts.  If  the  approaching  new  percep- 
tion be  too  weak  to  furnish  free  space  enough  by  re- 
sistance to  the  hindrances  of  the  former  old  concepts 
(26),  then  the  effort  of  the  helping  concepts  remains 
unsatisfied  and  arouses  the  disagreeable  feeling  of 
weakness,  opposed  to  the  pleasant  feeling  described  in 
section  37.  If  the  new  perception  be  stronger  than 
might  be  necessary  here,  then  the  percipient  would  feel 
himself  raised  out  of  his  accustomed  sphere,  for  the 
helps  can  not  make  it  equal  to  the  former  old  concepts. 
The  pleasantness  of  this  feeling  lies,  nevertheless,  in 
the  favoring  of  those  helps.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
mention  what  is  presupposed  here,  viz.,  that  the  old 
similar  concept  is  united  with  some  kind  of  a  helping 
one.  The  more  there  are  of  these,  and  the  more 
equally  they  work  together,  so  much  the  more  accurate 
will  be  the  valuation  of  the  intensive  magnitude. 

Here  belongs  the  investigation  into  the  time-stand- 
ard (Zeltmaass). 

Note. — In  my  lectures  upon  general   metaphysics  1  shall 
discuss  in  detail  the  three  dimensions  of  space,  likewise  the  de- 
velopment of  the  idea  of  number  and  its  relation  to  logical  gen 
eral  notions,  which  discussion  has  no  place  here,  though  it  is 
indispensable  in  metaphysics. 


13S  KATlOxNAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

Supplement. — The  Difference  hetween  Series. 

In  the  foregoing,  the  dependence  of  the  psychical 
processes  upon  the  form  of  the  series  has  already  been 
made  clear.  As  the  latter  will  appear  still  more  in  the 
result,  it  is  to  the  purpose  to  observe  the  possible  dif- 
ferences of  the  series  in  general : 

(1.)  The  series  are  longer  or  shorter.  In  order  to 
bring  this  comparison  back  to  a  definite  point  of  view, 
let  us  take  the  series  «,  b,  c,  .  .  .  q,  so  that  a  remainder 
from  a  may  be  blended  withjt?,  but  none  with  q,  then 
a  will  work  so  as  to  reproduce  p ;  on  the  other  hand,  i 
or  c  may  be  combined  with  g  or  r ;  in  this  way  the 
series  may  be  prolonged  indefinitely,  but  there  is  no 
immediate  connection  between  the  beginning  and  the 
end. 

(2.)  The  degree  of  union  among  the  terms  is 
stronger  or  weaker. 

(3.)  The  series  are  throughout  similar  or  not,  as 
well  in  reofard  to  the  strensrth  of  their  terms  as  to  their 
degree  of  combination.  The  strongest  terms  or  com- 
binations are  either  at  the  beginning,  in  the  middle,  or 
at  the  end. 

(4.)  Often  several  series  serve  for  one — e.  g.,  after 
frequent  repetition.  By  this  the  dissimilarities  may 
be  lessened,  but  often  the  beginnings  only  are  strength- 
ened. If  this  should  not  happen,  then  the  series  must 
not  receive  additions  at  the  end,  but  at  the  beginning 
— e.  g.,  c  d,  b  c  fZ,  a  b  c  cl. 

(5.)  Many  series  return  into  themselves  when  either 
the  beginning  or  one  of  the  later  members  is  repeated. 

(G.)  In  the  case  of  dissimilar  series  the  stronger 
terms   often  form  a  series  among   themselves.     It  is 


DIFFERENCES  OF  SERIES.  139 

then  in  the  power  of  reflection  to  reproduce  the  series 
either  in  the  form  of  a  summary  or  synopsis  or  more 
in  detail. 

(7.)  In  complicated  series  often  a  term  (or  several 
terms)  has  a  side  series — i.  e.,  a  series  whose  course 
does  not  lead  into  the  principal  series ;  also  one  term 
may  have  several  side  series,  so  that  either  one  series 
or  another  may  proceed  from  it. 

(8.)  The  side  series  may  progress  simultaneoush^ 
in  which  case,  however,  j^rovided  they  are  not  to  coin- 
cide, a  third  series  must  be  interposed  between  them, 
just  as  several  radii  of  a  circle  have  between  them  the 
surface  of  the  sector  (which  contains  innumerable  pos- 
sible lines). 

(9.)  In  the  case  of  complexes  of  characteristics  (of 
which  kind  are  all  notions  of  objects  that  appeal  to 
the  senses)  each  element  of  the  complex  (every  sen- 
suous characteristic)  may  be  the  beginning  point  of  a 
series — e.  g.,  a  series  of  changes. 

(10.)  Series  which  begin  simply  may  later  on  flow 
together  into  a  complex. 

This  discussion  may  be  sufficient  here  to  indicate 
the  number  of  possibilities  which  must  be  kept  con- 
stantly in  mind  at  one  time  in  order  to  study  the 
psychical  mechanism  accurately. 

In  this  we  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  the  re- 
production fluctuates  between  two  kinds  of  opposed 
possible  influences.  Either  reflection  may  be  added 
(this  proceeds  from  a  more  powerful  mass  of  concepts, 
generally  from  free-rising  concepts,  section  32),  or  there 
is  present  an  arrest  by  which  either  the  reproduction 
of  the  principal  series  or  side  series  is  stopped.  In  the 
latter  case,  in  dreaming  (or  in  feigning)  we  combine 


110  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

series  wliicli  when  we  are  fully  awake  require  many  se- 
ries between  them  if  they  do  not  even  neutralize  each 
other,  as,  for  example,  in  a  dialogue  of  the  dead,  in 
which  Alexander,  Hannibal,  Caesar,  and  Napoleon  con- 
verse with  one  another.  In  regard  to  what  concerns 
free-rising  concepts,  the  latter  can  not  be  considered 
to  be  such  absolutely,  but  only  in  relation  to  the  men- 
tal state  and  the  surroundings.  Observations  of  this 
kind  require  a  practical  experience  which  can  not  be 
taught. 


CHAPTER  11. 

THE    DEVELOPMENT   OF   KOTIO^^S. 

179.  All  our  concepts  without  exception  are  sub- 
jected to  the  laws  of  arrest,  of  blending,  etc.  They  may 
constitute  the  source  of  the  feelings  or  they  may  strug- 
gle for  realization  as  desires,  etc.  Then  where  do  no- 
tions {Begriffe)  have  their  seat  or  whence  do  they  come  ? 

At  the  beginning  of  Logic  (Introd.  to  Phil.,  section 
34)  it  has  been  said  that  our  concepts  collectively  are  no- 
tions in  regard  to  that  which  is  represented  by  them. 
Hence  notions  exist  as  such  only  in  our  abstraction  ; 
they  are  in  reality  quite  as  little  a  particular  kind  of 
concepts  as  the  understanding  is  a  special  faculty,  out- 
side, and  by  the  side  of  the  imagination,  memory,  etc. 
From  this  it  may  be  remarked  furthermore  that,  be- 
cause all  concepts  without  exception  may  be  expressed 
as  desires  and  feelings,  the  union  of  the  so-called  prac- 
tical with  the  theoretical  understanding  is  no  mystery, 


DEVELOPMENT  OF   NOTIONS.  141 

but  self-evident,  inasmuch  as  here  two  kinds  which 
must  first  be  combined  are  present,  rather  the  practi- 
cal understanding  and  the  theoretical  understanding 
are  two  imaginary  objects  which  we  have  first  created 
through  our  abstractions  and  then  considered  to  be 
something  real. 

180.  The  delusion,  how^ever,  that  notions  are  a  pe- 
culiar class  of  concepts  has  its  source  principally  in 
general  notions.  (In  his  Logic,  Kant  posits  the  es- 
sence of  notions  directly  in  their  generality.)  It  might 
occur  to  one  that  perhaps  under  certain  circumstances 
the  laws  of  arrest  between  concepts  might  efi'ect  a  sep- 
aration  of  the  dissimilar  from  the  common  character- 
istics of  concepts,  such  as  logicians  unhesitatingly 
ascribe  to  the  faculty  of  abstraction ;  but  investigation 
teaches  that  such  a  faculty  belongs  not  merely  to  the 
creations  of  fancy,  but  to  impossibilities.  From  com- 
plexes and  blendings  which  have  once  been  formed 
nothing  can  be  separated.  Partial  concepts  in  a  com- 
plex or  blending  carry  every  arrest  in  common,  and 
hence  remain  constantly  together;  and  from  simple 
sensations  one  can  not  even  in  thought  separate  any- 
thing and  leave  anything  else  remaining.  How  is  the 
general  notion  of  color  to  arise  from  red,  blue,  and 
yellow  ?  What  are  the  specific  differences  here  from 
which  abstraction  is  made  ?    Xo  one  can  give  them. 

General  notions  which  are  thought  merely  through 
their  content  without  the  introduction  of  the  products 
of  representation  for  the,  sake  of  applications  are,  as 
already  remarked  (78),  logical  ideals,  just  as  logic  as 
a  whole  is,  so  to  speak,  the  ethics  of  thinking,  but  not 
a  natural  history  of  the  understanding. 

Hence  we  can  only  ask.  How  is  it  that  we  construct 


142  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

such  ideals  and  approach  nearer  and  nearer  to  them  ? 
The  answer,  by  means  of  the  judgment,  has  been 
given  ah-eady,  and  we  must  now  develop  it.  In  this 
certain  total  impressions  of  similar  objects  are  presup- 
posed as  raw  material  from  which  general  notions  are 
gradually  constructed. '  These  total  impressions  are, 
however,  nothing  but  complexes  in  which  the  similar 
characteristics  of  the  partial  concepts  have  a  prepon- 
derance over  the  different  characteristics.  Such  ex- 
cess becomes  gradually  stronger  and  more  decisive. 
At  first  the  repeated  apprehensions  of  similar  objects 
form  a  time  series  (we  remember  when  and  where  and 
in  what  order  we  have  seen  such  objects).  If  the  se- 
ries becomes  too  long,  however,  it  ceases  to  develope 
further ;  but  the  frequently  recurring  becomes  a  per- 
manent concept  which  remains  in  a  condition  of  in- 
volution (31).  The  arrest  among  the  concepts  of  dif- 
ferent characteristics  has  caused  their  permanent 
obscuration,  although  they  have  not  been  entirely  sep- 
arated from  the  concept  of  what  is  of  the  same  kind. 

181.  What  happens  to  concepts  when  they  unite 
into  judgments,  and  why  do  they  so  often  occur  in 
this  form  ? 

Judgments  can  not  be  mere  complexes  or  blend- 
ings ;  otherwise  subject  and  predicate  could  not  be  sep- 
arated, rather  they  would  flow  together  in  such  a  way 
that  they  would  be  represented  as  an  undivided  unit, 
without  a  trace  of  the  union.  The  subject,  as  such, 
must  fluctuate  between  several  conditions,  inasmuch 
as  it  must  stand  opposed  to  the  predicate  as  the  one 
capable  of  being  determined  by  the  latter.  If  this  re- 
quirement can  be  complied  with  in  more  than  one 
way,  then  there  is  more  than  one  source  of  judgments. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  NOTIONS.  U3 

182.  First,  those  collective  impressions  from  simi- 
lar perceptions  flit  from  one  to  another  of  the  several 
characteristics.  He  who  has  seen  a  man  often  in  vari- 
ous attitudes,  now  standing,  now  sitting,  now  working, 
now  resting,  has  such  a  wavering  collective  concept ; 
he  who  sees  him  now  again,  decides,  by  aid  of  the  col- 
lective concept,  as  to  his  present  attitude,  and  thus 
a  judgment  is  formed.  A  multitude  of  negatives  (in- 
dicating the  conditions  in  which  he  does  not  find  him) 
are  contained  in  this,  though  hardly  observable,  but 
they  will  become  perceptible  in  cases  where  the  ex- 
pectation is  contradicted.  He  who  to-day  sees  a  tree 
from  which  the  storm  of  last  night  broke  a  branch, 
judges  first  negatively :  the  tree  has  not  its  branch ;  it 
is  broken,  splintered  in  this  or  that  place,  etc. 

183.  Secondly,  a  multitude  of  concepts  are  aroused 
in  a  person  looking  upon  an  object  new  to  him,  which 
concepts  are  reproduced,  to  a  limited  extent,  on  ac- 
count of  a  partial  similarity  to  the  object  mentioned. 
The  new  concept,  as  the  one  to  be  determined,  fluctu- 
ates between  the  old  concepts,  which  constitute  the 
determining  characteristics.  And  from  this  arises  the 
question.  What  is  this  object  ? 

184.  Thirdly,  those  collective  concepts  in  which 
series  lie  infolded  (31)  are  to  be  regarded  as  subjects 
whose  predicates  appear  one  after  the  other  in  the  un- 
folding. 

185.  Fourthly,  the  fluctuation  between  different 
mental  states  gives  to  the  concept  to  which  the  fluctu- 
ation is  attached  the  place  of  the  subject. 

186.  Fifthly,  and  principally,  on  account  of  its 
fluctuating  among  several  significations,  each  word  in 
the  language  is  fitted  to  be  the  subject  of  a  judgment. 


144  RATIONAL   rSYCIlOLOGY. 

A  sign  that  was  repeatedly  affixed  to  the  objects  indi- 
cated, with  their  chiingeable  accompanying  oonditions, 
carries  the  total  impression  of  the  latter  with  it ;  now, 
if  with  it  a  more  definite  object  is  to  be  designated, 
then  the  total  imi3ression  must  be  corrected ;  this  cor- 
rection occurs  through  the  predicates,  which,  however, 
in  a  developed  language  are  often  changed  into  adjec- 
tives, or  are  clothed  in  other  kindred  forms  of  speech, 
so  that  only  the  most  imj)ortant  among  the  corrections 
are  expressed  in  the  form  of  predicate.  Children,  on 
the  contrary,  speak  in  short  sentences ;  they  know  no 
full,  rounded  sentences  as  yet.  Their  concepts  arrange 
themselves  in  the  form  of  judgments  shortly  after  they 
have  learned  the  words. 

187.  When  one  hears  a  judgment  expressed,  there 
are  for  him  two  cases  possible  :  either  the  predicate  is 
found  among  the  several  characteristics  between  which 
his  concept  of  the  subject  fluctuates,  or  it  is  not.  In 
the  first  case,  there  is  no  doubt  but  he  will  understand 
the  judgment  as  such.  We  must  make  further  dis- 
tinctions in  the  second  case.  The  predicate  either 
agrees  with  these  characteristics  or  it  does  not.  If 
the  former  is  the  case,  then  with  the  act  of  appre- 
hending arises  a  combination  of  concepts  which  is  no 
judgment,  but  plainly  a  new  complex  or  blending. 
Thus  when  something  is  related  to  us,  we,  unperceived, 
arrange  the  individual  features  presented  together  in 
a  picture,  without  thinking  that  the  narrator  has  made 
use  of  those  forms  of  speech  which  are  employed  to 
unite  the  subject  with  the  predicate.  If  the  predicate, 
however,  is  opposed  to  those  characteristics,  then  still 
another  distinction  must  be  made — viz.,  it  is  either  m 
contrast  or  in  complete  opposition  to  them.     The  first 


DEVELOPMENT  OF   NOTIONS.  145 

requires  a  certain  kind  of  complexes  which  were  defi- 
nitely given  in  the  foregoing  (35),  and  the  result  is  that 
the  judgment  as  such  is  to  be  perceived  as  a  paradox 
or  as  false.  In  the  case  of  complete  opposition,  how- 
ever, the  judgment  a^opears  not  so  much  false  as 
senseless.* 

188.  On  the  contrary,  intelligible  speech,  above 
everything  else,  must  be  connected  ;  it  must  hold  fast 
a  significant  portion  of  the  concepts  present,  and  he 
who  holds  fast  the  whole  connection  will  understand 
best,  and  will  perceive  all  the  reciprocal  influences 
that  prevail  with  it.     Hence  the  understanding  ranks 

*  [The  first  edition  of  Herbart's  Manual  of  Psychology  dis- 
cusses as  an  example :]  "  Psychology  has  need  of  the  differ- 
ential and  integral  calculus."  This  statement  should  appear 
acceptable  to  those  who  have  considered  before  that  all  objects 
of  inner  experience  are  presented  as  changeable  magnitudes, 
and  who,  besides,  know  how  important  it  is  to  be  acquainted 
with  the  general  laws  according  to  which  changeable  mag- 
nitudes depend  upon  one  another.  Others  who  have  never 
thought  of  mathematical  calculations  in  connection  with  psy- 
chology will  consider  this  sentence  historically,  perhaps,  indeed, 
as  a  literary  peculiarity.  Those,  however,  will  name  it  wrongly 
who  have  elaborated  the  differential  and  integral  calculus  con- 
stantly with  a  view  to  an  application  which  requires  magnitudes 
that  may  be  measured  and  sharply  observed,  which  it  is  true  may 
succeed  in  the  outer  but  not  in  the  inner  experience.  Finally, 
many  will  find  the  foregoing  sentence  quite  senseless,  because 
they  do  not  know  in  the  least  how  to  compare  mathematics  and 
psychology,  but  regard  the  two  as  opposites,  like  death  and  life. 

(188)  The  senseless,  inasmuch  as  it  fixes  the  limits  for  that 
w^hich  is  intelligible,  teaches  us  to  know  the  understanding  and 
its  operation  more  accurately.  Mere  opposition  without  contrast 
only  causes  the  opposed  concepts  to  sink,  and  this  is  just  the 
influence  of  the  senseless — it  expels,  it  kills  thought,  while  con- 
trast elevates  at  least  some  thoughts. 
13 


14:6  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

as  a  finer  sense.     We  say  a  discourse  has  sense  and 
intelligence,  it  is  full  of  meaning,  etc. 

XoTE. — It  is  a  very  important  fact  that  in  music  also  the 
distinction  between  the  senseless  and  the  intelligible  is  made. 
Those  musical  composers  who  strive  after  contrasts  sometimes 
touch  upon  the  former  condition.  The  intelligible,  however,  is 
not  for  this  reason  by  any  means  also  the  beautiful.  Besides, 
music  is  so  like  discourse  (with  its  periods,  its  premises,  and 
conclusions)  that  ignorant  or  enthusiastic  people  very  easily 
imagine  that  music  says  something  to  which  only  words  are 
lacking.  Thus,  in  its  highest  eloquence,  music  is  held  to  be  a 
dumb  creature.  What  it  wishes  to  say,  however,  that  it  expresses 
perfectly  and  completely,  and  translations  of  its  meaning  into 
another  language  are  extremely  poor.  Music  has  its  understand- 
ing in  itself,  and  by  this  it  teaches  us  that  the  understanding 
is  not  to  be  sought  in  any  kind  of  category  whatever,  but  in  the 
connection  of  concepts  with  one  another  (of  whatever  kind  the 
latter  may  be). 

189.  The  development  of  ideas  is  then  the  slow, 
gradual  result  of  continuous  judgment.  It  may  be 
observed  here  that  poor  languages  appear  to  use  many 
metaphors,  which  indicates  that  remote  similarities 
suffice  to  reproduce  old  concepts  and  blend  them,  to- 
gether with  their  names,  with  the  new.  From  this 
condition  human  thought  passes  to  an  ever  greater 
and  finer  division  of  thoughts.  At  one  time  the  com- 
plex A  may  serve  as  subject  for  the  predicate  a,  at 
another  time  for  the  predicate  J,  then  in  bringing  to- 
gether the  two  judgments,  the  contrasts  between  a  and 
b  will  not  only  be  felt  (section  35),  but  will  also  be 
expressed  or  clearly  thought  in  the  judgments ;  this 
A  is  a,  and  that  A  is  b.  Here,  in  the  representation 
occurs  an  intentional  discrimination,  by  which,  how- 
ever, the  representation  is  in  no  way  divided  into  two 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  NOTIONS.  I47 

separate   acts,  but  the   psycliical   mechanism   always 
holds  together  the  separate  parts. 

190.  A  multitude  of  such  judgments  as  A  is  «, 
A  is  b,  A  is  c,  A  is  d^  etc.,  by  which  not  one  and  the 
same  A  is  to  be  taken,  but  several,  with  the  opposed 
a,  b,  c,  cly  of  themselves  form  a  series ;  since  the  «,  ^, 
c,  d,  blend  in  different  degrees  according  to  their 
lesser  or  greater  contrasts  (e.  g.,  the  three  judgments — 
this  fruit  is  green,  that  yellow,  a  third  yellowish  green — 
blend  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  with  them  the  colors 
in  their  orders — green,  yellowish  green,  and  yellow ; 
for  between  yellow  and  green  the  opposition  is  the 
strongest,  consequently  the  blending  the  least).  From 
this  arises  the  relation  between  the  genus  A  and  its 
species  {A  which  is  a,  A  which  is  b,  etc.).  At  the 
same  time  between  these  species,  on  account  of  their 
differences  a,  b,  c,  d,  there  is  a  variety  of  reproduction 
laws,  and  from  this  arise  the  vaguely  comprehended 
series,  such  as  the  gamut  in  music  and  the  spectrum  in 
color.  The  same  A  will  coincide  with  a,  ^,  7,  8,  as  here 
with  a,  b,  c,  d,  in  case  the  species  differ  from  A  not 
merely  in  one  but  in  several  characteristics. 

Note. — The  construction  of  a  series,  pedagogically  consid- 
ered, is  of  the  £^reatest  importance,  as  upon  it  depends  clear 
thinking,  as  well  as  construction  of  every  kind. 

191.  The  more  the  series  of  characteristics  form 
and  separate  in  this  way,  through  the  comparison  of 
similarities,  and  in  part  of  differences,  so  much  the 
sooner  will  it  be  possible,  by  means  of  them,  to  deter- 
mine the  content  of  the  complexes,  or  to  approach  the 
definitions  of  ideas.  For  now  every  element  of  a  com- 
plex— i.  e.,  every  characteristic  of  a  notion — has  its 


l^S  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

place  in  one  of  tlie  series  of  cliaracteristics.  The  la- 
bor of  finding  this  place  is  indicated  among  others  in 
such  questions  as:  How  does  the  object  look?  How 
large  is  it  ?  What  is  its  smell  and  taste  ?  But,  in  order 
to  find  the  place  of  all  characteristics  in  the  correspond- 
ing series,  a  number  of  reproductions  of  different  series 
is  necessary,  which  the  psychical  mechanism  will  not 
furnish  otherwise  than  by  virtue  of  a  dominating  con- 
cept mass.  The  Platonic  dialogues  show  what  labor 
this  costs,  and  how  many  partly  positive,  partly  nega- 
tive judgments  are  necessary  to  accomplish  it,  espe- 
cially with  ideas  of  the  higher  kinds ;  and  we  may  per- 
ceive in  the  limited  development  of  the  notions  of  the 
majority  to  what  a  limited  extent  this  labor  can  be 
considered  as  finished. 

192.  Thus  it  is  shown  in  every  way  that  the  defi- 
nition and  separation  of  general  notions,  clear  and 
distinct  thinking,  are  problems  which  the  psychical 
mechanism  does  not  solve  by  really  separating  its  com- 
plexes, but  by  allowing  each  individual  element  of  the 
same  to  remain  connected  with  some  series  of  charac- 
teristics already  formed.  General  notions  are  never 
really  thought  through  their  content,  but  with  regard 
to  their  extent,  though  with  intentional  distinction 
from  it. 

193.  The  attempt,  however,  to  think  the  notions 
merely  or  at  least  principally  through  their  content, 
consequently  through  a  summary  of  the  characteristics 
of  the  series  (which  characteristics  are  no  longer  gath- 
ered directly  from  experience  but  from  the  series  of 
signs  already  established) — this  attempt,  I  say,  effects 
a  remarkable  change.  It  gives  rise  to  philosophizing, 
and  this  causes  notions  to  become  objects  of  thought. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  NOTIONS.  1^9 

The  first  notions  whicli  philosophy  discovered  were 
numbers  and  geometrical  figures.  Later,  the  same 
proceeding  extended  to  all  logical  general  notions.  In 
this  province,  Plato,  who  carried  out  what  the  Pytha- 
goreans and  Socrates  had  begun,  stands  at  the  head  of 
philosophers.  The  next  step  is  the  philosophy  of  lan- 
guage, inasmuch  as  the  notions  are  shown  as  objects 
associated  with  the  words  found  in  the  languages. 
Aristotle,  following  a  Pythagorean  track,  sought  the 
categories — i.  e.,  the  most  general  notions  in  language. 
The  influence  of  this  is  threefold  : 

(a.)  The  great  majority  of  educated  people  to 
whom  philosophy  at  least  in  part  belongs,  refer  the  ab- 
stracted notions  back  again  to  things.  Experience  is  ar- 
ranged, scientifically  treated,  and  in  the  sciences  are  to 
be  found  firmly  fixed  points  of  dispute,  where  it  is  asked 
how  things  are  to  be  correctly  thought  through  no- 
tions and  indicated  through  words. 

(b.)  Philosophers,  through  the  effort,  partly  in 
themselves,  but  in  greater  part  in  others,  to  hold  notions 
fast  as  objects  of  thought,  are  led  to  overdo  the  matter 
by  placing  notions  among  the  number  of  real  objects. 
By  this  the  peculiarity  of  sensuous  things  (by  virtue  of 
which  they  contain  metaphysical  problems)  aids  them 
in  such  a  way  that  they  are  supposed  to  be  real  in  a 
much  higher  sense  than  the  objects  of  experience. 
Tills  is  a  characteristic  of  the  Platonic  doctrine  of 
ideas  which  has  its  influence  even  now.  Hence  the 
embarrassment  of  Aristotle,  who  found  sensuous  ob- 
jects, mathematical  figures,  together  with  numbers 
and  notions,  side  by  side  with  one  another,  and  seems 
never  to  have  succeeded  in  making  their  relations 
clear. 


150  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

(c.)  Another  delusion  is  the  one  peculiar  to  the 
school  of  Kant,  which  regards  the  categories  as  the 
fundamental  notions  of  understanding  taken  as  a  men- 
tal faculty.  Traces  of  this  belief  appear  in  Plato  and 
later  in  Descartes  and  Leibnitz. 

By  this  the  relationship  of  the  categories  with  the 
forms  of  series  is  obscured,  which  relationship,  never- 
theless, is  recognized  analytically.  The  categories  of 
the  inner  apperception  are  thereby  forgotten. 

We  may  observe  the  principal  categories — tiling^ 
property,  relation,  negative — at  the  bottom  of  which  lie 
the  form  of  judgment  and  the  form  of  series.  The 
notion  of  the  negative,  the  no  in  general,  is  the  clear- 
est proof  of  the  existence  of  such  a  notion,  which  in 
judging  arises  from  experience,  although  in  experience 
it  has  no  given  object. 


CHAPTER  IIL 

OUR    APPREHEN-SIO^    OF    THUvTGS    AK^D    OF    OUR- 
SELVES. 

194.  Entirely  of  themselves,  and  without  the 
slightest  action  which  could  be  called  an  action  of  syn- 
thesis (63),  our  concepts  become  combined  so  far  as 
they  are  not  hindered  by  an  arrest.  Hence,  for  a  child 
of  tenderest  years,  there  are  no  individual  objects  as 
yet,  but  entire  surroundings  which,  even  as  regards 
space  relations,  only  become  sej^arated  in  successive 
representations  (174). 

The  first  chaos  of  concepts,  while  it  constantly  re- 


THING  AND  PROPERTIES.  151 

ceives  new  additions,  is,  at  the  same  time,  subjected  to 
a  continuous  separation.  Not  that  combinations  once 
completed  would  ever  be  broken  up  (180) ;  on  the  con- 
trary the  number  of  concepts  is  constantly  increased  and 
their  inner  contents  augmented.  But,  on  the  one  hand, 
if  the  number  of  distinctions  increases  (189),  on  the 
other  hand  there  are  more  frequent  spatial  separations 
of  that  which  in  the  beginning  was  seen  or  in  some 
way  perceived  as  a  whole.  The  objects  move,  and 
chiefly  because  of  this  the  environment  is  broken  up 
into  distinctions ;  in  this  manner  a  plurality  of  things 
originates  for  man's  power  of  conception.  At  first  the 
table  seems  one  with  the  floor,  also  the  table-leaf  is  one 
with  the  table-legs.  The  table,  however,  is  moved 
from  its  place,  while  the  leaf  is  not  separated  from  the 
legs.  All  things  that  are  not  removed  from  one  an- 
other preserve  their  original  unity  in  the  conception. 

195.  As  the  surroundings  are  gradually  separated 
into  individual  things,  so  the  things  again  become 
separated  into  their  properties  (191).  If  it  be  asked 
here  to  which  subject  the  properties  really  belong,  the 
answer  is :  The  subject  is  always  the  total  complex  of 
these  properties,  provided  the  physical  mechanism  rep- 
resents them  in  one  single  undivided  act.  In  this 
there  is  no  difficulty  whatever,  so  long  as  not  all  the 
judgments  through  which  all  its  properties  are  ascribed 
to  one  and  the  same  thing  are  united. 

But  when  the  thought  once  reaches  this  degree  of 
maturity  (which  never  happens  with  most  men),  then 
the  case  is  different.  The  judgments  have  now  quite 
dissolved  the  complex  and  have  separated  its  properties 
from  one  another  as  a  manifold,  and  hence  one  subject 
will  always  be  presupposed  for  the  many  predicates. 


152  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

This  notion  has  lost  its  content,  however,  and  here  a 
metaphysical  abyss  yawns,  viz.,  the  question  concerning 
substance  (80)  as  an  unknown  something,  the  presup- 
position of  which  is  so  much  the  more  necessary,  as  it 
is  to  be  not  merely  that  subject,  which  never  becomes 
predicate  while  really  the  judgments  have  changed 
their  subject  into  pure  predicates ;  but  the  persistent 
thing  which  through  all  change  remains  self-identical 
while,  in  fact,  the  complex  which  serves  for  the  ob- 
ject (in  the  sensuous  world)  has  not  only  simultaneous 
but  also  successive  properties,  and  hence  is  in  no  wise 
self-identical. 

196.  The  contradictions  in  the  notion  of  the  thing 
with  several  properties,  and  in  the  notion  of  change 
are  familiar  to  us  (Introduction  to  Philosophy,  sec- 
tions 122-135).  Here  we  have  only  to  explain  how 
it  happens  that  the  ordinary  understanding  does  not 
observe  these  contradictions.  The  simple  explanation 
upon  tliis  point  is  this  :  The  psychical  mechanism  pos- 
sesses originally  and  quite  of  itself  exactly  the  unity 
which  the  metaphysician  loses  at  the  beginning  of  his 
investigation,  and  which  the  form  of  experience  de- 
mands, while  the  matter  even  of  the  very  same  experi- 
ence does  not  admit  this  unity — for  this  matter  includes 
the  many  of  the  simultaneous  properties  and  the 
contrast  of  the  successive  characteristic  properties. 
In  order  to  represent  a  material  object  we  do  not  need 
nearly  so  many  concepts  as  sensuous  properties,  but 
the  unity  of  the  act  of  reioresentation,  which  consti- 
tutes the  nature  of  the  complexes,  allows  no  question 
whatever  to  arise  in  the  ordinary  understanding  con- 
cerning the  unity  of  the  object  represented.  To  under- 
stand this  question  is  always   difficult  for  men,  even 


THEORY   OF   SELF-CONSCIOUSXESS.  I53 

after  the  acts  of  judgment  have  long  since  separated 
the  complexes.  Thus  the  psychical  mechanism  con- 
stantly deceives  many  who  are  even  philosophers. 

Note. — It  would  be  quite  useless  to  hope  that,  in  the  progress 
of  the  sciences,  one  might  perhaps  find  a  more  convenient  mode 
of  access  to  metaphysics  than  that  through  the  contradictions 
which  exist  in  the  form  of  experience.  The  unity  of  the  soul  is 
itself  the  deep  source  from  which  that  unity  enters  our  act  of  rep- 
resentation, and  which  we  afterward  lose  in  the  object  presented. 
In  this  and  in  the  completeness  and  exhaustiveness  of  those  laws 
of  reproduction  which  are  formed  according  to  the  principle 
laid  down  in  section  168  lies  the  answer  to  the  question  as  to 
how  the  forms  of  experience  may  be  given  (hitroduction  to 
Philosophy,  sections  119-123,  fourth  edition). 

197.  In  order  to  be  able  to  approach  the  difficult 
theory  of  self-conscionsness,  we  must  first  mention 
some  of  the  most  important  varieties  in  the  human 
apprehension  of  things. 

Objects  in  motion  occupy  the  spectator  more  than 
those  which  are  at  rest ;  for  the  observation  of  an  ob- 
ject in  motion  is  an  incessant  interchange  of  an  ex- 
cited and  a  satisfied  desire.  Let  the  object  in  motion 
be  in  any  given  place ;  the  concept  of  it  is  blended 
with  those  of  the  surroundings.  Then  let  it  leave 
this  place,  and  instead  of  it  something  of  the  back- 
ground becomes  visible  which  was  before  hidden  by 
it.  This  latter  perception  arrests  that  concept  of  the 
object  moved ;  at  the  same  time,  however,  the  latter 
will  be  driven  forward  by  the  concepts  of  the  environ- 
ment which  appears  the  same  as  at  the  beginning. 
Also  the  driving  forward  is  for  the  most  part  much 
stronger  than  the  arrest,  for  it  depends  on  a  much 
larger  aggregate  of  concepts  than  the  arrest,  which 


154  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

arises  from  the  view  of  only  a  small  part  of  the  back- 
ground ;  hence  the  concept  of  the  thing  moved  is  in 
the  condition  of  desire  (36).  This  desire,  however,  is 
satisfied,  for  the  thing  moved  has  not  escaped  from  the 
field  of  vision  (or  from  the  circle  of  perception),  but 
only  from  the  central  point  of  the  field  of  vision,  and 
the  full  gratification  will  be  reached  by  a  scarcely  per- 
ceptible turning  of  the  eye.  Thus  the  apprehension 
of.  the  thing  moved  (of  which  we  have  here  described 
the  differential)  proceeds  gradually. 

The  reason  that  the  thing  moved  not  merely  occu- 
pies more  of  the  attention  but  also  makes  a  deeper 
impression  than  the  object  at  rest,  lies  in  the  multijilici- 
ty  of  small  helps,  which  remain  from  every  environ- 
ment in  which  the  object  has  been  seen. 

198.  Since  the  living  object,  especially  a  sentient 
one,  is  seen  in  incom]3arably  more  and  more  varied 
movements  than  the  inanimate  object,  we  may  under- 
stand from  this  why  even  in  the  earliest  periods  of  ex- 
istence, not  only  man,  but  also  the  brute,  troubles  him- 
self much  less  about  the  inanimate  object  than  about 
the  living  one.  Here,  however,  it  may  be  remarked 
that  originally  things  were  not  regarded  as  being  in- 
animate, but  as  sentient ;  for,  upon  the  sight  of  an  ob- 
ject which  is  pounded  or  beaten,  a  memory  of  one's 
own  feeling,  upon  the  occasion  of  similar  suffering  in 
one's  own  body  causes  one  to  attribute  similar  feeling 
to  the  object.  Where  this  fails,  we  have  a  sign  of 
stupidity ;  the  more  sensitive  the  man,  so  much  the 
more  life  does  he  everywhere  presuppose  before  he 
tests  more  closely. 

Note. — It  was  an  error  of  idealism,  violent  in  its  creation, 
and  adhered  to  with  equal  violence  that  the  Ego  opposes  to  it- 


THEORY  OP  SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.  155 

self  a  Non-ego  (Fichte),  as  if  the  negation  of  the  Ego  were 
inherent  in  objects.  In  this  way  a  thou  or  a  he  would  never 
originate — another  personality  than  one's  own  would  never  be 
recognized  ;  that  which  has  been  inwardly  perceived  is,  wherever 
possible,  transferred  or  imputed  to  the  external  object.  Hence 
with  the  /,  the  thou  is  formed  at  the  same  time,  and,  almost 
simultaneously  with  the  two,  the  ive  which  idealism  forgot,  and 
was  obliged  to  forget,  if  it  would  not  be  awakened  out  of  its 
dream.  For  the  concept  of  the  ive  is  quite  manifestly  depend- 
ent upon  the  environment ;  it  originates  sometimes  in  larger, 
sometimes  in  smaller  circles,  and  always  so  that  it  at  the  same 
time  includes  the  Ego  within  it.  This  object  is  exposed  more 
clearly  to  our  analysis  than  the  mysterious  Ego.  As  Plato  re- 
garded the  state  as  a  book  with  large  letters  legible  for  weak 
eyes,  in  order  that  one  might  through  it  learn  to  read  smaller 
writing  more  fluently,  so,  in  order  to  make  a  good  preparation 
for  the  more  difficult  problem,  we  ought  to  investigate  the  we 
before  the  /. 

199.  But  whence  is  the  concept  of  a  concept? 
And  whence  the  concept  of  concept-forming  things 
or  objects  ?  At  first  this  question  must  be  taken  np 
in  its  simplest  form  How  it  is  possible  that  to  some- 
thing extended  in  space,  and  to  its  other  characteris- 
tics a  power  of  forming  concepts  may  be  joined,  in- 
deed may  be  one  with  it,  this  hardly  any  educated, 
much  less  any  uneducated  man  considers ;  but,  that 
there  are  things  which  have  concepts,  even  the  brute 
knows.  It  learns  this,  inasmuch  as  it  sees  that  these 
things  adjust  themselves  to  others  without  touching 
them. 

The  common  understanding  is  ready  to  believe 
that  the  needle  has  some  sort  of  concept  of  an  attract- 
ing magnet.  In  the  same  way  every  one  is  convinced 
that  A  contains  in  it  the  characteristics  of  B  if  the 
former  shows  itself  to-be  definitely  affected  by  the  lat- 


156  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

tcr.  The  characteristics  of  B  without  its  actuality 
constitute  the  picture  of  B^  or,  in  other  words,  the 
concept  of  B.  Now,  if  A  is  affected  by  the  properties 
(movements,  etc.)  of  B^  C,  D,  and  others  in  its  entire 
environment,  then  to  A  is  attributed  the  power  of  con- 
ceiving or  representing  ;  and  hence,  in  special  cases, 
will  come  such  predication  as  A  sees,  hears,  smells,  etc. 

XoTE. — It  is  ahnost  too  difficult  a  subject  for  the  purposes 
of  the  present  manual  to  treat  of  the  categories  of  inner  apper- 
ception— of  the  object  which,  entering  into  the  environment 
(field  of  vision),  interrupts  the  current  of  thought  by  engaging 
it  in  the  apprehension  of  this  object — and  causing  it  to  enter 
into  reciprocal  action  with  it — and  which  furthermore,  in  fre- 
quent repetitions,  pointing  back  to  that  which  preceded,  inter- 
feres with  the  involved  time-series  of  the  feelings,  whence  arises 
the  concept  of  the  subject.  Suffice  it  to  remark  that  the  con- 
fusions of  idealism  must  be  removed  by  the  distinction  of  the 
mere  subject,  as  time-existence,  from  the  Ego,  although  the  lat- 
ter is  necessarily  connected  with  the  former,  inasmuch  as,  when 
considered  separately,  it  leads  to  absurdities. 

The  gradual  penetration  of  sensations  into  the 
nerves  (as  when  the  child  eats  a  spicy  sweet  fruit,  or 
the  man  empties  his  glass),  likewise  the  penetration 
of  words  heard,  or  of  transactions  seen,  into  the  masses 
of  concepts — this  internal  echo  does  not  call  up  the 
concept  of  the  Ego,  but  only  the  concept  of  the  subject 
into  consciousness.  It  is  otherwise  when  we  surren- 
der ourselves  intentionally  to  the  sensation,  in  which 
case  the  enjoyment  enters  after  and  because  it  is 
sought. 

200.  In  most  cases  of  the  kind  just  mentioned  are 
A  and  B,  the  representing  and  the  represented,  mani- 
festly two  different  things  which  in  space  stand  op- 
posed to  one  another.     It  is  evident,  however,  that  in 


THEORY   OF  SELF-COXSCIOUSXESS.  I57 

case  the  two  happen  in  some  way  to  bo  one  and  the 
same,  then  the  concept  of  self-knowledge  (conscious- 
ness) ninst  arise. 

*  Here  let  no  one  ask,  how  it  is  possible  to  appre- 
hend the  two  opposite  concepts,  the  representing  and 
the  represented,  as  one  and  the  same.  This  difficult 
metaphysical  problem  is,  in  a  psychological  sense,  quite 
as  simj)le  as  the  one  mentioned  above,  viz.,  how  the 
apprehension  of  several  characteristics  together  make 
up  the  concept  of  one  object ;  or,  the  still  earlier  one, 
how  the  finite  space-magnitudes  can  appear  infinitely 
divisible.  In  the  soul  many  representations  merge 
into  one  act  of  representation  when  arrests  do  not 
prevent;  but  how  can  the  slightest  suspicion  exist 
originally  in  the  soul  as  to  whether  this  representa- 
tion can  persist  when  analytical  judgments  are  ap- 
plied to  it  (191),  and  it  is  subjected  to  metaphysical 
thought? 

Let  a  person  look  at  or  touch  his  own  limbs :  the 
spectator,  according  to  ordinary  custom  of  speech, 
says  he  has  seen  himself,  he  has  touched  himself.  The 
identity  in  this  self  is  manifestly  not  a  true  one,  for 
the  eye  and  the  touching  hand  are  manifestly  differ- 
ent from  the  arm  which  was  seen  and  touched.  How- 
ever, in  the  original,  psychological  sense,  the  identity 
exists,  for  the  whole  body  is  regarded  as  one,  because 
all  partial  concepts  of  it  are  most  closely  blended.  To 
see  or  feel  one's  self  is  only  a  special  case  of  knowing 
about  one's  self. 

201.  All  this  is,  however,  only  a  preparation  for 
the  explanation  of  self-consciousness.  In  the  forego- 
ing lies  only  the  beginning  of  the  concept  of  some 
one  Ego  ;  the  concept  of  me — i.  e.,  of  my  Ego— is  quite 


15S  RATIONAL   PSYCUOLOGY. 

different  from  this.  The  former  is,  however,  the  foun- 
dation of  the  hitter,  as  experience  proves,  for  at  first 
the  chiki  speaks  of  himself  in  the  third  person. 

On  the  contrary,  the  first  person,  as  the  first,  is  the 
beginning  point  of  a  series,  and  must  be  explained 
according  to  the  method  of  explaining  a  series  (29 
and  168-177). 

Man,  as  soon  as  his  ideas  of  space  are  in  a  measure 
matured,  finds  himself  the  movable  central  point  of 
things,  from  which  ray  out  not  only  distances  but  also 
other  obstacles  in  the  way  of  reaching  the  thing  de- 
sired, and,  on  the  other  hand,  toward  which  the  thing 
moves  when  it  is  obtained  as  desired.  Thus,  egoism 
[selfhood]  is  not  the  ground  of  desires,  but  it  is  a  spe- 
cies of  concept  that  can  be  referred  to  them.  However, 
the  egoism  [selfhood]  will  be  interrupted  in  a  person 
if  he  assumes  another  central  point  of  things.  To 
this  central  point  he  feels  himself  inevitably  drawn  : 
e.  g.,  as  in  the  sense- world,  to  the  capital  of  his  coun- 
try ;  or  in  the  mental  world,  to  the  Deity. 

Note. — The  concept  of  the  im,  which  depends  upon  the  pre- 
supposition of  common  sensation  and  apprehension,  is  of  the 
greatest  moral  and,  in  general,  of  the  greatest  practical  impor- 
tance. It  gives  a  natural  counterpoise  to  the  egoism  proper. 
Also  the  concept  of  the  ive  exists  naturally,  for  no  one  knows 
really  who  he  would  be  if  he  were  to  be  quite  alone.  The  notion 
of  uprightness  and  the  sense  of  honor  are  orig'inated  in  the  cir- 
cle of  the  we,  when  it  is  resolved  into  a  manifold  of  egos ;  but 
a  you  and  a  they  are  opposed  to  the  ive  with  all  the  evils  of  a 
corporation  soul.  The  most  wonderful  thing  is  that  we  our- 
selves are  now  this,  now  that  society  ;  upon  some  one  point  men 
agree  and  are  friends,  upon  another  they  are  enemies.  In  this 
inferiors  are  complained  of  by  superiors,  in  that  both  unite  and 
complain  about  their  common  superiors. 


THEORY  OF  SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.  I59 

202.  The  complex  which  makes  up  the  self  of  each 
person  receives  incessant  additions  in  the  course  of 
life,  Avhich  are  blended  together  with  it  in  the  closest 
manner.  If  this  blending  did  not  take  place,  the 
unity  of  the  personality  would  be  lost,  as  in  many  kinds 
of  insanity  really  happens,  inasmuch  as  a  new  ego  is 
created  out  of  a  certain  mass  of  concepts  wliich  act 
separately,  and  when  the  masses,  as  a  result  of  a  change 
in  the  organism,  enter  consciousness  one  after  the 
other,  a  changing  personality  also  arises. 

The  additions  are  not  so  much  new  apprehensions 
of  the  individual  body  for  which  the  susceptibility  is 
already  very  limited  (-45)  as  inner  perceptions  (40)  of 
concepts,  desires,  and  feelings.  Hence  the  concept  of 
the  ego  tends  constantly  more  to  the  notion  of  a  spirit 
which  is  completely  separated,  inasmuch  as  the  ego  is 
considered  as  abiding  uninjured  by  the  mutilations  of 
the  body,  during  the  changes  of  life,  and  even  after 
death. 

With  every  man,  the  ego  develops  differently  in 
different  concept-masses,  and,  although,  in  the  person 
mentally  sound,  no  manifold  ego  arises,  this  difference 
of  origination  is  not  insignificant  for  the  formation  of 
character  in  general  and  for  morality  in  particular. 
The  boy  who  is  one  person  at  home,  another  in  the 
school,  and  still  another  among  his  companions,  is  in 
danger.  The  man  who  has  a  different  tone  for  per- 
sons of  rank,  for  his  friends,  and  for  people  of  a  lower 
order,  is  not  so  secure  morally  as  the  simple  man  who 
remains  constantly  the  same.  Among  different  men, 
difference  is  unavoidable,  inasmuch  as  one  man  feels 
more  in  enjoyment,  another  more  in  sorrow,  a  third 
more  in  action ;  and,  indeed,  some  more  in  inner  action 


100  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

aiul  others  more  in  outer.  The  loriner,  inner  action, 
often  prepares  the  phin  outlined  for  the  latter.  The 
m^'stic  and  the  propagandist  of  liberty  are  most  widely 
separated  here ;  the  former  considers  himself  obliged 
to  destroy  the  individual  Avill,  to  give  up  the  individual 
ego ;  the  latter  preaches  the  absolute  independence  of 
the  ego.  Most  rarely,  however,  is  to  be  found  the  self- 
delusion  of  those  who,  in  the  midst  of  mysticism,  wish 
still  to  assert  their  personal  freedom,  in  order  to  com- 
bine everything  that  has  a  good  sound.  It  is  useless 
to  talk  to  such  people  of  a  middle  course.  They  have 
from  the  beginning  missed  the  right  way,  and,  in  order 
to  find  it,  must  go  the  whole  way  backward. 

203.  AYe  receive  a  correct  notion  of  ourselves 
through  the  notion  of  the  soul,  but  not  directly  through 
that  of  the  ego  just  explained.  Indeed,  the  latter 
must  be  transformed  into  the  former ;  for  the  ego  of 
the  ordinary  understanding  contains  purely  accidental 
characteristics,  which  ego,  by  means  of  analytical  judg- 
ments (of  answers  to  such  questions  as  "  Who  am  I  ?  "), 
reveals  [its  composite  character]  just  as  the  concepts 
of  material  objects  are  resolved  through  judgments 
(195)  into  pure  predicates  whose  subject,  long  a  gratui- 
tous assumption,  is  finally  lost  altogether.  These  judg- 
ments, inasmuch  as  they  separate  from  it  all  that  is 
individual,  leave  nothing  remaining  in  this  ego  except 
the  idea  of  identity  of  the  object  and  subject.  This 
latter  is  a  contradictory  notion  whose  transformation 
into  that  of  the  soul  is  the  business  of  general  meta- 
physics, just  as  the  idea  of  substance,  force  (196), 
spatial  and  temporal  things  (177)  are  transformed  into 
the  theory  of  simple  essences  and  of  their  disturbances 
and  self-preservations. 


THEORY  OF  SELF-CONSCIOUSXESS.  161 

Note. — The  contradictory  notion  of  the  pure  ego  is  the  meta- 
physical principle  from  which  has  proceeded  all  the  systematic 
investigations  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the  present  treatise. 
The  ego  as  a  metaphysical  principle  knows  and  contains  none  of 
the  distinctions  which  are  found  in  the  actual  ego  and  which 
arise  according  as  a  man  feels  himself  depressed  or  elevated,  and 
either  stimulated  or  wearied  in  his  efforts.  Now,  if  it  be  asked 
how  these  distinctions  arise,  the  answer  is.  Investigation  itself, 
impelled  by  the  principle,  demands  such  variety  and  such  con- 
trasts, and  leads  to  the  path  along  which  we  seek  them.  It  is  the 
peculiarity  of  true  metaphysical  principles  that  they  point  back 
beyond  themselves  to  the  connection  of  inner  experience.  If  the 
connection  in  experience  were  known  through  mere  experience, 
then  no .  metaphysics  would  be  necessary,  and  such  a  science 
would  not  have  arisen  at  all.  The  movement  of  thought,  how- 
ever, which  metaphysics  secures  in  different  problems  is  only  in  the 
smallest  part  uniform ;  hence  a  very  varied  practice  is  required. 
The  spirit  of  investigation  is  not  promoted,  but  destroyed,  by 
the  ruinous  tendency  to  smuggle  everything  into  the  four- 
cornered  box  of  the  so-called  categories,  or  into  the  three- 
cornered  one  of  thesis,  antithesis,  and  synthesis :  one  of  these 
mannerisms  is  of  as  much  value  as  the  other. 

204.  It  is  now  possible  to  explain  the  meaning  of  in- 
tuition (AnscJiauen  =  sense-percejotion),  an  expression 
which  has  been  subjected  to  a  wicked  misuse.  Intui- 
tion {Anschaueii)  means  the  apprehension  of  an  object 
when  it  is  presented,  as  such,  and  as  nothing  else. 

The  object  must  stand  over  against  the  subject  and 
also  other  objects.  To  find  it  thus  is  possible  after 
the  ego,  as  first  person,  has  been  assumed  spatially  as 
the  center  of  things.  Usually  the  object  will  be  found 
to  be  a  complex  of  properties,  like  sensuous  things ; 
these  properties,  however,  must  first  have  been  sep- 
arated from  the  whole  environment  (194),  in  order 
that  the  apprehension  may  seize  the  object  as  this  and 
as  no  other.  By  such  separation,  the  object  appears, 
14 


102  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

as  it  were,  upon  a  background  of  earlier  conce^Dts  which 
it  at  the  same  time  reproduces  and  arrests ;  itself  re- 
ceiving thereby  definite  outlines  as  well  in  space  as  in 
every  other  respect.  For  this  reason,  every  intuition 
(very  unlike  the  mere  sensation)  has  the  tendency  to 
burst  at  once  into  a  variety  of  judgments  (182)  which 
for  the  most  part  stifle  one  another,  partly  on  account 
of  the  arrest  among  their  predicates,  partly  because 
they  can  not  all  find  words  at  the  same  time ;  often, 
also,  because  the  apprehension  leads  from  one  subject 
to  another. 

For  this  reason  intuition  is  a  very  complicated  pro- 
cess which  must  be  prepared  through  many  earlier  acts 
of  production  (not  through  any  kind  of  forms  inherent 
in  the  mind),  and  which  then,  with  psychological  ne- 
cessity, results  as  it  can,  it  being  all  the  same  whether 
an  actual  object  or  a  delusive  form  be  constructed.  To 
test  this  is  the  business  of  thought,  give  it  what  other 
name  we  may,  and  no  intuition  can  anticipate  the  de- 
cision of  the  latter  (thought). 

Finally,  passivity  in  intuition  (which  is  expressed 
by  the  word  apprehension,  viz.,  the  reception  of  a  thing 
given)  is  not  really  a  passive  condition  of  the  soul  by 
which  intuition  is  produced,  although  it  is  without 
any  consciousness  of  activity ;  but  those  concepts  stand 
in  a  passive  relation  and  upon  them  as  a  background 
perception  draws  its  outlines,  or  (without  a  metaphor) 
these,  by  virtue  of  the  similarity  which  they  have  wdth 
the  perception,  are  reproduced  by  it,  but,  on  account 
of  dissimilarities,  are  arrested  by  it. 

This  peculiarity  in  sense-perception  or  intuition 
by  virtue  of  which  the  older  concepts  are  acted  upon 
by  the  new  perception,  can,  however,  revert  easily  and 


THEORY  OF  SELF-COXSCIOUSNESS.  163 

rapidly  into  the  opposite  if  a  long  succession  of  observa- 
tions does  not  hold  the  mind  in  its  passive  state ;  and  we 
have  already  indicated  what  occurs  in  such  a  case  (39). 
The  intuition  is  then  at  an  end ;  instead  of  it,  memory, 
imagination,  thought,  begin. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   UXGOVERXED    PLAY   OF   THE   PSYCHICAL 
MECHAN^ISM. 

205.  Ox  account  of  the  limitations  of  this  manual, 
we  shall,  to  the  subject  of  self-control  and  its  opposite 
(practically  so  important),  unite  the  consideration  of 
other  points  which,  in  an  elaborated  treatise,  would  re- 
quire to  be  discussed  more  in  detail. 

Independently  of  an  internal  dominating  influence, 
the  mental  activity  may  have  its  origin  either  in  the 
concepts  themselves,  or  in  the  physical  organism,  or  in 
external  impressions. 

206.  A  small  number  of  concepts,  if  left  to  them- 
selves, would  very  soon  approach  a  statical  point,  and 
would  retain  only  a  very  slow  movement  toward  it, 
through  Avhich  it  (the  statical  point)  w^ould  never  be 
quite  reached  (17). 

A  considerable  change  in  this  movement  is  effected, 
however,  through  the  great  number  of  concepts,  and 
the  very  complicated  combinations  of  them,  which  a 
man  gains  in  the  course  of  time. 

207.  Take  a  series  of  concepts  in  the  process  of 


164  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

elapsing  [i.  e.,  passing  through  consciousness]  :  every 
moment  there  is  a  change  in  tiie  arrest,  which  the  con- 
cepts that  are  entirely  or  almost  removed  out  of  con- 
sciousness suffer.  Some  may  become  active  because 
they  are  less  restrained  by  others ;  others  will  be  re- 
produced by  such  members  of  the  passing  series  as 
they  resemble.  But  the  reproduced  concepts  may  have 
their  own  series,  which  also  now  begin  to  pass  through 
consciousness  and  thus  these  series  become  compli- 
cated with  one  another  as  well  as  with  the  first  one. 
There  arise  from  this  complication  new  arrests  and 
blendings.  Through  such  new  combinations,  however, 
new  total  forces  (23)  are  formed,  by  means  of  which 
the  statical  points  become  displaced ;  consequently 
new  laws  of  movement  are  secured. 

A  manifold  change  of  mental  conditions  (33-38) 
can  by  this  hardly  fail  to  occur.  Such  a  change  brings 
the  physical  organism  into  play,  which  influence,  min- 
gling with  the  others  (we  shall  not  consider  it  further 
here),  causes  the  matter  to  become  still  more  compli- 
cated. 

With  this  play  of  the  imagination  (for  it  is  imagi- 
nation more  or  less  active)  are  combined  very  often 
actions  in  the  external  world  ;  and  the  audible  expres- 
sion of  thought  is  only  one  species  of  this.  With 
children  who  have  not  yet  learned  to  restrain  them- 
selves, such  expression  of  that  which  goes  on  in  the 
soul  is  the  rule.  To  this  (expression)  is  added  the  per- 
ception of  the  product  of  the  expression,  and  this  in- 
fluences the  course  of  the  psychological  process. 

208.  The  flow  of  human  perceptions,  if  it  is  in  any 
way  rapid,  does  not  allow  to  the  concepts  which  it 
calls  up,  time  to  place  themselves  in  equilibrium  with 


THE  PLAY   OF  THE   PSYCHICAL  MECHANISM.  165 

one  another :  the  preceding  ones  are  thrown  by  the 
succeeding  ones  upon  the  mechanical  threshold,  with- 
out forming  those  combinations  which  they  are  capa- 
ble of  making ;  and,  jirovided  the  influx  of  the  new 
concepts  continues  still  longer,  the  statical  threshold 
is  very  soon  developed  from  the  mechanical.  On  ac- 
count of  these  premature  arrests,  a  mass  of  undigested 
matter  is  collected  which  is  gradually  elaborated  when 
subsequent  reproductions  bring  it  again  into  con- 
sciousness.. 

209.  The  later  elaboration  of  the  material  j^re- 
viously  collected  is  the  more  important  since  the  older 
concepts  are  generally  the  stronger  on  account  of 
decreasing  susceptibility.  The  elaboration,  however, 
will  be  more  difficult  the  longer  it  is  delayed,  for  the 
reason  that,  in  consequence  of  the  constant  influx  of 
new  perceptions,  the  mental  state,  together  with  the 
corresponding  physical  condition,  constantly  changes, 
so  that  the  older  concepts  with  the  combinations  that 
have  previously  been  made  become  less  and  less  fit  for 
this  modification ;  consequently,  their  reproduction  is 
attended  with  increasing  hindrances.  In  this  may  be 
found  the  explanation  of  the  fact  that  that  which  is 
not  frequently  recalled  to  memory  sinks  further  and 
further  into  oblivion.  Accurately  speaking,  however, 
nothing  in  the  soul  is  lost. 

210.  The  purpose  of  the  elaboration  is  determined 
by  the  purpose  of  the  reproduction,  for  those  concepts 
v/hich  are  reproduced  simultaneously,  and  no  others, 
enter  into  new  and  closer  combination. 

Note. — Some  of  the  principal  pedagogical  notions  are  con- 
nected with  this  principle.  Among  others  we  may  mention  first 
of  all  the  distinction  between  analytic  and  synthetic  instruction. 


1G6  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  former  occurs  through  reproduct  ion  for  a  purpose ;  the  latter 
seeks  to  produce  a  combination  of  new  concepts  in  conformity 
with  a  purpose.  Furthermore  in  this  connection  belongs  the 
universal  requirement  that  absorption  ( Vertiefung)  and  self- 
possession  {Besinnuiig)  should  alternate  with  each  other  like  a 
sort  of  mental  respiration.  Absorption  ( Vertiefung)  occurs  when 
some  concepts  are  brought,  in  their  strength  and  purity,  one 
after  the  other  (as  free  as  possible  from  arrests),  into  conscious- 
ness. Self-possession  implies  the  collecting  and  combining  of 
these  concepts.  [  Vertiefung  signifies  that  absorption  in  the  de- 
tails of  some  object  which  is  attained  when  we  lose  ourselves  in 
its  contemplation.  Besinnung,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  recov- 
ery of  ourselves  which  is  attained  when  we  subordinate  the  ob- 
ject to  the  unity  of  our  knowledge ;  by  this  we  come  to  ourselves 
or  to  our  se?ises.]  Both  take  place  as  well  in  analytic  as  in 
synthetic  instruction.  The  more  completely  and  the  more  ac- 
curately these  operations  are  performed,  so  much  the  better  does 
the  instruction- prosper.  (See  the  author's  Allgemeine  Piida- 
gogik,  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  second  book.) 

211.  While,  for  the  reasons  above  meutioued,  con- 
cepts, when  they  constantly  follow  the  tendency  toward 
equilibrium,  thereby  change  from  one  movement  into 
another,  they  become  more  firmly  and  more  variously 
interwoven,  so  that  each  excitation  of  a  single  one 
among  them  is  communicated  more  and  more  to  the 
remaining  ones,  thus  assuring  their  reaction.  In  other 
words,  the  play  of  the  imagination  partakes  more  and 
more  of  the  nature  of  thinking,  and  man  becomes 
more  and  more  intelligent.  For  the  intelligence  has 
its  seat  in  this  general  connection  among  concepts,  but 
not  in  notions  and  judgments  taken  individually  (188). 
With  this,  however,  a  gradual  cultivation  of  notions 
and  judgments  is  combined,  inasmuch  as  the  circum- 
stances which  were  considered  above  occur  in  this  con- 
nection (179-192). 


THE  PLAY  OF  THE  PSYCHICAL   MECHANISM.  1G7 

212.  As  no  man  lives  alone,  but  humanity  exists 
in  the  form  of  society,  it  may  be  remarked  here  that 
conversation  is  the  ordinary  stimulant  for  the  imagina- 
tion ;  customs  and  general  opinions,  however,  are  usually 
the  halting-places  in  which  concepts  become  so  crossed 
and  interlaced  that,  from  there  on,  each  movement  of 
the  concept  receives  a  determination  (or  direction)  or 
as  we  also  may  say,  common  understanding  is  based 
upon  common  oj^inion,  which,  by  the  way,  may  be 
groundless  and  untrue,  therefore  may  in  a  higher  sense 
of  the  word  be  strongly  opposed  to  the  understanding. 

213.  A  man's  sense-perception  (Anschauen)  and  at- 
tention, in  general  his  interest,  depend  upon  his  imagi- 
nation and  thought.  Even  in  the  same  surroundings 
every  man  has  his  own  world. 

Attention  is  partly  involuntary  and  passive,  partly 
voluntary  and  active.  The  latter,  being  connected  with 
self-control,  Avill  not  be  considered  here.  The  former 
has  its  foundation  in  part  in  the  momentary  attitude 
of  the  mind  during  the  act  of  observing  {Merhen) ; 
moreover,  it  is  partly  determined  by  the  older  concepts 
which  the  object  observed  reproduces. 

{a.)  During  the  act  of  attention  four  circumstances 
are  to  be  observed  in  the  mental  state,  viz. :  the 
strength  of  the  impression ;  the  freshness  of  the  sus- 
ceptibility;  the  degree  of  opposition  to  concepts  al- 
ready present  in  consciousness ;  and  the  extent  to 
which  the  mind  was  occupied  previous  to  this  act  of 
attention. 

{!).)  In  regard  to  the  co-operation  of  the  older  con- 
cepts reproduced,  these  latter  may  be  unfavorable  to 
the  involuntary  observation,  because  of  the  fact  tliat  too 
little  or  too  much  is  in  consciousness,  inasmuch  as  in 


1C)8  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

both  of  these  cases  it  is  impossible  for  that  which  is 
newly  apprehended  to  adjust  the  mental  condition  to 
itself.  For,  if  the  new  concept  finds  nothing,  or  too 
little,  of  the  old  with  which  to  combine,  it  is  of  itself 
generally  too  weak  to  resist  being  overpowered  by 
other  concepts  which  have  already  proceeded  further 
in  collecting  and  combining.  If,  however,  too  many 
similar  old  concepts  present  themselves  in  conscious- 
ness, they  weaken  the  susceptibility  for  the  new.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  act  of  observing  will  be  promoted 
by  two  circumstances  :  first,  when  the  new  is  contrasted 
with  the  old,  by  which  the  reproduction  is  strong 
enough  for  union  without  doing  serious  harm  through 
an  excess  of  susceptibility ;  second,  when  a  reproduc- 
tion of  old  concepts  is  promoted  by  the  new,  and  the 
old  concepts  would  have  striven  after  this  in  any  case. 
In  this  case  it  establishes  new  combinations,  while  it 
gratifies  a  desire  at  the  same  time,  or  at  least  brings 
up  a  pleasant  feeling.  This  happens  especially  with 
previously  aroused  expectation. 

Note. — Attention  and  expectation,  as  the  two  steps  of  inter- 
est, belong  likewise  to  the  fundamental  notions  of  general  peda- 
gogy- 

214.  Among  these  excitations  of  the  psychical 
mechanism  which  have  their  origin  in  the  physical  or- 
ganism, we  may  be  here  allowed  to  pass  over  such  as 
present  more  physiological  than  psychological  phe- 
nomena— i.  e.,  those  in  which  the  bodily  needs  are  to 
be  considered. 

Generally,  however,  it  is  very  clear  that  every  phys- 
ical feeling  is  in  a  condition  to  bring  the  series  of  con- 
cepts that  are  complicated  with  it  into  consciousness; 


TQE   PLAY   OF  THE   PSYCHICAL   MECHANISM.  169 

and  that  these  series  of  concepts  will  come  np  so  much 
the  more  certainly,  since  with  all  other  concepts  other 
physical  feelings  are  connected  (weak  as  they  may  be), 
and  to  these  physical  feelings  may  correspond  other 
physical  conditions  which  can  not  be  brought  up  now. 
Upon  this  ground,  we  should  expect  a  greater  (rather 
than  a  less)  dependence  of  the  mind  upon  the  body, 
than  that  which  experience  shows  us, 

215.  Moreover,  the  changes  in  the  physical  condi- 
tion must  correspond  to  the  changes  in  the  mental  state, 
and  to  the  movement  and  interaction  of  the  concept 
series.  By  this  the  measure  of  time  and  the  velocity 
of  the  mental  change  may  meet  a  favorable  or  un- 
favorable condition  of  the  body  which  suffices  to  ex- 
plain the  alternating  pleasure  in,  and  inclination 
toward,  this  or  that  occupation,  provided  no  purely 
psychological  reasons  influence  it  besides. 

XoTE, — That  play  of  the  psychical  mechanism  is  especially 
an  uncontrolled  one,  or  at  least  one  difficult  of  control,  which 
arises  when  the  velocity  in  the  change  of  bodily  conditions  in- 
creases to  an  unusual  extent  and  thereby  hastens  the  corre- 
sponding course  of  the  concepts.  Such  a  phenomenon  occurs 
in  the  transition  from  illness  to  health  ;  during  the  development 
of  puberty ;  in  many  conditions  of  sickness,  etc.  The  imagi- 
nation runs  away  from  the  understanding ;  in  other  words,  the 
rapidity  of  the  self-developing  concepts  increases  the  violence 
with  which  they  remove  out  of  consciousness  those  concepts 
which  could  resist  them. 

216.  The  foregoing  acquires  a  greater  practical  im- 
portance when,  behind  the  manifold  and  variable  color- 
ing of  the  Ego  (202),  we  attempt  to  investigate  the 
persisting  individuality  of  man.  That  coloring  offers 
itself  to  the  observation  of  the  practical  educator,  and 


170  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

is  difficult  to  distingnisli  from  the  Ego.  Here  belong 
the  following  considerations : 

(a.)  In  a  condition  of  complete  health,  at  least  of 
tlie  mature  body  of  a  man,  the  influence  of  emotion 
upon  the  body  (100)  ought  not  to  be  apparent  at  all, 
or  at  the  most  should  occur  only  to  a  limited  degree ; 
so  that  no  perceptible  reaction  of  the  mental  activity 
upon  digestion  and  circulation,  or  the  reverse,  should 
take  place.  The  intrepidity  of  the  warrior  in  the 
midst  of  danger  is  (not  without  reason)  called  cold- 
bloodedness. 

(b.)  On  the  contrary,  in  every  human  organism  ac- 
tually exists  a  system  of  jDossible  emotions  predispos- 
ing it  in  such  a  manner  that  a  careful  education  only 
delays,  rather  than  removes  and  avoids,  the  outbreak 
of  these  emotions.  For  this  reason  no  man  can  be  en- 
tirely spared  the  experiences  to  which  he  is  predisposed, 
because  he  Avill  bring  them  upon  himself. 

(c.)  The  explanation  of  the  variety  of  ways  in 
which  physiological  pressure  (50)  arises  from  the 
organs  and  systems  of  the  body  belongs  to  physiology, 
but  the  changes  in  the  mental  activity  which  this 
pressure  may  effect  must  be  ascertained  from  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  psychical  mechanism  and  of  its  manifold 
possibilities  of  arrest.  The  least  difficult  of  these  are 
the  following : 

(1.)  Under  the  influence  of  this  pressure,  instead  of 
immediate  reproduction  taking  place,  obscurity  arises, 
inasmuch  as  the  new  concepts  obtained  through  new 
acts  of  perception  do  not  so  much  create  free  space  for 
the  older  similar  concepts  as  that  the  concepts  already 
present  (which  had  attained  equilibrium  with  the 
pressure)  weaken  in  the  reaction ;  so  that  now  the  in- 


THE  PLAY   OF  THE  PSYCHICAL  MECHANISM.  I7I 

fluence  of  the  pressure  increases,  and  the  older  con- 
cej)ts,  which  were  to  receive  and  appropriate  the  new, 
only  present  themselves  in  a  disturbed,  scanty  way. 
Hence,  very  often,  where  lively  interest  would  be  ex- 
pected, a  stupid  astonishment  is  exhibited. 

(2.)  The  same  pressure  retards  much  more  easily 
the  vaulting,  consequently  also  the  pointing  or  taper- 
ing ;  hence  the  concepts  do  not  stand  out  sharp,  al- 
though they  are  distinguished  from  others,  as  in  the 
case  of  men  who  intuitively  perceive  nothing,  who 
comprehend  nothing  in  its  full  relations,  and  who 
have  no  fine  feeling,  v\'hile  they  perhaps  learn  by 
means  of  mechanical  application. 

(3.)  With  many  persons  the  pressure  is  not  con- 
stantly effective  ;  it  appears  only  as  a  reaction  in  con- 
sequence of  the  tension  proceeding  from  the  mental 
activity.  Such  minds  are  active  and  easily  aroused, 
but  without  depth  and  sequence.  For  every  moment 
their  thoughts  are  cut  off  or  separated  ;  they  can  only 
construct  short  series  of  concepts.  They  do  not  like 
to  be  alone,  because  they  are  incapable  of  following  a 
line  of  thought. 

(4.)  If  a  constant  pressure  acts  ujion  free-rising 
concepts  (32),  their  movement  is  disarranged,  as  it 
enters  into  conflict  with  the  strongest  of  the  concepts 
which  ought  to  rise  the  highest ;  and  by  means  of  this 
conflict  the  weaker  concepts  become  free  to  enter  con- 
sciousness in  place  of  the  former.  Under  such  condi- 
tions, active  and  energetic  minds  show  themselves  un- 
even (rhapsodic)  in  their  action.  They  may  be  brill- 
iant, but,  unless  great  care  be  taken,  their  culture  will 
have  rents  and  fissures. 

(5.)  We  find  the  rhythm  of  mental  movements  in 


172  RATIONxVL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

general  very  different ;  hence  for  this  reason  some  at- 
tain better  that  which  is  quickly,  others  that  which  is 
slowly,  done.  These  indications  of  very  complicated 
investigations  may  suffice  here. 

217.  The  dilferent  concept  -  masses  depend  upon 
outside  impressions  derived  from  the  environment. 
Every  new  environment,  indeed  every  new  condition 
of  life,  brings  its  own  masses  of  concepts  in  great  part, 
but  not  entirely  separated  from  the  others.  Among 
these  masses  the  right  relations  necessary  for  self-gov- 
ernment do  not  by  any  means  always  arise.  .  Here  in- 
struction and  all  kinds  of  educational  training  have 
their  use.  AVe  shall  first  consider  here  not  the  recip- 
rocal action  of  concept-masses  upon  one  another,  but 
the  external  relation  of  the  man  to  his  environmer.t. 

218.  After  considering,  in  the  above,  the  excitation 
which  brings  forward  new  perceptions,  we  regard  the 
external  world  here  as  the  S2:>here  of  action ;  and  this 
is  the  seat  of  hindrance  to  action  as  the  second  aspect 
of  the  external  world  in  its  function  of  arousing  men- 
tal life.  The  connection  between  representation,  ac- 
tion, desire,  will  (the  words  are  placed  in  this  order 
intentionally),  must  now  be  more  accurately  developed 
than  before  (52). 

^lovements  in  different  parts  of  the  body,  and  the 
feelings  arising  from  these  movements,  are  the  con- 
ditions that  combine  the  functions  of  body  and  soul. 
If,  with  the  feeling,  some  kind  of  a  concej^t,  perhaps 
of  the  member  moved,  or  only  of  an  external  object, 
be  united,  then  every  excitation  of  this  concept,  in  case 
no  hindrance  intervenes,  effects  immediately  a  repro- 
duction of  the  former  feeling,  and  of  the  movement 
belonging  to  it.     In  regard  to  the  latter,  it  will  not  be 


THE  PLxVY   OF  THE  PSYCHICAL   MECHANISM.  I73 

necessary  that  the  concept  be  in  a  condition  of  desire, 
but  without  anything  further  it  will  be  accompanied 
by  action.  (This  is  the  case  with  the  lower  animals  and 
with  children  ;  only  the  mature  human  being  knows 
the  restraining  influence  of  other  concept-masses.) 
Further  investigation  of  this  requires  the  aid  of  the 
theory  of  the  concept  series. 

219.  In  a  series,  «,  ^,  c,  fZ,  let  the  concept  just  men- 
tioned, which  is  immediately  accompanied  by  an  ac- 
tion, be  indicated  by  d\  if  the  action  meets  no  hin- 
drance in  the  external  world,  then  it  occurs  without 
being  noticed,  and  the  series  runs  further  on  into  con- 
sciousness to  e,/,  etc.,  as  though  no  action  had  occurred. 
Examples  of  the  above  are  to  be  found  in  the  move- 
ment of  the  eyeball,  also  in  many  movements  of  the 
organs  of  speech,  while  the  movements  of  the  arms 
and  legs,  on  account  of  the  v»Tight  and  inertia  of  these 
limbs,  belong  in  this  respect  to  the  following  cases : 

If  the  action  find  a  hindrance  in  the  outer  world, 
the  feeling  belonging  to  tlie  action  is  arrested,  and  by 
means  of  it  the  concept  d  is  also  arrested.  Since  d  is 
blended  with  a  remainder  of  c,  a  smaller  remainder  of 
J,  and  with  a  still  smaller  remainder  of  a ;  further- 
more, since  the  rapidity  of  the  effect  of  these  remain- 
ders varies  according  to  their  magnitude,  and  is  in 
each  case  a  different  one,  while  the  passage  of  the 
series  is  stopped,  the  smaller  remainders  gain  time  to 
co-operate  as  helps  to  d^  and  to  strengthen  one  another. 
If  no  hindrance  had  existed,  then  c  would  have  acted 
first  upon  fZ,  and  the  smaller  remainders  would  have 
had  no  influence,  because  that  which  they  could  do 
would  already  have  been  done  without  them.  If  the 
hindrance  yields  upon  the  co-operation  of  J,  then  a 


174  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

does  not  come  to  its  helj:) ;  but  if  it  does  not  yet  yield, 
then  gradually  every  member,  however  many  may  be- 
long to  the  series,  will  give  its  contribution  to  the  gen- 
eral activity.  So  long  as  this  lasts,  every  member  of 
the  series  uj^  to  d  is  in  a  condition  of  desire.  At  the 
moment,  however,  when  the  whole  force  of  all  the 
united  helps  is  at  its  highest  tension,  the  desire,  pro- 
vided the  hindrance  is  not  3'et  overcome,  passes  into 
unpleasant  feeling  (section  36). 

All  this  is  very  easy  to  be  recognized  in  experience. 
One  of  the  frequent  acts  of  ordinary  life — e.  g.,  the 
opening  of  a  door — occurs  when  no  special  hindrance 
interferes,  almost  unobserved,  and  without  disturbing 
our  course  of  thought.  If,  however,  any  kind  of  fric- 
tion opposes,  then  we  gradually  exert  more  force,  we 
desire  more  and  more  strongly  that  the  door  be 
opened,  until  this  really  happens ;  if,  however,  the 
effort  is  in  vain,  the  desire  leaves  room  for  uncom- 
fortable feeling,  which  lasts  at  least  until  a  new  series 
of  thoughts  outside  the  circle  of  this  undertaking  pre- 
sents itself. 

220.  The  position  of  a  hindrance  represents  often 
merely  something  lacking  in  an  ordinary  environment. 
To  a  series  of  concepts,  a^  b,  c,  d,  e,  corresponds  the 
series  of  sense-perceptions,  a,  b,  c,  e,  in  which  d  is  lack- 
ing, hence  it  will  be  missed,  because  the  remaining 
concepts  can  not  come  into  the  condition  in  which 
they  can  re-establish  the  degree  of  undimmed  clearness 
which  existed  Avhen  d  was  blended  with  the  others  ;  in 
which  case  it  would  be  natural  for  them  to  bring  for- 
ward not  only  in  the  soul,  but  also  in  the  organ  of 
sense,  the  concomitant  conditions  of  the  actual  sense- 
perception.    If  the  series  «,  b,  c,  be  strong  enough,  and 


THE  PLAY   OF   TUE    PSYCHICAL   xMECHANlSM.  175 

the  miud  absorbed  in  it,  tlie  regret  for  the  missing 
member  d  becomes  a  longing. 

221.  Xow,  in  the  place  of  one  series,  let  a  tissue 
of  many  series  be  assumed  here,  which  may  extend 
through  the  whole  circle  of  a  man's  thought,  then  a 
general  keen  longing  for  the  missing  object  will  fill 
the  whole  mind.  This  is  the  foundation  of  that  spe- 
cies of  love  to  which  its  object  is  indispensable,  and 
which  abhors  every  possible  intimation  of  physical  or 
mental  separation.  It  is  known  that  love  is  modified 
through  its  many  different  occasions,  also  that  it  re- 
ceives many  admixtures,  some  of  them  sensuous  feel- 
ings ;  wdiere  it  arises  from  mere  custom,  however,  it  is 
to  be  observed  in  its  simplest  form. 

223.  The  first  essential  of  a  man's  character  is  fur- 
nished in  the  object  and  manner  of  his  love — from 
mere  diverting  preferences  all  the  way  up  to  love  as  a 
consuming  passion.  But  just  here  many  formal  con  • 
ditions  must  be  considered,  that  must  be  connected 
with  the  notion  of  willing.  (In  this  connection  see 
first  four  chapters  of  the  third  book  of  my  General 
Pedagogy.) 

223.  Will  is  desire  accompanied  with  the  presup- 
position of  the  attainment  of  that  which  is  desired. 
This  presupposition  becomes  united  with  the  desire, 
when,  in  similar  cases  the  effort  of  action  has  been 
followed  by  a  result — i.  e.,  by  su(?cess  (219) ;  for  then 
the  concept  of  a  period  of  time  which  contained  the 
gratification  of  the  desire  suggested  by  association  the 
beginning  of  a  new  similar  action.  From  this  arises  a 
glance  into  the  future,  which  glance  is  continually  ex- 
tended in  proportion  as  a  man  learns  to  use  more 
numerous  means  to  secure  his  ends.     Let  a  series,  a,  /3, 


170  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

y,  8,  be  formed  in  the  first  perception  of  the  course  of 
an  event.  Xow  let  the  concept  8  be  in  a  condition  of 
desire.  Although  as  such  it  strives  against  an  arrest, 
yet  the  helps  which  it  sends  to  y,  ft  a  may  act  un- 
hindered in  case  those  concepts  just  indicated  are  not 
arrested  in  consciousness.  Then  y,  /?,  a  will  be  repro- 
duced in  proper  gradation  (as  were  b  and  a  mentioned 
toward  the  end  of  section  29),  and,  provided  one  of 
these  concepts  be  combined  with  an  action  (218),  then 
an  action  occurs  of  such  a  nature  that,  under  favorable 
external  conditions,  the  previous  course  of  the  event 
may  be  actually  renewed,  in  such  a  manner  that  a,  ft  y 
act  as  means  to  the  end  8. 

224.  The  will  has  its  imagination  and  its  memory, 
and  the  more  it  possesses  of  this  latter  so  much  the 
more  decisive  is  it.  For  a  reproduction  similar  to  that 
just  mentioned  may  run  through  long  and  very  com- 
plicated series  in  many  directions,  and  call  up  action 
in  some  remote  member.  Moreover,  if  we  assume  that 
8  (in  section  223)  be  one  and  the  same  concept  with  d 
(in  section  219),  the  effort  in  this  action  is  easily  ex- 
plained, so  that  in  the  co-operation  of  a,  6,  c,  cZ,  lies  the 
strength  of  the  wilf  by  which  y,  ft  etc.,  are  roused  to 
the  point  of  action  which  is  the  means  to  the  end. 
The  decisive  presupposition,  however,  that  the  end  will 
be  reached  is  so  much  the  firmer  and  more  certain  the 
more  the  means  are  at  command — i.  e.,  the  further  the 
reproductions  just  indicated  reach, 

225.  The  will  is  strengthened  through  the  knowl- 
edge of  dangers  and  through  self-denials. 

True,  a  danger  is  not  the  less  to  be  feared  because 
we  know  it,  but  the  concept  of  the  danger  does  not 
effect  so  stronor  an  arrest  if  it  be  blended  with  the 


THE  PLAY  OF  THE  PSYCHICAL  MECHANISM.  177 

other  concepts.  Then  also  not  so  much  the  purpose, 
as  the  attempt  to  attain  the  purpose,  will  be  resolved 
upon ;  but  self-denials  free  the  mind  from  cares  and 
considerations  which  might  cause  the  will  to  waver. 

226.  If,  in  several  points  of  the  circle  of  thought, 
places  exist  in  which  concepts  rise  as  desires,  then  in 
the  reproductions  through  which  means  and  hindrances 
are  considered  they  may  easily  meet  and  oppose  one 
another.  The  fluctuation  in  this  contest  is  the  prac- 
tical deliberation  which  will  end  in  choice. 

This  latter  is  originally  not  a  work  of  practical 
[i.  e.,  moral]  principles ;  rather,  it  makes  such  princi- 
ples possible,  inasmuch  as  from  the  frequently  repeated 
choices  in  similar  cases  a  general  will  gradually  arises, 
and  is  established  through  additional  judgments  ex- 
actly in  the  same  way  as  the  general  notions  (179-192). 

Here,  however,  is  the  transition  to  the  following 
chapter. 

Note, — The  fact  that  the  greater  the  number  of  the  concept- 
masses  which  have  been  formed  in  the  mind,  so  much  the  more 
harmoniously  do  they  work  together,  when  a  desire  passes  into 
action  as  will,  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  fact  of  general 
will.  But  this  remark  is  at  the  same  time  to  be  regarded  as 
preparatory  to  the  following  chapter.  On  the  other  hand,  often 
in  one  concept-mass  everything  is  ready  for  willing,  but  the 
other  concept-masses  hinder  the  willing ;  thus  dissatisfaction 
may  for  a  long  time  precede  revolt. 

227.  The  circumstances  of  the  external  life  often 
hinder  a  man  from  turning  his  whole  will  inwardly, 
with  a  purpose  to  develop  his  character.  At  other 
times  the  favoring  circumstances  of  the  will  are  too 
large  for  the  limitations  of  his  circle  of  thought. 

The  first  case  is  by  far  the  most  frequent.     For 
15 


17S  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

this  reason,  especially  under  an  oppressive  state  of 
government,  a  dangerous  reserve  of  unknown  forces 
is  to  be  dreaded.  Hence  the  political  necessity  to 
preserve  a  regulated  freedom  for  human  activity. 


CHAPTER  V. 


SELF-CONTROL   AN'D   ESPECIALLY    DUTY   AS   A 
PSYCHICAL    PHENOMEJ^^Oi^. 

228.  Actual  self-control  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  that  which  a  man  exacts  of  himself,  and  this 
again  from  that  which  he  ought  to  exact  of  himself. 

229.  The  child,  almost  unobserved,  and  without 
being  acquainted  with  the  difficulties  of  the  matter, 
controls  himself,  when  he  puts  off  an  action  which 
serves  as  a  means  to  an  end,  and  resolves  to  do  it  at  a 
future  time.  Afterward,  when  the  future  has  become 
the  present,  it  is  found  that  that  present  moment  has  a 
will  of  its  own,  and  that  the  earlier  moment  could  not 
decide  for  the  present ;  and,  further,  that  it  is  a  ques- 
tion whether  the  present  will  is  the  same  as  the  former 
one  —  meanwhile,  perhaps,  hardly  any  thought  has 
been  given  to  this  question.  The  man  only  gradually 
learns  how  easily  he  can  be  unfaithful  to  himself. 

230.  Experiences  of  this  kind  [i.  e.,  wherein  we 
learn  the  inconsistency  of  the  will]  are  more  striking 
in  great  than  in  small  affairs  [i.  e.,  in  public  rather 
than  in  private  matters]  because  the  injury  is  more 
obvious  there.     Long  before   a   man  recognizes  the 


DUTY  AS  A  PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENON.     179 

psychological  necessity  for  making  a  rule  for  himself, 
and  for  binding  himself  to  it,  laws  exist  in  civil 
society,  and  these  laws  are  the  type  of  all  that  which 
is  enounced  in  later  times  as  ethical  laws. 

The  ruder  the  man,  so  much  less  considerate  the 
laws.  On  the  contrary,  the  less  the  danger  in  making 
the  exception  into  a  rule,  so  much  the  more  nicely 
is  legislation  inclined  to  distinguish  cases ;  and  the 
greater  the  faith  in  the  integrity  and  insight  of  the 
judges,  the  more  will  be  left  to  their  judgment.  Yet 
it  is  a  sign  of  a  good  law  if  it  was  established  before 
the  event  occurs  to  which  it  is  applied,  for  the  war- 
ranty of  the  complete  impartiality  required  lies  alone 
in  the  fact  that  the  lawgiver  can  not  know  the  in- 
dividual case  which  will  be  subsumed  under  it  because 
it  has  not  yet  occurred. 

231.  Conscience  follows  from  self-consciousness, 
for,  when  a  man  beholds  himself  as  an  object,  he 
passes  judgment  upon  himself.  The  inner  percep- 
tion, however,  may  rise  to  the  second  power,  and  then 
a  man  may  judge  his  manner  of  judging  himself. 

The  question,  whether  the  inner  judge  may  also  be 
partial,  arises  now,  and  the  danger  of  a  corrupted  self- 
judgment  may  be  learned  in  a  very  short  series  of  in- 
ner perceptions. 

As  a  necessary  security  against  such  partiality,  for 
the  inner  life  of  a  man  as  well  as  for  civil  society,  there 
is  required  a  fixed  law  which  precedes  the  cases  to  be 
decided.  The  severity  of  the  construction  of  this  law 
also  becomes  gradually  relaxed,  and  it  is  modified  to 
suit  the  different  kinds  of  cases  until  an  exaggerated 
mildness  leads  back  again  to  the  necessity  for  sharper 
attention  to  the  rule. 


ISO  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

232.  In  this  we  see  as  yet  nothing  settled  in  regard 
to  the  subject-matter  of  self -legislation.  The  necessity 
for  this  is  met  by  a  general  will,  as  described  in  section 
226,  which  is,  however,  very  different  in  individuals; 
hence,  in  the  beginning,  practical  (or  moral)  principles 
are  individual.  Decisions  as  to  that  which  one  pre- 
fers, or  which  one  finds  less  tolerable,  combined  with 
empirical  rules  dictated  by  prudence,  furnish  the 
largest  part  of  the  earliest  system  of  morality  which 
seeks  to  control  whims  and  to  quench  passions  through 
a  notion  of  true  and  lasting  happiness. 

233.  In  practical  [i.  e.,  moral]  philosophy  it  is 
shown  that  duty  is  based  upon  practical  (moral)  ideas. 
These  latter  possess  an  eternal  youth,  and  through  this 
feature  they  gradually  separate  from  the  class  of  wishes 
and  enjoyments  that  grow  weaker  with  time,  and  they 
are  recognized  as  the  only  unchangeable  thing  which 
can  answer  the  requirements  of  a  law  to  the  inner 
man  (231).  Besides,  they  bear  in  themselves  the 
stamp  of  an  unavoidable  decree,  because  a  man  posi- 
tively can  not  escape  that  judgment  whose  general 
form  they  indicate  ;  hence  in  those  practical  ideas  is 
to  be  found  the  necessary  content  which  must  fill  up 
the  general  form  of  self-legislation. 

Note. — In  this  is  explained  the  kind  of  self-government 
which  a  man  is  to  exact  of  himself  (228),  but  it  does  not  deter- 
mine how  much  of  it  he  is  able  to  carry  out.  This  latter  item 
is  indefinite,  and,  moreover,  a  constantly  unknown  quantity  to 
the  individual,  inasmuch  as  no  man  is  able  to  discern  accurately 
his  own  psychological  states.  It  is  no  wonder  that  so  simple  a 
concept  of  duty  does  not  appear  sufficiently  emphatic  for  the 
general  use  of  moralists,  nor  that,  in  order  to  preach  more  im- 
pressively, they  attempt  additions  which  are  of  an  exciting  as 
well  as  imposing  character.     In  many  cases  this  attempt,  if  it 


DUTY  AS  A  PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENON.     181 

be  not  overdone,  is  much  to  be  commended.  But  we  can  not 
restrain  our  astonishment  when  some  philosophers  appeal  to 
metaphysical  opinions  in  order  to  make  clear  the  necessity  for 
duty.  For  opinioyi  only  can  be  considered  here,  inasmuch  as 
no  one  will  think  of  making  the  obligation  of  all  to  duty  de- 
pendent upon  metaphysical  knowledge.  On  such  a  basis  the 
eternity  of  the  punishment  of  hell  may  finally  return  to  philo- 
sophical ethics,  which  is  certainly  an  effective  and  probable 
theory,  if  pursued  with  suitable  explanation  and  limitation,  and 
is  based  upon  psychological  grounds  as  may  be  seen  at  the  end 
of  this  book.  A  system  of  ethics,  however,  which  is  not  lax,  is 
bound  to  have  its  sharp  penalties.  And  this  severity  must  not 
be  made  to  depend  upon  certain  decisive  expressions  of  absolute 
obligation,  etc.,  but  only  upon  the  clearness  and  distinctness  of 
the  notions  of  that  which  may  be  condemned,  opposed  to  that 
which  may  be  commended.  That  blame  which  allows  no  excuse 
can  not  be  withstood,  but  if  one  be  resolved  to  incur  such  blame, 
then  no  system  of  ethics  influences  him  any  longer ;  he  is  a  sick 
man  who  must  be  healed — i.  e.,  brought  to  repentance  by  suffer- 
ing. Blame  does  its  part  of  the  work  when  it  shames  passion. 
Clear  discrimination  and  analysis  of  the  practical  (moral)  ideas 
which  make  up  the  ultimate  content  and  true  meaning  of  all 
moral  precepts  is  the  best  stimulant  for  the  conscience. 

234.  Actual  self-control  and  the  possibility  that  a 
man  may  carry  out  that  which  he  demands  and  should 
demand  of  himself  depends  upon  the  co-operation  of 
several  concept-masses.  In  this,  that  general  will  is 
manifested,  if  such  has  already  been  formed  (226),  and 
in  that  case  it  is  always  located  in  some  kind  of  concept- 
mass,  a  great  power  wliich  may  be  recognized  in  every 
activity  that  h^s  a  purpose.  In  this  connection  we  may 
recall  the  notion  of  labor  (123).  Every  kind  of  labor 
demands  that  the  will  shall  keep  constantly  striving  to 
realize  the  general  purpose,  while  those  voluntary  acts 
which  deal  with  the  details  and  execute  the  several  steps 
of  the  process  in  logical  order  succeed  one  another  in 


1S2  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

and  by  means  of  a  series  of  concepts  in  consciousness, 
although  sometimes  with  deLa3'S  and  fatiguing  efforts, 
as  shown  in  section  219  ;  but  the  rational  activity  of  an 
educated  man  is  composed  of  many  and  different  labors 
which  of  themselves  make  up  a  series  of  a  higher  kind. 
The  more  complicated  such  an  activity  is,  the  more 
manifest  is  the  power  of  that  dominating  concept-mass 
in  which  the  will  of  the  chief  design  has  its  seat  over 
all  the  others  which  are  subordinated  to  it  in  different 
degrees.  Also  facts  are  not  wanting  which  show  more 
strongly  than  is  necessary  how  tyrannically  the  domi- 
nating will  often  sacrifices  all  lesser  wishes,  so  that  a 
single  prejudice  or  a  single  passion  is  able,  as  it  were, 
to  desolate  and  lay  waste  the  whole  mind.  We  must 
beware  of  considering  self-control  merely  as  such,  as 
something  morally  good ;  if  it  is  to  be  so  regarded, 
then  the  quality,  and  not  merely  the  strength  of  the 
dominating  concept-masses,  must  be  considered. 

Note. — He  who  earnestly  desires  to  achieve  the  highest  de- 
gree of  self-control  should,  above  everything,  guard  against  the 
delusion  of  false  theories  which  represent  his  freedom  greater 
than  it  really  is.  These  theories  are  not  capable  of  making  one 
free,  they  rather  plunge  one  into  all  the  dangers  of  false  security. 
On  the  other  hand,  let  every  one  acknowledge  his  weak  side  and 
strive  to  strengthen  it.  This  is  not  accomplished  through  direct 
watchfulness  alone,  but  the  whole  interaction  of  the  man's  en- 
vironment in  actual  life  is  involved.  As  the  will  originally  had 
its  origin  in  the  circle  of  thought,  so  through  the  choice  of  em- 
ployments and  expedients,  it  leads  back  to  the  further  culture 
and  development  of  the  same.  The  Bible  and  hymn-book  are 
infinitely  important  supports  to  self-control.  To  many,  also, 
Horace  and  Cicero  are  helps.  Diet,  movement,  the  bath,  and 
mineral  springs,  work  against  mental  relaxation.  For  the  edu- 
cated classes,  art  (if  it  did  not  work  for  bread !),  especially  the 
theatre,  could  accomplish  much.     To  be  sure,  when  we  see  that 


DUTY  AS  A   PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENON.     183 

great  poets,  with  all  their  love  for  the  theatre,  are  not  willing 
to  confine  their  poetical  fancies  within  the  limits  of  theatrical 
representation,  we  can  only  lament  the  lack  of  German  inde- 
pendence which,  repelled  by  French  over-refinements,  gave  it- 
self up  not  only  to  the  admiration  but  also  to  the  imitation  of 
Shakespeare.  But  the  real  fault  of  the  theatre  lies  in  the  specu- 
lation upon  the  purses  of  the  rich  and  the  desire  of  the  masses 
for  a  spectacle.  The  danger  which  threatens  the  age  in  its 
striving  after  freedom  is  that  of  being  caught  in  the  snares  of 
the  moneyed  aristocracy.  For  examples,  look  at  England  and 
America. 

235.  Self-control  is  a  psychological  phenomenon, 
always  strictly  conformed  to  an  end  or  purpose,  and  the 
power  which  it  exercises  has  a  finite  magnitude,  not- 
withstanding that  we  never  can  assert  that  that  strength 
or  self-control  which  a  definite  individual  possesses  in 
a  definite  moment  is  the  greatest  which  any  person,  or 
to  which  that  individual  himself,  has  been  able  to 
attain.  Hence  ethics  in  general  presupposes  rightly, 
that  every  passion  may  be  governed,  and  if  a  person 
can  not  control  his  passions,  then  he  is  justly  blamed 
for  this  weakness  and  held  to  be  without  excuse  accord- 
ing to  the  idea  of  perfection. 

Note  1. — Those  who  assume  a  transcendental  freedom  of  the 
will  are  bound  to  attribute  to  it  an  infinite  amount  of  power 
over  the  passions,  or  otherwise  incur  the  charge  of  the  grossest 
inconsistency.  For  the  word  transcendental,  in  this  connection, 
indicates  an  opposition  to  all  causality  of  nature ;  hence  the 
natural  power  of  the  passions  would  be  capable  of  nothing  what- 
ever against  such  a  freedom.  The  relation,  however,  of  nothing 
to  something  is  as  something  to  infinite  magnitude ;  so  that  if 
the  power  of  passion  be  considered  something,  transcendental 
freedom  must  be  considered  infinitely  strong.  It  is  unnecessary 
here  to  discuss  further  the  fact  that,  on  account  of  its  own  action, 
transcendental  freedom  falls  into  the  same  causal  relation  from 
which  it  ouffht  to  be  free. 


ISJ:  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Note  2.— A  short  discussion  of  the  questions  that  arise  con- 
cerning the  mental  condition  of  criminals,  which  sometimes 
come  from  judges  and  physicians,  may  make  the  preceding  and 
the  following  clearer.  The  question  does  not  concern  philo- 
sophic instruction  upon  the  nature  of  free  actions,  but  the  judge 
assumes  that,  if  at  the  age  of  puberty,  the  criminal  was  of  sound 
mind,  he  knew  the  injurious  result  of  his  action  ;  that  he  would 
not  will  such  an  act  to  be  performed  against  himself ;  that  he 
had  developed  in  himself  the  general  notion  of  this  not-willing 
(or  renunciation) ;  and  that  he  knew  that  civil  society  would 
not  suffer  such  actions.  By  this,  if  he  were  an  honorable  man, 
he  would  certainly  have  been  deterred  from  the  action ;  if  he 
be  not  an  honorable  man,  then  the  more  firmly  fixed  his  bad 
character  is,  so  much  the  more  certainly  will  he  be  punished, 
and  so  much  the  more  certainly  will  bad  action  upon  every  op- 
portunity proceed  from  this  badness.  The  question  then  is  ' 
only,  Was  the  man  sick,  and  in  such  a  condition  that  we  may 
believe  that  he  acted  like  one  in  a  dream?  For  example,  might 
the  youthful  incendiary  be  overcome  by  a  morbid  desire  for  fire 
in  such  a  way  that  his  reproduction  did  not  penetrate  to  the 
concept  of  danger  to  the  inhabitants ;  or  that  the  universal 
maxim  to  bring  no  one  into  danger  (the  higher  concept-mass) 
was  hindered  in  its  action-,  and,  finally,  that  the  recollection 
of  civil  order,  of  right  and  law,  was  lost*?  In  the  last  case  the 
criminal  would  be  similar  to  the  unreflecting  child,  and  the 
culpability  so  much  the  less. 

236.  The  conditions  of  self-control,  consequently 
also  the  proof  of  its  finite  quantity,  are  to  be  found  in 
the  proportion  that  exists  between  the  dominating  to 
the  subordinate  concept-masses.  This  is  in  general 
clear,  yet  more  special  remarks,  partly  upon  the  do- 
minion of  desires  and  passions,  partly  upon  moral  self- 
control,  may  be  added. 

How  a  desire  gradually  extends  its  compass  may  be 
seen  in  sections  223  and  224.  The  flow  of  concepts 
stops  and  expands  at  the  point  which  is  desired  and 


DUTY  AS  A  PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENON.     185 

not  immediately  reached.  The  reproductions  awak- 
ened by  it  are  collected  (at  first  without  order)  as  fan- 
cies, but  fancying  is  gradually  transformed  into  think- 
ing (211),  and  notions  and  judgments  are  formed  more 
and  more  in  regard  to  desires  and  in  the  service 
thereof.  This  is  incorrectly  expressed  in  the  saying, 
"  Passion  sets  the  understanding  in  motion."  Not  an 
entire  mental  faculty  is  here  moved  to  a  one-sided  ac- 
tivity, but  only  a  certain  phase  of  thinking  (which  we 
may  attribute  to  the  understanding  in  so  far  as  it  is 
merely  a  general  term  for  certain  kinds  of  activity  in 
concepts)  is  created  in  the  thought-mass  which  has 
gathered  around  the  desire.  Uncultured  men,  to  say 
nothing  of  savages,  have  hardly  any  other  faculty  of 
understanding  than  that  of  their  passions.  But  among 
educated  men  there  are  other  concept-masses  elabo- 
rated to  the  stage  of  thought  called  "  understanding," 
and  here  still  another  phenomenon  is  added  to  that 
partial  understanding  that  belongs  to  the  passions 
which  is  qui-te  as  incorrectly  (as  the  above)  expressed 
in  the  maxim,  "  Passion  suppresses  the  understand- 
ing." For,  in  the  first  place,  either  the  other  concept- 
masses  of  the  understanding  present  themselves  too 
late — after  the  passion  has  been  gratified — and  the 
flow  of  the  concepts  hindered  by  it  has  been  again 
established,  in  which  case  we  say  rightly,  "  The  man 
has  been  precipitate  "  ;  and  he  himself  even  will  lament 
that  he  can  not  comprehend  his  precipitation,  for  his 
previous  act  now  hangs  like  a  lifeless  picture  before 
him  (42),  and  only  those  concept-masses  are  active 
which  look  down  upon  these  others  reproachfully. 
Or,  in  the  second  place,  at  the  same  time  with  the 
grade  of  understanding  that  belongs  to  the  passion, 


1S6  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

the  higher  grade  of  understanding  is  awakened  in  con- 
sciousness, although  it  is  not  strong  enough  nor  suffi- 
ciently excited.  From  this  arises  the  still  more  unfor- 
tunate result  that  that  combination  of  concepts  in 
which  it  has  its  seat  is  corrupted  and  ruined  through 
the  notions  furnished  by  passion,  which  latter,  the 
of  tener  this  occurs,  attains  so  much  the  more  domin- 
ion, and  shows  itself  so  much  the  more  worthy  the 
name  of  passion. 

We  have  spoken  here  of  more  than  one  understand- 
ing, and  there  must  be  more  than  one,  in  case  the 
understanding  be  regarded  as  a  force  or  as  a  faculty. 
For  the  causal  power,  the  mental  energy,  lies  nowhere 
else  than  in  certain  concept-masses,  and  of  these  there 
are  many  and  very  different  ones  which  can  all  act  as 
understanding.  The  same  is  true  of  the  power  of 
imagination,  of  memory,  of  reason ;  in  a  word,  of  all 
the  so-called  mental  faculties  ;  but  if  one  were  to  allow 
one's  self  to  indulge  in  such  an  innovation  in  the  use 
of  lansruae^e  it  would  not  be  well  to  recommend  it  for 
adoption  by  everybody ;  for  he  who  would  speak  of 
several  understandings,  of  several  imaginations,  etc., 
would  appear  to  assert  that  the  several  were  to  be  re- 
garded as  distinct  and  separate.  The  different  con- 
cept-masses, however,  to  which  all  this  points,  do  not 
by  any  means  admit  of  any  such  nice  discrimination, 
but  rather,  with  every  encounter  of  the  latter,  arise 
new  and  often  only  weak  blendings  of  similar  concepts 
out  of  which,  as  their  ingredients,  they  (imagination, 
memory,  etc.)  are  compounded.  The  manner  of  speak- 
ing just  used  is  then  exceptional,  and  it  remains  true 
that  a  man  possesses  only  one  understanding,  one  im- 
agination, etc.     These,  however,  are  not  forces,  not 


DUTY   AS  A   PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENON.     187 

faculties,  indeed  nothing  real,  but  merely  logical  desig- 
nations for  the  preliminary  classification  of  psychical 
phenomena. 

237.  The  consideration  of  moral  self-control  is  now 
in  order.  As  a  preparation  for  this,  we  must  make 
moral  feeling  comprehensible.  In  the  Kantian  phi- 
losophy, it  has  been  explained  that  this  is  useless  as  a 
foundation  for  ethics,  and  rightly  so,  for  we  can  in  no 
way  substitute  it  for  the  moral  judgments,  or,  to  give 
them  their  general  name,  "  aesthetical "  judgments, 
upon  which,  as  was  shown  in  the  practical  philosophy, 
practical  ideas  depend.  Such  substitution  would  con- 
found grounds  and  conclusions.  Moral  feeling  arises 
from  moral  judgments  ;  it  is  the  first  eSect  of  the  lat- 
ter upon  the  total  complex  of  all  concepts  present  in 
consciousness.  The  judgments  mentioned  have  their 
seat  in  only  a  few  concepts,  and  these  are  such  concepts 
as  form  an  aesthetic  relation  with  one  another.  Upon 
every  encounter  of  the  latter,  they  (the  judgments) 
arise  always  and  infallibly,  provided  (and  in  so  far  as) 
a  blending  of  those  concepts  is  not  made  impossible 
by  the  remaining  concepts  of  the  series.  When  they 
arise,  they  have  the  same  effect,  as  if  something  pleasant 
or  unpleasant  suddenly  entered  consciousness  (i.  e.,  ac- 
cording as  they  contain  approbation  or  blame).  By 
this,  they  either  favor  the  course  of  thought  present, 
or  they  hinder  it,  and  in  the  latter  case  action  upon 
the  physical  organism  is  often  occasioned  (e.  g.,  blush- 
ing) as  well  as  reaction  of  the  latter  on  the  former. 

Before  we  go  further,  we  may  remark  here  that  in 
the  influence  just  mentioned  of  the  moral  judgments 
upon  the  remaining  concepts,  hence  in  the  moral  feel- 
ing, the  specific  difference  of  those  judgments  is  mani- 


ISS  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

fested  very  little  or  not  at  all.  Whether  an  unrea- 
sonableness, or  an  injustice,  or  a  malevolence,  or  a 
cowardice,  or  that  which  otherwise  may  be  a  moral 
perversity  is  felt,  that  disturbance  which  may  cause 
the  thread  of  thought  which  is  running  through  con- 
sciousness to  suffer,  will  in  all  these  cases  be  about  the 
same.  In  this  respect,  much  will  depend  upon  the 
relations  which  the  concepts  present  in  consciousness 
hold  toward  one  another,  and  upon  the  rapidity  with 
which  their  series  pass  before  consciousness.  The  most 
essential  task  of  practical  (or  ethical)  philosophy,  how- 
ever, is  to  make  quite  clear  the  specific  difference  be- 
tween the  different  moral  judgments ;  consequently, 
the  moral  feeling  which  does  not  give  this  difference, 
also  does  not  give  us  the  principles  of  that  science. 

Let  it  be  assumed  that  a  desire  is  just  projecting 
its  plans  (236),  and  while  a  means  is  devised  for  its 
gratification,  the  moral  perversity  of  this  means  is  felt, 
then  the  feeling  acts  as  a  hindrance  and  checks  the 
course  of  the  concepts,  exactly  as  when  an  action  in 
the  outer  world  does  not  succeed  (219).  During  this 
suspension  two  things  occur  simultaneously :  First, 
the  concepts  which  proceed  from  the  desire  increase 
in  volume ;  secondly,  however,  the  moral  judgment 
also  gains  time  to  present  itself.  Now  the  question  is 
whether  this  judgment  is  connected  with  a  strong 
thought-mass  which,  as  it  spreads  more  and  more  in 
consciousness,  gradually  suppresses  that  increasing  de- 
sire, without,  on  its  side,  suffering  in  its  development 
from  the  unpleasant  feeling  into  which  the  suppressed 
desire  changes  ?  If  this  question  can  be  answered 
affirmatively,  the  self-control  is  present. 

238.  A  purely  moral  self-control  which  is  uniformly 


DUTY  AS  A  PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENON.     189 

present  in  every  act  of  commission  and  omission,  as 
well  as  most  careful. to  protect  all  subordinate  interests 
and  wishes,  is  an  ideal  to  which  the  name  psychical  or- 
ganism may  be  given.  For  to  it  belong  such  a  union  and 
subordination  of  concepts  as  is  not  only  adapted  to  the 
smallest  as  well  as  the  largest  combinations,  but  is 
also  capable  of  appropriating  to  good  purpose  all  addi- 
tional new  external  impressions.  This  self-control  is 
the  aim  of  education  and  of  self-development.  How 
near  a  man  may  come  to  this  aim  can  not  be  determined, 
and  for  that  reason  the  effort  toward  it  is  unlimited. 

239.  As  the  power  of  self-control  is  never  the  work 
of  a  moment,  but  rather  the  result  of  the  whole  past 
life,  so  also  no  particular  time  of  life  can  be  consid- 
ered to  be  decisive  in  regard  to  it.  A  considerable 
stock  of  thoughts  and  feelings  which  has  no  compara- 
tively great  addition  to  expect  (the  decrease  in  suscep- 
tibility is  to  be  borne  in  mind)  must  first  be  present, 
before  such  an  effective  concentration  of  mind  can  oc- 
cur that  a  man  is  able  to  come  to  a  successful  resolu- 
tion concerning  himself  in  general.  Then,  however, 
when  this  condition  is  fulfilled  (as  a  rule,  at  the  end 
of  the  educational  period)  it  is  time  for  the  deepest 
reflection,  for  the  most  comprehensive  practical  delib- 
eration. For  upon  the  thoroughness  of  the  combina- 
tion into  which  the  concepts  enter,  upon  the  exact 
knowledge  of  his  innermost  wishes  which  %  man  now 
attains,  upon  the  right  position  in  the  outer  world 
which  he  now  prepares  for  himself,  depends  the 
strength  as  well  as  the  correctness  of  the  guidance 
which  he  will  give  himself  henceforth,  and  just  upon 
this  depends  also  the  right  reception  of  everything 
new  to  which  the  course  of  life  will  further  lead. 


190  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    OBSERVATIONS    UPON    THE    DESTINY 
OF   MAN. 

240.  Psychology  will  remain  one-sided  so  long  as 
it  considers  man  as  standing  alone.  For,  in  the  first 
place,  he  lives  in  society  and  not  merely  for  this  world ; 
secondly,  these  two  facts  give  rise  to  various  attempts 
to  sketch  ideals  whose  attractiveness  elevates  them  (the 
ideals)  to  an  actual  mental  power. 

In  every  social  whole  the  individual  persons  are 
related  to  one  another  in  almost  the  same  way  as  the 
concepts  in  the  soul  of  the  individual  if  the  social  ties 
are  sufficiently  close  to  secure  the  mutual  influence 
completely.  Conflicting  interests  take  the  place  of  the 
opposition  among  concepts.  The  inclinations  and 
needs  of  assistance  from  others  furnish  those  condi- 
tions which  were  known  in  the  foregoing  under  the 
name  of  complexes  and  blendings.  The  direct  results 
of  the  psychological  mechanism  which  here  makes 
itself  felt  on  a  large  scale  are,  that  the  many  are  de- 
pressed by  the  few  so  much  as  to  lose  social  signifi- 
cance ;  that  even  of  these  few  only  a  small  minority 
attain  prominence ;  that  every  society  in  a  condition 
of  natural  equilibrium  assumes  a  pointed  (pyramidal) 
form  (see  section  82)  at  the  toj).  The  laws  of  move- 
ment controlling  the  psychical  mechanism  do  not 
suffer  complete  stagnation  any  more  here  (in  the  social 
organization)  than  in  the  individual.  On  the  con- 
trary, they  secure  reproductions  of  that  which  often 
seemed  to  have  entirely  disappeared,  which  reproduc- 
tions often  work  through  long  series  of  social  combi- 


THE   DESTINY  OP  MAN.  191 

nations.  Such  movements  [of  the  struggling  lower 
masses  in  the  social  whole]  are  often  much  more  ap- 
parent to  the  apperception  of  cultured  people  on  the 
higher  planes  than  is  the  relation  of  the  subordinate 
to  the  higher  concept  masses  in  the  inner  world,  pro- 
Tided  the  individuals  [of  these  lower  masses]  are  not 
warned  and  are  not  sufficiently  watchful  to  guard 
against  audible  and  visible  expressions.  For,  in  case 
the  governing  power  is  harsh  and  violent,  they  [the 
individuals  of  the  lower  orders]  are  accustomed  to  hide 
from  it ;  but  when  in  any  place  the  throne  becomes  a 
bed  of  rest,  then  it  is  with  society  as  it  is  with  [the 
psychological  mechanism  of]  those  individuals  ^vho  ex- 
ercise no  supervision  over  themselves. 

241.  If  observations  of  this  kind  were  completely 
elaborated,  they  would  furnish  a  science  of  politics  [or 
of  sociology]  similar  to  the  empirical  psychology  in  the 
first  part  of  this  book.  After  it  would  follow  an  em- 
pirical summary  of  that  w^hich  may  be  found  in  the 
history  of  nations  as  permanent  contrasted  with  the 
transient.  If  one  does  not  perhaps  prefer  to  consider 
the  different  ranks  and  orders  of  society  as  correspond- 
ing to  the  so-called  faculties,  he  may  take  up  the  three 
separate  powers  of  the  state,  the  legislative,  the  execu- 
tive, and  the  judiciary,  and  these  wdll  take  the  place  of 
those  psychical  faculties  and  afford  suggestive  analo- 
gies. History,  however,  will  deal  with  the  changing 
conditions  of  nations.  Finally,  in  order  to  give  a  com- 
panion picture  to  rational  psychology,  we  must,  after 
the  manner  of  the  science  of  statistics,  first  describe 
the  body  of  the  state — as  a  part  of  the  earth's  sur- 
face— together  with  the  traffic  taking  place  on  it ;  and 
the  reaction  of  this  upon  the  mind  of  tlie  people — i.  e., 


192  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

upon  tlieir  social  sentiments  and  views.  The  discus- 
sion of  the  true  moving  principles  of  the  historical 
events  narrated,  however,  is  to  be  looked  for  only  in 
the  philosophy  of  history. 

24:2.  The  foregoing  remark  reminds  us  that  the 
philosophy  of  history  depends  upon  psychology,  and 
that  it  does  not  presume  to  investigate  the  ways  of 
Providence,  which,  notwithstanding  the  often-heard 
discussions  upon  the  spirit  of  the  age,  still  are  and 
will  remain  obscure.  Here  are  to  be  found  illusions 
similar  to  those  in  the  philosophy  of  nature,  as  for  ex- 
ample when  the  teleological  phenomena  of  nature  are 
confounded  with  biological  phenomena,  as  if  one  in- 
vestigation might  include  both  series  of  phenomena 
in  one  view,  and  even  as  if  the  type  of  a  general 
necessary  course  of  nature  might  be  discovered  by  in- 
ventorying and  comparing  the  phenomena  which  occur 
upon  the  earth  before  our  eyes. 

It  is  certain  that  no  history  of  known  countries 
and  nations  can  ever  furnish  a  world  history  in  the 
true  sense  of  the  word.  Furthermore,  it  is  certain 
that  no  theory  is  able  to  give  a  notion  upon  it  which 
will  have  even  a  shadow  of  truth.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  just  as  certain  that  every  attempt  of  this  kind, 
however  remote,  exhibits  a  foolish  forgetfulness  of  hu- 
man limitations.  Just  as  certainly  ought  the  philoso- 
phy of  history  to  guard  against  smuggling  in  a  sys- 
tematic totality  into  the  different  forms  in  which 
historical  events  and  social  combinations  are  shown, 
as  if  one  were  to  be  the  necessary  complement  of  the 
other,  and  all  united  were  sujiposed  to  make  up  a  com- 
plete exposition  of  the  human  mind.  All  history  up 
to  the  present  time  is  a  beginning  whose  sequel  no  one 


THE  DESTINY   OF  MAN.  I93 

can  foretell,  and  the  present  condition  of  things  is  as 
little  a  condition  of  general  wickedness  as  of  perfection- 
Howe  ver,  as  psychology  keeps  in  view  the  sinking 
and  the  already  sunken  concepts  together  with  their 
combinations,  in  order  not  to  be  taken  by  surprise  at 
the  renewed  rising  of  those  concepts,  so  also  shall  the 
philosophy  of  history  trace  out  the  suppressed  forces 
and  the  germs  of  better  and  worse  hidden  in  them,  so 
that  the  combinations  under  which  the  good  may  rise 
and  the  bad  be  overcome,  may  be  made  clear  ;  for,  in 
order  to  know  what  is  to  be  done  and  what  avoided 
every  age  wishes  information  upon  this  question.  The 
statesman  demands  of  the  philosophy  of  history  that 
which  the  educator  demands  of  psychology.  For  both, 
iron  necessity  which  admits  nothing  else,  and  absolute 
freedom,  which  holds  nothing  firmly,  are  equally  inju- 
rious delusions.  Movable  and  tractable  forces  which, 
however,  under  certain  circumstanc9s  gain  a  definite 
form,  and  gradually  a  lasting  character,  are  the  fun- 
damental hypotheses  of  pedagogy  and  politics.  Such 
forces  have  been  indicated  in  the  foregoing. 

243.  The  conditions  of  mental  health  already  rec- 
ognized, w^hich  change  into  the  health  of  the  citizen 
life,  demand  a  useful  survey  of  that  concerning  which 
the  philosophy  of  history  inquires  in  every  state  for 
every  epoch,  and  for  the  secure  establishment  of  which 
it  has  to  seek.  If  with  mania,  delusion,  dementia,  and 
idiocy,  we  wished  to  compare  the  madness  of  the  de- 
sire for  innovation,  the  delusion  of  party  spirit  not 
curable  through  any  experience,  the  capricious  sep- 
aration of  ranks  or  castes,  communes,  provinces,  from 
the  bond  of  union  of  universal  order  and  unavoidable 
reciprocal  action,  the  slack  and  blind  toleration  of  such 
16 


194  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

miscliievous  perversions — such  a  comparison,  since  it 
can  not  be  accurately  carried  out,  would  indeed  seem 
too  difficult  and  too  little  instructive.  But  certainly 
equanimity,  susceptibility,  concentration,  and  recipro- 
cal determination  of  all  concepts  through  one  another 
find  their  counterpart  in  the  healthy  and  well-ordered 
nation  wherein  each  one  aj^plies  himself  peacefully  to 
his  business,  yet,  upon  the  call  of  a  general  need,  each 
one  obeys  and  acts,  and  all  together  accomplish  what 
is  required ;  and  also  the  whole  receives  the  impulse 
communicated  to  it  from  all  parts.  The  last  point 
may  appear  the  most  difficult  to  secure,  but  certainly 
that  public  life  is  not  sound  which  separates  itself 
from  the  concerns  of  the  smaller  circles  instead  of 
taking  advantage  of  them. 

244.  Men  form  an  ideal  of  society,  similar  to  these 
psychological  features  just  sketched,  oftener,  no  doubt, 
than  they  would  if  under  the  guidance  of  a  practical 
[i.  e.,  moral]  philosophy.  For  that  which  lacks  the  co- 
operation of  the  social  forces,  that  which  collides  with 
the  rest  and  makes  too  much  friction  without  serving 
any  good  purpose,  will  be  easily  observed,  and  con- 
demned as  unfitting. 

However,  as  we  may  imagine  that  which  is  defect- 
ive improved  by  something  better,  so  man  assigns  to 
himself  the  place  which  he  would  like  to  occupy  in  an 
ideal  society.  He  believes  it  his  destiny  to  take  this. 
His  calling  or  vocation  is  an  approximation  to  it,  or 
his  position  and  influence,  which  in  actual  society  are 
as  nearly  as  possible  similar  to  destiny,  serve  the  same 
purpose. 

Here,  where  all  plans  are,  as  much  as  possible, 
united,  lies  the  unit  point  of  his  character,  although 


THE   DESTINY    OF   JMAN.  195 

with  great  differences ;  for  the  concept-masses  which 
concentrate  here  do  not  always  hold  a  secure  control. 
Many  can  only  at  moments  think  of  a  special  elevation 
in  their  condition. 

If  a  character,  however,  is  to  become  quite  mature, 
a  chief  directing  motive  of  the  will,  Avhich  furnishes 
the  trend  for  all  individual  acts  of  willing,  must  exist. 
The  man's  ideal  of  his  place  in  society  is,  in  this  case, 
the  soul,  as  it  were,  of  that  psychical  organism  men^ 
tioned  in  section  238.  The  forms  of  character  differ 
as  greatly  as  do  the  relations  of  the  concept-masses. 

Through  the  above,  the  great  difference  between 
plans  and  maxims  comes  to  view.  Men  who  have  once 
found  their  sphere,  and  have  reached  their  place  ac- 
cording to  their  own  view,  now,  without  demanding 
anything  more,  adjust  themselves  to  it  according  to 
rules  of  prudence,  order,  morality,  right,  duty;  and 
the  punctual  observance  of  these  points  without  ex- 
ception is  the  foundation  of  their  inner  satisfaction. 

Observed  psychologically  as  well  as  morally,  these 
characters  are  very  different  from  those  who  live  ac- 
cording to  dominating  plans,  and  consequently  either 
have  something  to  seek,  or  else  something  to  save,  so 
that  it  may  not  be  entirely  lost.  It  is  true  that  we  do 
not  by  any  means  find  an  entirely  pure  morality  always 
connected  with  punctilious  observances ;  on  the  con- 
trary, the  application  of  the  received  maxims  varies 
greatly.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ideal  of  the  vocation 
and  calling  which  is  the  source  of  all  practical  plans 
is  not  by  any  means  something  indifferent  to  morality, 
but  what  is  held  most  righteous  and  pure  by  society 
may  constitute  the  foundation  of  this  idea.  But,  let 
plans  for  life  be  what  they  will,  they  may  miscarry,  and 


196  RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

whoever  depends  upon  them  alone  may  go  to  the 
bottom ;  consequently,  in  order  to  save  himself,  a  man 
may  come  to  the  place  where  he  will  make  use  of  bad 
means.  At  least  he  may  not  avoid  the  thought  of 
them,  and  will  by  this  to  some  extent  be  disturbed. 
"We  must  admit,  accordingly,  all  other  things  being 
equal,  that  characters  with  dominating  plans  are  the 
more  energetic;  characters  with  dominating  maxims 
are  the  purer. 

2-45.  A  man  can  not  be  blamed,  however,  for  con- 
necting his  plans  according  to  his  idea  of  his  rank  and 
vocation,  and  for  fixing  the  latter  according  to  his  idea 
of  society ;  for,  however  necessary  the  moral  self-con- 
trol of  his  inner  life,  it  is  not  enough  to  form  one's 
chief  occupation.  The  individual,  knowing  himself  as 
earthly  and  fragile,  separated  from  society,  is  in  his 
own  eyes  too  small,  too  narrow.  He  needs  at  least  a 
family,  and  even  this  does  not  fill  his  mental  horizon. 
To  fill  his  place  in  the  social  whole  is  the  highest  aim 
which  he  can  see  clearly;  not  to  see  so  much  as  this 
would  be  narrow-mindedness. 

Even  in  the  strongest  characters,  a  source  of  suffer- 
ing is  to  be  found  in  this  connection.  If  they  wish  by 
means  of  maxims  and  principles  to  stand  morally  firm 
above  all  practical  details  (Fld7ie),  they  must  suffer 
whenever  the  movement  of  society  carries  them  away 
from  their  ideal ;  indeed,  the  suffering  begins  as  soon 
*  as  their  actual  occupation,  instead  of  approaching  the 
ideal,  begins  to  deviate  from  it.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, a  man  looks  higher ;  he  peers  into  the  ob- 
scurest distances,  and  tries  whether  it  be  possible, 
without  becoming  visionary,  to  draw  a  mental  picture 
of  that  distance. 


THE  DESTINY  OF  MAN.  197 

246.  Since  the  soul  is  immortal,  the  career  of  the 
individual  man  can  not  be  confined  to  the  earthly  life. 
Totally  unacquainted  with  the  arrangements  of  Provi- 
dence for  the  remote  future,  we  can,  however,  ask 
what  would  necessarily  occur,  merely  according  to  psy- 
chological laws,  and  without  any  other  influences,  when 
the  bodily  covering  is  dissolved  and  the  dissimilar  ele- 
ments are  scattered. 

First  must  disappear  the  special  influences  which 
the  body  was  fitted  to  exercise  at  the  age  the  man 
has  reached ;  hence  must  disappear  the  obstruction 
through  which  the  oldest  concepts,  which  in  them- 
selves are  the  strongest,  were  limited  in  the  vigor  of 
their  action.  Hence  death  is  rejuvenescence  without 
bringing  back  childhood ;  for  none  of  the  combina- 
tions of  concepts  that  were  gradually  united  can  be 
again  set  free.  Meanwhile,  the  condition  of  the  earth- 
ly life  which  was  last  present,  with  its  cares  and  bur- 
dens, is  reduced  to  its  due  share  of  importance  in  the 
whole  past. 

247.  While  in  general  the  striving  for  equilibrium 
determines  the  movements  of  all  concepts,  yet,  in 
order  to  attain  this  equilibrium,  very  great  revolutions 
among  them  may  be  necessary.  For  it  has  been  shown 
how,  out  of  the  movements,  new  laws  of  movement 
arise  (207),  and  how  the  irregular  accumulation  of  con- 
cepts during  life  (208)  make  necessary  a  subsequent 
rearrangement.  This  new  elaboration  and  rearrange- 
ment after  death  must,  it  is  evident,  differ  greatly  from 
that  which  occurs  during  life  here  in  the  midst  of 
earthly,  sensuous  things.  A  dream  can  have  no  simi- 
larity whatever  to  it ;  for,  although  the  senses  become 
closed  by  sleep,  the  latter  (sleep)  also  depresses  the 


19S  RATIOXAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

concepts  so  that  the  laws  of  their  connection  only  act 
partially.  Through  this  partial  action  the  distorted 
figures  of  the  dream  arise  (210).  After  death,  however, 
wlien  free  from  the  body,  the  soul  must  reach  a  more 
complete  state  of  wakefulness  than  it  ever  did  in  life. 

248.  However,  the  product  which  concepts  striving 
after  equilibrium  gradually  create  can  not  be  quite 
the  same  in  any  two  human  souls,  since  all  differences 
of  the  earthly  existence  must  exert  an  influence  upon 
them.  The  concepts  of  the  child  that  has  died  young 
would  very  soon  approach  their  general  equilibrium, 
and  so  also  the  thoughts  of  the  man  of  peaceful  con- 
science, who  is  simple  in  his  actions  and  desires,  are 
not  destined  to  any  great  change.  On  the  contrary, 
no  restless,  far-reaching  mind,  fettered  by  the  world 
and  suddenly  torn  therefrom,  can  attain  the  stillness 
of  eternity  otherwise  than  by  a  passage  through  violent 
transformations  which,  owing  to  entirely  changed  con- 
ditions, may  be  still  more  stormy  and  painful  than 
those  by  which  the  passionate  man  is  so  often  tor- 
mented in  this  world. 

249.  Finally,  however,  after  the  lapse,  longer  or 
shorter,  of  what  we  call  hours,  days,  and  years,  for 
every  soul,  however  deep  and  confused  its  disorder 
may  be,  such  a  movement  of  concepts  must  take  place 
as  will  approach  more  and  more  gently,  and  by  less 
and  less  intervals,  to  the  general  equilibrium,  yet  with- 
out ever  entirely  reaching  it. 

Finally,  for  the  dying  man,  time  becomes  extinct ; 
yet  even  this  takes  place  in  a  manner  that  implies  time. 
Eternal  life  is  an  infinitely  gentle  fluctuation  of  con- 
cepts, an  exceedingly  faint  trace  of  that  which  we  call 
life. 


THE  DESTINY  OF  MAN.  I99 

250.  Without  agitation,  but  in  a  state  of  the  clear- 
est wakefulness,  the  soul  knows  and  feels  the  nobility 
or  want  of  nobility  of  its  former  career  upon  earth, 
which  it  carries  within  itself  as  the  imperishable  char- 
acter given  to  its  Ego,  and  for  that  reason  as  an  insep- 
arable good  or  evil ;  and  it  is  incapable  even  of  de- 
siring or  even  of  wishing  that  its  state  or  condition 
should  be  otherwise  than  it  is. 

Yet  here  the  fact  must  not  be  overlooked  that  in 
these  disordered  souls,  after  the  great  inner  revolu- 
tions which  ensue  upon  death,  it  is  impossible  that  all 
the  misery  which  they  had  brought  together  while 
they  existed  in  body  should  continue  to  endure.  Ex- 
actly the  opposite.  The  objects  of  desire  and  the 
brief  period  of  endazzlement  by  the  same,  together 
with  the  discord  in  the  bodily  conditions  brought 
about  through  violent  passions,  all  this  has  long  ago 
disappeared;  the  child-like  peace  has  not  entirely, 
though  it  has  in  part,  returned,  and  has  soothed  the 
w^ounded  feelings,  and  healed  the  madness  of  passion. 
As  the  delusion  weakens,  the  truth  comes  forward. 
More  loudly  and  clearly  the  conscience  speaks  ;  finally, 
it  speaks  alone :  the  sinner  is  converted,  and  remorse 
loses  its  sting. 

251.  Providence  has  permitted  that  very  different 
destinies  be  prepared  for  men  in  the  world.  To  us 
the  difference  seems  great  and  important,  a  few  years 
after  death  it  may  be  very  much  lessened.  The  sim- 
ple sense-perceptions,  this  first  material  of  the  mental 
existence,  are  for  all  persons  the  same,  and,  even  in 
the  short  life  before  the  power  of  speech  is  gained,  the 
child,  by  reason  of  its  great  susceptibility,  receives  a 
considerable   number   of   tliem.     Many  combinations 


200  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

of  this  raw  material  which  the  earthly  life  had  not  se- 
cured through  its  experience  will  be  completed  in  the 
future,  not  to  create  new  knowledge  (at  least  this 
might  be  difficult  to  indicate),  but  to  produce  a  peaceful 
well-being.  Now,  if  something  of  the  difference  that 
exists  in  the  earthly  career  be  continued  into  eternity 
— a  difference  distinguishing  good  men  from  bad — then 
the  life  here  may  be  for  all  full  of  purpose,  and  every 
individual,  considered  for  himself  alone,  without  any 
comparison  with  others,  justifies  the  act  of  Providence 
which  caused  him  to  enter  upon  an  earthly  existence. 
252.  Thus  appears  the  remote  future,  seen  from 
the  standpoint  of  science,  whose  foundation  is  nothing 
but  common  human  experience.  Upon  this  nothing 
can  be  positively  asserted.  Probably  everything  is  oth- 
erwise arranged  because  some  kind  of  divine  govern- 
ment is  probable ;  in  the  foregoing  statement,  how- 
ever, only  that  has  been  suggested  which,  without  any 
fore-ordination,  might  ensue  of  itself.  If  we  wish  to 
investigate  this  last  question  more  closely,  the  possi- 
bility of  such  an  investigation  will  improve  with  the 
progress  of  the  statics  and  mechanics  of  the  mind  ; 
but,  as  all  metaphysics  arise  from  experience,  and  as 
no  experience  without  metaphysics  furnishes  a  genu- 
ine scientific  knowledge,  so  on  the  other  hand  meta- 
physics is  not  able  to  take  a  single  step  beyond  the 
limits  at  which  the  necessary  development  of  the  ideas 
of  experience  ends. 


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2  vols.     Illustrated.     Cloth,  $5.00. 

INSECTIVOROUS    PLANTS.     12mo.     Cloth,  $2.00. 

MOVEMENTS    AND    HABITS   OF   CLIMBING   PLANTS. 

With  Illustrations.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.25. 

THE  VARIOUS  CONTRIVANCES  BY  WHICH  ORCHIDS 
ARE  FERTILIZED  BY  INSECTS.     Revised  edition,  with 

Illustrations.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.75. 

THE  EFFECTS  OF  CROSS  AND  SELF  FERTILIZA- 
TION    IN     THE     VEGETABLE     KINGDOM.      12mo. 

Cloth,  $2.00. 

DIFFERENT  FORMS  OF  FLOWERS  ON  PLANTS  OF 
THE    SAME    SPECIES.      With  Illustrations.     12mo.     Cloth, 

$1.50. 

THE  POWER  OF  MOVEMENT  IN  PLANTS.  By  Charles 
Darwin,  LL.  D.,  F.  R.  S.,  assisted  by  Francis  Darwin.  With 
Illustrations.     12mo.     Cloth,  $2.00. 

THE  FORMATION  OF  VEGETABLE  MOULD  THROUGH 
THE  ACTION  OF  WORMS.  With  Observations  on  their 
Habits.     With  Illustrations.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.50. 


New  York:  D.  APPLETO:!  &  CO.,  72  Fifth  Avenue. 


D,    APPLETON   &    CO.'S   PUBLICATIONS. 


Professor  JOSEPH    LE   CONTE'S   WORKS. 

EVOLUTION  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  RELIGIOUS 
THOUGHT.  By  Joseph  Le  Conte,  LL.  D.,  Professor  of  Geology 
and  Natural  History  in  the  University  of  California.  With  numer= 
ous  Illustrations.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.50. 

"  Much,  very  much  has  been  written,  especially  on  the  nature  and  the  evi- 
dences of  evolution,  but  the  literature  is  so  voluminous,  much  of  it  so  fragment- 
ary, and  most  of  it  so  technical,  tl'at  even  very  intelligent  persons  have  still  very 
vague  ideas  on  the  subject.  I  have  attempted  to  give  (1)  a  very  concise  account 
of  what  we  mean  by  evolution,  (2)  an  outline  of  the  evidences  of  its  truth  drawn 
from  many  different  sources,  and  (,8)  its  relation  to  fundamental  religious  beliefs." 
—Extract  from  Preface . 

ELEMENTS  OF  GEOLOGY.  A  Text-book  for  Colleges  and  for 
the  General  Reader.  By  Joseph  Le  Conte,  LL.D.  With  upward 
of  900  Illustrations.    New  and  enlarged  edition.    8vo.    Cloth,  $4.00. 

"Besides  preparing  a  comprehensive  text-book,  suited  to  present  demands, 
Professor  Le  Conte  has  given  us  a  volume  of  great  value  as  an  exposition  of  the 
Bubject,  thoroughly  up  to  date.  The  examples  and  applications  of  the  work  are 
almost  entirely  derived  from  this  country,  so  that  it  may  be  properly  considered 
an  American  geology.  We  can  commend  this  work  without  qualification  to  all 
who  desire  an  intelligent  acquaintance  with  geological  science,  as  fresh,  lucid, 
full,  authentic,  the  result  of  devoted  study  and  of  long  experience  in  teaching." 
—Popular  Science  Monthly. 

RELIGION  AND  SCIENCE.  A  Series  of  Sunday  Lectures  on  the 
Relation  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion,  or  the  Truths  revealed 
in  Nature  and  Scripture.  By  Joseph  Le  Conte,  LL.  D.  12mo. 
Cloth,  $1.50. 

"  "We  commend  the  book  cordially  to  the  regard  of  all  who  are  interested  in 
whatever  pertains  to  the  discussion  of  these  grave  questions,  and  especially  to 
those  who  desire  to  examine  closely  the  strong  foundations  on  which  the  Chris- 
tian faith  is  reared."— ^osi^Oft  Journal. 


SIGHT  :  An  Exposition  of  the  Principles  of  Monocular  and  Binocular 
Vision,  By  Joseph  Le  Conte,  LL,  D.  With  Illustrations.  12mo. 
Cloth,  $1.50. 

"Professor  Le  Conte  has  long  been  known  as  an  original  investigator  in  this 
department  r  all  that  he  gives  us  is  treated  with  a  master-hand.  It  is  pleasant  to 
find  an  American  book  that  can  rank  with  the  very  best  of  foreign  books  on  this 
subject."— 7%e  Nation. 


New  York:  D.  APPLETON  &  CO.,  72  Fifth  Avenue. 


University  of 
Connecticut 

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